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The initial motivating question for this thesis is what the standard of rigour in modern
mathematics amounts to: what makes a proof rigorous, or fail to be rigorous? How is
this judged? A new account of rigour is put forward, aiming to go some way to answering
these questions. Some benefits of the norm of rigour on this account are discussed. The
account is contrasted with other remarks that have been made about mathematical proof
and its workings, and is tested and illustrated by considering a case study discussed in
the literature.
On the view put forward here one can obtain a manner of informal, rigorous mat-
hematics founded on any of a variety of proof systems. The latter part of the thesis is
concerned with the question of how we should decide which of these competing proof
systems we should base our mathematics on: i.e., the question of which proof system
we should take as a foundation for our mathematics. A novel answer to this question
is proposed, in which the key property we should require of a proof system is that for
as many different kinds of structures as possible, when the proof system allows a gene-
ralization about that kind of structure to be proved, the generalization actually holds
of all real examples of that kind of structure which exist. This is the requirement of
soundness of the proof system (for each kind of structure). It is argued that the best
way to establish the soundness of a proof system may be by giving an interpretation of
its axioms on which they are established as true. As preparation for this discussion, the
thesis first investigates the logical and conceptual basis of various arithmetic concepts,
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A mathematical proof of a proposition is often taken to be amongst the best kinds of
evidence for it, but is this appropriate? What can be said about the standard of proof
in mathematics – what is it that makes a given argument valid or not? Can we give
reasons why this is a good standard of evidence? The first part of this thesis addresses
these questions, at least for rigorous proof – the standard of valid proof applied in
much of modern mathematics. Chapter I gives a new account of mathematical rigour,
building on the work of Burgess (2015). Some benefits of rigour on this account are
discussed: in particular, all rigorous arguments are formalizable in principle, and one has
a reliable mechanism for resolving disputes between mathematicians about the validity
of arguments.
Many authors object to the kind of account of rigour put forward in chapter I, in
which there is a link between rigour and formalizability. Some objections are considered
in chapter I, but a remaining concern that many have expressed is that informal proofs
may consist of a kind of irreducibly high level reasoning, strongly resistant to formaliza-
tion, requiring radically new ideas perhaps to be introduced before it can be formalized.
Though a number of authors have expressed a concern along these lines, rarely do they
put forward substantial examples of arguments that exhibit the property they claim.
An exception is an argument from knot theory known as Alexander’s lemma (Alexander
1923), which was recounted by Field’s medallist Vaughan Jones in a philosophical piece
(Jones 1998) in which he claims that it is an easy result that would be very difficult to
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formalize. De Toffoli and Giardino (2016) use the argument as the basis of a case study
in which they defend a rather different view of proof to that in chapter I, with a number
of their claims reiterated by Larvor (2019).
Clearing up these various claims about Alexander’s lemma is the primary purpose of
chapters II and III. There are now multiple different versions of the argument in play:
Alexander’s original, which works with polygonal knots, Jones’s retelling which works
with smooth knots, and De Toffoli and Giardino’s version, which combines aspects of
both. Each merits a different response. Chapter II argues that despite De Toffoli and
Giardino’s claims, Alexander’s original argument is perfectly rigorous by the normal
standard, as enunciated in chapter I; all the properties they attribute to it which clash
with this standard are actually only found in their retelling of the argument, rather
than the original, and are inherited from Jones’s version of the argument, a consequence
of them combining these two versions of the arguments together. Noting these points
removes the basis for the view of proof that De Toffoli and Giardino advocate, and
nullifies their objections to the kind of view of proof seen in chapter I. The remaining
issue is the status of Jones’s version of the argument. Chapter III argues that though the
argument as he tells it would indeed be very hard to formalize, this is simply because
it is deeply flawed from a rigorous point of view, as rigour is normally understood.
The argument for this illustrates the closeness of the view of rigour given in chapter I to
standard features of the concept. It is also an opportunity to address the question of how
pictorial arguments fit into the picture given in chapter I; many authors feel that pictorial
arguments may give good examples of valid arguments that resist formalization, and
Jones and De Toffoli and Giardino both emphasise the visual features of their versions
of Alexander’s lemma. Chapter III uses Jones’s version of the argument to argue for a
general characterization of what rigour requires of pictorial arguments, expanding on the
work of Larvor (ibid.), and argues that this defuses the threat that pictorial arguments
had been thought to pose to a link between rigour and formalizability.
2
The account of rigour in chapter I uses the current practice of mathematics as based
on ZFC as its focus, but one could found one’s rigorous mathematics on any of a variety
of proof systems, leading to different options for what reasoning would be available.
Thus the question of which proof system we should use as a basis arises: this is the
question of which foundation we should choose for our mathematics. The latter part of
the thesis is ultimately concerned with this question, with chapter VI arguing that when
considering whether a given proof system could be used as a foundation for mathematics,
the key property we should require for it is that it be sound for as many different
kinds of mathematical structures as possible: i.e., that for as many different kinds of
mathematical structures as possible, when a generalization about that kind of structure
is derivable in the proof system, that generalization actually holds of all real examples
of that kind of structure which exist.
It is argued that many obvious routes to try to establish the soundness of a proof
system will not work, and that in fact, the best route we have to establishing the sound-
ness of a general proof system is via the iterative conception of set, or the limitation
of size conception: if one of these accounts – or a combination, or some other account
– justifies the axioms of set theory, then we can argue that set theory is sound, and
thus a potential foundation. Thus we have a case for veritism, being defined here (in the
context of philosophy of mathematics) as the view that it matters whether the principles
we use in mathematics have some subject matter they are true of. ETCS and homotopy
type theory may then have their soundness at least partially justified by giving an inter-
pretation of them in set theory, and proving a relative soundness result. These findings
are used to argue against the view of set theory and extrinsic evidence put forward by
Maddy (2011).
Key to the discussion of soundness is the ability to give characterizations of mathe-
matical structures that have real world content, that are the kind of thing that can be
satisfied or fail to be satisfied by real world objects (as opposed to being purely formal
3
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definitions); and to state real properties that such structures may have. Our ability to
do these things is dependent on what logical resources we take there to be available,
logic being the way we model our language’s ability to state definitions and properties.
As preparation for the discussion in chapter VI, the two short chapters chapters IV
and V discuss the conceptual and logical resources underlying various arithmetic con-
cepts. Chapter IV considers what is required to define functions by primitive recursion,
arguing that a logical operator called the double ancestral captures what is conceptually
required by this ability in a satisfying way. As an incidental application, this is used to
strengthen an argument of Smith (2008) for Isaacson’s thesis. Then chapter V argues
that combining the ancestral and double ancestral operators with plural logic allows a
natural way to define the concepts of finiteness and equinumerosity for finite pluralities,
as well as the operations of addition and multiplication for finite pluralities. These are





1 Questions about proof
What’s going on in mathematical proofs? How do they establish the truth of their
conclusions? By proof I mean the kind of proof mathematicians actually write and
exchange with each other and accept as valid.
One way to attempt to understand proof is via derivations, the formal objects that
logicians use to model deduction. Gentzen intended his system of natural deduction to
be
a formalism that reflects as accurately as possible the actual logical reasoning
involved in mathematical proofs (Gentzen 1969, p. 74)
and he described its derivations as having
[a] close affinity to actual reasoning (ibid., p. 80).
One can read this as meaning that all valid mathematical inferences should be instances
of the logical rules of natural deduction, or closely related to them.1 If mathematicians
1This is apparently the reading of Goethe and Friend (2010, pp. 274–275). It is also possible that
Gentzen merely intended that the logical substructure of proofs should be expressible in natural deduction
– aspects such as introducing and eliminating premises, moving from a statement about an arbitrary x
to a statement about all x, and so on.
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did actually explicitly work according to certain fixed formal rules, then proof would be
unmysterious: understanding proof would just come down to understanding the relevant
formal rules. However as many authors point out, in reality mathematical proofs do not
proceed according to any list of rules that one could specify in advance.2 There is far
too much variety of inferences for that, and new proofs will often contain inferences that
are somewhat (or completely) novel.
More plausible than a naive rules based view of proof is one on which the correctness
of a proof consists in its being formalizable – translatable into a derivation according to
some given system of formal rules. What exactly this description amounts to will depend
on what notion of translation is employed (and on the underlying system of formal
rules). Though historically often implicitly assumed by philosophers of mathematics
to be correct, numerous authors have recently objected to this view. There have thus
been many calls to develop a new, more plausible account of mathematical proof and its
epistemology.3
This chapter aims to provide such an account, or at least an outline of it – found
largely in sections I.3 and I.4. The account is not actually of proof in general, but
only of rigorous proof, rigour being the standard of acceptable proof in much of modern
mathematics. I do not view this as a significant limitation. Indeed I argue in section I.2
that questions like “what is mathematical proof?”, asked in full generality, are unlikely
to receive a satisfying answer: there is no univocal notion of proof in mathematics, or
at least not one we can expect to obtain a substantial philosophical analysis of. The
account of rigorous proof given here is not the last word on the subject, and I note places
where it could be expanded on. In chapter II and chapter III case studies are used to
test the account and contrast it with alternatives.
2See for instance Tragesser (1992), Celluci (2009), Leitgeb (2009), Goethe and Friend (2010), and
Larvor (2012).
3As illustrations of the objections, and the calls for improvement, see for instance Rav (1999; 2007),
Celluci (2009), Detlefsen (2009), Leitgeb (2009), Pelc (2009), Goethe and Friend (2010), Antonutti
Marfori (2010), Larvor (2012), Weir (2016), De Toffoli and Giardino (2016), and Larvor (2019).
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The account put forward here takes a somewhat novel approach: instead of focusing
exclusively on proofs, considering also the ability of mathematicians to produce and
recognize valid inferences. Where does this ability to recognize validity come from?
What can be said about it? Answering these questions is one way to gain insight into
what is going on in proofs themselves - how they justify their conclusions.
In this chapter the resulting account is used to address two questions about proof
that have been raised in the literature. The first is that of how mathematicians are so
able to generate agreement about the validity of proofs. This phenomenon – that if a
mathematician thinks a proof is valid, they can generally convince others, or be convinced
themselves of a flaw in it – has been noted by various authors, including Azzouni (2004,
pp. 83–84) and Antonutti Marfori (2010, pp. 267, 270–271). Explaining it is one of
the major motivations for the “derivation–indicator” view of proof that Azzouni (2004)
puts forward. Azzouni’s analysis of proof has met with controversy, with for instance
Tanswell (2015) raising what appear to be valid criticisms. Using the account of rigour
put forward here, in section I.5 I give an explanation of this agreement about validity
that aims to be simpler and more plausible than Azzouni’s.
The second question is that of whether rigorous proofs are necessarily formalizable.
Many authors answer this question in the negative, for a variety of different reasons,
some of which are considered here. One cannot properly discuss formalizability without
discussing what formal system one is targeting, and the first objection to formalizability
considered is the claim that mathematicians should really be regarded as working in
naive set theory, with its unrestricted comprehension scheme. This has been claimed
for instance by Jones (1998) and Leitgeb (2009). If correct this would render the for-
malizability claim empty of interest, since set theory with unrestricted comprehension is
inconsistent and so any argument is trivially formalizable in it (with every inference jus-
tified by your favourite set theoretic paradox). This position is evaluated and dismissed
in section I.6.
7
CHAPTER I. UNDERSTANDING RIGOUR
Next, the family of worries stemming from Rav (1999) is considered. He argues that
when filling in intermediate steps in an argument, we have no reason to believe the
process will necessarily terminate. This worry is reiterated by Weir (2016), who uses it
as motivation for a version of formalism which can handle infinitary proofs. Pelc (2009)
raises a weaker version of the worry, arguing that the process of filling in intermediate
steps will terminate in principle, but that we have no reason to believe it will terminate
in a proof of feasible length, say involving less than 10120 steps. In section I.7 a response
to Rav’s worry is put forward, and a possible response to Pelc’s worry also sketched.
A third kind of worry about formalizability asks how, if part of our norm for validity is
that arguments they be formalizable, are mathematicians so good at judging this? After
all, mathematicians generally seem to be reliable at judging validity, with arguments
accepted as valid generally staying that way, and agreement about validity often quickly
reached (as noted above). If part of our norm for validity is that proofs be formalizable,
there is a mystery about how mathematicians are so good at judging this – since most
mathematicians do not know the axioms of set theory, are unfamiliar with the rules of
logic, have never used a proof assistant, and in general have no real experience of or
interest in the process of formalization. This is also addressed in section I.7.
These are not all the worries about formalizability that have been raised. Anot-
her prominent family of worries maintains that a proof may involve irreducibly high
level reasoning – reasoning that is very difficult to formalize, that may require radically
new ideas for its formalization, that may not be “the same argument” when formalized
(Rav 1999; 2007; Celluci 2009; Leitgeb 2009; Goethe and Friend 2010; Larvor 2012).
Chapters II and III consider in detail one strain of this kind of thought.
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2 Initial remarks on rigour
The main account of rigour is found in sections I.3 and I.4 and, but first there are some
preliminary remarks worth making. To begin with, we will see some examples of non
rigorous mathematics; this helps illustrate the distinctive nature of mathematical rigour,
and is also used to argue against the idea that there is a unified notion of “proof” in
mathematics that is worth conceptually analyzing. Indeed one of the intended lessons of
this chapter is that it is rigorous proof, not proof in general, which is the philosophically
interesting concept. The latter part of this section summarizes the discussion of rigour
given by Burgess (2015), which makes a number of valid, significant points, but which
does not address the questions discussed in section I.1 that this chapter attempts to
answer.
First, the examples of non rigorous mathematics. One good example consists of
manipulations involving infinitesimals in the 17th and 18th centuries, which – before the
introduction of limits into analysis – were not generally rigorous. For a toy example of
how they often worked, we can determine the derivative of the function x 7→ x2. If we
let dx be small, then we have
(x+ dx)2 − x2
dx
= x






and then since dx is small we discard it, obtaining 2x as the derivative of x 7→ x2
at x. Arguments along these lines (and more complicated versions) were carried out
by various authors, with Fermat perhaps being the first to give this particular kind of
calculation (Kline 1990b, pp. 344–345). These methods met with criticism however,
as it was not clear what the status of “small” quantities such as dx was, or what was
allowed when manipulating them. Indeed if dx is small but non zero then the result
is only approximate; for the result to be exact, we require that 2x + dx = 2x, but
then we obtain by subtraction that dx = 0 and so we cannot divide by dx to begin with.
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Rolle pointed this out (Mancosu 1989, pp. 230–231), followed more famously by Berkeley
who complained that infinitesimals appeared to be the “ghosts of departed quantities”
(Berkeley 1999, pp. 80–81).
Other common methods in the 17th and 18th centuries also lacked rigour. Often
arguments proceeded by assuming that what held for the finite also held for the infinite,
with infinite series being manipulated as though they were finite sums, without worrying









































+ . . .
despite knowing that the sum 1 + 12 +
1
3 + . . . is infinite (Kline 1990b, p. 443).
4 As
illustrated by many further examples in Kline (ibid., Chapter 20), infinite series were
freely manipulated in this period without worrying about convergence, despite these
methods sometimes leading to false or contradictory conclusions.
Arguments like these gradually came to be seen as unacceptable. In the 19th century
both the calculus and the study of infinite series were rephrased in terms of the concept of
limit, putting them on a firm footing (Kline 1990a, Chapter 40). Infinitesimals were then
largely eschewed in analysis until Robinson demonstrated how one could in fact reason
rigorously about them, via the logical concept of a non standard model (Robinson 1996).
Recent work has shown how the inconsistency in arguments like the above involving
infinitesimals can be embraced and utilized, in a suitable paraconsistent logic (see for
instance Brown and Priest 2004, and Sweeney 2014).
Other ways of reasoning formerly regarded as valid also came to be shunned, such
























= 1 − 1
n+ 1
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as appeals to intuition. Proofs were demanded of even very intuitive statements, with
the Jordan curve theorem being a famous example. This states that if φ : S1 → R2 is
continuous and injective then R \ φ(S1) consists of exactly two connected components,
one of which is bounded and the other unbounded, and φ(S1) is the boundary of each
component. If one explained all the relevant terms – “continuous”, “injective”, “boun-
ded” and so on – to a layman, they would likely state that this was simply immediate,
and one might well get the same reaction from some undergraduates (particularly those
with a preference for applied mathematics). It takes some effort to imagine a curve φ
in such a way that the conclusion seems anything but obvious. Nonetheless mathemati-
cians were not satisfied with this, and providing a rigorous proof turned out to be very
difficult. Bolzano had already noted that this fact required proof (Coulston 1970, p.274)
and this proof was only provided by Jordan (published in Jordan 1887) more than 30
years after Bolzano’s death.5
There are a number of lessons to be drawn from these examples. Firstly, they can
be used to assess the adequacy of an account of rigour, such as that given in sections I.3
and I.4 – it needs to be able to explain why they are not considered rigorous. Secondly,
such examples illustrate that an argument does not have to be rigorous to be reliable, or
explanatory, or valuable. Arguments involving infinitesimals in the 18th century could
plausibly be all three (such as the differentiation example above), as could manipula-
tions of infinite series. Much of modern non rigorous physics and engineering is also
presumably reliable, explanatory and valuable. Nonetheless rigour does bring benefits,
some of which will be discussed in this chapter.
These examples also illustrate the broadness of the notion of mathematical proof
in times past. This, I believe, tells against the desire to seek a philosophical account
of the general notion of proof – to discover what proof in general “really is”, or where
5Some controversy followed Jordan’s proof, with Veblen (1905) claiming it was flawed, and claiming
to give the first rigorous proof. However Hales (2007) argues that Jordan’s proof was basically valid,
though perhaps not as polished as it could be.
11
CHAPTER I. UNDERSTANDING RIGOUR
its boundaries are drawn. Indeed in the above examples, reasoning of various kinds all
distinct from the usual mathematical paradigm of deduction is seen. To make arguments
involving infinitesimals one postulates a new manner of calculation, in which a quantity
is treated at one stage as non zero, and later as small enough that it can be neglected.
This can otherwise be viewed as the postulation of a new kind of entity with these
apparently odd properties. Either way, it is essentially a form of abductive reasoning:
reasoning of a kind which is not justified by anything that has gone before, but instead
by its immense success in solving all manner of differential problems. It is not so different
to the postulation of new principles or entities in physics, except that it is confirmed
by mathematical applications and deductions, rather than by experiments. Then the
manipulation of infinite series as though they were finite is essentially a case of argument
by analogy, again backed up by its apparent success in solving problems. Finally we have
appeals to intuition, delivering conclusions that one finds very hard to doubt because of
one’s intuitive grasp of the concepts involved – not so different from the intuition that
philosophical zombies could exist, or that nothing can cause itself.
I do not think there is much to be gained by seeking to discover what these disparate
forms of reasoning “have in common”. They are all taken to justify high credence in their
conclusions, and they all concern abstract, mathematical subject matter, but beyond
that I am not sure there is much to be said. Certainly one could conduct a fruitful
investigation into abductive reasoning, or intuition as a form of evidence, but there is
unlikely to be much distinctive to say about either in the context of mathematical proof
that does not apply to more general contexts. There is also not much I think to say about
why such methods were accepted, beyond that they were felt to be reliable. The best
assessment of proof in general may just be that there are different kinds of permissible
actions that one may carry out, as Larvor (2012) puts it. It is rigorous proof which
I think is more deserving of philosophical attention: this is where the ideal of flawless
deduction that Euclid aspired to takes its purest form (Burgess 2015, pp. 36–38), and
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where mathematical reasoning is found at its most distinctive, and epistemologically
robust.
The variety of kinds of inference allowed in proofs historically makes it clear that it
is only for rigorous mathematics that one could defend the formalizability of arguments.
For instance what would a formal system for arguments like Bernoulli’s, involving ma-
nipulation of divergent series, look like? Would it formalize analogies between the finite
and the infinite? Similarly there is no reason to think that irreducibly intuitive reasoning
would be formalizable. That it is only for rigorous mathematics that one could defend
formalizability is a point that has perhaps not always been clearly grasped by objectors.
Indeed in chapter III I analyze a knot theoretic proof sketch which has been claimed to
be unformalizable (Jones 1998; De Toffoli and Giardino 2016), and argue that in fact
the argument is far from rigorous, and this is the reason it fails to be formalizable.
Given the major differences between the historical standard of proof and what mo-
dern rigour permits, an obvious question is how and why the shift to rigour came about.
Considering that would take us too far afield, but it is one topic which Burgess discusses
(Burgess 2015, Chapter 1) in his account of rigour, to which we now turn. Burgess is
mainly concerned with implications of the norm of rigour for the debate over structu-
ralism, and does not give explicit arguments concerning the kinds of questions raised in
section I.1 – the epistemology of proof, the ability of mathematicians to reach agreement
about the validity of proofs, the issue of formalizability and so on. Nonetheless some
observations he makes are worth highlighting.
Burgess emphasises that any piece of rigorous mathematics takes place in a context
of existing results and definitions which can be appealed to (ibid., pp. 149–158). One
can then extend the boundaries of knowledge with a new argument, stringing together
definitions and proofs of propositions, appealing to existing results and using existing
concepts where needed. Burgess also emphasises that often it does not matter whether
a fact one is appealing to is a basic principle or a consequence thereof, or how concepts
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used were actually defined as long as the properties one needs of them do hold. This is
the basis of his critique of structuralism as a metaphysical position.6
Both aspects of the rigorous process – definitions, and proofs of propositions – merit
some attention. Burgess notes that when introducing a new concept, one is required a
clear definition in terms of existing ones (Burgess 2015, p. 7). This definition does not
have to be completely formal – for instance one can state that a vector space is a set
equipped with an abelian group structure and a scalar multiplication operation, without
specifying exactly how this is coded set theoretically: as a triple (V,+, ·), or ((V,+), ·),
or as (+, ·), or in some other way. It just needs to be clear that the definition could be
made completely precise in such a way that all uses made of the concept would be valid.
Burgess also discusses what the standard of rigour requires for proofs of propositions.
He considers various possibilities, and ultimately comes to the (tentative) conclusion
that:
What rigor requires is that each new result should be obtained from earlier
results by presenting enough deductive steps to produce conviction that a
full breakdown into obvious deductive steps would in principle be possible
(ibid., p. 97)
This I think is basically right. However there is more to say before this can be brought
to bear on the issues discussed in section I.1. If we are interested in the epistemology
of proof, then this is only a sketch rather than a full account. How is this conviction
generated? How is it reliable? If mathematicians are judging formalizability in principle
(which is roughly what “full breakdown into obvious deductive steps” might amount
to), how are they able to judge this? As discussed in section I.1, most mathematicians
6He argues that exactly how the concepts one uses were defined is often irrelevant, as all one will
need are certain derived properties. Thus one need not care about how things were defined when doing
mathematics. It is this irrelevance of definitions that Burgess argues has been mistaken by structuralists
for a metaphysical truth about the nature of mathematical structures, with structuralists hoping to infer
for instance that mathematical objects have only general structural properties (Burgess 2015, Chapter
3).
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have no experience of or interest in formalization, after all. There is also the question
of how mathematicians are so good at resolving disputes, discussed in section I.1, which
we could hope to answer. Addressing these issues is the purpose of the remainder of the
chapter.
3 A rigorous eduction
As mentioned in section I.1, the account of rigorous proof put forward here uses a
somewhat novel approach: to try to understand the skill of mathematicians in judging
and producing rigorous proofs by thinking about how this skill is acquired. For this
we will start at the beginning. There are many different universities around the world
that teach rigorous mathematics, and they may teach it in somewhat different ways,
but there are some common features that can be pointed to. Students are generally
taught the basics of rigorous proof by seeing and working through examples, paired with
descriptions of how and why the reasoning involved works. An example of a basic early
result students might see is displayed in fig. I.1.
Figure I.1: Bartle and Sherbert (2000, p. 26) (proof of (c) is omitted)
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
This demonstrates a fact commonly assumed without question: that the square
of a non zero real is positive. Probably the only part of the argument that requires
explanation is the symbol P, which denotes the set of (strictly) positive real numbers.
Axioms concerning this set have been stated a few pages previously. The relevant axioms
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are that:
(i) For any a ∈ R, either a ∈ P or (−a) ∈ P or a = 0, with exactly one of these
holding.
(ii) If a, b ∈ P then a · b ∈ P.
From these the above proof proceeds straightforwardly, arguing by cases.
The main thing to note about this proof is just how incredibly detailed it is. Virtually
all of the logical structure of the argument is right there on the page. There are places
where one could be even more explicit, in particular in the assertion that a2 = (−a)(−a),
and indeed this follows immediately from the facts that 1 = (−1)(−1) and that (−a) =
(−1)a, which are both given as exercises (Bartle and Sherbert 2000, p. 29). Nonetheless
the proof is very close to the formal level and would be no challenge to formalize.
We can call this level of very great detail that proofs can be carried out at the “week
2 level of detail”. Of course students may not see this particular argument in week 2,
or at all; it is just a convenient name. We are not defining the “week 2 level of detail”
here in terms of what is comprehensible to certain students– instead we give examples of
basic arguments at this level of incredible detail, such as the above and also for instance
basic number theoretic results (Taylor and Garnier 2014, Theorem 6.2; Silverman 2012,
Lemma 7.1) or basic results from linear algebra (Axler 1997, Propositions 1.1–1.6).
As students learn the subject they won’t just be passively reading proofs like this.
They will also typically (and importantly) be proving these kinds of basic facts themsel-
ves, demonstrating them with arguments written out at this very explicit level of detail.
The hope is that by doing this they will gain what we can call “proficiency at week 2
detail”, the ability to prove simple facts like this one by chaining together these kinds
of very basic steps.
A bit more will be said about how this basic level of proficiency is gained later in
this section. For now we proceed onwards through the curriculum. As time passes the
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arguments the students are presented with will gradually get faster, and have fewer of
the details filled in. Some time later – perhaps a few months, or a term – they may
encounter an argument like that in fig. I.2.
Figure I.2: Bartle and Sherbert (2000, p. 168)
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
This theorem presents another fundamental fact: that if a function on an interval
has a “relative extremum” – a local maximum or a local minimum – at an interior point,
and is differentiable there, then the derivative must be zero. This is clear by visualizing
the situation, but we are doing rigorous mathematics so are not satisfied with that, and
we demand a proof.
The argument given is again fairly detailed, but is slightly less explicit than the
previous example: not all the details are there. It only actually covers the case where
f ′(c) > 0, showing that this cannot happen, and the task of showing that f ′(c) < 0
cannot occur is left to the reader. If the reader has understood the argument they should
have no problem seeing how this would go, or writing it out. This aspect of the proof is
fundamental to the way we learn rigorous mathematics. Students will hopefully not be
treating proofs like the deliverances of some oracle: lecturers will hopefully encourage
them to engage with the proofs, to see if they could have proved the results themselves,
to see if they can prove similar results by similar methods, and to see if they can fill in
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any parts where the proof is sketchy, and check any parts of the proof they are not sure
about in more detail.
The course did not start by teaching students the week 2 level of detail material just
to pad the schedule. The hope is that now when they meet an argument like this which
is a little bit faster, strung together out of inferences that are simple but not necessarily
completely basic, they can check any inference they are not sure of by proving it in
more detail, using their “proficiency at week 2 detail” that they have hopefully already
attained. Thus they can sharpen their judgement of which simple (but not completely
basic) inferences are valid, checking such inference whenever necessary by seeing if they
can be proved.
Students won’t just be seeing theorems like this however. They will also be proving
these kinds of slightly higher level statements themselves, by stringing together inferences
that are simple (but not necessarily completely basic). By doing so they will hopefully
gain what we can call “proficiency at term 2 detail”, the ability to prove these slightly
higher level inferences by stringing together simple inferences, and to reliably judge the
validity of simple inferences (checking whenever necessary by proving them at the week 2
level of detail).7 Again we define the “term 2 level of detail” by giving examples, such as
the above and also for instance from Bartle and Sherbert (2000, Theorem 5.2.1), Axler
(1997, Proposition 2.9, Proposition 2.13) and Silverman (2012, Lemma 9.2).
As the terms go by the students are gradually exposed to more and more condensed
arguments. After another year or so they might meet an argument like that in fig. I.3.
Here the students see a proof that power series can be differentiated term by term.
The proof is another step up in terms of compression, in terms of relying on the intelli-
gence of the reader. This can be seen in the first line, where the reader is expected to see
7A note on terminology. I find it natural to speak of proving inferences, as in proving them in greater
detail, though strictly speaking this may be a category error: inferences are things that we draw, assess,
or justify, and we normally only speak of proving statements and propositions. Nonetheless I think it is
clear what is meant – replacing a given inference by a chain of intermediate inferences, which collectively
constitute a proof of the conclusion from the premises – and it is a convenient and expressive idiom.
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Figure I.3: Bartle and Sherbert (2000, p. 270)
Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
that a certain sequence is bounded if and only if another sequence is. Also in the second
sentence, the reader is expected to “easily see” that a certain equation holds. These
statements are extremely plausible; and if a student has any doubt, they can check them
by proving them in more detail, using the “proficiency at term 2 detail” ability they
have hopefully gained. They do not need to take these statements on trust, and they do
not need to guess.
Again we can talk roughly about this “year 2 level of detail”, giving further examples
of arguments at about this level of detail to help explicate it, again for instance from
analysis (Bartle and Sherbert 2000, Theorems 9.3.2 and 10.1.3), from number theory
(Silverman 2012, Theorem 42.1), and also from ring theory (Aluffi 2009, Proposition
III.3.11, III.4.5) and complex analysis (Bak and Newman 2010, Proposition 3.1).
This process continues in the obvious way. As the years progress a student is exposed
to gradually faster and faster arguments, arguments where gradually more and more of
the details are left out and more is left to the reader’s intelligence. We can pick out
further levels of detail a student will encounter, in the same way as above. First, we
define a “year 3 level of detail” by giving examples, now with a wider variety: from
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functional analysis (Rudin 1987, Theorems 4.6–4.12), complex analysis (Conway 1978,
§IV.2), measure theory (Fremlin 2010, Chapter 12), general topology (Munkres 2000,
§33), algebraic topology (J. M. Lee 2000, Chapter 13), differential geometry (J. Lee
2012, Chapter 3), commutative algebra (Aluffi 2009, §V.1), representation theory (James
and Liebeck 2001, Chapter 6), number theory (I. M. Niven, A. Niven, and Zuckerman
1991, §1.2), combinatorics (Szemerédi 1975, Facts 1 & 2), logic (Cori and Lascar 2000,
§1.1), and category theory (Awodey 2010, Proposition 2.10). Again these may not be
arguments a given student actually sees in their third year, but the level of detail is
intended to be one that competent third year students will be gaining proficiency at, for
both reading and writing proofs.
Detail here is not the same thing as accessibility. An argument can be very detailed
but still difficult, for instance because it involves difficult concepts, or relies on difficult
results, or because the result is poorly motivated and the proof strategy unexplained –
or just because the argument is too long. Detail here means explicitness, and proximity
to definitions, and how much the proof says of what could be said. It is the antonym of
“how much is left out”.
Naturally these predicates “week 2 level of detail”, “year 2 level of detail” and so on
will be vague: we may not be able to always determine precisely whether an argument is
at the year 2 level of detail or not, just as we may not be able to decide whether a jumper
is red, or perhaps orange instead. That does not undermine these predicates’ validity
or usefulness. Although there will be borderline cases, there will also be cases where we
can in fact state with confidence that an argument is at around the year 2 or year 3 level
of detail, rather than the week 2 or graduate level of detail (defined shortly). Of course
an argument may not all take place at the same level of detail, so that describing the
different levels of detail its parts take place at may be more appropriate than trying to
shoehorn the whole argument into one category – as with a multicoloured jumper. One
issue with these levels of detail that does not have such a comparison with jumpers is
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that it can potentially be quite difficult to compare the detail of pieces of mathematics
from very different areas, where the reasoning is of a very different style. We can mitigate
that as here by giving examples from a wide range of areas when characterizing levels
of detail.
We now continue in the same way, defining further levels of detail a student will
encounter. It should perhaps be emphasised that this terminology of levels of detail is
new terminology I am introducing, and not a standard part of mathematical discourse.
There are times one might see something like it used – for instance if a mathematician
presented an unconvincing argument to a colleague, and after some questioning the col-
league asked them to explain it more slowly, like they were talking to a grad student.
Also, concepts like these can perhaps be seen as implicitly underlying some mathemati-
cians’ talk of detail in mathematics, an example of which will be seen in section I.5 when
discussing how these levels of detail can help mathematicians resolve disputes about the
validity of proofs.
We will actually now pick out two different graduate levels of detail. First, we
define the “graduate level of detail (explicit)” by giving examples, from functional ana-
lysis (Banach 1987, Theorem II.1), complex analysis (Conway 1978, §IV.6), measure
theory (Schwartz 1954), general topology (Walker 1974, §1.1–1.16), algebraic topology
(Switzer 2002, Chapter 4), differential geometry (Hirsch 1976, §1.3), algebraic geometry
(Eisenbud and Harris 2000, §I.1.4), commutative algebra (Eisenbud 1995, Chapter I.2),
representation theory (Fulton and Harris 1991, Lecture 4), number theory (I. M. Niven,
A. Niven, and Zuckerman 1991, §5.7), combinatorics (Erdös 1947, Theorem 1), logic
(Prawitz 1965, Chapters I–III), and category theory (MacLane 1998, §II.3–II.6).
The basic idea is hopefully now clear, but we can keep going and pick out a “graduate
level of detail (terse)” by giving some examples: from algebraic topology (Hatcher; 2001,
§2.2), differential geometry (Thurston 1997, §2.7), algebraic geometry (Hartshorne 1977,
§II.3) and category theory (MacLane 1998, Chapter IX). As seen in the examples above,
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Each inference at level A
can be recognised/checked
to be provable at level B
Figure I.4: Levels of detail
some research mathematics is written out at a level of detail already covered: for instance
Szemerédi (1975, Facts 1 & 2) at the year 3 level of detail, and Banach (1987, Theorem
II.1), Schwartz (1954), Erdös (1947, Theorem 1) and Prawitz (1965, Chapters I–III) at
the graduate level of detail (explicit). However plenty of research mathematics does take
place at a level of greater compression, and one could keep going and pick out levels of
this, named perhaps “research article level of detail (terse)”, “research article level of
detail (very terse)”, and maybe one or two more. A range of levels of detail we can
obtain in this way is seen in fig. I.4.
To be clear, there is nothing privileged about the levels of detail listed in fig. I.4.
There is a continuum of levels of detail that we could potentially pick from (perhaps
idealizing somewhat, given that statements in proofs are finite objects), and nothing to
mark out those in fig. I.4 as special; they are just useful examples for the purposes of
this chapter.
A little more should be said about the upper reaches of mathematics, at the top
of fig. I.4 and beyond. In fact it is clear that nothing too different happens as one
approaches the research frontier – the gradual ascent to levels of greater and greater
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compression continues. That nothing radically different is happening can be seen in the
ability of professors to take the most important, beautiful or useful results in a field –
once it has matured – and collate them into a textbook with proofs accessible to graduate
students. In the process proofs may be simplified or altered, but there is never any great
obstacle to writing out what was once research level mathematics at a level of detail that
graduate students can follow. One can see this in for instance the titles in the Springer
Graduate Texts in Mathematics series.
A particularly extreme example of this is given by the case of Perelman’s proof of
the Poincaré conjecture. This was one of the most major conjectures in mathematics,
and the subject of a Clay Millennium Prize. In 2002 and 2003 Perelman uploaded three
papers containing a claimed proof (Perelman 2002; 2003b,a). The papers were written
at a very high level, containing mathematics sketchy enough that despite only totally
70 pages, it took teams of mathematicians 3 years – working in correspondence with
Perelman – to verify the argument as correct. Perelman was then offered a Field’s
medal, and subsequently a Millennium Prize, both of which he declined. Since 2006
more detailed expositions of his argument have been produced, such as Morgan and
Tian (2007), which is a textbook intended to be accessible to graduate students. Indeed
it looks to be at about the graduate level of detail (explicit) or graduate level of detail
(terse). It comes in at 521 pages – about 8 times longer than Perelman’s original papers.
This is quite an increase, but even so it shows that there is not too dramatic a leap in
terms of compression from maths at a level graduate students can understand to some
of the most concise mathematics acceptable as a proof.
Now to say a little more about the lower end of fig. I.4. First, a potential issue is
that some areas of maths are generally only studied at a high level, because they have
substantial mathematical prerequisites or typically involve subtle or complex arguments.
This is the case with harmonic analysis, the theory of functions of several complex
variables, and modern algebraic geometry, amongst other areas. This presents a potential
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problem with regards to the lower levels of detail in fig. I.4, since for instance no-one
does algebraic geometry in week 2 of their degree. In some cases this is unproblematic
since expanding an argument in great detail will lead to basic inferences like those found
in other areas – for instance combinatorics or analysis, in the case of harmonic analysis.
In other cases reasoning used is more sui generis. Nonetheless in these cases I think
it still makes sense to talk about what an inference carried out at say the term 2 level
of detail would look like. In fact we sometimes see this happen: when a new manner
of argument is introduced, even to advanced students, a few very explicit examples are
often given of how it works. This is so that students have a sense of what is underlying
more complex arguments, and know what to fall back on if they ever find more complex
arguments hard to follow or produce. An instance of this from differential topology – a
fairly advanced subject, done in full generality – is seen in J. Lee (2012, Proposition 2.4).
Here Lee is giving an example of how to use the smooth charts on a manifold to prove
local facts about them, and it is written up in great detail to make clear to students how
this works, at around the week 2 or term 2 level of detail. One could do the same for
other advanced subjects, for instance writing out the arguments of Eisenbud and Harris
(2000, §I.1.4) from algebraic geometry mentioned above at the term 2 level of detail.
A second issue about levels of greater detail is one that was rather passed over in the
discussion above: what takes place in the initial stages of learning rigorous mathematics,
before the ascent up the levels of compression can start. To begin with, students will
be taught how the basics of proof work, and what to do with the logical vocabulary
∧, ∃,¬,∀ and so on, by a combination of examples and informal descriptions of what
is going on and why. For instance they will (hopefully) learn by seeing and working
through examples that to prove a statement ∀nφ(n) about all numbers, one can take
an unknown number n, prove that φ(n) holds without assuming anything special about
n, and then deduce that indeed ∀nφ(n) holds – essentially the ∀-introduction rule from
natural deduction. The logical workings of proof can be stated in simple, clear, precise
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form – in terms of the hypotheses active at each stage, and how to introduce and exploit
them – and when students can grasp how this works from examples it is not such a
great surprise. Anyway not all students do manage to learn the rules from examples,
and how to best teach the logic of proof is much discussed in the mathematics education
literature (see for instance Epp 2003; 2009). As well as the logical vocabulary students
will learn the basics of set theory, including how to determine if two sets are equal via
extensionality (whether this is an axiom or an inference rule is not important to the
students, and the distinction may not be clear to them), and they will be shown various
acceptable ways of forming new sets – power sets, cartesian products and so on.
There is a further basic aspect of proof that students are expected to infer from
examples, and this is the ability to prove results by describing algorithms or procedures to
achieve some desired mathematical goal, with Euclid’s algorithm being an early example
students often encounter (Silverman 2012, pp. 33–34), and further examples coming in
linear algebra (Axler 1997, Proposition 2.6, Proposition 2.7; Artin 1991, pp. 14–15) and
other areas. Though some such proofs can be rephrased as arguments by induction,
sometimes they may implicitly require the definition of functions by recursion, and this
is not usually something early undergraduates will be in a position to justify formally
– the set theoretic treatment of recursion is typically taught later on in a more general
form that applies to recursions on all ordinals (such as in Jech 2006, Theorem 2.15).
In fact this does not present any sort of problem, and is not so different to the cases
above where students grasp principles from examples; in this case the general principle
implicitly underlying these kinds of recursive arguments is the axiom of dependent choice.
This states that if X is a set and R is a binary relation on X such that for all x ∈ X
there is y ∈ X with xRy, then for all x ∈ X there is a sequence (x0, x1, . . .) of elements of
X where x0 = x and for all i, xiRxi+1. That this is a statement rather than an inference
rule, and not a basic axiom of set theory (it is deduced from the axiom of choice) is not
important here. It is intuitive, and can be stated clearly, simply and precisely, and it is
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not a surprise that students can grasp from examples what kinds of arguments are in
line with it.
The basic axioms governing sets are exempted from the general requirement that
inferences be justifiable by proofs in greater detail. One can rightly assert this without
actually deciding on which the basic axioms are; for instance it does not matter whether
one regards the statement that function sets BA exist as a basic axiom, or as justified by
an argument that appeals to more basic axioms (union, separation, pair set and power
set perhaps). Whatever the basic axioms are, they need not be justified by a proof,
and other basic properties of sets are justified in terms of them (perhaps out of sight
of students). There has been some discussion of exactly what means of set formation
are allowed in mathematics – in particular, whether the unrestricted comprehension
principle of naive set theory is used – and this issue will be addressed in section I.7.
With these points addressed, we have the essentials of how rigour is learnt. We
can pick out different levels of detail maths is done at by giving examples, and students
proceed upwards through these levels of detail as described above: once they have gained
proficiency at a certain level of detail they are in a position to engage with more concise
arguments, with a tutored sense of what more compressed inferences are valid – tutored
by their experience at proving such inferences. If they are ever unsure, they can use
their existing proficiency to check a more compressed inference and see if it can in fact
be justified by a proof; and if so, they can ask why they were suspicious about it, and
consider how to adjust their instincts to recognize such inferences as valid in future.
It is essential to the normal process of learning rigorous mathematics that students
are in a position to check inferences for themselves in this way, rather than just being
presented with high level arguments they are intended to imitate. This is the most
significant difference between mathematics as taught rigorously, and mathematics as
taught in a physics degree (for instance). As discussed above there are also cases early
on where students are expected to infer general principles from examples. There are
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only a few such cases though, and the reasoning each general principle encompasses can
be characterized simply and precisely.
As mentioned in section I.1, there are various places where this account could be
expanded on. This could be a task for further investigations on the subject. For instance,
one might seek a better understanding of exactly how students “adjust their instincts”
to recognize a wider variety of inferences as valid, having seen particular cases to be
provable in greater detail; or how, and with what degree of success, they “infer general
principles from examples” in the early stages. These questions will be put to one side in
this thesis however.
One limitation of the above that will be addressed later is that much of what has
been said only really makes sense for sentential arguments, rather than for instance
arguments involving pictures; what rigour requires of pictorial arguments in particular
is considered in chapter III.
4 The concept of rigour
Implicit in the process of learning rigorous maths described above is that each time
a student is trying to master a new level of greater compression, it is constitutive of
inferences being at that level of compression that they be provable at a previous level of
detail, a level the student is already comfortable at – so that there are no leaps in the
process of learning rigorous mathematics where a student is unable to check inferences
for themselves (apart from when grasping certain basic principles). Indeed if inferences
at the level of greater compression didn’t need to be provable in more detail, then
“checking” them by seeing which inferences can be justified with a proof would be a
mistake. As discussed above, the basic axioms of set theory are exempted (whatever
exactly they are taken to be), and are intended to be accepted by students without
argument, though possibly with the assurance that they are “obvious”.
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Similarly, it is constitutive of rigour that nontrivial inferences can potentially be pro-
ved at a level of greater detail, so that if there is ever any unclarity – or disagreement –
about the correctness of an inference it can be resolved by seeking a proof, or requesting
one. Again proving in more detail here means an appreciable step up in detail, going
up a notch in terms of levels of detail that we can pick out. This is one useful mecha-
nism in mathematics for resolving disputes about the validity of proofs, as discussed in
section I.5. For the purpose of resolving disputes, this requirement is of less practical im-
portance at levels of very great detail, as mathematicians may agree immediately about
sufficiently basic inferences; but equally, for these simpler inferences it is generally more
obvious that they can be proved in greater detail, and how such a proof would go, so
the requirement is no unnecessary burden. Also, the ability to gain greater clarity about
the correctness of inferences at all levels by seeking a more detailed proof is very impor-
tant for the purposes of learning mathematics, as mentioned above. Again, the basic
axioms of set theory are exempted from the requirement of being justifiable in greater
detail: their correctness is not up for debate (within mathematics) and is supposed as a
precondition for the mathematical enterprise to get going.
This is, I think, the key feature of rigorous mathematics: that there is a range of
levels of detail that it can take place at, where inferences at a more compressed level
can necessarily be proved at an appreciably greater level of detail. This requirement
that inferences be provable in more detail is why the examples discussed in section I.2
were not rigorous: the manipulations of infinitesimals and infinite series discussed could
not be justified in greater detail, and could not be regarded as basic rigorous rules in
themselves since it was not clear how to demarcate what reasoning was acceptable.8
Similarly brute intuitions such as for the truth of the Jordan curve theorem are not in
themselves suitable in proofs unless they can be backed up with more detailed arguments.
8Reasoning with infinitesimals was put on a firm footing by Robinson (1996) in terms of the logical
concept of non standard model, and Nelson (1977) showed how to give a rigorous axiomatization for
the approach. One can also use a paraconsistent approach to embrace the contradictory nature of
infinitesimals, as seen in Brown and Priest (2004) and Sweeney (2014).
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The necessity that inferences be provable in greater detail applies to levels of detail
that students (and mathematicians) reach after progressing onwards from the basic level
at which the subject is first taught – assumed above to be the week 2 level of detail.
However not all students do manage to directly grasp how proof works at this level of
detail, and some need more explicit demonstration of the rules that proof is implicitly
following. There are courses and textbooks which provide this, such as Velleman (2006),
which teaches how proof works essentially by teaching how to prove statements using
the natural deduction rules: here the premises being used are explicitly tracked and
calculated with, according to the rules governing the various bits of logical vocabulary.
We can call this most basic, most explicit level of detail the “intro to proof level of
detail”. Students can use this as a stepping stone to gain comprehension of how basic
arguments at the week 2 level of detail work, and implicit in this (as above with later
levels of detail) is that inferences at the week 2 level of detail be provable at the intro to
proof level of detail – otherwise gaining a grasp of how arguments work at the intro to
proof level would be misleading as to what is going on at the week 2 level. Thus we can
extend the above argument that inferences need to be provable in greater detail all the
way down until we reach the intro to proof level of detail, where arguments explicitly
use the natural deduction rules.
A minor caveat to this ability to prove in greater detail is that some arguments
may require rephrasing when proving in more explicit formal terms – for instance one
would often justify the Euclidean algorithm as an informal recursive process of repeated
division with remainder, described for integers a, b > 0 perhaps by saying:
Write a = q0b+ r0 with 0 6 r0 < b,
write b = q1r0 + r1 with 0 6 r1 < r0,
write r0 = q2r1 + r2 with 0 6 r2 < r1,
and so on, until we reach rn = 0
which if proved more explicitly would be transformed into some sort of formal recursive
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definition (of the form justified by the axiom of dependent choice – though there is no
choice here – as discussed in section I.3). In these kinds of cases one is replacing a part of
a proof with a similar more detailed version, rather than literally filling in inferences in
greater detail. However these kinds of cases are the exception rather than the rule, and
do not make any essential difference to any of the discussion below, so we will generally
include them under “proving in greater detail” (speaking a little loosely).
Now although the account above has focused on the ability to prove inferences in
greater detail, it should be emphasised that one does not generally have to see how
to prove an inference in greater detail to understand it, or accept it. For instance, to
someone familiar with the notion of homeomorphism it probably feels obvious that the
sphere {x ∈ R3 : ‖x‖ = 1} is homeomorphic to the cube {x ∈ R3 : maxi |xi| = 1},
but sitting down and trying to write out a proof of this could well take a while. Such
examples are not limited to topology. In logic – a subject where perhaps one would
expect “intuition” would play less of a role – it might well feel obvious that substituting
term t for variable x in a formula φ, when x is not free in φ, will just return φ, but again
proving this in detail would take a bit of work (though probably less insight than the
previous example). These kinds of higher level judgements about inferences – without
a proof in mind – are an essential part of mathematics. Nonetheless it is important
in rigorous mathematics that the option of proving inferences in more detail is there,
to aid in gaining a firm grasp of any new concepts, and in guiding and sharpening
one’s judgement in any difficult cases – not all homeomorphic spaces are as obviously
homeomorphic as the two above.
Also, when checking a proof one does not always necessarily actually check that
every inference in is valid. Indeed if an unsurprising claim in a proof is supported by
reasoning that looks like the right kind of thing, and the right amount of effort, then
an experienced mathematician may pass on without checking every single detail. This
is seen in interviews conducted by Andersen (2017) with mathematics referees, and also
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mentioned by Thurston (1997, p. 32). It appears this can be a fairly good guide to
the overall correctness of results, though numerous commentators have remarked on the
unreliability of the mathematical literature and the pervasiveness of errors in proofs, to
which this manner of refereeing may be a contributing factor (Jaffe and Quinn 1993;
Thurston 1994, p. 33; Nathanson 2008; Grcar 2013, pp. 421–422).
5 Disagreements about validity
It is traditional when studying deduction to think in terms of a single sharply defined
notion of validity, that every inference either has or lacks. I think the above analysis of
rigour rather tells against this conception.
Indeed having picked out various levels of detail that mathematical inferences can
take place at, we can introduce a cumulative hierarchy of validity predicates – “valid at
the week 2 level of detail”, “valid at the term 2 level of detail”, and so on, where for
instance “valid at the term 2 level of detail” means an inference either at the term 2 level
of detail, or at a level of greater detail. One can keep ascending in this way, defining
validity predicates which allow larger and larger, more and more compressed inferences,
inferences that are increasingly challenging for even an experienced mathematician to
follow. At some point one will reach inferences compressed enough that they are well
beyond the bounds of what mathematicians consider to be valid. However there appears
to be no natural place on the continuum of levels of detail to draw a line, and say this
is the limit of validity: that inferences at least that detailed are valid, while those less
detailed are not. Asserting that there is a precise such limit seems to just be philosophical
dogma, unsupported by the facts of the practice. Suppose for instance that a preprint
of an article is uploaded to the arXiv, and read by two mathematicians experienced in
the field – one of whom concludes that it is perfectly rigorous, the other that the proof
of a certain lemma is too sketchy and incomplete. Who are we to say as philosophers
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that one is definitely right, and the other definitely wrong? I think it is more plausible
to say that judgements of validity are – to some extent – both vague and subjective.
Some philosophers are aghast at this suggestion, and it is worth explaining why,
given the account of rigour above, it is not as damaging a claim as might be thought. In
as much as there is disagreement about the validity of a certain inference, the framework
of rigour provides a mechanism for resolving it.
That mathematicians are good at resolving disagreements about validity – that if
a mathematician believes a proof is valid, they are generally able to convince others of
this, or become convinced themselves of a flaw in it – has been noted by various authors
as a fact that deserves explanation, and is one of the main motivations of Azzouni’s
derivation indicator view of proof is to attempt to provide this (Azzouni 2004, pp. 83–
84; Antonutti Marfori 2010, pp. 267, 270–271). The idea behind Azzouni’s account is
that the informal proofs mathematicians write serve to indicate formal derivations. This
has met with criticism, with Tanswell (2015) pointing out that attempted proofs may
have many different attempted formalizations, which poses a problem since Azzouni
wants to characterize validity of the informal proof in terms of success of the indicated
formal derivation. Additionally as seen in section I.3, mathematics generally proceeds at
a much greater level of compression than is found in formal proofs, and (as mentioned
in section I.1) most mathematicians have no experience of or interest in the activity
of formalization, so Azzouni’s account is rather far removed from how mathematicians
typically engage with proofs in practice.
Instead of hoping for an explanation in terms of formal derivations, it is more pro-
mising to look to the process of proving in more detail itself. Indeed if a mathematician
ever puts forward a purported proof in which an inference is not convincing, then a
more detailed justification for that inference can be requested – an appreciable step up
to a level of greater detail, perhaps from the research article level of detail (terse) to
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the graduate level of detail (terse), as discussed in section I.3.9 At this level of grea-
ter detail inferences are more transparent and judgements of validity are more reliable,
and this may already serve to resolve the controversy – with the new argument being
acceptable, or an obvious error in it discovered. If not, and an inference in this more
detailed argument is still controversial, a more detailed justification can be asked of it
in turn, taking us to a still greater level of detail at which errors will be even more
obvious – perhaps we now reach the third year level of detail. In principle this process
will terminate when one reaches the level of complete formalization, though in practice
if both sides are of sound mind and proceeding in good faith then the controversy will
be resolved well before that.10
Thus if one believes a proof to be rigorous, in as much as this belief is correct one
can always (in principle, and usually in practice) fill in the details of any inferences that
are felt to be sketchy, to increase the level of detail to one which is found acceptable.
In the imagined case considered initially of two mathematicians disagreeing about an
arXiv preprint – with one finding that a particular lemma was argued for too briefly
– the dispute would normally be resolvable in this way, bringing the proof into a form
acceptable to everyone.
Thus though in my view there may be some subjectivity and vagueness to where
exactly the limits of rigour are drawn, much more significant is the strong form of
objectivity afforded by rigour, in which there are always robust reasons available to win
over an objector – provided one’s assessment of a proof as valid is justified.
In fact this dispute resolution mechanism is essentially that described in the Princeton
Companion to Mathematics:
[T]he fact that arguments can in principle be formalized provides a very
9Though this terminology of levels of detail is new, the process is not.
10The resolution of disagreement in this manner is an example of the idea from argumentation theory
that a debate goes down to the level of detail that will satisfy both parties (using the apt words of
an anonymous referee). For more on argumentation theory and mathematics, see Aberdein and Dove
(2013).
33
CHAPTER I. UNDERSTANDING RIGOUR
valuable underpinning for the edifice of mathematics, because it gives a way
of resolving disputes. If a mathematician produces an argument that is
strangely unconvincing, then the best way to see whether it is correct is to
ask him or her to explain it more formally and in greater detail. This will
usually either expose a mistake or make it clearer why the argument works.
(Gowers, Barrow-Green, and Leader 2008, p.74)
Sections I.3 and I.4 can be seen as a clarification and elaboration of the process outlined
in this quote. As an explanation of how disputes in mathematics can be resolved, this
seems to be both more straightforward and more plausible than Azzouni’s account, and
better grounded in mathematical practice. However there may well be more to be said
about the reality of disputes over validity in mathematics, and how well this simple
account fits it.
6 Naive set theory?
The final topic of the chapter is how this account of rigour impacts on the question of
formalizability. Before the discussion of this in section I.7, we take a brief detour from
the main course of the chapter, to address a sceptical view about the basic principles
used in mathematics: the idea that mathematicians should be viewed not as working
in a system like ZFC(U), but in naive set theory, with its axiom scheme of unrestricted
comprehension. This has been suggested by Leitgeb (2009), and some mathematicians
have made similar claims about their own understanding (Jones 1998, p. 205; Aluffi 2009,
p. 1). Indeed “Naive set theory” is actually the title of a set theory textbook by Halmos
(Halmos 2011). If mathematicians are best regarded as using unrestricted comprehen-
sion, this would make the claim that mathematical proofs can be formalized trivial, since
set theory with unrestricted comprehension is inconsistent and so any argument can be
immediately formalized in it (with every inference justified by a set theoretic paradox).
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The key step when considering this possibility is to distinguish different senses of the
term “naive set theory”. Certainly most mathematicians do not know what the axioms of
ZFC are, but they do have a solid grasp of how to legitimately form new sets: by taking
unions, subsets, power sets, Cartesian products, function sets, equivalence classes, and
so on. This understanding may be “naive” in the sense that it is not accompanied by
explicit awareness of how these operations are justified in terms of the basic axioms –
but that is totally different to “naive” set theory in the logicians’ sense, in which the
central principle is that of unrestricted comprehension, the scheme
∃y (x∈y ⇔ φ(x))
for all formulae φ in which y does not occur free.11 Indeed the above set forming opera-
tions are not generally justified in any more direct terms by unrestricted comprehension
than by ZFC; to form Cartesian products for instance, one still needs to go through
the rigmarole of defining what ordered pairs are and what a family of objects is, and
the availability of unrestricted comprehension does not significantly simplify this. Mo-
reover, there is no evidence of mathematicians making essential appeals to unrestricted
comprehension, and this being accepted as valid. In the normal course of mathematics,
all classes one would like to be sets are easily seen to be set sized using the standard
set forming operations. In category theory, where size issues are encountered, the axiom
of universes was introduced specifically so that they could be dealt with in a rigorous
way. There are occasional instances where classes are manipulated as though they were
sets, for instance in the definition of the Grothendieck group as a quotient of the set of
isomorphism classes of finitely generated modules over a ring R; but in this case there
is nothing genuinely troubling going on since one can easily define a set of representa-
11The set theory in Halmos’s textbook is naive in an even weaker sense. Halmos does in fact state the
usual basic axioms of set theory (with no mention of unrestricted comprehension), and he uses them to
derive various set theoretic operations and facts, but he says the approach is naive in that “the language
and notation are those of ordinary informal (but formalizable) mathematics”.
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tives of the isomorphism classes instead (the quotient modules RnM of powers of R, with
isomorphic quotients identified), or one can appeal to the axiom of universes.
Moreover there are genuine mathematical cases where the distinction between sets
and classes is crucial, and the use of unrestricted comprehension would be disastrous.
For instance the general adjoint functor states that if G : D → C is a functor with
D complete and locally small, then G has a left adjoint iff it preserves all limits and
satisfies the solution set condition (MacLane 1998, p. 121). The solution set condition
states that a set of morphisms with a certain property exists, and in this case the fact
that this be a set rather than a class is key, as there is always a class of morphisms
with the required property. In the presence of unrestricted comprehension, the general
adjoint functor theorem would become the claim that any limit preserving functor whose
domain is complete and locally small has a left adjoint, which is false in general. The
issue of which functors have adjoints is not some category theoretic curiosity – it arises
naturally in various areas of mathematics including algebra and topology.
Thus the way mathematicians form sets may be naive in the sense that it need not
be founded in explicit knowledge of the basic principles, but there is no indication that
it is naive in the sense of relying on unrestricted comprehension. If it did, signs of this
ought not to be too hard to find.
7 Formalizability
Now to the question of formalizability itself. As advertised previously, it will be argued
here that valid rigorous proofs are formalizable, in principle, though what this means
requires clarification. The prospects for feasible formalization will also be touched on.
For the purposes of this section we will introduce the concept of “deductive groun-
ding” between levels of detail. If L,L′ are levels of detail, then we say that L′ is de-
ductively grounded in L if every inference valid at level of detail L′ is provable at level of
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detail L.12 This concept of grounding is justificatory rather than metaphysical, and does
not share all the properties of standard notions of metaphysical grounding (for instance
it is reflexive). This concept of grounding uses a notion of provability, and the kind of
modality employed here needs to be spelt out before we know what deductive grounding
amounts to. The notion of provability we will use is one of “in principle” provability,
abstracting from limitations in terms of time or other resources (and thus perhaps ab-
stracting away from the limitations of our own physical universe). One could otherwise
use a notion of what is actually feasibly provable, given the physical and biological
constraints on us, and obtain thereby a notion of “feasible deductive grounding”.
We can relate this notion of deductive grounding to a notion of “in principle forma-
lizability”. Indeed, we can fix some standard system of first order natural deduction (for
instance that of Prawitz 1965, Chapter I), and we take a formal derivation to be a com-
plete derivation in this system in the language of set theory with all premises amongst
the axioms of ZFCU. We then define the “formal level of detail” to consist just of these
formal derivations. We characterize a proof as being formalizable in principle if every
inference in it is provable at the formal level of detail. Thus the claim that every proof
at a level of detail L is formalizable in principle is just the claim that L is deductively
grounded in the formal level. This is a weak notion of formalizability in principle, and
for instance if the Riemann hypothesis is a theorem of ZFC then the one line proof of
the Riemann hypothesis from no premises is formalizable in principle by this definition.
Nonetheless it is one possible sense of formalizability in principle; the question of what
we do and should mean by formalizability will be returned to later in this section.
The key property of this notion of in principle provability is that it satisfies a version
of the converse Buridan formula. In general the converse Buridan formula is (the scheme
12As was noted in section I.4, some inferences at level L′ may be part of an informal section of a
proof which as a whole needs to be replaced by a more detailed and formal version at level L; this was
illustrated with the example of the Euclidean algorithm. This caveat makes no real difference to what
follows.
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of formulae) of the form
∀x ♦(φ(x)) ⇒ ♦(∀xφ(x)).
It is of the same general form as the converse Barcan formula, though with an existential
instead of universal quantifier (Konyndyk 1986, p. 94). This converse Buridan formula
is not typically valid. For instance if I have a well stocked fridge, it may be the case
that for every item in the fridge I can have that item as part of my dinner, but that it
is impossible for me to have every item in the fridge as part of my dinner. Nonetheless
in cases where one abstracts from resource constraints it can be valid. In particular if
we have a finite set S of inferences, and write Prov to indicate that we have obtained a
proof of s ∈ S, then we do have that
∀s∈S ♦(Prov(s)) ⇒ ♦(∀s∈S Prov(s))
since if each element of S is provable, then – given sufficient time – it will be possible to
obtain coeval proofs of every element of S.
It follows that if level of detail L′ is deductively grounded in level of detail L, and
we have a proof p of result s valid at level of detail L′, then one can in principle obtain
a proof of the s at level of detail L. Indeed every inference in p is provable at level of
detail L, so that (as just discussed) it is possible to obtain a simultaneous proof of every
inference in p; concatenating these then gives a proof of s at level of detail L, as claimed.
Thus we can obtain that the notion of deductive grounding is transitive. Indeed
suppose we have levels of detail L,L′, L′′ with L′ deductively grounded in L and L′′
deductively grounded in L′. Let s be an inference valid at level of detail L′′. Then by
the definition of deductive grounding, we can in principle obtain a proof of s at level of
detail L′; but then as just discussed, given such a proof one can in principle obtain a
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proof of s at level of detail L. Thus s is indeed provable at level of detail L.13
Now we will use this to argue that for the levels of detail that a student moves
through on their way to mastering research level mathematics, each more compressed
level is deductively grounded in its more detailed predecessors.
First we will give an informal argument for this. Recall that as discussed in section I.4,
it is crucial for rigour that valid mathematical inferences be provable in greater detail
(unless they are already basic). This is an essential part of how rigorous mathematics is
learnt, and of how validity is reliably judged – since for inferences that are not immedi-
ately convincing, one can always clarify the situation by seeking a proof in more detail.
In both cases proving in more detail means an appreciable step up in detail, going up a
notch in terms of levels of detail that we can pick out. This is an important mechanism
for resolving disputes in mathematics, as seen in section I.5.
This requirement that inferences be provable in greater detail does not immediately
imply that (for instance) the year 3 level of detail is deductively grounded in the year
2 level of detail, since perhaps one could point instead to some intermediate level of
detail L used as a stepping stone to reach the year 3 level of detail. But it would not be
possible to pick out more than a small finite number of levels of detail between the year
2 level of detail and the year 3 level of detail that we could actually distinguish – with
each being an appreciable step up in compression from the last – and that a student
would have time to move through, using each one as a stepping stone to the next, in the
course of ascending from the year 2 to the year 3 level of detail. If these were listed in
order as L1, L2, . . . Ln, with L1 deductively grounded in the year 2 level of detail, Li+1
deductively grounded in Li for each i and the year 3 level of detail deductively grounded
in Ln, then it follows immediately that the year 3 level of detail is deductively grounded
in the year 2 level of detail, by transitivity. Similarly we obtain that the term 2 level
of detail is deductively grounded in the week 2 level of detail, that the graduate level of
13This argument could be carried out more formally, and implicitly uses the rule ♦♦φ ⇒ ♦φ of S4,
which holds for the kind of metaphysical possibility being employed.
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detail (terse) is deductively grounded in the graduate level of detail (explicit), and so on.
Thus we obtain by transitivity that all such levels of detail are deductively grounded in
the week 2 level of detail.
Now we give a more formal argument. We will consider a student gradually moving
through an education in mathematics, where at each time t there is the level of detail
mt of mathematics that they have mastered so far, and the level of detail lt that they
are learning at that point. We will assume that the collection of times t making up this
period of education forms a complete ordered set, which we denote by I. I may or may
not have endpoints – an initial point, and/or a final point. If L and L′ are levels of detail
we will write L 6 L′ to denote that L′ consists of mathematical inferences at least as
compressed as those at level L. We will assume that the function t 7→ mt is monotonic,
i.e. that if t′ > t then mt′ > mt. For there to be no magical jumps in this process of
learning, it needs to be the case that for all times t not initial in I, there is some t′ < t
such that mt 6 lt′ , so that the level of detail mastered at time t was actually learnt at
some previous point in time. We also need that for all times t not final in I, there is
some t′ > t such that mt′ 6 lt, so that there is no magical jump after time t where at all
subsequent times, a level of detail has been mastered that is greater than that which was
being learnt at time t. Finally, as discussed above, it is constitutive of learning rigorous
mathematics that at each stage, the level of detail one is learning is deductively grounded
in a level of detail one has already mastered, i.e. that lt is deductively grounded in mt.
Now for the argument. For each t there is some t′ < t such that mt 6 lt′ , but lt′ is
deductively grounded in mt′ , so that by transitivity mt is also deductively grounded in
mt′ (call this backwards grounding). Also, for each t, there is t′ > t such that mt′ 6 lt,
so that mt′ is deductively grounded in mt (call this forwards grounding). Now suppose
for contradiction that there is s > t such that ms is not deductively grounded in mt. We
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let r be the infimum of
{s | ms not deductively grounded in mt}
(a set which is bounded below by t). By forwards grounding, there is t′ > t such that mt′
is deductively grounded in mt, so that by monotonicity of m, we have that r > t′ > t.
Thus r is not initial in I, and so by backwards grounding for r, there is t′ < r such that
mr is deductively grounded in mt′ . But by the definition of r, we must have that mt′ is
deductively grounded in mt, and thus by transitivity that mr is deductively grounded
in mt. But then forwards grounding for r gives that there is t′ > r such that mt′ is
grounded in mr, and thus in mt; then by monotonicity of m, if r 6 t′′ 6 t′ then mt′′ is
deductively grounded in mt, so that t′ is actually a lower bound for
{s | ms not deductively grounded in mt},
so that r is not the infimum of this set, giving the required contradiction. Thus from
the assumptions we have made, it follows that if s > t, then ms is deductively grounded
in mt.
This we obtain that all levels of detail that can be mastered rigorously, from a process
starting at the week 2 level of detail, are deductively grounded in the week 2 level of
detail. Then it is clear by inspection that arguments at the week 2 level of detail can be
written out as formal derivations, as was noted in section I.3, and their premises are all
amongst the basic axioms of set theory, so that the week 2 level of detail is deductively
grounded in the formal level. Otherwise, as discussed in section I.4, one can define
an “intro to proof level of detail”, in which the natural deduction rules are explicitly
used, and which some students use as a stepping stone to master the week 2 level of
detail; it follows (as above) that the week 2 level of detail is deductively grounded in the
intro to proof level of detail, whose proofs are trivially formalizable – they are already
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natural deductions of a slightly nonstandard kind. Either way we obtain that the week
2 level of detail is deductively grounded in the formal level, and thus that all the levels
of detail that can be mastered rigorously are deductively grounded in the formal level.
In other words, all rigorous mathematics is, in principle, formalizable. This is not a
mere empirical fact obtained by looking at examples of mathematical arguments (except
perhaps for the step from the formal level to the intro to proof or week 2 level), but a
direct consequence of the norm of rigour in mathematics as enunciated here in terms of
levels of detail.
We can also note the answer to a concern about formalizability noted in section I.1:
if rigour requires proofs to be formalizable, how are mathematicians so good at judging
this? The answer is that mathematicians are not directly judging formalizability, but
are instead judging the rigour of inferences (as discussed in sections I.3 and I.4), and
that formalizability is obtained as a consequence of rigour.
In the literature the main worry about this kind of in principle formalizability is
raised by Rav (1999), reiterated by Weir (2016). Rav considers a situation where one
has an inference A → B in a proof, and after some thought fills this in with intermediate
inferences to obtain A → A1, A1 → A2, . . . , An → B. Perhaps one is then questioned
by a student or non specialist as to why A1 follows from A, and comes up with a new
interpolation A → A′, A′ → A1. Rav claims we can give no “theoretical” reason why
this process of adding interpolations ought to ever terminate (Rav 1999, pp. 14–15).
The basic problem with this description is the lack of any attempt to characterize the
form the interpolating inferences must take. One cannot just write in any intermediate
inferences that suit one’s fancy, whether justifying an inference to oneself or to a sceptic.
For instance suppose we are trying to argue that the fact there are infinitely many primes
(IP) is a consequence of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic (FTA), and we write
RH for the Riemann hypothesis and ST for Szemerédi’s theorem. It is clearly nonsense
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to try to justify FTA → IP by filling in intermediate inferences of the form
FTA → RH, RH → ST, ST → RH, RH → IP.
These may be valid as material implications (in the presence of the axioms of ZFC), but
they are totally useless as intermediate inferences for us; and to explain why they are the
wrong kind of intermediate inferences, we have to start putting inferences on some sort
of scale of plausibility, or simplicity, or evidentness, and require that adding intermediate
inferences take us in the increasing direction on this scale. This is the first step towards
thinking of mathematics in terms of levels of detail, as in sections I.3 and I.4, and to
the requirement – implicit in Rav’s description – that nontrivial inferences be provable
in greater detail. We can then argue as above that rigour implies formalizability, giving
the dissolution of Rav’s worry.
The argument given above concerned in principle formalizability, but it is also pos-
sible to say a little from this perspective about how practical formalization might be.
Indeed we can use the above framework to address a weaker version of Rav’s worry put
forward by Pelc (2009), who accepts that the process of filling in with intermediate in-
ferences will necessarily terminate, but questions whether we have any reason to believe
this process will result in a formal derivation of feasible length (given some initial proof
of reasonable size). Pelc defines a vast number M in terms of various fundamental con-
stants, large enough so that there is no possibility of us ever (in practice) constructing
a formal derivation of this length. His number M is at least the number of particles in
the universe divided by the Planck time (in seconds), and thus at least 10120 on stan-
dard estimates; so a special case of Pelc’s worry is whether when formalizing a proof of
reasonable length, we have any reason to believe the resulting formal derivation will be
less than 10120 symbols.
The framework of levels of detail developed above can also be useful when addressing
43
CHAPTER I. UNDERSTANDING RIGOUR
this kind of worry. Indeed one can get from the week 2 level of detail to the research
article level of detail (terse) in a small number of steps up: via the year 2 level of detail,
the graduate level of detail (explicit), and the research article level of detail (explicit).
For each of these steps one can estimate by considering examples what kind of factor
increase in length one generally obtains, when writing out an inference from the more
compressed level at the more detailed level. Though it would have to be confirmed by
more careful investigation, my belief from considering examples is that this factor is not
generally too large, with a factor of less than 5 being common, a factor of 10 being fairly
rare and a factor of 20 being very rare (as a proportion of inferences). This is supported
by the example of Perelman’s proof of the Poincaré conjecture discussed in section I.3,
where an extremely high level argument was written out at around the graduate level of
detail with a factor of increase in length of 8. Thus though one may obtain exponential
growth in proof length as one fills in details in a proof, to bring it down to the week 2
level of detail, the base and exponent are both fairly small: the former being the factor
of increase with each step to greater detail, the latter being the number of such steps
(4 in the case above). Even with a factor of 20 at each stage, and another crude upper
bound factor of 20 to get to the formal level from the week 2 level, this gives us an
overall factor of increased length of at most 205 = 3, 200, 000 to formalize an argument
at the research article level of detail (terse). This is vastly less than the factor Pelc is
concerned might be necessary. Though this could undoubtedly result in very unwieldy
proofs (if this crude upper bound was attained), they would still be within the bounds of
feasibility, as usually conceived – requiring perhaps a few gigabytes or tens of gigabytes
of space to store on a hard drive.
Even if one can fill out the above sketched argument to make a convincing case that
all rigorous proofs of reasonable length will be feasibly formalizable, this does not meet
one major kind of objection to formalizability: namely, that the process of formalization
so dramatically changes a proof that the formal derivation that results cannot rightly
44
8. FURTHER QUESTIONS
be regarded as the “same proof” as the original, and thus should not be regarded as
a formalization of it. Larvor writes of the “violence or essential loss” that can result
from formalization (Larvor 2012, p. 717). A related question concerns what practical
relevance formalization has, or could have, to mathematics; it played only an indirect role
in the account of rigour from sections I.3 and I.4, and turned out to be inessential to the
process of resolving disputes in mathematics described in section I.5. These questions
will have to await possible consideration in future work.
8 Further questions
Before continuing to examine case studies, a few issues left unresolved about rigorous
proof should be mentioned.
First, to say a bit about a topic that has been neglected: understanding proofs.
Indeed instead of just checking each line of a proof, one generally also wants to under-
stand the proof “as a whole”. This can be phenomenologically quite distinct from mere
confidence that each line follows from the previous ones, as Tieszen (1992, pp. 58–59)
emphasises. Though it is tempting to think about understanding in terms of the dis-
tinctive subjective subjective experience of grasping a proof, this characteristic sensation
may not always be attainable – for instance it may be hard to gain the feeling of an
immediate grasp of a proof taking longer than a page or so, or of a proof which relies on
substantial previous results. An attractive alternative is to think of understanding as an
ability, as advocated by Avigad (2011): for instance understanding a proof may mean
that one can recreate it oneself, convey its ideas informally to another mathematician,
use its ideas or techniques to prove similar results, generalize it, suggest how it could
have been discovered, and so on. In many of these capacities that displays understanding
of a proof, the ability to create or recognize valid proofs – proofs in which every inference
is valid (as discussed above) – is key: recreating the proof means writing out a similar
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valid proof of the same result, generalizing it means writing out a similar valid proof
of a more general result, and so on. Arguably, to convey the ideas behind the proof to
another mathematician means to use words, gestures, diagrams and so on to equip the
recipient with the means to recreate for themselves a similar valid proof of the result
in question. As Thurston (1994, pp. 31–32) emphasises, it can often be much easier to
convey mathematical ideas by informal communication than by embedding them in and
then excavating them from rigorous proofs.
A second point is that in practice in mathematics it is not demanded that every
inference in a proof actually be valid. Total validity is intended when many philosophers
speak of proof (as has been the attitude in this chapter), but in reality if an argument pu-
blished in a mathematics journal contains a number of typos and minor logical errors, it
may still be regarded as a perfectly acceptable proof. We could call the mathematicians’
use of the word proof proof in the weak sense, to distinguish it from the philosophical
use of the term. The key feature I think for proof in this weak sense is I think that
the proportion of valid inferences is high, or very high, and that those inferences which
are invalid are each fixable relatively easily. Thus for instance the classification of finite
simple groups may well be a proof in this weak sense, even though it is so enormously
long that it is practically certain that it contains errors. This is more or less the view
taken by Aschbacher (2005). A proof of a result in this weak sense still establishes that
its conclusion is a logical consequence of the basic principles used – since in principle
one could convert it into a proof in the strict sense, in which case the result would be a
logical consequence of the relevant basic principles (as seen in section I.7), and whether
or not the conclusion is a logical consequence of the basic principles is independent of
whether any such strict proof is actually written out.
Finally, a note on the epistemology of mathematics. In sections I.3 and I.4, an
attempt was made to understand how rigour is judged in mathematics by thinking
about how rigorous proof is learnt – by a gradual ascent up levels of greater and greater
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compression, at each stage being able to tutor one’s judgement of which inferences are
valid by checking if they can be proved in greater detail. There is undoubtedly more that
could be said about this process, but at any rate it is only part of a full epistemology of
mathematics. Indeed it was argued in section I.7 that a valid proof shows its conclusion to
be a logical consequence of the basic principles used; but this in itself does not imply that
the conclusion is true. That would require further arguments, for instance arguments
that the basic principles themselves are true. Thus the epistemology sketched here is one
component of a full epistemology of proof, which would need to be supplemented by an
epistemology of the basic principles themselves. Whether the basic principles generally
used in mathematics – those of set theory – are true, and how we could know this, are
exactly the kinds of epistemological questions that philosophy of mathematics has long
wrestled with, and which some advocates of the shift to focusing on actual mathematics
like to disparage, or describe as irrelevant to mathematics itself (for instance Rav 1999,
Goethe and Friend 2010 and De Toffoli and Giardino 2016). It is of note that thinking
about mathematical practice and the epistemology of proof leads us back naturally to
exactly this standard epistemological question.
9 The choice of proof systems
The discussion of rigour in this chapter was centred around the case of set theory,
formalized in the theory ZFC, but there is no requirement that rigorous mathematics
be founded in this proof system. One could obtain a practice of high level rigorous
mathematics founded on many other proof systems, such as the elementary theory of
the category of sets (ETCS), or homotopy type theory; where in each case, once one has
grasped how the basic principles of the proof system work, one can gradually elide more
and more proof steps and move to proofs at levels of greater and greater compression,
with proofs at each rung up in terms of compression always being able to be filled out
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in greater detail to a previous level of compression already mastered. This is in many
ways not a novel idea. Advocates of ETCS as a foundational system often claim that
when one is familiar with the theory, and able to work using compressed informal proofs
based on it in this manner, the reasoning that is available is essentially indistinguishable
from that used in informal reasoning founded on ZFC; and one of the stated goals of
the homotopy type theory (HoTT) book was to develop a new style of “informal type
theory” (Univalent Foundations Program 2013, p. iv), or informal proof in HoTT, more
compressed arguments founded in the formal theory in this kind of way. In each case,
we can obtain by similar arguments as in section I.7 that more compressed arguments
founded on a proof system are in principle formalizable in that proof system.
Thus we have a potential choice in mathematics about what proof system should be
used to underlie our informal arguments – the choice of a foundation for mathematics.
There are more options than those mentioned above, for instance buttressing ZFC with
additional axioms, such as large cardinal axioms, or instead restricting to a potentially
more secure proof system, such as a predicative system. In chapter VI we will consider
what we should be looking for when choosing between such proof systems, and it will
be argued that the key condition we should seek from a proof system is that it be sound
– that when we can prove generalizations about some kind of mathematical structure
in the theory, these generalizations do actually hold of all real examples of that kind of
structure. First though, we turn to some case studies to test the account of rigour given
in this chapter on.
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Intuition and Permissible Actions
1 Alexander’s lemma
Many authors disagree with the kind of analysis of rigour put forward in chapter I,
where there is a link between rigour and formalizability. Two sets of objections have
already been addressed: the idea that mathematicians should really be regarded as
working in naive set theory (with unrestricted comprehension) in section I.6, and the
worry about whether the process of filling in intermediate inferences in an argument
might not terminate, in section I.7. A third kind of objection was mentioned at the end
of section I.1: concern that a proof may involve reasoning that is somehow irreducibly
high level, that resists being formalized, that requires radically new ideas perhaps to be
introduced before it can be formalized. Although worries of this kind are often expressed
(Rav 1999; 2007; Celluci 2009; Leitgeb 2009; Goethe and Friend 2010; Larvor 2012), the
authors rarely give concrete examples of substantial real world mathematical arguments
to demonstrate the phenomena they describe.
A prominent exception is the case of a famous argument from knot theory called
Alexander’s lemma (Alexander 1923). This received philosophical attention after Field’s
medallist Vaughan Jones recounted it in a philosophical piece (Jones 1998), describing it
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as an easy, intuitive argument that would be very difficult to formalize. Following Jones,
De Toffoli and Giardino make the argument the centrepiece of a case study (De Toffoli
and Giardino 2016) in which they defend a rather different view of proof to that put
forward in chapter I. De Toffoli and Giardino’s claims have subsequently been taken up,
with mild reservations, by Larvor (2019).1
Properly disentangling all the claims that have been made about this lemma takes
some work. The situation is made complicated by the fact that the concept of tame
knot – the key concept in the lemma – is standardly made precise in two very different
ways: via polygonal knots, or via smooth knots.2 Proving a theorem about polygonal
knots allows one to deduce the corresponding theorem about smooth knots and vice
versa, thanks to equivalence results relating the two concepts; but actually carrying out
a proof in terms of polygonal knots can be a very different matter to carrying out a
proof in terms of smooth knots, as turns out to be the case with Alexander’s lemma.
Alexander’s original proof worked with polygonal knots, and Jones’s version used smooth
knots – and this apparently minor difference has huge consequences for the rigour, and
formalizability, of the arguments.
In this chapter I consider De Toffoli and Giardino’s analysis of proof (De Toffoli and
Giardino 2016), which makes some claims that are in tension with the perspective from
chapter I. They recount Alexander’s lemma and use it as a case study to support their
analysis of proof, but I argue that in fact their version of the argument mixes together
features of both Alexander’s original proof and Jones’s retelling – and that this causes
them to misunderstand what is going on in Alexander’s proof at key points, leading
them astray in some of their main conclusions about it, and about proof more generally.
I argue that Alexander’s original proof is actually a very good illustration of a rigorous
1Larvor (2012) also references Alexander’s argument, but omits many of the strong claims made
about it.
2Tame knots are a special case of the more general notion of knot, being those knots which are only
“finitely knotted”. Knots which are not tame are called wild. The theory of wild knots has not progressed
nearly as far as the theory of tame knots, and they are not important in this thesis.
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argument according to the standard described in chapter I.
That clarifies the status of Alexander’s original proof, but not of Jones’s version of
the argument and the comments he makes about it – and leaves open the possibility
that Jones’s version of the argument could be used to support some of De Toffoli and
Giardino and Larvor’s claims, and attack the kind of account of proof put forward in
chapter I. Chapter III considers Jones’s version of the argument and defends against
this possible attack, in the process drawing general lessons about what rigour requires
of pictorial arguments.
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly stating Alexander’s result itself. This result
concerns tame knots, and there are different ways of making this concept precise – a
fact which turns out to be crucially important for assessing the various versions of the
argument, as mentioned above. For now though, a tame knot can just be thought of as a
tangled, knotted loop of string in space – though one which is only “finitely” tangled and
knotted (more precise definitions are found in section II.3). A key tool in knot theory is
the ability to project a knot on a suitable plane, obtaining a knot diagram that indicates
all its salient features (fig. II.1).
Figure II.1: A knot diagram
Alexander’s lemma just states that every tame knot is equivalent to one with a
diagram that only winds one way around an axis. Figure II.2 shows this to be true, as
an example, of the diagram in fig. II.1.
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Figure II.2: A knot diagram winding around an axis
2 De Toffoli and Giardino’s account of proof
Here I describe the key features of the account of proof that De Toffoli and Giardino
put forward, and hope to support by considering Alexander’s lemma. Some aspects of
it I think are correct, but other parts I take issue with. Some of their claims about
Alexander’s lemma are echoed by Larvor (2019), as discussed here. Section II.3 then
relates De Toffoli and Giardino’s version of Alexander’s argument.
One of De Toffoli and Giardino’s main aims (following Larvor 2012, p. 716) is to
challenge the model of formal logic as adequate to account for proof (De
Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 27)
It is not totally clear what view they (and Larvor) are intending to counter here, however.
Formal derivations are a model of proof, and how good or bad a model is will depend
on what you are using it for. It is not clear whether anyone has claimed that formal
derivations are the right model in all circumstances – this is not claimed by Azzouni
(2013) or Burgess (2015), two recent defenders of a link between informal and formal
derivations, and nor is it claimed by my account in chapter I. There are some ways
in which formal derivations are obviously unlike the proofs mathematicians write: if
all you know is the rules of natural deduction, there is no way you will be able to
follow research level mathematics, no matter how smart you are. There is thus more to
say about informal proof than just that it is modelled by formal derivations, and indeed
chapter I sketched a simple account of how the standard of proof in much of mathematics
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– rigour – works. Some of what De Toffoli and Giardino go on to say is compatible with
that, and can be seen as useful additions to it for the particular case of low dimensional
topology, or more widely. Some of their account is in contradiction with it though, and I
will generally take issue with these parts. Some of their stronger claims in this direction
are unsupported by Alexander’s proof, as we will see in sections II.4 and II.5.
De Toffoli and Giardino are right to emphasise the collective aspects of mathematical
practice (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 28–29). They are also right to emphasise the
harnessing of existing human cognitive capacities during mathematical reasoning (ibid.,
pp. 29–30). This would be included under what I vaguely termed “high level” reasoning
in sections I.3 and I.4. However I would amend their discussion to emphasise that when
it comes to rigorous mathematics, the important question is how the existing cognitive
capacities are linked with judgements of provability: how does one learn reliably that
certain natural ways of reasoning can be backed up (given the time and inclination) with
proofs? They next discuss representations, in particular systems of notation, and I think
they make important points here about the value of efficient, suggestive notation (ibid.,
pp. 30–32).
De Toffoli and Giardino’s next topic of “permissible actions” is the main one about
which I have reservations. The concept is drawn from Larvor (2012). To motivate their
discussion of permissible actions, they appeal to a quote from Jones (1998):
I remember being worried by Russell’s paradox as a youngster, and am still
worried by it, but I hope to demonstrate ... that it is not at all difficult to
live with that worry while having complete confidence in one’s mathematics
(Jones 1998, p. 203; De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 203)
They infer from this quote that confidence in mathematics is not based on “‘logic’ or
foundations”, and ask what the actual grounds for conviction are. It is worth saying a
bit about this before moving on to discuss permissible actions. A basic point is that it is
crucial to distinguish how one can gain conviction in mathematics from the question of
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what the standard of proof is in mathematics. It is certainly true that rigorous proof is
not the only way to gain conviction in mathematics: indeed this is the point of Jones’s
quote above, and he supports it with a number examples, such as his discussion of
the huge number of applications of the Fourier transform, making the point that even
if all our proofs of its properties turned out to be fallacious (or built on inconsistent
assumptions) there must still be some sense in which this transform is true or valid
(Jones 1998, pp. 203–204). In section I.2 we also saw a number of examples of inferences
that may be convincing (and some of which were once accepted as valid), but would
not be acceptable by the modern standard of rigour in mathematics. Though Jones is
correct that conviction can be generated without a rigorous proof, that does not mean
that that is the norm in mathematics, or that we should look elsewhere for the actual
grounds for conviction; nor is this evidence either for or against any analysis of proof,
whether based on logic or otherwise.
Now, onto the topic of permissible actions. De Toffoli and Giardino believe that
mathematicians can gauge whether a proof is correct by seeing whether it consists enti-
rely of these permissible actions, which are ways of reasoning that are accepted by the
community of practitioners. As they put it,
To become a practitioner means to learn to operate correctly on the represen-
tations, that is, to perform the appropriate actions. (De Toffoli and Giardino
2016, pp. 32–33)
They describe the proof as being addressed to this particular community of practitioners,
a community which
defines the ‘permissible actions’ on the representations. (ibid., p. 44)
They believe that when Alexander refers to “legitimate operations” he means these kinds
of “permissible actions”. They describe these as
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part of [the community’s] mental model, [which] can be considered as reliable
to gain new knowledge about the object of research. (ibid., p. 45)
They also introduce the term “local criteria of validity” in this connection, arguing that
different areas of mathematics will have “different criteria of validity” (ibid., p. 49).
It is true that there are standards for what is acceptable in mathematical proof, and I
would agree that there is no logic based criterion for this. An attempt to roughly describe
how the standard of rigour in mathematics works was given in chapter I, and I did not put
forward a criterion: one with no prior experience of evaluating mathematics could not
read that account and hope to be able to judge the correctness of proofs. The distinctive
feature of De Toffoli and Giardino’s analysis is in seeing mathematicians as split into
distinct communities, each with their own idiosyncratic ways of reasoning and their own
local standards of correctness – standards which each individual community defines,
without any further justification being supplied or called for. De Toffoli and Giardino
write as though each community’s ways of reasoning are automatically accurate about
the community’s chosen subject matter, because they form part of the mental model the
community shares.
One obvious question this analysis ignores is where these communities come from.
Practitioners of the various branches of mathematics have not been passing their wisdom
down from one generation to the next since time immemorial. Most branches of modern
mathematics have only existed in their present form since around 1900 or later, with the
modern notion of mathematical rigour only stemming from around that time. It is not
clear how the creation of new branches of mathematics and new mathematical commu-
nities would fit into De Toffoli and Giardino’s account. They seem to be denying any
general standard for what is acceptable in proof, which suggests that each community is
free to set its standards as it likes on formation (though as De Toffoli and Giardino tell
it, these standards appear to be fixed once they have been accepted by the community).
Can any group of people studying mathematical subject matter call themselves a com-
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munity of mathematicians, no matter how they do it? What if they extend the notion
of proof to include numerical evidence, or conclusions reached in dreams?
This would evidently be problematic, and the reality is that the creation of new bran-
ches of mathematics is a routine part of the ordinary functioning of the subject. Indeed
new branches of mathematics – studied by a particular “community” – are invented with
some regularity. However one cannot just make up whatever kind of mathematics one
likes, positing the existence of new kinds of objects, together with new basic principles
stating how they behave: in rigorous mathematics, the birth of a new branch requires
a demonstration of how its objects can be defined in terms of existing concepts, and
how its basic principles can be demonstrated as consequences of these definitions. For
instance associativity is in a sense an axiom of group theory, but we do not need to posit
it as a new basic principle – it is just a property that (by definition) any group has.
There are occasionally what might look like exceptions to this, notably the axiom
of universes sometimes used when working with categories (in particular in modern
algebraic geometry, following Grothendieck). This is not an ad hoc assumption about
categories however. One can be justified in appealing to it because (the feeling goes) it
could perfectly well have been amongst the basic principles from the start. It can be
precisely stated, can be motivated philosophically in a similar way to the other axioms,
and is known to be independent of them. Having noted this special case, it can be put
to one side.
It is true that in each branch there will be distinctive ways of reasoning, or “permis-
sible actions”. However De Toffoli and Giardino appear to suggest that these actions are
reliable because the community accepts them – that since they are accepted they form
part of the shared mental model of the practitioners, and thus are constitutive of the
subject matter of the branch, so are automatically an accurate way to reason about that
subject matter. In reality, in rigorous mathematics the opposite is the case. The per-
missible actions are not reliable because the community accepts them: the community
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accepts them because they are reliable – because they can be seen and checked to be
accurate ways of reasoning about the subject matter, according to the definitions given.
As well as being too permissive in its implications for what standards a community
of mathematicians can set, the analysis in terms of permissible actions also does not
properly reflect the pervasiveness and importance of novelty in mathematical arguments.
De Toffoli and Giardino do accept the possibility that the practice of mathematics may
evolve, for instance with material representations (symbols, notation, diagrams and so
on) stemming from certain mental models, but then leading to insights which feed back
in and modify the mental models themselves (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 30).
But this is only a potential source of gradual change in the standard of proof that a
community accepts, and it seems that at each point in time on this view there is still a
fixed list “permissible actions” which states what kinds of inferences can be made, a list
taught to each new practitioner as a student. If a novel kind of argument is made, not
comprised of inferences on the list of permissible actions, then whether this argument is
valid or not will (apparently) come down to whether the community can be persuaded
to change their standards of proof to accept it.
In reality however mathematical reasoning is not nearly so constricted. Consider
the introduction of probabilistic methods into combinatorics by Erdős, the application
of linear algebra to group theory by Frobenius and others, and the development of
homology by numerous mathematicians (including Alexander himself). If a brilliant
mathematician develops a new way of reasoning about some object, then if that way
of reasoning is correct, and can be seen to be correct, and justified in greater detail
and precision if necessary, then it is a valid way of reasoning – even if the community
had never even considered it before. Many breakthroughs in mathematics consist of
exactly this. Even in more ‘everyday’ mathematics, papers will often contain new ways
of arguing and new ideas, but on a smaller scale. The novelty we see in mathematics
is possible precisely because there is a general standard for acceptable proof, one not
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constituted by the methods each community of mathematicians currently happens to
use.
De Toffoli and Giardino’s account of permissible actions – and their attack on logic
based approaches to proof – is supported by their view that visualization, imagination
and intuition are crucial to the practice of proving in topology. They emphasise the
importance of reasoning by envisioning and imagining transformations of topological
representations (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 44–46), and regard intuition as playing
an ineliminable role at a key point in the proof (ibid., pp. 44). Larvor (2019) accepts
their analysis in terms of visualizing transformations (pointing out a similarity with
thinking about how one could twist a piece of rope around), and accepts their claim that
“Alexander had no qualms about relying on [spatial intuition] in this proof”, though
noting that this is remarkable (ibid., p. 14). He does then row back somewhat however,
pointing out that Alexander used a polygonal notion of knot and knot deformation in
his argument, in contrast to De Toffoli and Giardino’s account – an absolutely key point,
as seen here and in chapter III.
Now the account of rigour from chapter I does not rule out uses of intuition and
visualization; although the focus there was on the ability to prove inferences in greater
detail, it was noted – in section I.4 – that it is also essential in mathematics that argu-
ments can proceed at a high level, without one having a detailed proof of each inference
in mind (either when writing, or when following the argument). Certainly some such
high level inferences will involve visualization, imagination, and what might be called
“intuition”.
However for these kinds of judgements to be rigorous – as the notion is usually un-
derstood – this has to be intuition of a rather special kind. One cannot just be giving
an untutored judgement of the plausibility of a claim: one has to be judging its pro-
vability. A classic example to illustrate this is the Jordan curve theorem, referenced
in section I.2, which states roughly that every continuous injective closed curve in the
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plane has an inside and an outside. This is intuitively about as obvious a statement as
one can give, and to someone without experience of pathological functions it is probably
hard to imagine what a counterexample could possibly look like. Nonetheless the proof
is famously hard (if one works from the definitions, without tools like algebraic topo-
logy). Part of learning rigorous mathematics is learning to tell the difference between a
statement like the Jordan curve theorem – which is obvious, but hard to prove – and a
statement like the intermediate value theorem, which is obvious and whose proof is in
fact straightforward. Of course intuitive judgements of plausibility are very important
in mathematics: it is crucial that us humans are able to judge a statement like that of
the Jordan curve theorem to be very likely, and thus set out to prove it. But when doing
rigorous mathematics, there is a great difference between the kinds of judgements that
would guide research in this way, and the kinds of judgements that are acceptable in a
proof itself.
The rest of this chapter considers Alexander’s argument to see whether it supports
De Toffoli and Giardino’s more controversial conclusions – in terms of each branch of
mathematics having its own local standards of correctness, and topological proofs so-
metimes involving essential appeals to intuition – or whether it supports the kind of
view of rigour seen in chapter I, some features of which were recalled here.
A first issue with their analysis – in which mathematics is split up into separate
communities, with their own standards of proof and ways of reasoning – is that it is not
even clear whether there was an established community of knot theorists at the time
Alexander was writing (1923): this was before some of the major inaugural results of
the field, such as Reidemeister’s theorem – the seminal theorem which states that any
equivalent tame knots have diagrams which can be related by a finite sequence of the
three Reidemeister moves (Alexander and Briggs 1926; Reidemeister 1927).
It will be argued at any rate that Alexander’s paper is not addressed to such a
community, using ways of reasoning that only an initiate would understand. Instead the
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entire argument is elementary, and straightforward to anyone with a basic knowledge of
mathematics. He does not assume a background knowledge of knot theory, gesturing at a
simple definition of tame knot as composed of a finite number of straight pieces (though
he does not state this completely precisely) – here we see the concepts of the new field
being defined in terms of existing concepts, as discussed above. Based on this definition,
we can follow the argument, and see his inferences about tame knots to be accurate
– not because we have been taught special kinds of reasoning used by knot theorists,
but because we already have a grasp of how straight line segments in R3 behave. We
can follow the argument involving the new concepts because of our grasp of the existing
concepts, checking any inferences in greater detail as necessary. The argument Alexander
gives is rigorous by the general standard enforced widely in mathematics, discussed in
chapter I – it does not rely on some special standard of proof used by knot theorists.
It is true that one key concept in the argument – the “legitimate operations” – goes
undefined, but it is clear from the context what this is intended to mean, as I discuss
in section II.4. This is one critical point where De Toffoli and Giardino misinterpret
Alexander, apparently taking him to be working with an intuitive notion of continuous
(or smooth) transformation, without precise definition. This misinterpretation leads
them to misunderstand the inference Alexander makes with the notion, which leads
them in turn to overstate Alexander’s reliance on intuition and visualization.
A second respect in which they misinterpret Alexander, also leading them to overstate
his reliance on intuition and visualization, is in the structure of his argument: how his
argument ensures that the process of knot modifications described terminates. Again
they claim he is relying purely on intuition to justify this, and again their claim is
erroneous (as a claim about Alexander’s argument), as I discuss in section II.5.
First, I will briefly describe De Toffoli and Giardino’s account of Alexander’s argu-
ment, before looking at these two aspects in detail.
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3 De Toffoli and Giardino’s account of Alexander’s argu-
ment
As discussed in section II.1, there are currently three versions of Alexander’s argument
in play: Alexander’s original proof (Alexander 1923), a description by Field’s medallist
Vaughan Jones in a philosophical piece (Jones 1998), and the version of De Toffoli and
Giardino in their own philosophical piece (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016). Alexander’s
and Jones’ versions are importantly different, but De Toffoli and Giardino’s version
combines together aspects of both, and this is where the problems stem from.
Here I will limit myself to describing the key features of De Toffoli and Giardino’s
version. Later I will mention contrasting features of Alexander’s original, but I will not
relate his whole proof, as it is perfectly accessible in its original form – brief, simple and
clearly written (Alexander 1923).
Now for some definitions. A knot is just defined to be a continuous injective map
S1 → R3. Two knots are equivalent if they are related by an ambient isotopy, which is
a continuous deformation of the first into the second which also deforms the ambient
space continuously.
The kind of knots we are interested in are the tame knots, those which are only
“finitely knotted”. As discussed in section II.1, there are two different standard ways to
define what a tame knot is – and this turns out to be important when unpicking what
is going on in the different accounts of the lemma. The first is to use the notion of
polygonal knot, a loop made of a finite number of straight line segments, intersecting
only at the relevant endpoints. The second is to use that of smooth knot, a smooth non
self intersecting map S1 → R3. It is the case that every polygonal knot is equivalent to a
smooth knot and every smooth knot is equivalent to a polygonal knot; and we can thus
define a tame knot to be one which is equivalent to a polygonal knot, or – equivalently
– to a smooth knot.
61
CHAPTER II. INTUITION AND PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS
Alexander works quite explicitly with polygonal knots, whereas Jones phrases his ver-
sion of the argument for smooth knots.3 Ultimately these give the same conclusion, since
every polygonal knot is equivalent to a smooth knot and vice versa; but the arguments
are (necessarily) quite different. De Toffoli and Giardino oscillate between regarding the
knot they are discussing as polygonal and as smooth as they move through the argument,
following Alexander in places and Jones in others, and this is how some crucial aspects
of Alexander’s argument are lost.4 When discussing De Toffoli and Giardino’s paper,
Larvor notes that Alexander did work with polygonal knots, and wonders whether this
might matter to their conclusions (Larvor 2019, p. 2728); he is right to wonder about
this, though does not fully realise its importance.
Now onto the argument itself. De Toffoli and Giardino phrase this as showing that
any knot is equivalent to a closed braid (see their paper for an account of braids, whose
nature will not be important here). However they limit themselves to arguing for the
result seen in section II.2, that any tame knot has a diagram in which there is an
axis around which the knot always goes the same way – always clockwise or always
anti-clockwise. This is Alexander’s original lemma, which had no mention of braids –
braids were only defined a few years later – though the fact that every tame knot has a
representation as a closed braid is a quick corollary.
The relevant part of De Toffoli and Giardino’s account of the argument (De Toffoli
and Giardino 2016, p. 41) starts by taking a tame knot K with diagram DK , and taking
this diagram DK to be polygonal – thus implicitly assuming that K is polygonal (which
they can do since any tame knot is equivalent to a polygonal knot). They take a small
linear piece AB of DK which does not contain more than one crossing, and choose a
point C such that O lies in the triangle ABC. They replace AB in the diagram by the
two segments AC and CB. This gives a precise description of the intended modification
3A full discussion of Jones’s argument is left until chapter III, with a more detailed discussion of the
definitions for smooth knots (involving a slightly different characterization of them) in section III.3.
4It is clear that De Toffoli and Giardino are aware though that smooth and polygonal knots are
different, as seen for instance in their footnote 26 (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 41).
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to the knot diagram, but leaves open the question of what the modification of the knot
K is which leads to this change in DK . This is one of the key points where De Toffoli
and Giardino depart from Alexander’s proof.
To explain what modification of K gives rise to this change in DK , they appeal
to a Jones’s version of the argument. He is working with smooth knots, rather than
polygonal knots, and phrases this key part by saying that one “throws it over one’s
shoulder”, referring to the short stretch of knot being focused on (Jones 1998, p. 211).
He illustrates this with a diagram like that of fig. II.3. De Toffoli and Giardino repeat
Jones’s phrase, saying that one throws the segment AB over one’s shoulder (ibid., p. 211).
They reference pictures and videos of how this manoeuvre could be carried out on a







Figure II.3: The over the shoulder manoeuvre
Basing this part of their argument on Jones’s version, their description and pictures
of this manoeuvre involve smooth knots. This clashes badly with the context, as by
assumption their knot is polygonal. They describe how
Intuitively, the move consists in replacing a portion of the knot that goes
in the opposite direction by throwing it in the other side of the point O so
that it goes in the right direction. This has to be done carefully, without
introducing new entanglements. (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 41–42)
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They do not describe why care is needed, how entanglements could be introduced, or how
they could be avoided – and it is appears that again in this remark they are describing
the smooth rather than polygonal case.
It appears they feel that in this description they are clarifying details left implicit by
Alexander, quoting Alexander as saying
the transformation of DK obviously corresponds to an isotopic transformation
of the space curve L (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 42, emphasis De
Toffoli and Giardino, notation changed by them)
Here they use L in place of K, as Alexander is discussing a system of linked knots (for
which De Toffoli and Giardino are introducing this symbol L) rather than just a single
knot.
Their final remark is that by repeating the process, one can eliminate every segment
of the diagram which went in the wrong direction, and obtain the desired result.
There are two key respects here in which De Toffoli and Giardino unwittingly alter
Alexander’s argument. One, highlighted above, is in what modification is made to the
knot K that leads to the described modification of the diagram DK . The second is in the
structure of the argument, leading De Toffoli and Giardino to believe that intuition is
required to deliver that the process of knot modifications terminates. These alterations
are the source of De Toffoli and Giardino’s bolder claims about the argument, which
they use as grounds for their analysis of proof more generally. The first is discussed in
section II.4, and the second in section II.5.
4 The “legitimate operations”
Firstly we have the nature of the knot modification Alexander uses: given (in De Toffoli
and Giardino’s notation) a knot K, we make some modification to it that corresponds
to the transformation of the diagram DK discussed in section II.3. When interpreting
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this De Toffoli and Giardino drawing on Jones’s version of the argument, despite Jones
working with smooth rather than polygonal knots, meaning De Toffoli and Giardino’s
description and pictures make little sense with regard to the polygonal knot K they (and
more importantly, Alexander) are working with.
De Toffoli and Giardino then misinterpret Alexander’s phrase of modifying the knot
using “legitimate operations”. Working from their pictures and description – based enti-
rely on Jones’s version of the argument, and a recent video by Dalvit (2012) – they infer
that Alexander is appealing to a shared practice amongst topologists of envisioning con-
tinuous transformations. They believe that this form of reasoning is not propositional
and cannot be reduced to formal statements. They thus believe that Alexander’s argu-
ment is not valid according to any general standard of validity that applies throughout
mathematics, only being valid according to a special, local standard of validity (based
on envisioning these kinds of continuous transformations) used in some areas of low
dimensional topology. This is the main basis for their claim about mathematics being
broken up into separate communities, each with their own standard of validity, that was
discussed in section II.2. A second contributing factor to this claim is their altering the
structure of Alexander’s argument, discussed in section II.5.
To understand what Alexander actually means, it will help to make clearer the
context of the relevant part of his argument. Firstly, Alexander is quite explicit that he
is working with a polygonal notion of knot, assuming that a knot is composed of a finite
number of straight line segments in R3 (Alexander 1923, p. 93). This is central to the
way his proof works, as he moves through the finite number of straight line segments one
by one, fixing any which in the diagram go the wrong way around the axis (section II.5
discusses the structure of his argument more closely).
When discussing Alexander’s proof, I will base my notation on De Toffoli and Giar-
dino’s from section II.3, rather on Alexander’s, but it is useful to supplement it. I will
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write [a1, . . . an] for the convex hull of a1, . . . an, defined to be
[a1, . . . an] =
{ n∑
i=1






Thus for instance [a, b] is the line segment between point a and point b (for a, b distinct),
and [a, b, c] is the closed triangular region with a, b, c as its vertices (for a, b, c not colli-
near). If a < b ∈ R then this segment [a, b] is the usual closed interval with endpoints a
and b.
We have a polygonal knot K in R3, with projection DK onto a plane P . Let π : R3 →
P be the orthogonal projection, so DK = π(K). We have picked a point O in P , and we
are modifying DK so that it only goes clockwise (say) around O. [A,B] is a subsegment
of DK which goes anti-clockwise, and such that DK has at most one crossing on [A,B].
We select a point C such that the point O lies in the interior of the triangle [A,B,C].
We seek to find a knot K ′ which is equivalent to K such that the diagram DK′ of K ′ is
the same as DK , but with the two segments [A,C], [C,B] replacing the single segment
[A,B]. This is the context of the quote from Alexander seen at the end of section II.3:
The transformation of DK obviously corresponds to an isotopic transforma-
tion of the space figure K. (Alexander 1923, p. 94)
(the notation here has been modified to fit with De Toffoli and Giardino’s account5).
This is where De Toffoli and Giardino appeal to Jones’s version of the argument, for
the smooth case, using his phrase about throwing the knot over one’s shoulder, with a
diagram like that in fig. II.3. They also use stills from a a video by Dalvit (2012) made
to illustrate the smooth version of the argument. As mentioned in section II.3 and at the
start of this section, this makes little sense in the context Alexander is working. His knot
is polygonal and no smooth isotopy can be applied to it (due to kinks in the knot where
5Alexander here is actually talking about a linked system of knots S, rather than a single knot K,
but this is of no importance for us.
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the different segments meet). Also, the kinds of continuous/smooth transformations that
De Toffoli and Giardino describe and picture would not lead to a result with the required
diagram – the same as that of K, but with the two segments [A,C], [C,B] replacing the
single segment [A,B]. If one isotopied K into a smooth knot, the result would have a
smooth diagram, not a polygonal diagram.
However if one puts aside Jones’s version of the argument and instead focuses just on
what Alexander is saying, it is clear what he means. We will suppose first that there is
a single segment of K lying above [A,B], so that there are a, b ∈ K such that [a, b] ⊆ K
and π([a, b]) = [A,B] (actually it appears to be an oversight by Alexander that this is not
guaranteed at this point, as will be discussed later in this section; a slight rephrasing of
the argument would guarantee this). If DK has a crossing point on [a, b], with x ∈ [a, b]
such that there is y /∈ [a, b] with π(x) = π(y), then we can assume WLOG (by a rotation
of space) that x− y points vertically upwards. Thus the region vertically above the line
segment [a, b] is free from obstructions.
We are seeking a knot K ′ obtained by an isotopic transformation of K such that
π(K ′) is the same as π(K) = DK but with the two segments [A,C], [C,B] replacing
the single segment [A,B]. Thus K ′ must have the line segment [a, b] replaced by some
combination of line segments in R3 whose projection (under π) is [A,C] ∪ [C,B]. So
there must be a point c with π(c) = C, and a joined to c in K ′ by a sequence of line
segments which project to [A,C], and c joined to b in K ′ by a sequence of line segments
which project to [C,B]. Does such a point c exist?
Obviously yes. As we are visualizing it, the region vertically above [a, b] is free from
obstructions, so if we take c to be enormously high up then the triangle [a, b, c] will go
almost straight up from the line segment [a, b], and will not hit anywhere in K – in other
words, with [a, b, c] ∩K = [a, b]. This is illustrated in fig. II.4. Thus we can take K ′ to
be K but with [a, b] replaced by [a, c] ∪ [c, b], which has the required projection, as seen
in fig. II.5.
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Figure II.4: Avoiding K with the triangle [a, b, c]
There is no question that this is what Alexander intends, rather than the vaguely
specified continuous/smooth transformation De Toffoli and Giardino describe and pic-
ture. Perhaps they were attempting to make the proof more accessible to a lay audience,
but in truth figs. II.4 and II.5 give a simpler and clearer picture than their account.
It is clear from the preceding Alexander has a notion of isotopy in mind on which if we
have a knotK with a segment [a, b] and a point c such that the triangle [a, b, c]∩K = [a, b],
then K is isotopic to K ′ where K ′ is the same as K but with [a, b] replaced by [a, c]∪[c, b].
If Alexander had a notion of isotopy in mind on which this was not possible, his paper
would be misleading at this key point. We don’t need to know any more about his notion
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Figure II.5: The result of replacing [a, b] with [a, c] ∪ [c, b]
of isotopy than this to follow his argument, and this much we can infer from it.
It turns out that this is essentially exactly the standard notion of equivalence for
polygonal knots. Alexander gives the definition in another paper:
On any edge AB we may construct a triangle ABC, so drawn that neither the
vertex C, the edge AC, the edge CB, nor the plane triangular region bounded
by ABC has a point in common with the knot. We may then transform the
knot by removing the edge AB and substituting in its place the edges AC
and CB, along with the vertex C. We may also perform the reverse operation
which consists in replacing a pair of consecutive edges AC and CB, together
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with their common vertex C by a single edge AB, provided neither the edge
AB nor the plane triangular region bounded by ABC has a point in common
with the knot. Each of the transformations here described will be called an
elementary deformation. (Alexander and Briggs 1926, p. 563)
He defines two knots K1 and K2 to be of the same type if they can be related by a finite
sequence of elementary deformations of the above kind. If this holds I will instead say
that K1 can be polygonally deformed into K2. This is an equivalence relation.
The standard notion of equivalence for arbitrary knots (not just polygonal) is that
of ambient isotopy. We define a knot here to be a continuous injective map φ : S1 → R3.
Then an ambient isotopy is a continuous map H : R3 × [0, 1] → R3 such that t 7→ H(t, s)
is a homeomorphism R3 → R3 for all s and H(t, 0) = t for all t. If φ, ψ are knots, an
ambient isotopy from φ to ψ is an ambient isotopy H such that H(φ(t), 1) = ψ(t) for all
t. We call φ, ψ ambient isotopic if an ambient isotopy from φ to ψ exists, and this is an
equivalent relation on knots.
It is in fact the case that two polygonal knots are equivalent under polygonal defor-
mation iff they are ambient isotopic. This is a basic fact of knot theory, in a sense more
basic than the equivalence of smooth and piecewise linear notions of knot that De Toffoli
and Giardino cite (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 41, footnote 26). One direction of
this equivalence of equivalences is easy: that if K1 and K2 are polygonal knots such that
K1 can be polygonally deformed into K2, then K1 is ambient isotopic to K2 (actually
ambient isotopic via a piecewise linear ambient isotopy). This is proved for instance as
one of the first propositions in Burde and Zieschang (2002, pp. 6–7, implication (3)⇒(2)
of Proposition 1.10). Thus under either polygonal deformation or ambient isotopy, it is
clear that replacing [a, b] in K by [a, c] ∪ [c, b] gives an equivalent knot (the former by
definition, the latter by a simple argument). Thus under either definition Alexander’s
proof is valid, and we do not need to know which one he intended to follow it.
I will shortly discuss how De Toffoli and Giardino’s claims hold up in light of all these
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points. Before that there are two things that should be remarked on. The first is the
existence of a point c high enough up that K∩ [a, b, c] = [a, b]. This is a good example of
the kind of high level reasoning discussed in sections I.3, I.4 and II.2. Someone trained
in maths can “see” this to be true by visualizing the situation; but it is also clear how
one would spell this out in greater detail. For λ > 0 let cλ = c + λn where n is the
normal to P pointing “upwards”, i.e. in the direction of x− y if K has a crossing point
x ∈ [a, b] with π(y) = π(x), y /∈ [a, b], as discussed above (if there is no such x we can
take n to be any non zero normal to P ). Then the claim is that for λ sufficiently large,
K ∩ [a, b, cλ] = [a, b]. We can split this up into multiple subclaims. Let [d, a] be the edge
of K preceding [a, b], and [b, e] the edge following [a, b]. Let [p, q] be the edge containing
y if there is such a y, otherwise we can take [p, q] = ∅. Then we have that
K \ ((d, a] ∪ [a, b] ∪ [b, e) ∪ (p, q))
is compact with
π(K \ ((d, a] ∪ [a, b] ∪ [b, e) ∪ (p, q))) ∩ [A,B] = ∅,
and we need to argue that:
• For λ sufficiently large, [a, b, cλ] ∩ [d, a] = {a}
• For λ sufficiently large, [a, b, cλ] ∩ [b, e] = {b}
• For λ sufficiently large, [a, b, cλ] ∩ [p, q] = ∅
• For λ sufficiently large, [a, b, cλ] ∩ (K \ ((d, a] ∪ [a, b] ∪ [b, e) ∪ (p, q))) = ∅.
Each of these can indeed be proved in greater detail if necessary. It appears that this
comes to a few pages, if written out comprehensively. Of course one does not have to
write this out to see Alexander’s proof to be valid; but it is important for rigour that
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it be possible to argue the inference in greater detail if called for, and that it is not an
irreducibly high level intuition. As discussed in section I.3 and section II.2, I think there
is an important question for the epistemology of mathematical proof here: how and in
what circumstances can one gain the ability to reliably judge high level inferences like
this to be provable in greater detail?
The second point is that in the above, I introduced the assumption that there is a
single segment of K lying above [A,B] – that there are a, b ∈ K such that [a, b] ⊆ K
and π([a, b]) = [A,B]. If one was careless when visualizing the situation one might well
assume that [A,B] would have to have such a line segment [a, b] lying above it, but in
fact this need not be the case: all we can guarantee is that there is a finite sequence
[a1, b1], . . . [an, bn] of line segments contained in K with [A,B] =
∪n
i=1 π([ai, bi]). Each
of these line segments [ai, bi] must lie above the line segment [A,B], but they can have
different vertical components to their gradients. In this case the argument proceeds
much the same way as above, but the point c has to be picked high enough that for
each i, the triangle [ai, bi, c] only intersects K in [ai, bi]. The unnecessary complication
this creates appears to be a simple oversight by Alexander. When he talks about “P
mov[ing] along certain segments of the broken line” (Alexander 1923, p. 94) he could
just as easily talk instead about P moving along the projection of certain segments of
the knot above. This would not affect the rest of his proof at all, and in this case each
segment [A,B] like the one we considered above would have a single segment [a, b] of K
above it.
Now to De Toffoli and Giardino’s claims about this part of the argument. First,
they claim that the reasoning is not propositional reasoning, nor formal reasoning, and
is not based on formal reasoning, nor can it be reduced to formal statements (De Toffoli
and Giardino 2016, pp. 43–44, 48–49). It is not entirely clear what they mean by
this. Alexander’s written proof consists entirely of words and symbols, and contains no
pictures – in what sense is it “not propositional”? One can reason from a first proposition
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to a second in many different ways, including via one’s spatiotemporal faculties. Perhaps
when they say propositional reasoning, they mean reasoning in terms of strict logical
rules; and of course Alexander’s argument is not literally a formal argument – nor are
most published proofs. This is not a significant point though, and I doubt anyone has
ever claimed the opposite. Although Alexander’s proof is not formal, as discussed in
chapter I and above it is important for rigour that its inferences be provable in greater
detail if requested; and this is indeed the case, as sketched for one key inference above.
If one keeps repeating this process, asking for greater detail/more precision in every
inference, and then for greater detail/more precision in each of those more detailed
inferences in turn, one will eventually reach a formal derivation. This is line with the
briefly sketched argument in section I.7 that all rigorous proofs are formalizable, as a
consequence of the norm of rigour. I am not claiming any epistemic benefits to this here
however, just noting that it can be done.
With regard to the claimed importance of non-propositional reasoning, it is also
worth noting that the crucial clarifications of Alexander’s argument given above were
propositional – the correct intended knot modification, the existence of the point c high
enough above the knot that K ∩ [a, b, c] = [a, b], and so on. These propositions can be
illustrated visually, but if one had to limit oneself to the propositions or the illustrations
in writing out the argument, I think the propositions would be the part to keep.
Although Alexander’s proof would require a normal mathematician to do some vi-
sualising to follow it, De Toffoli and Giardino do not quite grasp the nature of the
visualization involved. They describe Alexander’s proof as based on the manipulation of
concrete spatio-temporal objects (ibid., p. 44), which is inaccurate as Alexander’s proof
is based on knots being a finite union of straight line segments, which are not concrete
and have zero width (of course in some crude sense one would could trace back a grasp of
how straight lines behave to familiarity with concrete objects, but in this sense almost all
mathematical reasoning would be based on the concrete and the claim is uninteresting).
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They repeatedly refer to Alexander’s argument as involving smooth or continuous trans-
formations (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 41, 43, 44, 45, 46). As discussed above,
Alexander intends a polygonal deformation of the knot; referring to this as “continu-
ous” is misleading in its excess generality, and referring to it as “smooth” is incorrect.
This polygonal deformation requires a much more straightforward visualization than the
continuous/smooth ones they indicate in their various diagrams (ibid., pp. 42). Their
remarks about being careful not to introduce new entanglements while transforming the
knot might be pertinent to Jones’s version, but are not relevant to Alexander’s actual
proof with its simple polygonal transformation (ibid., p. 42).
This all leads them to overestimate the role played by visualization in the proof,
which is much simpler and more easily backed up by detailed arguments then they
describe. This completely undermines their claim that Alexander’s proof relies on a
special “local” standard of validity used by topologists, in terms of envisioning continuous
transformations (ibid., pp. 43–46, 48–49). In fact Alexander’s proof is perfectly rigorous
by the usual standards in mathematics (with a mild imperfection in the point noted
above that he should guarantee a single segment of K lying above [A,B], but does not,
unnecessarily complicating things slightly).
De Toffoli and Giardino’s claims here are really only suited to Jones’s version of the
argument – they are right that Jones’s version seems to have fairly irreducible appeals
to intuition and spatiotemporal reasoning, and that it would be very difficult to prove
in greater detail or formalize. A full discussion of Jones’s version of the argument, and
whether it can be used to support these comments on proof, is found in chapter III.
5 Termination of the process
There a second respect in which De Toffoli and Giardino misrepresent Alexander’s ar-
gument which leads them to overstate its reliance on visualization and intuition. The
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proof describes a sequence of modifications to a knot, and it is essential to the proof that
this sequence eventually terminates, in a knot with a diagram of the required form (only
going the right way around an axis in the plane); if it does not terminate, the lemma
fails. Here De Toffoli and Giardino claim that
it is left to our intuition to prove that . . . it is not an infinite process.
Alexander does not really [give] us any other justification: this reasoning
plays an epistemic role. (ibid., p. 44)
However as was the case in section II.4, their conclusion rests on a confusion. In this
case, they miss out key steps in Alexander’s reasoning, which ensure the termination of
the process. They are wrong to think that in their version of the argument “intuition”
could guarantee the termination of the process – in the argument as they have stated it,
there is no guarantee that the process will terminate.
I will start by discussing the problem with De Toffoli and Giardino’s version of the
argument. They choose a small straight portion [A,B] of the diagram, which goes the
wrong way aroundO and contains at most one crossing, and they correct this one segment
– bending it to go the other way around O. They then move onto another small straight
portion of the diagram which goes the wrong way and contains at most one crossing,
and do the same. Since the diagram has only finitely many crossings, one might hope
that this process would always terminate. The problem is that when bending a segment
to go the right way, one may introduce extra crossings to the diagram, and one may
in fact introduce extra crossings to the troublesome parts of the diagram – that go the
wrong way around O. Thus one could potentially keep on going forever, bending more
and more segments of the diagram to go the right way, but constantly adding to the
workload as one goes by increasing the number of troublesome crossings. The diagram
would get more and more complicated, with smaller and smaller segments being bent
the right way each time. The lemma would fail.
De Toffoli and Giardino show some awareness of this problem in the above quote, but
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are wrong to think that it can be brushed aside by “intuition” (De Toffoli and Giardino
2016, p. 44). In the process as they describe it, they have left the above possibility wide
open. It would not be difficult to describe a sequence of knot modifications that fits their
description but never terminates: take two troublesome sections S1 and S2 on opposite
sides of O, and first correct a section of S1 containing a crossing while simultaneously
adding at least one troublesome crossing to S2, then correct a section of S2 containing a
crossing while simultaneously adding at least one troublesome crossing to S1, and so on.
Of course one could use one’s “intuition” to see that this could be avoided – that one
could give a more careful description of the process that ruled out this possibility. But
that is not to use intuition to see their argument is valid: it would be to use intuition
to rewrite their argument to make it valid. Their comment that one has to carry out
the over the shoulder manoeuvre “carefully” to avoid introducing new entanglements
(ibid., p. 42) does not help, since the procedure being described is one that has to work
without human oversight or intelligence (it has to work just as well for a knot diagram
with 101000 crossings as with 10).
In fact, the problem is easily avoided, as seen in Alexander’s actual proof. The key
difference between his proof and the version described by De Toffoli and Giardino is in
its logical structure – exactly the kind of feature that a perspective focused overmuch on
visualization and intuition is likely to miss. Alexander’s proof is not an induction, which
is the attempted structure of De Toffoli and Giardino’s; it is a double induction, with the
part of the argument described by De Toffoli and Giardino being the inner induction.
Indeed, Alexander’s proof first considers the set of segments of DK which bend the
wrong way around O (in his notation, he considers the set of segments of Sπ which
bend the wrong way around L). I will call this set T here. His argument deals with
each element σ of T in turn, by breaking each such σ up into finitely many subsegments
σ1, . . . σn on each of which there is at most one crossing. The point is that one when
one corrects the subsegment σi one does not add crossings to σ – though one may add
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crossings to other elements of T . To make this completely clear, we can phrase the
argument as follows. I will not be entirely formal here, sufficing to make clear this
double induction structure.
Proposition. Suppose K is a polygonal knot and σ a line segment contained in DK
which goes around O the wrong way. Suppose σi is a subsegment of σ such that DK has
at most one crossing on σ. Then K is equivalent to a polygonal knot L with the same
diagram as K, except with the subsegment σi = [A,B] replaced by two segments [A,C]
and [C,B] with C a point such that O ∈ [A,B,C].
Proof. This is the part of the argument discussed in section II.4, and the part that
appears in De Toffoli and Giardino’s account (in somewhat altered form, as discussed in
section II.3 and section II.4).
Proposition. Suppose K is a polygonal knot and σ a line segment contained in DK
which goes around O the wrong way. Then K is equivalent to a polygonal knot L which
has the same diagram as K outside of σ, and such that L’s diagram goes the right way
around O on the part it replaces σ with.
Proof. We break σ up into subsegments σ1, . . . σn such that each σi has at most one cros-
sing. Then by repeatedly applying the previous proposition (this is the inner induction)
to each σi in turn, we obtain the result. Here we use the fact that if σi = [A,B] and C
is a point such that O ∈ [A,B,C], then ([A,C] ∪ [C,B]) ∩ σ = {A,B}, so that replacing
σi with [A,C] ∩ [C,B] does not add any crossings to any σj for j > i.
Proposition. Suppose K is a polygonal knot. Then K is equivalent to a polygonal knot
L with a diagram which only goes around O the right way.
Proof. This is by induction on the size of the set of segments of DK which go around O
the wrong way, with the previous proposition providing the induction hypothesis (and
the base case trivial).
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Thus Alexander’s argument here is perfectly rigorous – by the normal standards –
as stated. The apparent flaw De Toffoli and Giardino discuss, the possibility that the
process need not terminate – which they look to intuition to solve – is a flaw their version
inherits from Jones’s, and has no root in Alexander’s original argument.
In summary, the account of rigour put forward in chapter I is unthreatened by Alex-
ander’s proof. On the contrary, Alexander’s proof is a good illustration of it. All of De
Toffoli and Giardino’s stronger claims about Alexander’s argument rest on two alterati-
ons: concerning the nature of the knot deformation Alexander intends, and the structure
of his argument. With these points cleared up, their claims about his argument are seen
to have no basis. The grounds for Larvor’s statement (echoing De Toffoli and Giardino)
that “Alexander had no qualms about relying on [spatial intuition] in this proof” are
also removed.
This resolution of De Toffoli and Giardino’s claims about Alexander’s argument de-
stroys the basis for their more general claims about mathematics being split into different
communities, each with their own standard of validity, claims which were critiqued in
section II.2. The remaining question is whether Jones’s argument can be used to support
some of De Toffoli and Giardino’s comments and attack the kind of account of rigour
put forward in chapter I – a question considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter III
Rigour, Pictures and Knot
Theory
This chapter has two linked goals. Firstly, to clarify the status of Jones’s version of Alex-
ander’s lemma; and secondly, to determine what rigour in general requires of pictorial
arguments (a loose end from chapter I).
Jones describes the argument he puts forward as being very simple and intuitive, but
very difficult to formalize. De Toffoli and Giardino (2016) make these same claims about
Alexander’s lemma, echoed in turn (with a little hesitancy) by Larvor (2019); as seen
in chapter II, De Toffoli and Giardino believe they are analyzing Alexander’s original
proof, but in fact they misrepresent key aspects of Alexander’s argument by mixing
it with Jones’s. The possibility remains that De Toffoli and Giardino’s, and Larvor’s
comments are accurate when applied to Jones’s version however. If correct – if Jones’s
argument is rigorous, simple, intuitive and very difficult to formalize – this could pose a
challenge to the view of rigour put forward in chapter I.
However this chapter contends that the reason the argument is so hard to formalize
is because it falls a long way short of being rigorous, by the normal standard. To
show this, the chapter uses typical features of what is normally understood by rigour in
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mathematics, rather than directly relying on the account from chapter I; in the process,
though, the close connection between the account from chapter I and these usual features
of rigour is illustrated.
What rigour requires of pictorial arguments in particular is a question left unanswered
by chapter I. Many authors believe that pictorial reasoning may prove a problem for the
kind of view of rigour put forward there, arguing reasoning of this kind may provide
good examples of valid yet unformalizable arguments (Leitgeb 2009; Goethe and Friend
2010; De Toffoli and Giardino 2015; 2016; Larvor 2019). This chapter considers the case
of pictorial arguments, and argues – based on the example of Jones’s argument – that a
crucial requirement for them to be rigorous is that we be able to state which features of
the pictures are actually used in the argument, and which are merely accidental features
of how the pictures happen to be drawn. This is used in section III.8 to defend the
standard view of proof against the general objection that pictorial arguments may be
valid yet unformalizable, and also to provide an amendment to Larvor’s analysis of what
is required of pictorial arguments for them to be rigorous (Larvor 2019).
To make Jones’s argument rigorous much mathematical work needs to be done. Here
I argue for various modifications that need to be made, and state some definitions and
propositions that play a role in this. Many of the mathematical details are omitted,
and are gathered in Appendix A. Most of the proofs are routine, but some contain ideas
which are worth noting, and are discussed here. Propositions have the same numbering
here and in section A.1.
1 Rigorous use of pictures I
We start by discussing what rigour requires of pictorial arguments – which might involve
a sequence of pictures with inferences from one to the next, or might just have a single
picture with inferences connecting it the to surrounding prose. What do we need of these
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kinds of arguments for them to be rigorous? The claim I want to make is that we need
to be able to state what features of the pictures are accidental – just features of they
happen to be drawn – and which features actually play a role in the argument.
For a first example of an argument which satisfies this condition, we will consider
the converse to the mutilated chessboard problem. The original mutilated chessboard
problem is a famous brain teaser in which two opposite corner squares are removed
from a chessboard, and it is asked whether it is possible to tile the remainder of the
chessboard with 31 dominos, each covering two adjacent squares. Actually, this turns
out to be impossible. When dominos are placed on a chessboard, each covers exactly
one black square and one white square, so that placing a series of dominos on a board
will always cover an equal number of black and white squares. But two opposite corner
squares of a chessboard are the same colour, so once they are removed the board has a
different number of black than white squares; thus it cannot be tiled by dominos. By the
same argument whenever two squares of the same colour are removed from a chessboard,
the result cannot be tiled by dominos.
The converse mutilated chessboard problem considers the opposite situation: what
happens when one removes two squares of different colours? Then this impossibility
argument fails. A mathematician Ralph Gomory gave a beautiful proof that in this case,
tiling the result is always possible (Honsberger 1978, pp. 66–67). The proof essentially
consists of the picture in fig. III.1.
As seen in fig. III.1, the squares of a chessboard can be put in a Hamiltonian cycle
through adjacent squares, and thus with successors in the cycle having opposite colours.
Then if squares A and B of opposite colour are removed there are an even number of
squares between them in this order, which can then be tiled with dominos. The path
this follows is shown in fig. III.1. Corners are no problem since a domino can be placed
either vertically or horizontally at them as required.
Not only is this a very clever and pleasing argument, it is also perfectly rigorous. It
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Figure III.1: Removing squares of different colours from a chessboard
is completely clear what the picture shows: a Hamiltonian cycle through the chessboard
squares, with successive squares adjacent. It is also clear that some aspects of the
picture are mathematically irrelevant. For instance the shading on the black squares is
not identical, with some having more dense shading in places than others – but this one
can very safely ignore. This is almost too obvious to be worth pointing out, except that
this clarity is not always present: with some pictures, we may not be clear on which
aspects are relevant to the argument, and which are just accidents of presentation. As
we will see, this is the case with Jones’s argument – one reason for its lack of rigour.
Since we can clearly state what the content of the diagram fig. III.1 is – and what
inference we make with it – this argument fits the paradigm of rigour described in
chapter I. Suppose one had an undergraduate student who is thoroughly immersed in the
detailed, careful manner of proof of analysis, and hesitates about the above discussion,
wanting to know how to carry it through in a more careful style. It is not difficult to
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make things more precise. If S is a set of chessboard squares, with A ⊆ S2 the set of pairs
of adjacent squares, then from fig. III.1 we can see that there is a bijection f : Z64 → S
where for each n ∈ Z64 we have (f(n), f(n + 1)) ∈ A. Here Z64 denotes the quotient
group Z64Z of integers modulo 64. This bijection from a cyclic group to the chessboard
squares is one way of being more precise about the intended Hamiltonian cycle. Other
parts of the proof can be made more precise in similar ways if need be, with the picture
still always serving as a visual aid.1 Full formalization, including formally defining the
above bijection f , might well be very tedious but probably also fairly routine.
The view that rigorous use of pictures requires that one can state which features of
them are argument relevant can also be supported by considering the example of Eucli-
dean geometry. Mumma (2010) discusses how though Euclid’s diagrammatic reasoning
was originally regarded as the paragon of rigour, during the 19th and 20th centuries it
came to be seen as less rigorous than sentential formalizations of geometry. A driver of
this was a lack of clarity over what kinds of inferences could be licensed by diagrams.
The problem was made acute by examples where paradoxical conclusions can be re-
ached using apparently valid diagrammatic reasoning (ibid., pp. 261–262). To dispel
these worries one can distinguish between the exact properties of a diagram and the
coexact properties: examples of the former are equalities or inequalities between angles
and lengths, and examples of the latter are containment relations between regions of
the diagram. The latter are stable under small perturbations of the diagram whereas
the former may not be. Any diagram one draws will have necessarily have exact pro-
perties – one line segment being longer than another for instance – but on the analysis
of Mumma (following Manders 2008) these are just features of how the diagram hap-
1Some might object that one should not spell out the details of a visual proof in precise terms like
this, and should urge the student to meditate on the argument, let it slosh around in their mind until
the right level of certainty is reached. My opinion is that if there is ever doubt about a higher level,
quick proof, then – if one has the time – it can be very helpful to see how it can be made more precise
and detailed, and thus seeing why the argument is valid. By doing so one’s judgement for what higher
level arguments are valid, and how to make valid high level arguments, can be continually sharpened.
This point is emphasised by Tao (2009).
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pens to be drawn, and are not used directly in inferences. One can only directly infer
coexact properties of a diagram. This is part of why general conclusions can be drawn
from particular diagrams, and is also a sensible condition since if one reproduces very
slightly wrong then its exact properties may be lost. If one does want to deduce an
exact property, one reasons propositionally using other exact properties as hypotheses,
and perhaps coexact properties of a relevant diagram (Mumma 2010, pp. 262–267). The
situation is further complicated by the presence of a construction stage during a dia-
grammatic argument, of drawing new lines, circles or points on a diagram. This leads
to conditions on which coexact properties can be inferred (ibid., pp. 267–277).
The above is a very brief summary, but the basic point is the same as that of the
chessboard example. For reasoning using Euclidean diagrams to be rigorous, we have
to be able to state what kinds of inferences we can or can’t draw from the diagrams:
which features of the diagrams can be relied on, and which are merely accidental. Being
able to spell this out is a major advance in our understanding of Euclid’s reasoning, and
confirms its rigour.
Jones’s argument will be used to illustrate what it looks like when this requirement
fails. Indeed in section III.5 it will be argued that we do not know what features of his
diagrams are actually supposed to be playing a role in the argument; as a result, we
are not sure what inferences are being made, or what key terms mean. This is a major
bar to considering the argument as rigorous. This analysis of what rigour requires of
pictorial arguments is returned to in section III.8, where it is used to amend Larvor’s





This section recounts Jones’s argument and his comments on it, and discusses those
comments of De Toffoli and Giardino, and Larvor, which could be taken to use it as a
basis. It also indicates those parts of the argument whose rigour will be discussed in the
remainder of the chapter.
Unlike Alexander, Jones takes a knot to be a smooth closed curve in R3 (which
should be non self intersecting, though he does not state this). Thus he is working with
smooth knots, a special case of tame knots (as usually understood, and as defined in
section II.3). He takes the notion of equivalence for such knots to be that of one being
smoothly deformable into the other (Jones 1998, p. 209). Exactly what this means will
be discussed in section III.3.
Jones’s argument is very simple. Given a knot one wishes to make wind a certain
way around an axis, one follows the knot round until one finds a stretch that is going
the wrong way. Then
One isolates a short stretch going the wrong way and “throws it over one’s
shoulder” until it is on the other side of the knot, going around correctly.
(ibid., p. 211)
This is illustrated in fig. III.2.
Jones says that
The only thing that could go wrong in the above procedure is that, in trying
to throw a bit of string over one’s shoulders, one may meet a crossing. This is
easily handled. Since we are proceeding one short stretch at a time around the
knot, simply isolate that crossing and, if it happens to prevent our throwing
over our shoulders, throw it the other way. When we have arrived back at
the beginning point, we [stop]. (ibid., p. 211)
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Figure III.2: The over the shoulder manoeuvre
That ends Jones’s argument.
Jones contrasts this simple argument with an argument of Von Neumann’s from
functional analysis. He states that the theorem from functional analysis is difficult,
requiring significant mathematical background to even understand, and many hours of
work to fully appreciate the proof. By contrast this argument from knot theory is “easy”:
“the result and its background could be explained quiet rapidly to a clever high school
student” (Jones 1998, p. 212). He continues:
a careful analysis of these proofs reveals that the proof of [the knot theoretic
result], if properly formalized, would be much longer than that of [the result
from functional analysis]. One would have to be precise about the kinds
of continuous deformations that are allowed, and constructing the functions
required for the “throwing over the shoulder” trick would be a nightmare.
(ibid., p. 212)
He states that the reason this knot theoretic result is “so easy” is because “we are able
to bring to bear our full intuition about three-dimensional space on the problem” (ibid.,
p. 212).
Many of De Toffoli and Giardino’s comments on Alexander’s lemma echo Jones’s
comments on his version of the argument. They claim that the argument involves re-
asoning that “cannot be reduced to formal statements without completely altering the
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proof” (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, p. 48), emphasising the importance of visuali-
zation in the argument, and the lack of any further justification beyond the visual for
some parts of it: they state that one key inference is “is left to our intuition to prove”,
that “Alexander does not really gives [sic] us any other justification: this reasoning plays
an epistemic role” (ibid., p. 44). They mention both Jones and Alexander’s versions of
the argument and appear to believe that these conclusions apply to both. However as
I argued in chapter II, they are mistaken in this. Alexander’s original proof (Alexander
1923) is very different to Jones’s retelling. The original is perfectly rigorous by normal
standards: it has no big leaps of reasoning, and no essential appeals to intuition. Alex-
ander works in the polygonal setting rather than the smooth setting which Jones uses,
and this makes rigour much easier to achieve. De Toffoli and Giardino are misled in
their analysis by Jones’s retelling of the argument, and these comments of theirs only
make sense when applied to Jones’s version.
The same goes for much of Larvor’s discussion of the argument. In Larvor (2012,
p. 727) he accepts Jones’s description of Alexander’s proof, stating that the central move
is the “over the shoulder” manoeuvre and that giving a physical demonstration of this –
for instance with a piece of string, or on a chalk board – is the core inferential act of the
proof. Then in Larvor (2019) he appears to largely assent to De Toffoli and Giardino’s
account of the argument, again repeating that the “over the shoulder” manoeuvre is the
core of the proof, visualized as carried out on an imaginary loop of rope (ibid., pp. 13–
14). As mentioned in section II.2, he accepts their claim that “Alexander had no qualms
about relying on [spatial intuition] in this proof”, though noting that this is remarkable
(ibid., p. 14); and he does later row back somewhat, pointing out that Alexander used
a polygonal notion of knot and knot deformation in his argument, in contrast to De
Toffoli and Giardino’s account. As seen here and in chapter II, this is an absolutely key
distinction.
One central aspect of De Toffoli and Giardino’s account cannot be supported by
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Jones’s version of the argument, however: their contention that each branch of mathe-
matics has its own local criteria of validity, rather than there being a single dominant
standard of rigour that (pure) branches collectively follow. Jones’s version of the ar-
gument was not published in a mathematical journal, but is a proof sketch in a piece
of philosophical musings. The focus of his article is on how conviction is generated in
mathematics, and many of his examples are clearly cases where one can have conviction
even in the absence of anything that would normally be called a proof – for instance
in his discussion of the vast number of applications of the Fourier transform, which (he
says) surely secure it from any attacks of logical inconsistency or contradiction (Jones
1998, pp. 203–204). His description of Alexander’s lemma is informal, perhaps delibera-
tely so to make it accessible to his philosophical audience, and he doesn’t claim that the
argument as he relates it would be acceptable to a mathematics journal – nor does he
use the word “rigour” or its cognates anywhere in describing his argument. Additionally,
Alexander’s original proof of the lemma, which was published in a journal (Alexander
1923), is completely rigorous by normal standards, as seen in chapter II.
If Jones’s argument is rigorous, and these comments represent a properly rigorous
understanding of it, then that tells against the view of rigour from chapter I. Although
that view did allow for high level inferences – without a detailed proof in mind – the
key feature was that one’s judgement of the validity of such inferences be tutored by an
ability to prove them in more detail, allowing one to correct and clarify one’s high level
intuitions whenever necessary. In contrast these authors advocate an understanding of
Jones’s argument which is irreducibly high level, based solely on some intuitive grasp of
how loops in space can be bent and shaped.2 When they discuss the immense difficulty of
formalizing the argument, what is really at stake is the difficulty of proving its assertions
in any greater detail – to even get started on the process of formalization: to get a sense
of how difficult this would be, just have a think for yourself about how you would give
2Jones, for instance, discusses how the argument could be relayed to and understood by a bright high
school student, who clearly would have no more sophisticated understanding of the argument than this.
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a more detailed, precise justification of any part of it. Thus apparently the only way to
understand the argument is in terms of the kinds of irreducibly high level visualizations
and intuitions these authors advocate.
One of the aims of the rest of this chapter is to defuse this threat: it will be argued
that in fact Jones’s argument badly fails to be rigorous by the normal standard. Of
course it would be circular to use the account of rigour from chapter I to judge this, and
instead standard features of the concept of rigour in mathematics will be appealed to.
In the process, the closeness of the account of rigour from chapter I to what is normally
meant by rigour in mathematics will be illustrated.
First, section III.3 discusses rigorous definitions of some central concepts of knot the-
ory. After that detailed consideration of Jones’s argument starts. Section III.4 discusses
a major potential ambiguity in the form the sequence of knot modifications takes, arguing
that Jones rather oversimplifies this in crucial respects, and that this leads De Toffoli
and Giardino to misunderstand the structure of the argument. Rigour requires greater
clarity here, and a rather more complex argument. Then section III.5 examines Jones’s
term “short stretches”, and argues that it is ill defined in various important respects, and
we need a more precise understanding of the term for the argument to go through. Here
Jones’s pictures are not much help, also being ambiguous in important ways – in that
we do not know which features of the pictures are actually intended to be playing a role
in the argument, and which are merely features of how the pictures happen to be drawn.
Making Jones’s argument rigorous requires a more precise definition of what the “short
stretches” are, and thus also a clearer understanding of which features of the pictures
are actually argument relevant. Having done this work, Alexander’s lemma follow from
a few clearly stated intermediate results. Of these the “over the shoulder manoeuvre”
is key, and section III.6 argues by comparison with other results that rigour requires a
proof of this, rather than just an appeal to intuition.
The details of all the definitions and proofs seen in these sections to be necessary to
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make Jones’s argument rigorous are given in Appendix A, and putting them all together
gives us an argument which is rigorous by usual standards, and also rigorous by the
standard described in chapter I: it is clear that every inference in it could be justified
in more detail if required, and ultimately that the proof could be made formal without
any great insight or ingenuity required, though perhaps requiring quite a bit of time due
to its length. Section III.7 sums up the analysis of Jones’s argument, and addresses the
comments of Jones, De Toffoli and Giardino and Larvor. Finally section III.8 returns to
the discussion from section III.1, arguing based on consideration of Jones’s pictures in
section III.5 that a key requirement for a pictorial argument to be rigorous is that we be
able to state which features of the pictures are actually relevant to the argument, and
which are merely there accidentally. This is used as the basis of a proposed amendment
to Larvor’s account of what rigour requires of pictorial arguments (Larvor 2019).
3 Definitions
Before examining the rigour of Jones’s argument, we need to look at the concepts in-
volved. As discussed in section I.2, for a mathematical definition to be rigorous it must
be clear that the definition could be made formal in such a way that all uses of the
concept would be valid. This is a totally standard feature of rigour that I assume Jo-
nes, De Toffoli and Giardino, and Larvor would accept.3 At any rate there are various
well known ways to give simple definitions for the basic concepts of knot theory, that I
am sure these authors are familiar with. One can motivate the need for such rigorous
definitions by considering natural questions about knots that would be left open by an
intuitive characterization.4
3It is true that De Toffoli and Giardino speak rather vaguely about the “legitimate operations” used
in the argument to deform the knot (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 41, 44, 45, 48, 49), but they also
mention that knots are considered up to ambient isotopy (ibid., p. 33), a concept they give a completely
precise account of in another paper (De Toffoli and Giardino 2014, p. 831).
4For instance, can a knot be nowhere differentiable? Can it have positive area (like an Osgood curve)?
Can it be infinitely knotted?
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The option Jones takes is to regard knots as smooth. There are various ways of
spelling this out, and for a rigorous argument we should settle on one. We will take
smooth knots to be certain T -periodic curves for some T > 0. A map φ with domain
R is T -periodic if we have φ(t) = φ(t + T ) for all t ∈ R. It follows immediately that
φ(t) = φ(t + kT ) for all k ∈ Z. We will fix some T > 0 to serve as the periods of our
curves. For t, t′ ∈ R, we write t ≡ t′ if there is k ∈ Z with t′ − t = Tk, i.e. if t′ − t ∈ TZ.
This is an equivalence relation on R.
Definition III.1. A smooth knot is a smooth map γ : R → R3 with period T such
that for all t, γ′(t) 6= 0, and such that γ is injective up to ≡–equivalence – i.e. for any
t, t′ ∈ R we have γ(t) = γ(t′) iff t ≡ t′.
Taking knots to be T -periodic is simpler than taking them to have domain [0, T ],
since then we would have to make sure that the derivatives at 0 matched up with the
derivatives at T . We require that γ′(t) 6= 0 for all t since otherwise the knot could have
kinks – γ(t) could slow down and then stop as t approaches t0 from below, and then
start off again in a different direction as t increases beyond t0. If B is a subset of R3, we
denote the set of smooth T -periodic maps from R to R3 with image in B by C∞T (R, B).
We also need a notion of equivalence for smooth knots. The one Jones gestures at is
that of smooth isotopy (this is equivalent to other standard notions of equivalence)
Definition III.2. Let β and γ be smooth knots in R3. A smooth isotopy from β to
γ is a smooth map H : [0, 1] × R → R3 such that if we set Hs : t 7→ H(s, t) then Hs is
a smooth knot for all s ∈ [0, 1], and H0 = β and H1 = γ. We write β ∼ γ if a smooth
isotopy from β to γ exists.
Another key definition is that of regular diagram, a well behaved diagram (defini-
tion A.1.3). One can argue from the definition that such diagrams only have finitely
many crossing points (theorem A.3.10), so are potentially suitable for being pictured as
literal human diagrams.
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One benefit of giving these kinds of rigorous definitions is that it allows one to bring
more sophisticated mathematical ideas to bear on the problem. For instance, one can
define a norm on the space of smooth knots which corresponds to the intuitive idea of
when two smooth knots are close, and can be useful for proving facts about them.5
For Alexander’s lemma we need a point in the plane around which our knot diagrams
will wind. We will just take this to be the point 0 in the complex plane. We then define
a quantity Dγ(t) that indicates the direction that the diagram of a smooth knot γ goes
around 0 (for the details, see the discussion following proposition A.1.5). This quantity
is strictly positive or strictly negative when γ is winding anticlockwise or clockwise
respectively around 0 at t (and is 0 whenγC is going towards or away from 0 at t, or is
stationary). It can be checked that this coincides with other ways of making rigorous
the concept of which direction γC is going around 0.
Now we can give a precise statement of the result we aim to prove.
Alexander’s lemma. Let γ be a smooth knot. Then there is a smooth knot β which
is smoothly isotopic to γ such that β has regular projection avoiding 0, and we have
Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
4 Structure of the argument
Now to discuss Jones’s argument itself. The first basic thing to clarify about this argu-
ment is its structure. At a first glance, one might think that the argument consisted of
dividing the knot diagram up into short stretches on which it goes the wrong way and
has at most one crossing, then going through these short stretches and correcting each
in turn with the over the shoulder manoeuvre. This is apparently how De Toffoli and
Giardino interpret it (De Toffoli and Giardino 2016, pp. 41–42).
5The definition follows definition A.1.2. Under this norm, smooth isotopy classes of knots are open
(theorem A.3.8). This captures the intuitive idea that if you perturb a smooth knot, you get another
smooth knot equivalent to it. Mathematically, it means that to show that every knot is smoothly isotopic
to a knot of some class L, it suffices to show that L is dense in the set of smooth knots.
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However on this reading the argument fails: there is nothing to stop us from adding
new crossings elsewhere as we go, potentially adding to the future workload rather than
decreasing it. One could easily describe a sequence of knot modifications along these
lines that did in fact go on forever. Just take a knot diagram with two stretches U1 and
U2 on which it goes the wrong way around the axis, with U1 and U2 on opposite sides
of the axis and each having multiple crossings. One starts by fixing a stretch of U1 with
only one crossing, and in doing so adds more crossings to the unfixed part of U2; then
one fixes a stretch of U2 with only one crossing, and in doing so adds more crossings to
the unfixed part of U1, and keeps going in this fashion.
A naive reaction might be that this would be a very stupid way to proceed, but
that is to misunderstand the nature of the argument required. We are not describing a
procedure for a human to follow, so that given a knot they can – with some intelligence
– obtain a diagram which only winds one way around some axis. I am emphasising this
because De Toffoli and Giardino seem to think that by intuition one can make sure that
the process terminates:
it is left to our intuition to prove that this [sequence of knot modifications]
is not an infinite process. (ibid., p. 44)
But the procedure we create is only as smart as we make it, and has no intuition of its
own; and intuition cannot deliver termination of the process De Toffoli and Giardino
describe, since as seen above termination is not guaranteed.
The key idea for a process of knot modifications which does terminate is very simple,
and completely explicit in Alexander’s original proof (Alexander 1923, p. 94). The idea
is to structure the proof as a nested induction. First we pick out stretches U1, U2, . . . Un
on which the knot diagram goes the wrong way. Then we divide U1 into shorter stretches
V1, . . . Vm on which it has only one crossing. We go through the Vi one by one, using the
over the shoulder manoeuvre to fix Vi without adding crossings to any unfixed Vj , but
perhaps adding crossings to Ui for i > 1. In this way we can fix all of U1, and then move
93
CHAPTER III. RIGOUR, PICTURES AND KNOT THEORY
onto U2. We now divide U2 into shorter stretches on which it has only one crossing, and
fix each of these shorter stretches without adding crossings to unfixed parts of U2, but
perhaps adding crossings to Ui for i > 2. By continuing in this way we will fix each Ui,




Figure III.3: The over the shoulder manoeuvre, avoiding unfixed short sections
If this argument seems harder to follow than what Jones describes, I sympathise. It
is significantly more complicated. It has a crucially different logical structure, a nested
induction unlike the failed simple induction argument sketched above. In fact I think
this nested induction is what Jones intends: he talks first about finding a “stretch that
is going the wrong way”, and then divides this further into “short stretches” on which it
has only one crossing. However his account is very unclear on this point. He makes no
mention of the need to avoid adding crossings to the stretch one is fixing when throwing
bits of it one by one over the shoulder. It may be that this is the kind of detail that he
feels is so obvious that it does not need mentioning, but leaving it out is likely to lead
to confusion – as it did for De Toffoli and Giardino, who missed the nested induction
completely in their account, making their appeal to intuition instead to supposedly
guarantee termination of the process. Thus to make the argument rigorous, we should
be explicit about what is going on here.
It is also rather misleading, I think, to skip over these considerations. Jones is
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trying to make a point about how straightforward an argument can be while being very
difficult to formalize: but to make this point he leaves out a key aspect of it (and one
which significantly complicates it).
5 “Short stretches”?
In our new sketch of the argument, we first divide the knot diagram into stretches
U1, . . . Un on which it bends the wrong way, and go through fixing these one at a time:
we break the stretch Ui we are working on into shorter stretches on which it has at most
one crossing, and one by one throw these shorter stretches over the shoulder to fix them,
taking care not to add any crossings to unfixed parts of Ui, as illustrated in fig. III.3.
This is only a sketch though. Forgetting for the moment whether we will want to
justify the inferences in this argument in greater detail, right now we do not even know
what these inferences are. There are two main sources of uncertainty. One is the nature
of these stretches Ui on which the knot diagram bends the wrong way – what properties
do they have? The second is the over the shoulder manoeuvre – when we do this to the
knot, what are we doing? What properties does the result have to have?
These two questions are connected. For the argument to work, we have to be able
to cover troublesome parts of the knot diagram with finitely many of these Ui, which
have certain nice properties. We will then be working through these Ui one at a time,
repeatedly using the over the shoulder manoeuvre on it to correct it and bend it the
right way around the axis. But when we are doing this to Ui, we may well affect the
diagram on Uj for some j > i: these sets U1, . . . Un may well overlap. Thus whatever
nice properties the Ui have, the over the shoulder manoeuvre needs to be done on Ui in
such a way that it doesn’t spoil the nice properties of Uj for j > i.
Thus identifying the nice properties that the Ui must have is a somewhat delicate
task: we need strong enough nice properties that we can carry out the over the shoulder
95
CHAPTER III. RIGOUR, PICTURES AND KNOT THEORY
manoeuvre without difficulty, but we also need to avoid making them so strong that
Uj ’s nice properties might be spoilt by carrying out the over the shoulder manoeuvre
elsewhere on the knot. We also need to pick the properties of the Ui in such a way that
troublesome parts of the knot diagram can be covered by finitely many of them.
One could be forgiven if one missed this point when reading Jones’s exposition, as
De Toffoli and Giardino (2016) do. Jones ignores the possibility that these stretches
might overlap (Jones 1998, p. 211); indeed, he only considers the much easier special
case in which there is a single Ui with a single crossing on it.
Carrying out this balancing act – making the nice properties of the Ui strong enough,
but not too strong – is one of the most delicate parts of the proof. This kind of task is
exactly what we would normally expect from someone carrying out a rigorous argument:
as discussed in section I.2, a central requirement of rigour is that it be possible to give
rigorous definitions of the concepts one uses – definitions that are clear, and could be
made formal if requested. Here, however, Jones’s prose and pictures are of minimal help.
The problem is essentially that mentioned in section III.1: that we are not sure which
features of Jones’s pictures are relevant to the argument, and which are just artefacts
of how they happen to be drawn. As will be seen, there are a great range of candidate
properties that the Ui should have, all compatible with his pictures, and he gives us no
way to distil out those which are actually intended to be part of his argument.
One description Jones does give of the Ui is as being a “stretch”, but that does not get
us far. It is not a mathematical term and has little in the way of obvious mathematical
meaning. We are talking about subsets of R, and presumably when we describe them
as “stretches” we are implying they are connected, and thus are intervals. Beyond this
not much is clear though.
It seems like taking the Ui to be open may be a good idea, to allow us to make a
compactness argument to obtain our finite list U1, . . . Un. We can introduce a notation
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for troublesome parts of the curve: if A ⊆ R, we let
D60γ (A) = {t ∈ A | Dγ(t) 6 0}
be the set of “troublesome” points in A (we define other similar notations such as D>0γ (A)
in the obvious way). Our aim in Alexander’s lemma is to obtain a knot β smoothly
isotopic to our initial knot γ with D60β (R) = ∅, or equivalently with D
60
β ([0, T ]) =
∅. Since Dγ is a continuous function, D60γ (A) is always a closed subset of A and so
D60γ ([0, T ]) is compact. Thus if we can cover D60γ ([0, T ]) with a family of open intervals
(Ui)i∈I , then we can cover it with finitely many of the Ui. Note that even this basic
property – that the Ui be open – is not obvious from Jones’s diagrams; to the contrary,
on his sketch it looks as though the endpoints A and B are included in the troublesome
stretch to be corrected (ibid., p. 211).
A simplistic interpretation of the requirement that the diagram of γ bends the wrong
way on each of these stretches U might be that we have Dγ(t) 6 0 for all t ∈ U . But
we cannot necessarily cover D60γ ([0, T ]) with such intervals, since we may have a point
t ∈ D60γ ([0, T ]) with Dγ(t) = 0 and Dγ(s) > 0 for s approaching t from below (say).
Instead, it makes sense to require (roughly) that such a U contains an interval on
which Dγ 6 0, an interval which might be all of U . Thus γ might not “bend the wrong
way” on U , but instead “has at most one backwards bend” on U . We will not need to
really worry about the portion of U on which γ bends the right way.
The next property we need is that γ|U doesn’t wind too far around the axis. Take a
look at fig. III.3. If the Vi kept winding clockwise all the way round the knot, it could
well be impossible to throw V1 over the shoulder without hitting some Vi with i > 1.
What we want is some control on the argument of γC on U , or more specifically on
the part of U on which γC goes clockwise around the axis, i.e. D60γ (U). We do this
by requiring that γ|
D60γ (U)
bends at most half way clockwise around the axis, or more
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formally that
sup{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (U)} 6 inf{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (U)} + π,
where Argγ is a smooth argument function for γ (see the discussion following proposi-
tion A.1.5 for the details of this).
There are other properties that might seem relevant. For instance, when picking the
Ui, do we want them to be small enough that γC is roughly straight on them? We know
that later when doing the over the shoulder manoeuvre we’re going to want to bend part
of Ui round as in fig. III.3 without hitting the unfixed portion of Ui, and this may be
easier if Ui is roughly straight (imagine trying to carry out the modification in fig. III.3 if
the Vj were enormously wiggly, oscillating in close to the axis point and then out again).
What properties the Ui need to have will depend on how the rest of the argument is
going to be carried through, which makes the lack of precision in this regard a more
serious problem.
As it happens a “rough straightness” property like this will not be needed however.
The properties listed above turn out to be sufficient. Putting them together, we obtain
the following definition.
Definition III.3. Let I be a nonempty compact interval in R. Let γ be a smooth knot
which projects onto C avoiding 0. We say that γ has at most one backwards bend
on I if sup(I) < inf(I) + T2 , and D
60
γ (I) is an interval such that
sup{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (U)} 6 inf{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (U)} + π.
Then if J is any nonempty bounded interval we say that γ has at most one backwards
bend on J if it has at most one backwards bend on J .
This is independent of the choice of Argγ . We require sup(I) < inf(I) + T2 so that
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two such sections can only intersect at one end modulo T -equivalence, which simplifies
things a little. The definition is carried out for compact intervals first because to carry
out the proofs it turns out that having at most one backwards bend on U , rather than
just on U , is useful.
In a similar way we then need to work out what we are aiming to achieve when we
are doing the over the shoulder manoeuvre – what properties should the bent segment
have? One can go through a process like the above of considering potentially useful
properties, and it turns out that the following is what’s needed.
Definition III.4. Let γ be a smooth knot which has regular projection avoiding 0. Let I
be a compact interval with sup(I)− inf(I) < T2 . Say that a smooth knot β is a bending
forwards of γ on I if it has regular projection avoiding 0, is smoothly isotopic to γ
and:
(i) D>0β (I) is an interval
(ii) If t /∈ Int(I) + TZ then β(t) = γ(t)
(iii) Dβ(t) > Dγ(t) for all t
As discussed above, forming these definitions and making that they interact in the
appropriate way is the most delicate part of making Jones’s argument rigorous. It is
here that the weakness of Jones’s pictures is particularly clear. It is true that in a sense
Jones’s pictures do (roughly) display the properties listed above (Jones 1998, p. 211).
For instance, the stretch between A and B he picks out is an interval and does bend at
most half way around the axis, satisfying the key conditions of definition III.3. Then
when this stretch is bent forwards, the part of the modified interval where the diagram
goes the right way around the axis is itself an interval, so the condition “D>0β (I)” of
definition III.4 is satisfied, and the condition “Dβ(t) > Dγ(t)” is also visibly satisfied.
So his diagrams are compatible with the properties listed above: however that is little
help, since they are also compatible with a vast array of other properties. In his diagram
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the stretch from A to B isn’t too wiggly – does this matter? The condition that we pick
stretches which are roughly straight was considered above and actually, in the end, is
not important to the argument. Jones’s diagram is no help there. Similarly, the stretch
from A to B has roughly constant radial distance from the axis – is this important? No,
it turns out. Does it matter that the stretch from A to B has no parametric inflection
points (points where it goes from bending “to the right” to bending “to the left”, or
vice versa)? Again, no, this is unimportant. In Jones’s diagram the stretch from A to
B is bounded on either side by stretches on which the knot diagram goes the right way
(clockwise). Should we require this? Actually, no, we can’t – since we are requiring
that the stretches we pick bend at most half way around the knot axis (so may need to
overlap with other stretches where the knot diagram goes the wrong way). One could
keep listing such properties for ever.
The basic problem is that we are not sure which features of Jones’s diagrams are
a part of the argument, and which are accidental. The ability to make this clear was
highlighted as a key requirement for an argument involving pictures to be rigorous in
section III.1, and will be discussed further in section III.8. When Jones talks about
picking the short stretches, and shorter stretches, it simply is not clear from his pictures
what he means – what properties these stretches have. The same goes for the properties
of the over the shoulder manoeuvre. As discussed above clarifying these is one of the
subtlest parts of rigorizing the argument, since we need properties for the Ui strong
enough that we can carry out the over the shoulder manoeuvre without being so strong
that the over the shoulder manoeuvre spoils them.
So one major lack of rigour in the argument is that Jones’s pictures are insufficient
to pin down the key concepts – so that we do not even know what claims the argument
involves. Once these concepts are properly defined we still have to make the argument




Proposition III.5. Suppose β is a bending forwards of γ on I and α is a bending
forwards of β on J , such that there is t ∈ I ∩ J with Dβ(t) > 0 and such that sup(I ∪
J) − inf(I ∪ J) < T2 . Then α is a bending forwards of γ on I ∪ J .
Then a crucial property we need, as emphasised above, is that when one “bends
forwards” according to the above definition one does not mangle sections on which the
knot has at most one backwards bend.
Proposition III.6 (Bending forwards does not interfere with other sections). Suppose
γ is a smooth knot, and I is a compact interval such that γ has at most one backwards
bend on I. Suppose that β is a bending forwards of γ on J such that that D>0β (J) *
Int(D60γ (I)) + TZ. Then β has at most one backwards bend on I.
The proofs of these propositions are routine. It is important that they can be proved
though. We are certainly guided by intuition and visualization when forming these
concepts and reasoning about them, but to definitively establish their properties we
want a proof. It is not enough that one just cannot think up a counterexample – it could
be that our imagination was limited in some way (as has often turned out to be the case
in the history of mathematics). In this case our intuition that these facts are true leads
naturally and straightforwardly to rigorous proofs. If somehow such a statement had
turned out to be very hard to prove, that would have cast doubt on our initial intuition,
and would indeed make providing a proof more urgent.
There is one more complication before we can proceed to the main part of the ar-
gument. This is that a smooth knot γ may not have a diagram which can be covered
by open intervals on which it has at most one backwards bend, since it may wiggle bet-
ween going clockwise and anticlockwise round the axis infinitely many times on a small
interval (see the comments preceding proposition A.1.10 for a full discussion). This is
another (potentially significant) complication which Jones fails to mention. It can be
got round however by hitting γ with a small perturbation, nudging its diagram so that
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Dγ ends up only having simple zeroes, which avoids the possibility of these infinitely
wiggly bits. The proof of this result (proposition A.1.10) is the first that requires a real
idea, in this that of introducing a small fairly arbitrary perturbation to γ, and proving
that some such small perturbation will have the required result.
We introduce the terminology that γ projects nicely if it has regular projection
avoiding 0, withDγ only having simple zeroes – thus ruling out the possibility of infinitely
many wiggles just discussed. Then with the results mentioned here proved, the key result
that needs to be established is the following.
Bending Forward proposition. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely. Let U
be an open interval in R such that γ has at most one backwards bend on U . Then there
is a smooth knot β which projects nicely and is a bending forwards of γ such that if t ∈ U
then Dβ(t) > 0.
If this proposition can be shown, Alexander’s lemma follows easily, as can be seen
in lemma A.1.24 and the immediately preceding results. The question now is what we
have to do to rigorously establish this proposition.
6 The “over the shoulder” manoeuvre
To argue that if γ has at most one backwards bend on U then we can bend it forwards
in this way, Jones’s account is simple. We split U up into short sections on which it
has at most one crossing, and throw each of these over our shoulder (if our stretch lies
above the part it crosses), or throw it the other way (if our stretch lies below the part
it crosses). As discussed in section III.4, Jones misses out a key part of the argument
here, which is that if we have divided U up into short stretches V1, . . . Vn, then we need
to make sure that when throwing Vi over our shoulder we don’t add any crossings to any
unfixed Vj . This is illustrated in fig. III.3.
102
6. THE “OVER THE SHOULDER” MANOEUVRE
This is the part of the proof that Jones thinks would be very difficult to argue in
more detail: he says that
constructing the functions required for the “throwing over the shoulder” trick
would be a nightmare. (Jones 1998, p. 212)
It is not clear what method he envisages that would be so nightmarish. It is true that it
would probably be extremely difficult to concoct a single formula for the path in fig. III.3
directly built from basic smooth functions. The same goes for the smooth isotopy. It
may not even be at all clear whether a suitable formula for a smooth isotopy exists;
maybe there is a worry one would have to resort to nudging little bits of the curve in
the right direction, one small bit moving one small step at a time. This could well be a
tremendous effort.
Nonetheless, a proposition being hard to prove is not generally grounds for omitting
to prove it, when doing rigorous mathematics. If a proposition seems obvious but a
proof seems very hard, that suggests that either the proposition is not as obvious as it
appears (as with the Jordan curve theorem), or that our proposed tactics for proof are
lacking and we should look for better ones.
This goes even for propositions which may be very intuitive: there are plenty of
examples of such propositions that are normally taken to require careful proof. The
separating hyperplane theorem states (in one version) that if A and B are disjoint
compact convex subsets of Rn then there is a hyperplane which separates them, lying
strictly between them. Here a convex body is one containing the line segment between
any two points in it, and a hyperplane in Rn is an (n− 1)-dimensional affine subspace.
This theorem is illustrated in fig. III.4. In dimensions 2 and 3 it is about as intuitive
a statement as one can imagine. Convex bodies “look” very straightforward, and there
is no way to draw or visualize two such compact convex bodies without the statement
seeming completely obvious from an intuitive perspective. Nonetheless proving this takes
some thought (give it a try).
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Figure III.4: The separating hyperplane theorem
I am not aware of anyone seriously suggesting a rigorous argument could assume a
proposition like this without proof, no matter how intuitive it is. Perhaps in a more
applied area of mathematics one might do so, if the intuition was strong enough that
one found it convincing; but as discussed in section I.2, reasoning can be convincing and
reliable without being rigorous. One of the normal purposes of the label “rigour” is to
make clear that if propositions such these are being relied on, then they will have been
proved.
If someone wishes to claim that a rigorous argument could assume the Bending
Forward proposition of section III.5 without proof, then they have two options: arguing
that rigour does not actually need propositions like the above to be proved, or arguing
that the case of the Bending Forward proposition is somehow different. The former
amounts to saying that actually there was no need to prove the Jordan curve theorem,
or the separating hyperplane theorem, which is not an option I imagine many will find
attractive. It is also not obvious how an argument for the latter option would proceed. If
anything, the separating hyperplane theorem (in dimensions 2 and 3) is more immediate
from an intuitive point of view than the Bending Forward proposition. Perhaps one
could say that the separating hyperplane theorem is likely to have wider application, so
we need to justify it more surely; but that is an argument for enforcing rigour in one
case and not the other, not an argument that what rigour requires is different in the two
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cases.
The requirement that we can provide a proof of the Bending Forward proposition is
an example of the general requirement from chapter I that we be able to prove inferences
in greater detail. In this case as it stands, the Bending Forward proposition is too coarse
an inference (though plausible) to be acceptable in a proof by the usual standard of
rigour: though it can be proved, even filling in its details at all requires a decent amount
of ingenuity and effort. By providing a more detailed justification of it, we will reach
the point where (though not completely formal) making any point in the argument yet
more detailed becomes a routine matter.
So the question is how we can justify this over the shoulder manoeuvre. Here we
can see more clearly what is going on by splitting our task up into two separate claims.
One is the existence of a suitable path in the plane like the dashed path traced out in
fig. III.3. The second is the existence of a smooth isotopy modifying our original knot
to follow this new path (with its planar projection). We will deal with this latter aspect
first – the part that Jones thinks will be a “nightmare”.
Part of carrying out the smooth isotopy can be justified very easily. The point of
dealing with a short stretch of knot on which the diagram has at most one crossing
is that then we can pull this stretch far out of the page, or push it far into the page
(depending on whether our stretch lies above or below the stretch it crosses), taking it
away from the main body of the knot so that we can then manoeuvre it freely. We can
obtain the following precise result to this effect, whose proof is completely routine.
Proposition III.7. Let γ be a smooth knot such that γ′C(t) 6= 0 for all t, and γC has at
most one crossing point in (a, b), with a < b < a+ T . Let K > 0 such that |γ3(t)| < K
for all t, and let a < c < e < f < d < b. Then γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot
β with:
• βC = γC
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• β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ
• |β3(t)| 6 K for t /∈ (c, d) + TZ
• |β3(t)| > K for t ∈ [c, d]
• |β3(t)| = 2K for t ∈ [e, f ]
• (|β3|)′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (c, e)
• (|β3|)′(t) < 0 for t ∈ (f, d)
Thus our modified knot β has the same projection as γ, and has the same “vertical”
values as γ too outside of (a, b)+TZ. β(t) flies steeply up from the plane for t just above
a, reaching a (potentially very great) distance K from the plane for t between c and d,
and then β(t) heads steeply back down to the plane as t approached b. We can take the
intervals (a, c) and (f, b) on which β is heading up from the plane and then down again
to be as small as we like, and can take the distance K to be as large as we like.
Having pushed this section of the knot far above (or below) the rest of it, we are
free to slide and bend it around as we like without hitting the main body of the knot.
When we think about it, we have great freedom to slide curves around in a given plane
Consider fig. III.5 for instance. It seems obvious that we can push the curve over to
follow the new dashed path, without moving A or B: just push the solid section between
A and B down through the gap, then stretch out the left hand side, bringing it past the
left of A to trace out the dashed path. While doing so the tangent to the curve at A
will rotate in a circle, but that will not be a problem (since we can take the curve to be
bending down very steeply towards the plane near A).
This manoeuvre does not depend on any special features of the curves pictured. Even
if the target curve is very wiggly, that makes no difference. Consider the situation in
fig. III.6: perhaps it is harder to see in this case, but again we can isotopy to follow the
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A B
Figure III.5: A planar isotopy
dashed path with no problem, pushing it down through the gap between A and B and
stretching and sliding parts of the curve into the appropriate places.
A
B
Figure III.6: More complicated planar isotopy
Considering examples like this leads us to suspect that actually any two smooth
planar curves with the same endpoints will be smoothly isotopic (by an isotopy which
fixes their endpoints). This may seem like a foolish point to raise – why would we
consider general planar curves, when we could limit our attention to simpler examples
like that in fig. III.5? But even in that simple case it was not clear how a proof should
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go, and as Jones says it might be a “nightmare” to try to construct a smooth isotopy by
hand.
It is common in mathematics that theorems are easier to prove when proved in the
right generality, which can mean proving them in more generality. If it is the case that
any two smooth planar curves with the same endpoints are smoothly isotopic (keeping
endpoints fixed), this is in a sense a more natural fact than a special case like fig. III.5,
and maybe we would expect there to be a good “reason” for this. Perhaps one might
worry that proving the general case will just be a harder version of the simpler case,
maybe constructing an isotopy to push in each wiggly part one at a time, giving an
inductive argument on the number of wiggles. But the point of considering the general
case is to lead us away from this kind of thinking.
As it happens, there is a very neat proof of the general case. It may well be that
this is a standard result, but I have not been able to find a reference for it. The key
idea is that a smooth wiggly path gets less and less wiggly as we zoom in on it – that
is, shorter and shorter sections of the path get less and less wiggly. Thus if we zoom in
to shorter segments of the path, whilst simultaneously rescaling to keep the endpoints
fixed, we will follow a smooth progression that transforms our path into a line. For
instance zooming in on the midpoint of the dashed path in fig. III.6 and rescaling gives
straighter and straighter sections, as seen in fig. III.7. Since being smoothly isotopic
(relative endpoints) is an equivalence relation, if every such path is smoothly isotopic to
a straight line in this way then we are done.
Using this idea we can indeed prove that any two smooth planar curves with the same
endpoints are isotopic (keeping the endpoints fixed). Actually it is convenient to prove
a slightly stronger statement, in which the endpoints can vary within some complex
neighbourhood at each end, introducing the notion of a smooth isotopy relative
(a ↪→ X) for a smooth isotopy in which the value of the curve at endpoint a stays
within the convex set X throughout the transformation (see the discussion preceding
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Figure III.7: Zooming in on a wiggly path
proposition A.1.12 for a more formal statement). The result is the following. Here a
smooth immersion γ : R → R2 is a curve with γ′(t) 6= 0 everywhere.
Proposition III.8. Let I be a proper interval and let α, β : I → R2 be injective smooth
immersions. Let a 6= b ∈ I and let X,Y be disjoint convex subsets of R2 with α(a), β(a) ∈
X and α(b), β(b) ∈ Y . Then there is a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) and relative
(b ↪→ Y ) from α to β.
The proof is elegant, with most of the work just checking that the isotopy sketched in
fig. III.7 is smooth (which is not particularly difficult). This kind of result could well be
useful in other circumstances as well, and the theorem has obvious higher dimensional
analogues.
With this and proposition III.7, it is not difficult to justify a very general form of
the over the shoulder manoeuvre (there is a routine intermediate result proved along the
way in section A.1, which we skip here).
Proposition III.10. Let γ be a smooth knot which has regular projection, with a < b <
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a+ T such that γC(a) 6= γC(b) and γC has at most one crossing point in (a, b). Suppose
α ∈ C∞T (R,C) is a smooth immersion such that α|[a,b] is injective, and with α(t) = γC(t)
for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ. Then γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot β with β(t) = γ(t) for
/∈ (a, b) + TZ, and βC = α.
This is the result that Jones claims would be a “nightmare” to prove. In this he
is simply wrong. The proof is largely routine, with the only little bit of magic needed
being the idea behind proposition III.8. By skipping over the proof Jones misses out on
a chance to discover that neat idea for himself.
The last step needed to complete the argument is the existence of a suitable target
path. We need to argue that given a smooth knot, a planar path like that in fig. III.5
exists; if we can do this then we can use proposition III.10 to deduce the existence of a
suitable smooth knot, one which is a bending forwards of our original knot.
It will not be possible to cover this last part in detail. It does not require any great
insight, though is a certain amount of effort. The tactic used in section A.1 is to first
prove the existence of a suitable angle function, then join this with a suitable radius
function, and then perturb the result to make it regular. The resulting proposition
is complicated (proposition A.1.17), as the resulting knot needs to satisfy a number
of different conditions to allow the Bending Forward proposition to be proved. This
complexity is no reason to sweep the details under the rug though – it suggests that
someone who claims the existence of such a knot is obvious has not fully grasped what
is required.
With this in hand, finishing the proof is largely straightforward. Finally we obtain
our desired conclusion.
Lemma III.24 (Alexander’s lemma). Let γ be a smooth knot. Then there is a smooth
knot β which is smoothly isotopic to γ such that β has regular projection avoiding 0, and
we have Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
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7 Assessment of Jones’s argument
As we have seen, there are numerous major problems with Jones’s argument from a
rigorous point of view. The basic structure of the argument is very unclear, with him
skipping over a key aspect, one which substantially complicates it (section III.4). The
terms he uses – like “short stretch” – are also very unclear, and properly defining them
is a delicate task (section III.5). Then, with this preliminary work done, the main result
still needs to be proved. Section III.6 looks at similar mathematical results which are
taken to require rigorous proof, and argues that this is no different: there is no reason
it should be regarded as rigorous to just assume this result, or gesture at a picture as
an argument. Section III.6 sketches the argument, which employs a neat idea at one
point to prove that any two smooth planar curves are smoothly isotopic relative their
endpoints.
When this work is done, the resulting argument is rigorous by the normal standard,
as described in chapter I: all its concepts are defined precisely, and all its inferences
are written out at a level of pretty great detail, and each one could be proved in even
greater detail if one desired. Thus Jones’s argument is no threat to the view of rigour
put forward in chapter I. The comments of Jones, De Toffoli and Giardino, and Larvor –
about the argument involving essentially visual reasoning and high level intuition, that
would be very difficult to justify in more detail or formalize – are only true of Jones’s
non rigorous version of the argument. Making it rigorous removes these features.
The result is much longer and more complex than Jones’s simple sketch, as seen
in section A.1. However, we can see some definite benefits of making Jones’s argument
rigorous. Not only is the argument much clearer and more explicit, but the process gene-
rates potentially useful mathematical ideas. As mentioned in section III.5 and discussed
fully in section A.1 (proposition A.1.10 and the preceding), the proof that the set of
knots which project nicely and for which Dγ has only simple zeroes uses a perturbation
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argument, proving that a certain modification of a knot exists by considering a family of
small perturbations of the original knot, and proving that one has the required property.
This is an idea which could obviously be useful more widely in the subject and in other
areas of mathematics (and I’m sure is a standard technique in some areas). Then the
proof of proposition III.8 involves another new idea – the zooming and scaling idea –
which has aesthetic value in itself, as well as straightforward generalizations. Also the
result proved could well be useful in other contexts. Much of the argument of section A.1
does consist of filling in routine details, and may not have much relevance beyond this
particular result, but such is mathematics.
8 Rigorous use of pictures II
Jones’s argument can be used to illustrate a wider point about the use of pictures in
mathematics, as discussed in sections III.1 and III.5. This is that for a mathematical
argument involving pictures to be rigorous, we have to be able to state which features of
the pictures actually play a part in the argument, and which are merely artefacts of how
it happens to be drawn – we have to know which features of the pictures are argument
relevant.
For instance, if a section of the diagram is roughly straight, are we intending to argue
as though it is actually roughly straight, or is that just how we drew it? Actually we need
to know much than just whether the section is being represented as “roughly straight”.
If we are going to rigorously reason with the diagram, we need to know which clearly
stateable property the diagram is indicating – for instance, a certain precise bound on
the curvature of the curve in that area, or that the curve has no parametric inflection
points. This is what I mean by knowing which features of the picture is argument
relevant; knowing which precisely stateable properties it is representing. Of course a
picture may just be indicating such a feature, rather than sharing it exactly.
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In section III.5 we saw how unclear Jones’s notion of “short stretch” was: there are
any number of properties that we might think one of his “short stretches” should have,
and we have no clue which of these are actually required by the argument. A huge variety
of such properties are compatible with the diagrams Jones gives. The same goes for the
over the shoulder manoeuvre – we do not know what properties the result is required
to have, as a wide range of properties are all compatible with Jones’s diagrams. Thus
because we do not know which features of Jones’s diagrams are actually playing a role in
the argument, and which are accidental, we cannot regard the argument as rigorous: we
do not know what key terms in the argument mean6, and do not know what inferences
we are expected to be making.
This lesson applies much more widely. Suppose we have a diagram A and a diagram
B, and we are asked to assent that from A we can reach B. If there is any generality
involved, and we do not know what general features of the two diagrams are included,
then we simply do not have a rigorous understanding of what we are being asked.
This is an important point, since it defuses the threat that pictorial reasoning has
been thought to present to formalizability, and to the kind of account of rigour put
forward in chapter I. It also constitutes an amendment to Larvor’s account of what
pictorial arguments have to satisfy to be rigorous (Larvor 2019).
First, the objections to formalizability. As mentioned in the introduction, many of
those who object to formalizability as a norm in mathematics focus their objections on
pictorial arguments in particular (Leitgeb 2009; Goethe and Friend 2010; De Toffoli and
Giardino 2015; 2016; Larvor 2019). They claim that pictorial arguments may involve
reasoning that resists verbal description. But if a pictorial argument is rigorous by the
above standard, we see that this cannot be the case.
Suppose we have an argument formed from a sequence of pictures, and that the
6In the mathematical sense: of course we may know what to provide if a “short stretch” of string is
requested, but this is no more mathematical use than an informal every day notion of continuity would
be to analysis.
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argument is rigorous – so we can state which features of the pictures are actually relevant
to the argument, and clearly describe these features. Then (us being finite beings) each
picture will only have finitely many such relevant features, so we can replace each picture
by a description of the relevant features. As discussed initially, we need to be able to
make this description mathematically clear for our use of the picture to be rigorous. Thus
we should be able to straightforwardly convert our pictorial argument into a sequence
of clear textual inferences. A reader is free to visualize the meaning of these textual
inferences, as with any other textual inferences, and they may even visualize something
like the omitted pictures.
In a sense this process is illustrated by the process of rigorizing Jones’s argument
seen in sections III.4 to III.6, but there is a lot going on there beyond just converting
Jones’s pictures into prose (due to the many different respects in which his argument
lacks rigour).
One objection might be that if we replace a sequence of pictures by a sequence of
blocks of text in this way, the result might be very long and complex. In many cases we
would not expect much increase in proof length though – if a sequence of pictures comes
with a statement of which features are argument relevant, then ditching the pictures and
just using this statement instead might even reduce the page count of the argument.
The textual proof will only be much more cumbersome if we have some compressed
way of conveying information in the pictures, a convention for which features of the
pictures are actually argument relevant. Such a convention is illustrated by the case of
Euclidean diagrams, as spelled out by Mumma (2010). With the convention that only
coexact features of Euclidean diagrams are actually argument relevant, it is possible to
give efficient diagrammatic proofs, that may (perhaps) be much longer if written out in
prose.
This objection ultimately bleeds into the general objection often raised to formaliza-
bility, that filling in the details of an argument may fundamentally alter it, overwhelming
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the reader with trivialities and obscuring the bigger picture. I cannot reply to that ob-
jection here, but my point is that it is a completely general objection, and nothing
specific to the case of diagrammatic reasoning. Pictures are just one possible example
of an efficient high level way of conveying information, one amongst many others. High
level notation does not have to be pictorial. If the use of pictures is rigorous in the sense
defended here – if we know which features are argument relevant – then the debate about
formalizing pictorial arguments is much like the debate about formalizing any other kind
of argument.
As well as defusing these picture based objections to formalizability, this condition
– that we can state which features of diagrams are argument relevant – constitutes an
amendment to Larvor’s account of pictorial rigour (Larvor 2019). Larvor states three
necessary conditions that diagrams must satisfy to be rigorous:
(a) it is easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates the structure of the
mathematical object
(b) the information thus displayed is not metrical
(c) it is possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with other
mathematical inferential practices.
He does not claim that these are jointly sufficient, instead aiming to give necessary
conditions that can be supplemented in future work (ibid., p. 6). This I aim to do.
Larvor motivates these by discussing various case studies, including Euclidean ge-
ometry and Jones’s argument. As we have seen, Jones’s argument is not rigorous, so
should not be used as the basis for a philosophical study of rigorous pictorial arguments,
but Larvor’s conclusions do not rely on it.
I do not think that these conditions are incorrect, but I do think there is more to
say. The most important point is the point made above: that we know which features
of a diagram are argument relevant (which may well depend on what argument we are
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using it in). This I think makes condition (c) more or less redundant – if we know which
features of a diagram are argument relevant, then we already know how the diagram
should interact with other inferential practices. We can only rely on those features of
the diagram that we were taking to be argument relevant when drawing new inferences
from it. We cannot rely on any features of the diagram that were merely artefacts of
how it happened to be drawn. Similarly if we are to infer a diagram from some other
inferential context, then we have to be sure that all argument relevant features of the
diagram can actually be inferred from that other context. If these conditions are satisfied
then there seems to be no barrier to rigorously reasoning between the diagram and other
contexts.
This also clarifies (a). When drawing a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates
the structure of the mathematical object, if the diagram is going to be rigorous then we
have to be clear on which of its features are intended to be part of the representation. I
have no quibble with (b). Thus we obtain the following amended version:
(a) it is easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates understood features
of the mathematical object
(b) the information thus displayed is not metrical
(c) we are able to clearly state which features of the diagram we are taking to be part
of its role in an argument, and which are merely accidental
Here we need to have a mathematically precise understanding of the “features” of a
diagram, as discussed above.
With these modifications made, we have a simpler, clearer and stronger set of ne-
cessary conditions pictorial arguments in mathematics to be rigorous. We also defuse





For the next two brief chapters we shift focus, to address some conceptual issues that
will be appealed to in the discussion in chapter VI of what we want from a foundation
for mathematics. The primary question investigated in this chapter concerns primitive
recursion: what logical resources are required to capture our grasp of primitive recursion,
and the ability to define primitive recursive functions out of a simply infinite sequence?1
The answer given here will be in the form of an operator which I call the double ancestral,
a version of the ancestral operator with two arguments instead of one (or four instead
of two, depending on how one conceives of the ancestral). This is not an entirely novel
insight: R. M. Martin (1943; 1949) defined a version of the ancestral slightly more general
than that given here and showed how it could be used to define primitive recursive
functions. He did not advocate this as the real conceptual basis of primitive recursion
however, or discuss the philosophical implications of this for arithmetic, mainly being
concerned with developing a relatively strong nominalistic framework.
1By simply infinite sequence I mean the usual notion of ω-length infinite sequence equipped with
successor function, such as the natural numbers structure.
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Since the double ancestral operator is arguably a purely logical operator, and is onto-
logically innocent, we thus obtain that the ability to define primitive recursive functions
out of a simply infinite sequence is available in purely logical terms. This will be used
in chapter VI, to show that one can interpret arithmetic statements in terms of any real
simply infinite sequence that we encounter – part of the more general discussion of real
world instantiations of mathematical structures, which is important to the question of
soundness phrased in chapter VI.
The conceptual issues considered in this chapter and the next give an opportunity
to do some philosophy of a rather different flavour, and as an aside, this chapter will
discuss implications of this issue for Isaacson’s thesis (this is an incidental application
of independent interest, and not appealed to in the rest of the thesis). This is a thesis
concerning the status of PA (first order Peano arithmetic). Though PA is necessarily
incomplete, Isaacson (1987; 1992) famously argues that there is a sense in which it is
complete: it captures the purely arithmetical content of our concept of natural number.
Isaacson’s thesis states that to prove an arithmetical sentence which is unprovable in PA,
one will have to employ further ideas, such as higher order concepts or reflections on
the consistency or truth of the axioms of PA. These further ideas go beyond the purely
arithmetic.
Isaacson argues mainly by looking at examples of true sentences unprovable in PA,
and seeing what is needed to prove them. Smith (2008) gives a different argument for the
same basic thesis, arguing that understanding the predicate “natural number” amounts
to understanding the ancestral operator — and thus that the truth of Isaacon’s thesis
rests on whether when you supplement PA with the ancestral operator in the appropriate
way, the result is conservative over PA. As Smith demonstrates, it is not difficult to show
that it is, giving positive support to Isaacson’s thesis.
This chapter considers the case of primitive recursive functions, and uses this to
buttress Smith’s argument. Indeed the same questions Smith asks of the predicate
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“natural number” should be asked of the functions of addition and multiplication. In
Peano arithmetic these functions are assigned symbols in the language, governed by the
axioms
x+ 0 = x
x+ Sy = S(x+ y)
x× 0 = 0
x× Sy = (x× y) + x
where S is the successor operation on numbers. Just as we can ask how we form the
predicate “natural number” and know its axiomatization in PA is appropriate, we can
ask this of + and ×. We are not simply positing these functions, assuming that there are
valid operations on numbers with these properties. We are not imposing these operations
by fiat – perhaps starting with multiple candidate infinite sequences, and then narrowing
our attention to those which happen to allow these operations. We feel we can see that
numbers are the kind of things which can be added and multiplied in the way these
axioms describe. Grasping this is part of grasping the axioms of PA. But how do we
grasp this? How do we come to see that we can introduce functions like this, which are
total and single and satisfy the relevant equations? As we will see, this question has a
satisfying answer in the form of a double version of the ancestral operator.
Since the double ancestral provides a plausible and satisfying account of our grasp
of these primitive recursive functions, we obtain a new test of Isaacson’s thesis: when
arithmetic is phrased in terms of the double ancestral, is the resulting theory conserva-
tive over PA? This is a stronger test than Smith’s since this theory straightforwardly
interprets the ancestral arithmetic used in his test.
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1 The thesis
We start by clarifying what Isaacson’s thesis states. In Isaacson’s original argument,
he takes the proper conception of the natural numbers to be given by the second order
axiomatization. He then feels it is natural to see what remains of this when one restricts
oneself to just quantifiers over the natural numbers (rather than also sets of natural
numbers), moving from the second order induction axiom to the first order induction
axiom scheme. Since what one obtains from this is too weak to define addition and
multiplication, axioms for these are added (and all primitive recursive functions then
become definable). The theory that results from this is PA (Isaacson 1987, pp.148–154).
For Isaacson, Isaacson’s thesis is that any arithmetic truth is provable in PA, where
an arithmetic truth is one which is part of the “purely arithmetic content of our full
understanding of the concept of natural number”. The latter seems to be shorthand for
the process described above by which PA arises.
Thus stated, the thesis appears to be true, but somewhat ad hoc. If our concept
of natural number is a second order concept, then why should “arithmetic content”
refer to restricting oneself to first order quantifiers over numbers? Further, the above
characterization of “arithmetic truth” seems to be in conflict with his later remarks
about it. He talks of arithmetic truths being those that can be directly perceived to
be true, or derived from such statements (ibid., pp.159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 165, etc);
but if grasping the concept of natural number really means grasping the second order
axiomatization, then the first order instances of the induction scheme are not directly
perceived to be true, they are deduced from the second order axiom. Similarly if addition
and multiplication are rightly defined in the way Isaacson discusses, using Dedekind’s
method which quantifies over functions as objects, then one does not directly perceive
the Peano axioms for them to be true – these axioms have a fairly complicated second
order justification. Given that these statements can be seen to be true on the basis of
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the second order axiomatization, there seems to be no principled reason why could not
give a second order justification for further first order arithmetic truths. That would tell
against Isaacson’s thesis.
Nonetheless, one can extract from Isaacson’s writings the following central idea (here
we let LA be the language of PA – a first order language):
Proving a statement of LA that is unprovable in PA will require employing
concepts beyond those required to grasp the basic concepts of arithmetic:
natural number, successor, induction, addition and multiplication.
This is what I mean by Isaacson’s thesis in this chapter.
How strong a thesis this is will depend on how strong a notion of “grasp” one works
with – to fully understand a certain concept, how much further one’s understanding
should extend. In general these questions can be difficult. Sometimes there is a consen-
sus, as in the generally held view that one can properly grasp first order logic without
being able to understand second order logic. Things are not always as clear as in this
case though – can one fully grasp fifth order logic without being able to grasp sixth order
logic?
What the thesis amounts to may also depend on what one takes the right interpreta-
tion of arithmetic to be. For instance suppose one defended a conception of arithmetic
as being about strings formed from some particular symbol |. This is essentially the
conception of Hilbert (1990), and is developed in more detail by Parsons (2007), though
they are concerned particularly with intuitive aspects of the theory and avoid arbitrary
quantification over the domain. It may be that one could describe a first order theory
of the strings, interpret PA in this theory, and argue that our grasp of the concepts of
arithmetic amounted to a grasp of this theory of strings (this is not what the authors
mentioned argue). Then if one could show that this theory of strings was conservative
over PA, one would have evidence for one version of Isaacson’s thesis. However this
would be a very limited version of Isaacson’s thesis, entirely dependent on the claim
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that a proper grasp of arithmetic amounts to a grasp of this theory of strings and should
be expected to extend no further. It would be more an argument for a particular inter-
pretation of arithmetic than for Isaacson’s thesis in general.
The best defence of Isaacson’s thesis would be one which examines the axioms of PA
themselves, rather than relying on any particular interpretation of them. One will also
obtain a stronger version of Isaacson’s thesis if one is liberal in the notion of “grasp” one
uses – liberal in questions of what further concepts proper grasp of a particular concept
entails.
2 The argument
Smith (2008) gives a better argument for the thesis than the hypothetical string based
one just sketched. He focuses on what is required to grasp the concept of natural number.
The basic thought is that
understanding quantification over the [natural] numbers involves understan-
ding that the numbers are zero, the next number, the one after that, and
so on, without limit – and understanding too that these are the only num-
bers. Which is in effect to grasp the thought that every number stands in
the ancestral of the successor relation to zero. (ibid., pp.3–4, emphasis his)
Smith thus argues that grasping the concept “natural number” amounts to grasping the
ancestral operator. This allows him to set a test for Isaacson’s thesis. He supplements
PA with the ancestral operator, to give what he calls “ancestral arithmetic”. Then
if grasping the concept “natural number” amounts to grasping the ancestral operator,
Isaacson’s thesis requires that anything provable in this ancestral arithmetic is already
provable in PA, i.e. that ancestral arithmetic is conservative over PA. This Smith shows
straightforwardly, giving positive support to Isaacson’s thesis.
However Smith’s account misses out a crucial part of arithmetic, as discussed initially:
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the functions of addition and multiplication. We want to know how we grasp that
numbers are the kinds of things that can be added and multiplied. One approach is
to define addition and multiplication in full second order logic, which one can do given
the successor operation and a second order induction axiom. It would be a surprise
if quantifying over relations was necessary to grasp these primitive recursive functions
however. If true, that would presumably disprove Isaacson’s thesis as understood here.
It would also suggest that primitive recursion requires the existence of abstract ob-
jects, so is not a purely logical operation, and is unavailable to a nominalist; although
a nominalist will not be discussing addition and multiplication of numbers, there may
be other contexts where they wish to use primitive recursion, for instance involving
concretely instantiated infinite sequences. If understanding primitive recursion required
quantifying over relations, that looks impossible however.
The main claim of this chapter is that the double ancestral gives us a satisfying
analysis of how one can grasp these kinds of primitive recursive functions, in the same
way the ancestral does for the concept of “natural number”. This gives rise to a new,
stronger test of Isaacson’s thesis, in terms of what I call double ancestral arithmetic.
One issue I will not address is the Neo-Fregean analysis of arithmetic. They might
argue that arithmetic is properly understood in terms of cardinality, using second order
logic augmented with Hume’s principle. If that were true it would present a major chal-
lenge to Isaacson’s thesis as understood here. I do not find the Neo-Fregean arguments
convincing, but they are not the subject of this chapter, and will have to be set to one
side.
3 The ancestral and the double ancestral
The prototypical instance of the ancestral operator is the relation “ancestor”. Similarly
a prototypical example of the double ancestral operator is the relation “ancestor of the
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same generation”. Figure IV.1 illustrates this diagrammatically: illustrating the relation
ASG(x, y) between ancestors of Jeff and ancestors of Sarah, of x being an ancestor of
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Figure IV.1: The “ancestor of the same generation” relation
We can illustrate the general case of the double ancestral operator in the same way,
seen in fig. IV.2. To better suit its application to primitive recursive functions, we will
use the reflexive form – this corresponds to a modification of the “ancestor of the same
generation” relation to include Jeff as an ancestor of Jeff of the same generation as Sarah
is of Sarah. We let φ(x, y) and ψ(w, z) be two place relations, and write (φ, ψ)∗(c, d, x, y)
to indicate that the double ancestral of φ and ψ holds of c, d, x and y. In fig. IV.2 we
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Figure IV.2: The double ancestral of φ and ψ
We can also informally explain (φ, ψ)∗ in prose. We have that the relation (φ, ψ)∗(c, d, x, y)
holds iff
• x = c and y = d
• Or φ(c, x) and ψ(d, y)
• Or there are u and v such that φ(c, u) and φ(u, x), and ψ(d, v) and ψ(v, y)
• Or there are u, u′ and v, v′ such that φ(c, u) and φ(u, u′) and φ(u′, x), and ψ(d, v)
and ψ(v, v′) and ψ(v′, y)
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• Or there are u, u′, u′′ and v, v′, v′′ such that φ(c, u) and φ(u, u′) and φ(u′, u′′) and
φ(u′′, x), and ψ(d, v) and ψ(v, v′) and ψ(v′, v′′) and ψ(v′′, y)
...
and so on (and these are the only objects related by (φ, ψ)∗). This is strictly analogous
to how one would informally explain the ancestral, except that it is a simultaneous
description involving two relations φ and ψ rather than just one – if you left out all
mention of d, y and ψ from the above you would have a description of what is required
for the ancestral φ∗(c, x) to hold.
One can give a precise definition of the double ancestral using finite sequences. We
have that (φ, ψ)∗(c, d, x, y) holds iff for some n > 0 we have sequences (a0, . . . an) and
(b0 . . . bn) such that c = a0, d = b0, x = an, y = bn, and for all i = 0 . . . (n− 1) we have
φ(ai, ai+1) and ψ(bi, bi+1). One can also give a definition in second order logic, where
the relation {(x, y) | (φ, ψ)∗(c, d, x, y)} is the intersection of all relations R such that
R(c, d) and such that if R(x, y) and φ(x,w) and ψ(y, z) then R(w, z).
However there seems no reason to think that understanding predicates formed from
the double ancestral operator requires one of these definitions – any more than for the
ancestral operator. Smith (2008) and Avron (2003) argue that an explicit definition of
the ancestral is not necessary, and that the ancestral operator can be thought of as a
conceptual primitive occupying a valid middle ground between first and second order
logic.2 Exactly the same arguments can be used for the double ancestral.
One attractive way to argue for the ancestral and double ancestral as primitives is to
argue that we grasp them by grasping the introduction and elimination rules for them, as
with other logical vocabulary (helped by informal explication, again as with other logical
vocabulary). This view of ancestral style predicates is urged by Parsons (2007, Chapter
2Others have also used ancestral logic as a middle ground between first and second order logic, such
as Heck (2011, pp. 274–279), though Heck does not give sustained arguments for this status.
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8), and exactly the same could be said of relations formed by the double ancestral.
We will see those these rules for the double ancestral in a second, but first we will
characterize it in stricter logical terms. Formally the double ancestral is an operator
on formulae that produces relation symbols. We introduce an extra clause into the
recursive definition of formulae for the language: if φ and ψ are formulae, x1, x2 are
distinct variables, y1, y2 are distinct variables, and s1, s2, t2, t2 are terms, then we obtain
a formula (φ, ψ)∗x1,x2,y1,y2(s1, t1, s2, t2). Free occurrences of x1, x2 in φ become bound in
this formula, as do free occurrences of y1, y2 in ψ.
Now for the rules for the double ancestral. We will shortly see that it can be used to
play the role of the (single) ancestral, so since there is no complete effective deductive
system for the ancestral operator (Shapiro 1991) there isn’t one for the double ancestral
operator either. However we can still give natural deductive rules that capture the
reasoning we use for it in practice. These parallel those for the ancestral described by
Smith, and the rules for the predicate “natural number” described and defended by
Parsons (2007, Chapter 8). It is these rules that will be used to test Isaacson’s thesis,
so that if one could argue that there were further inferences that a grasp of the double
ancestral should license, the test of Isaacson’s thesis would be undermined; there are no
obvious candidates for this though. I use φ[t|x] to denote the substitution of the term t
for free occurrences of variable x in φ.
s1 = t1 s2 = t2
(φ, ψ)∗~x,~y(s1, t1, s2, t2)
(1)
(φ, ψ)∗~x,~y(s1, t1, s2, t2) φ[s2|x1, s3|x2] ψ[t2|y1, t3|y2]
(φ, ψ)∗~x,~y(s1, t1, s3, t3)
(2)
∀~x~y ((χ(x1, y1) ∧ φ ∧ ψ) ⇒ χ[x2|x1, y2|y1]) (φ, ψ)∗~x,~y(s1, t1, s2, t2)
χ[s1|x1, t1|y1] ⇒ χ[s2|x1, t2|y1]
(3)
In rule (3) we require that x2 and y2 are not free in χ. The first two rules give ways
of showing that objects lie under the double ancestral, the third is an induction rule: if
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some property χ is preserved by φ together with ψ, then it is preserved by (φ, ψ)∗~x,~y.
We now quickly sketch a semantics for this. If A is a structure for the language and v
a variable assignment over A then we stipulate that D, v  (φ, ψ)∗~x,~y(s1, t1, s2, t2) iff there
exist sequences (a0, . . . an) and (b0, . . . bn) for some n > 0 such that a1 = v(s1), b1 = v(t1),
an = v(s2), bn = v(t2), and for each i = 0 . . . (n−1) we have A, v(x1 7→ ai, x2 7→ ai+1)  φ
and v(y1 7→ bi, y2 7→ bi+1)  ψ. Otherwise one can employ the double ancestral in the
metalanguage for this clause.
Next we note that the double ancestral operator can be used to define the an-
cestral operator. If we have a relation φ(x, y) for which we wish to form the ancestral
(φ)∗x,y(w, z), we can take some variables u1, u2 distinct from x, y, w, z, take ψ to be
“u1 = u2”, and take (φ)∗x,y(w, z) to be ∃u1((φ, ψ)∗x,y,u1,u2(w, u1, z, u1)). It is an easy
check that this has the right semantics and satisfies Smith’s deductive rules.
The double ancestral defined here is a special case of the two place generalized
ancestral, which was defined by R. M. Martin (1943). Avron (2003, pp.157–158) also
discusses the generalized ancestral, and proves that it cannot be defined in terms of the
ancestral. As we will soon see, the double ancestral can be used to define primitive
recursive functions, so Avron’s proof also shows that the double ancestral cannot be
defined in terms of the ancestral. It is possible to define the generalized ancestral (and
thus the double ancestral) in terms of the ancestral if one has a pairing function on
objects, as we will see in proposition IV.1.
Thus one could conceivably try to sidestep the arguments made here by claiming
that we grasp a pairing function for natural numbers, and thus that the double ancestral
in an arithmetic context can be defined in terms of the ancestral, with us grasping
primitive recursive functions via a pairing function combined with the ancestral in this
way. However it seems clear that appealing to a pairing function for natural numbers
would be a very bad explanation of our grasp of addition and multiplication. The ability
to form a pair (m,n) of two natural numbers, either as a self standing object or via
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an injection N2 → N, is no part of a usual understanding of PA. Pedagogically, our
understanding of addition and multiplication has nothing to do with a pairing function
N2 → N – we learn addition and multiplication long before learning about a pairing
function, and students are often surprised to discover that such an injection exists.
Grasping abstract pairs or general tuples of natural numbers also seems to be no part
of our initial conception of arithmetic. Thus it will be assumed that founding our grasp
of primitive recursion on a pairing function is an unattractive option.
I focus on the double ancestral rather than the generalized ancestral in this chapter
however because it allows a simpler informal characterization, and is a closer fit for the
case of primitive recursive functions. One could argue that anyone who grasps the double
ancestral should be able to grasp the two place generalized ancestral; whether or not
that is correct, the conservativeness argument given later would also apply to the two
place generalized ancestral, so Isaacson’s thesis is safe either way.
4 Primitive recursion and the double ancestral
When Smith argues that a grasp of the ancestral is used to understand the predicate
“natural number”, he does so by pointing out that
understanding quantification over the [natural] numbers involves understan-
ding that the numbers are zero, the next number, the one after that, and so
on, without limit – and understanding too that these are the only numbers.
Which is in effect to grasp the thought that every number stands in the
ancestral of the successor relation to zero. (Smith 2008, pp.3–4, emphasis
his)
Fix an object a and a function f , and consider the primitive recursive function g
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a might be any object (not necessarily a number). Exactly parallel to the above expli-
cation of what it is to understand the predicate “natural number”, we can say that
understanding the function g involves understanding that g applied to zero
gives a, that g applied to the next number after zero is f of g applied to
zero, that g applied to the next number after that is f of g applied to that
number, that g applied to the next number after that is f of g applied to
that number, and so on.
Understanding some sort of informal explication along these lines is how we understand
what we mean by g, and why we can introduce a function symbol with these properties –
in exactly the same way as understanding the ancestral is how we know we can form the
predicate “natural number”. The above is doubtless less clear than the earlier explication
of “natural number”, but it has a parallel structure, just involving twice as many objects.
It is also visibly an explication of the function g in terms of the double ancestral. This
is illustrated diagrammatically in fig. IV.3.
Comparing this to fig. IV.1 and fig. IV.2 makes it pretty clear, I think, that definition
by primitive recursive is a straightforward case of the double ancestral; and, in fact, that
the double ancestral generalizes definition by primitive recursive in an exactly parallel
way to how the ancestral generalizes the definition of the concept “natural number”. We
can see the same thing happening in prose. We can describe the above function g by
saying g(x) = y iff
• x = 0 and y = a
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Figure IV.3: Primitive recursion via the double ancestral
• Or x = S(0) and y = f(a)
• Or there are u and v such that u = S(0) and x = S(u), and v = f(a) and y = f(v)
• Or there are u, u′ and v, v′ such that u = S(0) and u′ = S(u) and x = S(u′), and
v = f(a) and v′ = f(v) and y = f(v′′)
• Or there are u, u′, u′′ and v, v′, v′′ such that u = S(0) and u′ = S(u) and u′′ = S(u′)
and x = S(u′′), and v = f(a) and v′ = f(v) and v′′ = f(v′′) and y = f(v′′)
...
and so on (and these are the only objects related by g). This is visibly an example of a
definition of which the prose characterization of (φ, ψ)∗(c, d, x, y) seen in section IV.3 is
the general form.
Exactly as Smith argues that grasping the concept natural number means grasping
it as an instance of the ancestral operator, we can argue that grasping a definition by
primitive recursion means grasping it as an instance of the double ancestral operator.
There seems to be no good reason why anyone who can grasp a function defined by
primitive recursion should not be able to grasp other instances of the double ancestral.
Formally, for this primitive recursive definition via the double ancestral to work all
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we need is that ∀x S(x) 6= 0 and ∀xy (S(x) = S(y) → x = y), so that S is a suitable
successor function, being injective and avoiding 0. Defining the ancestral (φ)∗x,y(w, z) in
terms of the double ancestral as seen in section IV.3 (or taking it as an extra primitive),
we can then define a predicate N for the successors of 0 – the natural numbers – to
apply to those x satisfying (v = S(u))∗u,v(0, x). We define the function g via the relation
G(x, y) defined as
(u2 = S(u1), v2 = f(v1))∗u1,u2,v1,v2(0, a, x, y).
It is straightforward by induction along the predicate N that for all x satisfying N(x)
there is a y such that G(x, y), using the fact that f is total and rule (2) from section IV.3.
Thus G is a total relation, and we seek to argue that it defines a well defined function.
First, putting the relation χ(w, z) defined to be w = 0 → z = a into the induction rule
for G, rule (3), gives that for all x, y, if G(x, y) then x = 0 implies y = a; in other words,
G(0, y) implies y = a. Thus we have that G(0, y) and G(0, y′) implies y = y′. Next
we prove a lemma, arguing by induction along G that if G(Sx, y) then there is z such
that y = g(z) and G(x, z); the induction hypothesis is the relation χ(w, z) defined to be
G(w, z) ∧ (∀u (w = S(u) → ∃v (z = g(v) ∧ G(u, v)))). Finally we argue by induction
along the predicate N(x), that if x satisfies N(x) then for all y, y′, if G(x, y) and G(x, y′)
then y = y′. The base case for 0 was the first thing proved above. For the induction step,
if the property holds for x, and we have G(Sx, y) and G(Sx, y′), then by the lemma there
are z, z′ such that G(x, z) and G(x, z′) and y = f(z), y′ = f(z′). Thus by the induction
hypothesis z = z′, and so y = y′ as required. Thus G does indeed define a total and well
defined function, which we can denote as above by g. It is immediate by rules (1) and
(2) that this function satisfies the defining equations mentioned initially in this section.
One possible caveat to the arguments of this section is that there are interpretations
of arithmetic on which addition and multiplication might not be seen as given by pri-
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mitive recursion: for instance the approach of Neo-Fregeanism via cardinality, and the
interpretation of arithmetic in intuitive terms via strings of symbols given by Parsons
(2007). As noted in section IV.1, a Neo-Fregean perspective does seem to present major
problems for Isaacson’s thesis, which I cannot address here. Parsons does argue that
addition and multiplication in the context of strings should be seen as distinct from
an intuitive perspective from other primitive recursive functions (ibid., Chapter 7), but
this is very much a result about his particular notion of intuition, and this string based
context. He does not argue that this string interpretation is the true interpretation of
arithmetic, and does not argue that it gives an interpretation of all of PA. Thus his views
(even if correct) do not present much of a challenge to the perspective here.
5 Double ancestral arithmetic
We call the theory of N mentioned in section IV.4 double ancestral arithmetic. It has a
language with the constant 0 and the successor function S, and its axioms are:
∀x (v = S(u))∗u,v(0, x) (4)
∀xS(x) 6= 0 (5)
∀xy (S(x) = S(y) → x = y). (6)
This is a particularly simple and natural axiomatization – all we need is that every
number is a successor of 0, and and that the successor function is injective without 0 in
its range. It is categorical because of the standard semantics for the double ancestral,
and thus for the relation (v = S(u))∗u,v.
We can give an informal characterization of addition similar to that of general pri-
mitive recursive functions:
Adding 0 to x gives you x, adding 1 to x gives you Sx, adding 2 to x gives
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you SSx, adding 3 to x gives you SSSx, and so on.
It follows that the relation x+ y = z can be captured by the double ancestral
(u2 = S(u1), v2 = S(v1))∗u1,u2,v1,v2(0, x, y, z)
(one can visualise a diagram similar to fig. IV.3 to see how this works). As with the case
of a general primitive recursive function seen in section IV.4, one can prove straight-
forwardly in double ancestral arithmetic that this definition does indeed define a total,
single-valued function with value z of its arguments x and y. Using the normal notation
x+ y = z for it, we have that + satisfies the usual equations
x+ 0 = x
x+ Sy = S(x+ y).
Similarly multiplication x× y = z is captured by the double ancestral
(u2 = S(u1), v2 = v1 + x)∗u1,u2,v1,v2(0, 0, y, z).
Again one can prove its usual properties in the theory.
Thus one obtains the axioms of Smith’s ancestral arithmetic and (a fortiori) of PA
in double ancestral arithmetic – the instances of the induction axiom scheme follow from
axiom (4). The double ancestral provides the general concept of which addition and
multiplication are a special case. Thus it provides a useful test case for Isaacson’s thesis.
If Smith is correct that a grasp of the ancestral is what’s needed to grasp the predicate
“natural number”, and the parallel argument here for the double ancestral and primitive
recursion is also correct, then the axiomatization of arithmetic above in terms of the
double ancestral appears to include everything that is needed for a full understanding
of PA (as long as the deductive rules for the ancestral and double ancestral are in some
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sense adequate).
Thus conservativeness of double ancestral arithmetic over PA would imply that one
would have to employ ideas beyond those needed to understand PA in order to prove
a statement of LA that was unprovable in PA. On the other hand if double ancestral
arithmetic is not conservative over PA, then – on a very natural interpretation of arithme-
tic – we would have examples of statements of LA provable using only the conceptual
resources needed to understand PA, so Isaacson’s thesis would be in trouble.
Fortunately for Isaacson’s thesis, we have the following.
Proposition IV.1. Double ancestral arithmetic is conservative over ancestral arithmetic
(as defined by Smith).
Proof. We show that ancestral arithmetic and double ancestral arithmetic are definitio-
nally equivalent. Let TAnc be the theory of ancestral arithmetic, LAnc its language, and
let TDA be the theory of double ancestral arithmetic and LDA its language. We saw above
how to define the relevant primitives of ancestral arithmetic – the ancestral operator,
addition and multiplication – in terms of the double ancestral. Let φ 7→ f(φ) denote the
translation by these definitions from the LAnc to LDA. We have that if TAnc,Γ ` then
TDA, f(Γ) ` f(φ), since double ancestral arithmetic proves the axioms for the ancestral
and addition and multiplication.
Now in ancestral arithmetic we can define a bijective pairing function α : N2 → N,
where α(x, y) = α(x′, y′) iff x = x′ and y = y′. We let the inverse be z 7→ (β1(z), β2(z)).
We will show how to translate statements involving the double ancestral into statements
involving the (standard) ancestral using this. This translation function will be denoted
by g.
The idea is simply that (φ, ψ)∗x1,x2,y1,y2(s1, t1, s2, t2) is equivalent to the ancestral
(φ[β1(x), β1(y)] ∧ ψ[β2(x), β2(y)])∗x,y(α(s1, t1), α(s2, t2))
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This can be easily checked to be the case semantically.
We define g by induction on the number of occurrences of the double ancestral in a for-
mula. For statements θ of LDA which do not involveRTC2, g(θ) is just θ. For a statement
of the form θ = (φ, ψ)∗x1,x2,y1,y2(s1, t1, s2, t2), we let φ
′ be g(φ)[β1(x)|x1, β1(y)|x2] and ψ′
be g(ψ)[β2(x)|y1, β2(y)|y2], and then define g(θ) to be (φ′ ∧ ψ′)∗x,y(α(s1, t1), α(s2, t2)).
g acts on statements built from propositional connectives or quantifiers in the obvious
way, e.g. g(θ1 ∧θ2) = g(θ1)∧g(θ2). It is an easy check that this is an adequate definition
of the double ancestral, in as much as the deductive rules for the double ancestral hold:
we have that if TDA,∆ ` θ then TAnc, g(∆) ` g(θ).
Then it is not difficult to show f and g give a definitional equivalence (Corcoran
1980), i.e. that for any χ ∈ LAnc we have TAnc ` χ ⇔ g(f(χ)), and for any θ ∈ LDA we
have TDA ` θ ⇔ f(g(θ)).
Thus if χ is a formula of LAnc and TDA ` f(χ) then TAnc ` g(f(χ)) so TAnc ` χ. In
this sense TDA is conservative over TAnc, as claimed.
Putting this together with Smith’s result that ancestral arithmetic is conservative
over PA, we can conclude that double ancestral arithmetic is conservative over PA. Thus
Isaacson’s thesis passes the test, and looks secure; even more secure than it did after
passing Smith’s test, since we have now taken the functions of addition and multiplication
into account.
Incidentally this argument makes it clear that understanding primitive recursion does





We now combine the idea of the ancestral and double ancestral with the resources of
plural logic, briefly showing how this allows the definition of various key arithmetic
concepts – finiteness, equinumerosity (for finite pluralities), addition and multiplication
– and thus allows a novel kind of interpretation of arithmetic. Aspects of this are
compared to the Neo-Fregean interpretation. If one accepts ancestral logic and plural
logic separately as real logics, then there is a strong case that their combination here
should also be considered a real logic, in which case we obtain that the concepts of
finiteness and equinumerosity for finite pluralities, and the other arithmetic relations
defined here, are purely logical. This will be useful for the issues considered in chapter VI.
Once again, the basic ideas here are in a sense not new, and follow the example of
R. M. Martin (1943; 1949). He set up a nominalist system using a generalized ancestral
operator together with a mereological base system, to provide a setting for arithmetic.
The definitions of finiteness, equinumerosity and multiplication that I will give are es-
sentially those given by him, except that I work with pluralities instead of the fusions of
atoms (mereological simples) that he uses. His motivations were different: he appears
to have been aiming just to give a fairly strong nominalistic system for doing maths
in, and gave little philosophical discussion, not claiming his work had implications for
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the semantics or epistemology of arithmetic. Nonetheless, all due credit to Martin. If
nothing else, this chapter can be seen as advocacy of the importance of his work.
1 Plural double ancestral logic
The original case for plural logic was made by Boolos (1984; 1985), who argued that
English contains statements involving plural quantification that cannot be translated
away into purely singular terms (such as “there are critics who admire only one another”),
and gave a semantics for plural logic, logic containing such plural quantifiers. A more
extended case is made by Oliver and Smiley (2013), who argue that “[t]here are three
good reasons to recognize plural terms: the notion is coherent; English itself appears to
contain many examples; and rival singularist treatments of the phenomena fail” (ibid.).
I think these arguments make a reasonable prima facie case for accepting plurals, though
I do not think they settle the matter. For the purpose of this chapter and the following
one, we will assume they are correct however.
Thus as well as singular variables x, y, z, . . . we introduce here plural variables xx,
yy, zz, . . ., with quantifiers over each type of variables, the usual logical rules, and
comprehension for pluralities. It is slightly easier to define the arithmetic concepts
discussed here if one allows an empty plurality, though this may be controversial, and
the cases where pluralities are required to consist of at least one, or at least two, objects
are also discussed.1
For plural variables there is an important distinction between collective and distri-
butive predicates, discussed by Oliver and Smiley (ibid., §2.1): a distributive predicate
states for instance that the men are rotund, where this applies to the men if and only
1The versions of plural logic in which “there are” means “there are zero or more”, “there are one or
more” or “there are two or more” respectively are interpretable in terms of each other, as Burgess and
Rosen (1997, pp. 151, 155) discuss. It does not look like these reinterpretations work for the general
case of ancestral and double ancestral operators operating on pluralities, but the reinterpretations may
be valid for the instances of these operators used here.
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if it applies to each individual, whereas a collective predicate states for instance that
the men are carrying a stone, which can apply to the men even if it applies to none of
them individually. Provided one accepts collective predicates, and similarly collective
relations, for pluralities, and accepts the kind of rule based defence of the ancestral
mentioned in section IV.3 urged by Parsons (2007, Chapter 8), then there appears to
be no objection to accepting versions of the ancestral and double ancestral which form
collective relations between pluralities; examples of such collective relations, such as the
relation of equinumerosity, and of one plurality being a finite extension of a second, will
be seen shortly.
Given a formula φ and distinct plural variables xx1 and xx2, the ancestral for plu-
ralities gives a new binary relation symbol (φ)∗xx1,xx2 which takes two plural terms as
arguments. We can informally explain (φ)∗xx1,xx2 in prose, paralleling the explanation
of the double ancestral from section IV.3. We have that the relation (φ)∗xx1,xx2(aa, tt)
holds iff
• aa = ss
• Or φ[aa|xx1, ss|xx2]
• Or there are uu such that φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2] and φ[uu|xx1, ss|xx2]
• Or there are uu and there are uu′ such that φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2] and φ[uu|xx1, uu′|xx2]
and φ[uu′|xx1, ss|xx2]
• Or there are uu and there are uu′ and there are uu′′ such that we have φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2]
and φ[uu|xx1, uu′|xx2] and φ[uu′|xx1, uu′′|xx2] and φ[uu′′|xx1, ss|xx2]
...
and so on (and these are the only pluralities related by (φ)∗xx1,xx2). This is the same as
how one would informally explain the usual ancestral, but for plural variables instead.
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Then the double ancestral creates a relation symbol (φ, ψ)∗xx1,xx2,yy1,yy2 which takes
four plural terms as arguments, given formulae φ and ψ and distinct plural variables
xx1, xx2, yy1, yy2. Again we can give an informal explication of this in prose, pa-
ralleling that of the double ancestral from section IV.3. We have that the relation
(φ, ψ)∗xx1,xx2,yy1,yy2(aa, bb, ss, tt) holds iff
• aa = ss and bb = tt
• Or φ[aa|xx1, ss|xx2] and ψ[bb|yy1, tt|yy2]
• Or there are uu and there are vv such that φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2] and φ[uu|xx1, ss|xx2],
and φ[bb|yy1, vv|yy2] and φ[vv|yy1, tt|yy2]
• Or there are uu and there are uu′, and there are vv and there are vv′, such that
φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2] and φ[uu|xx1, uu′|xx2] and φ[uu′|xx1, ss|xx2], and φ[bb|yy1, vv|yy2]
and φ[vv|yy1, vv′|yy2] and φ[vv′|yy1, tt|yy2]
• Or there are uu and there are uu′ and there are uu′′, and there are vv and there
are vv′ and there are vv′′, such that φ[aa|xx1, uu|xx2] and φ[uu|xx1, uu′|xx2] and
φ[uu′|xx1, uu′′|xx2] and φ[uu′′|xx1, ss|xx2], and φ[bb|yy1, vv|yy2] and φ[vv|yy1, vv′|yy2]
and φ[vv′|yy1, vv′′|yy2] and φ[vv′′|yy1, tt|yy2]
...
and so on (and these are the only pluralities related by (φ, ψ)∗xx1,xx2,yy1,yy2).
These are governed by the same rules as for the ancestral and double ancestral, but









∀xx1 xx2 ((χ(xx1) ∧ φ) ⇒ χ[xx2|xx1]) (φ)∗~xx(aa, ss)
χ[aa|xx1] ⇒ χ[ss|xx1]
(3)
In rule (3) we require that xx2 is not free in χ.
For the plural double ancestral we have
aa = ss bb = tt
(φ, ψ)∗~xx, ~yy(aa, bb, ss, tt)
(4)
(φ, ψ)∗~xx, ~yy(aa, bb, ss1, tt1) φ[ss1|xx1, ss2|xx2] ψ[tt1|yy1, tt2|yy2]
(φ, ψ)∗~xx, ~yy(aa, bb, ss2, tt2)
(5)
∀ ~xx ~yy ((χ(xx1, yy1) ∧ φ) ⇒ χ[xx2|xx1, yy2|yy1]) (φ, ψ)∗~xx, ~yy(aa, bb, ss, tt)
χ[aa|xx1, bb|yy1] ⇒ χ[ss|xx1, tt|yy1]
(6)
In rule (6) we require that xx2 and yy2 are not free in χ.
One can give a semantics for each of these operators using the same operator in the
metalanguage, for instance extending the semantics for plural logic from Boolos (1985)
appropriately.
2 Finiteness
To start characterizing arithmetic concepts, first we define what it is for a plurality
yy to be the same as the xx but with one additional element, which we write as
Succ(xx, yy), “Succ” for “successor”. This holds if every x amongst the xx is also among
the yy, and if there is a unique y which is amongst the yy but not the xx. Then
using the ancestral for plurals we can form the relation (Succ(xx1, xx2))∗xx1,xx2 , where
(Succ(xx1, xx2))∗xx1,xx2(ss, tt) holds if the tt are obtained as a finite extension of the
ss. Then we can define what it is for a plurality to be finite: they are just the finite
extensions of the empty plurality (or the finite extensions of the pluralities of size one or
two, depending on what we take the minimum size of a plurality to be). The informal
characterization of this is that the empty plurality is finite, and that if the uu are empty
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and the ss are obtained from uu by the addition of a single element, then the ss are
finite, and that if the uu are empty and the uu′ are obtained from the uu by the addi-
tion of a single element, and the ss are obtained from the uu′ by the addition of a single
element, then the ss are finite, and so on. This is a natural informal characterization of
finiteness.
Then the rules for the plural ancestral tell us that the empty plurality is finite (or
all those of size one or two, depending on the minimum size of our pluralities), that if
the ss are finite and the tt are the same as the ss but with one element added, then the
tt are finite; and that if some property is preserved under addition of one element to a
plurality, and holds of the empty plurality, then it holds of all finite pluralities. These
principles seem very plausibly to be constitutive of what we mean by finiteness. The
first two would I think be accepted by almost anyone; the inductive principle is a little
more obscure, but I think we would expect people to accept at least some arguments
along these lines. For instance, if we wanted to argue that every finite group of people
has a tallest person, we could argue as follows: if there is just one among the xx then
they have a tallest person, and if the yy have a tallest person u and people zz are just
the yy with an extra person v then either u or v will be a tallest person among the yy.
It is possible that many people would not see the need for this kind of argument (taking
this kind of fact as obvious). It is also possible that an ordinary person might phrase
it more naturally in a different way, as saying that if there’s one person then they’re
the tallest; if you add a second person, then if they’re taller than the previous person
then they’re the tallest, otherwise the previous person was the tallest; if you add a third
person, then if they’re taller than the previous two then they’re the tallest, otherwise
the tallest of the previous two is the tallest, and so on. Though phrased differently this
has essentially the same structure as the preceding argument. It appears here that we
can see an ordinary person’s grasp of inductive inferences involving finiteness as on a





The definition of equinumerosity for finite pluralities is very similar, but using the plural
double ancestral instead of the plural ancestral. Using the double plural ancestral we
can form the relation (Succ(xx1, xx2),Succ(yy1, yy2)) ~xx, ~yy, where
(Succ(xx1, xx2), Succ(yy1, yy2)) ~xx, ~yy(aa, bb, ss, tt)
holding means that the ss are obtained from the aa by adding in as many additional ele-
ments as it takes to obtain the tt from the bb. We write this relation as Add(aa, bb, ss, tt).
If we allow an empty plurality, one can then define ss and tt to be equinumerous if
Add(ee, ee, ss, tt) where ee is the empty plurality. Otherwise if we require all pluralities
to have size at least one (or two), then we can define ss and tt to be equinumerous if
there are aa, bb of size one (or two) such that Add(aa, bb, ss, tt). The informal charac-
terization of this is that either the ss and the tt are empty, or there are empty uu and
vv such that Succ(uu, ss) and Succ(vv, tt), or there are empty uu and vv and there are
uu′ and there are vv′ such that Succ(uu, uu′) and Succ(vv, vv′) and Succ(uu′, ss) and
Succ(vv′, tt), and so on.
This a natural informal way to describe the concept of equal size: both pluralities
are empty (or have size one, or two, depending on the minimum size of our pluralities),
or both are obtained by adding one extra to an empty plurality, or both are obtained
by adding one extra to pluralities related like that, or both are obtained by adding one
extra to pluralities related like that, and so on. This is similar to a description of the
pluralities on each side as built up by the addition one by one of the same number
of elements – and similar too to a description in terms of counting each plurality and
obtaining the same result.
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The rules for the double ancestral then tell us that:
• The empty plurality is equinumerous to itself (or all those of size one or two are
equinumerous)
• If ss and tt are equinumerous, and the ss′ and the tt′ are obtained by adding a
single element to ss and tt respectively, then the ss′ and the tt′ are equinumerous
• If a relation R holding between pluralities ss and tt implies that it holds between
ss′ and tt′ when ss′ and tt′ are obtained by adding a single element to ss and tt
respectively, and also R holds between any empty pluralities, then R holds between
all equinumerous pluralities
We will write this equinumerosity relation as xx ≈ yy. This has the basic properties one
would expect. Indeed it is easy to see that if xx ≈ yy then xx and yy are finite, and
that if xx is finite then xx ≈ xx. Then the ≈-relation is symmetric for empty pluralities,
and if yy ≈ xx and Succ(yy, yy′) and Succ(xx, xx′) then yy′ ≈ xx′, so it is immediate
by ≈-induction on xx ≈ yy (with induction hypothesis yy ≈ xx) that xx ≈ yy implies
yy ≈ xx. Also, by ≈-induction we have that if xx is not empty and xx ≈ yy then
there are xx′ and yy′ such that xx′ ≈ yy′, Succ(xx′, xx) and Succ(yy′, yy) (call this the
successor equinumerosity property). Thus if yy is empty and xx ≈ yy then xx must be
empty.
Arguing that the relation is transitive appears to require more work. First, say that
yy and yy′ differ in one element if there is a unique y amongst the yy but not the yy′,
and a unique y′ amongst the yy′ but not amongst the yy. We can argue by induction on
yy that if yy and yy′ differ in one element then yy ≈ yy′. This is trivial for yy empty.
Suppose it holds for yy, and that we have Succ(yy, zz), with a unique x amongst the zz
but not the yy; and that we have that zz′ differs from zz in one element, with a unique z
amongst the zz but not the zz′ and a unique z′ amongst the zz′ but not the zz. If x 6= z
then we let yy′ consist of the same elements as yy but with z′ added and z removed; thus
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yy′ differs from yy in one element, so by the induction hypothesis we have yy ≈ yy′, but
we have Succ(yy, zz) and Succ(yy′, zz′) by construction, and so yy′ ≈ zz′ as required. If
on the other hand x = z then Succ(yy, zz′) and so zz ≈ zz′. Thus either way we are done.
Then we have that if Succ(yy, zz) and Succ(yy′, zz) then either yy = yy′ or the yy differ
from the yy′ in one element, and so either way yy ≈ yy′. Now we argue by induction
on xx that if xx ≈ yy and yy ≈ zz then xx ≈ zz. This is true for xx empty. Suppose
true for xx, and that Succ(xx, xx∗), and let xx∗ ≈ yy and yy ≈ zz. By successor
equinumerosity, there are xx′, yy′, yy′′, and zz′ such that xx′ ≈ yy′, Succ(xx′, xx∗),
Succ(yy′, yy), yy′′ ≈ zz, Succ(yy′′, yy) and Succ(zz′, zz). Then we also have xx ≈ xx′
and yy′ ≈ yy′′ by the first intermediate result. Thus xx ≈ xx′ ≈ yy′ ≈ yy′′ ≈ zz′, and
so by the induction hypothesis xx ≈ zz′. Thus xx∗ ≈ zz as required. Thus by induction
whenever xx ≈ yy and yy ≈ zz we have xx ≈ zz, so that ≈ is transitive, and is thus an
equivalence relation on finite pluralities.
We can then also argue that if Succ(xx, xx∗) and Succ(yy, yy∗) then xx ≈ yy iff
xx∗ ≈ yy∗. The only if direction is immediate from the rules governing ≈, and for the
converse, we have by the second intermediate result proved on the way to transitivity that
if xx∗ ≈ yy∗ then there are xx′ and yy′ with xx′ ≈ yy′, Succ(xx′, xx∗) and Succ(yy′, yy∗).
Thus xx ≈ xx′, and yy ≈ yy′, so since ≈ is an equivalence relation we have xx ≈ yy as
required.
This account of equinumerosity is an attractive one. As Burgess (2005, pp.80–85)
discusses, when giving an account of a concept we can either intend a hermeneutic ac-
count, which is intended to describe what the term presently means, or a revolutionary
account, which is purely a proposal for the future use of the concept. Giving a herme-
neutic account is potentially a much greater challenge, as one needs to take into account
what current or prior users of the concept have taken it to mean, whereas the primary
question for a revolutionary account of a concept is just whether it is useful. The main
existing account of equinumerosity is found in Hume’s principle, stating that the xx are
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equinumerous to the yy iff there is a relation R which is a bijection between the xx
and the yy. This is essentially the definition of equinumerosity used in mathematics,2
to which the account given here is not intended as a rival: in mathematics one wants
powerful, mathematically fruitful concepts, and the approach used here appears to just
be more awkward and less widely applicable than the definition in terms of bijections
(as it does not apply to infinite sets).
However there is also the everyday, preexisting notion of equinumerosity, which needs
separate consideration. As a revolutionary proposal for an everyday language notion of
equinumerosity, the concept described above has the advantage that it is phrased in
(arguably) a more innocent logic than Hume’s principle, which requires second order
logic: both the ancestral operator and the use of plurals have been argued to be purely
logical, and ontologically innocent, and if this is right then the same should apply to the
combination of them discussed here. The status of full second order logic by contrast is
more questionable, relying as it does on the existence of abstract objects such as relations.
As a hermeneutic account of the everyday concept of equinumerosity, the proposal here
also has advantages. It has been noted, for instance by Heck (2011, pp.168–172), that a
grasp of equinumerosity in terms of bijections does not seem to be essential to an everyday
understanding of the concept. Someone can understand for instance the statement that
“there will come a time as many days in the future as there are birds in the sky”, with no
awareness that this need involve a way of pairing up days and birds, either as a relation
definable in our language, or as an abstract relation entity. If our pre theoretical notion
of equinumerosity did involve a tacit understanding of bijections, then the extension
to the infinite case ought to be straightforward for people, whereas the definition of
cardinality in terms of bijections for infinite sets is an aspect of higher mathematics that
is famously found to be difficult and unintuitive. By contrast, the three principles seen
above that characterize equinumerosity on this account are much more natural. The
2Though in mathematics one takes a bijection to be a set of ordered pairs, instead of an entity in the
range of a second order binary relation variable.
146
3. EQUINUMEROSITY
first two – that the empty plurality is equinumerous to itself (or all of size one or two
are equinumerous, depending on our stance), and that if ss and tt are equinumerous,
and the ss′ and the tt′ are obtained by adding a single element to ss and tt respectively,
then the ss′ and the tt′ are equinumerous – are clearly basic to our standard conception
of equinumerosity. These first two principles are actually very similar to two of the three
principles that Heck takes to be basic to the concept Heck (ibid., p. 170): the second
above is essentially the same principle as Heck’s second principle (though phrased in
plural rather than second order logic), whilst Heck’s first principle is the first of the
principles above conjoined with the claim that if xx is empty and is equinumerous with
yy, then yy is empty, which is a property that we can easily derive, as noted above.
Heck’s third principle states essentially that if S(xx, xx∗) and S(yy, yy∗) and xx∗ ≈ yy∗
then xx ≈ yy, which was also derived without too much difficulty above. The third
principle governing equinumerosity here, the induction principle, is more difficult, but
we can argue that at least some instances of it would naturally be accepted. As an
example, we can argue by induction that whenever there are as many people xx1 as
people xx2 then the xx1 and the xx2 can be lined up facing each other, with each person
in each line directly opposite one person in the other line. This is true whenever there
is a single xx1 and xx2. If it’s true for xx1 and xx2 and the yy1 are the xx1 with extra
person v1, and the yy2 are the xx2 with extra person v2, then xx1 and xx2 can be lined
up facing each other, with v1 and v2 facing each other at one end. One could give a
more informal version of this, but with a similar argumentative structure, by arguing
that the conclusion held when there was one among the xx1 and one among the xx2,
or two among the xx1 and two among the xx2, and so on, adding in an extra person
to the argument at each step. It appears to be about as reasonable to take acceptance
of this kind of inference as part of a standard notion of equinumerosity as it is to take
a grasp of ∀-introduction to be implicit in a standard understanding of quantification.
As other points in favour of the characterization given here, it avoids using the concept
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of bijection, and has no obvious extension to the infinite case – fitting the layman’s
confusion about what “sameness of size” might mean for infinite totalities.
Though this conception does not employ the notion of bijection, one can still prove
intuitive facts about bijections, such as that bijections between finite pluralities establish
equinumerosity between them: if φ(x, y) is an open formula which is bijective in its two
arguments, then we can prove by induction on xx that if φ relates the objects amongst
the xx to the objects amongst the yy then xx ≈ yy. Principles like this appear to
underlie examples like Heck’s of the cookies and the children (Heck 2011, p. 171).
4 Arithmetic operations
We now move on to discuss further arithmetic concepts, namely how to characterize
what it is for a finite plurality zz to be the same size as as the sizes of the finite
pluralities xx and yy added, or multiplied. For addition, we use the same relation Add
as that in the definition of equinumerosity, and define +(xx, yy, zz) to mean (assuming we
allow the empty plurality) that there is a plurality xx2 equinumerous with xx such that
Add(ee, xx2, yy, zz) where ee is the empty plurality (one can adjust this appropriately
if one takes pluralities to be nonempty). This states informally that zz can be obtained
from zz′ by adding as many elements as it takes to obtain yy from ee, i.e. as many
elements as there are in yy.
We can again prove basic properties of this that one would expect. It is clear from
the definition that xx ≈ xx′ and +(xx, yy, zz) implies +(xx′, yy, zz). From the induction
rule for the relation Add we obtain that if Add(ee, xx2, yy, zz) with yy nonempty then
there are yy′ and zz′ with Succ(yy′, yy) and Succ(zz′, zz) and Add(ee, xx2, yy′, zz′). Thus
if we have +(xx, yy, zz) then there are yy′ and zz′ with Succ(yy′, yy) and Succ(zz′, zz)
and +(xx, yy′, zz′). It then follows without much difficulty by induction on yy that if
yy ≈ yy2 then +(xx, yy2, zz) implies +(xx, yy, zz). The base case where yy is empty
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is trivial. For the induction step, we suppose the conclusion holds for yy, and that we
have Succ(yy, yy∗) and yy∗ ≈ yy∗2 with +(xx, yy∗2, zz). Then as noted there are yy2 and
zz′ with Succ(yy2, yy∗2) and Succ(zz′, zz) and +(xx, yy2, zz′), so that yy ≈ yy2 and thus
by the induction hypothesis +(xx, yy, zz′) and so +(xx, yy∗, zz) as required. Thus if
xx ≈ xx′ and yy ≈ yy′ then +(xx, yy, zz) iff +(xx′, yy′, zz).
Now we argue that if zz ≈ zz2 and +(xx, yy, zz) implies +(xx, yy, zz2). We do this by
induction on yy. For the base case, using the induction rule for Add we obtain that if yy
is the empty plurality then Add(ee, xx2, yy, zz) implies xx2 = zz, so that +(xx, yy, zz)
implies xx ≈ zz. Conversely of course if yy is the empty plurality then xx ≈ zz
implies +(xx, yy, zz). Thus if yy is the empty plurality then +(xx, yy, zz) iff xx ≈ zz,
from which the base case of our induction follows immediately. For the induction step,
we suppose we have a plurality yy for which the induction hypothesis holds, and that
Succ(yy, yy∗), with pluralities zz, zz2 such that zz ≈ zz2 and +(xx, yy∗, zz). Then
as noted in the previous paragraph there are yy′ and zz′ such that Succ(yy′, yy∗) and
Succ(zz′, zz) and +(xx, yy′, zz′). Thus yy′ ≈ yy, so that by the result of the previous
paragraph we have +(xx, yy, zz′). Then also if we let zz′2 be the same as zz2 but with
one element removed then Succ(zz′2, zz2), and so zz′2 ≈ zz′, and thus by the induction
hypothesis +(xx, yy, zz′2), and thus +(xx, yy∗, zz2) as required. Thus if xx ≈ xx′ and
yy ≈ yy′ and zz ≈ zz′ then +(xx, yy, zz) iff +(xx′, yy′, zz′). In effect, if we think of
cardinalities as given by quotienting finite pluralities by the equinumerosity relation,
then this says that the addition relation is a well defined relation on cardinalities. It is
then easy to also show by induction on yy that +(xx, yy, zz) and +(xx, yy, zz2) implies
zz ≈ zz2, so that addition is a well defined (possibly partial) operation on cardinalities.
As noted in the previous paragraph, if ee is the empty plurality then we have
+(xx, ee, zz) iff xx ≈ zz. Also, if Succ(yy, yy∗) and Succ(zz, zz∗) then +(xx, yy, zz)
implies +(xx, yy∗, zz∗). These principles parallel the equations for addition in Peano
Arithmetic.
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Finally, the case of multiplication. We define ×(xx, yy, zz) to be the relation
(Succ(uu1, uu2),+(vv1, xx, vv2)) ~uu, ~vv(ee, ee, yy, zz)
whose informal meaning is that zz is obtained from ee by repeatedly adding adding as
many elements as there are in xx to ee, as many times as there are elements in yy. It
is immediate then, by our results about addition, that if xx ≈ xx′ then ×(xx, yy, zz)
iff ×(xx′, yy, zz). The induction rule for the relation × gives that if ×(xx, yy, zz) with
yy nonempty then there is yy′ with Succ(yy′, yy) and zz′ with +(zz′, xx, zz) such that
×(xx, yy′, zz′). It then follows as before by induction on yy that if yy ≈ yy2 and
×(xx, yy2, zz) then ×(xx, yy, zz). Then, similarly to for addition, one obtains that if
ee is the empty plurality then ×(xx, ee, zz) iff zz = ee. Thus we obtain by induction
on yy that if ×(xx, yy, zz) and zz ≈ zz2 then ×(xx, yy, zz2), with the induction step
following by a similar (and in fact simpler) argument to that for the corresponding result
in the case of addition. Thus if xx ≈ xx′, yy ≈ yy′ and zz ≈ zz′ then ×(xx, yy, zz) iff
×(xx′, yy′, zz′). We also obtain easily, as before, by induction on yy that if ×(xx, yy, zz)
and ×(xx, yy, zz2) then zz ≈ zz2. Finally we have seen that if ee is the empty plurality
then ×(xx, ee, zz) iff zz = ee, and it is immediate that if Succ(yy, yy∗) and +(zz, xx, zz∗)
then ×(xx, yy, zz) implies ×(xx, yy∗, zz∗), again obtaining the analogues of the Peano
axioms for multiplication.
Though these operations of successor, addition and multiplication parallel the fami-
liar ones, there is no guarantee yet that they are total: if xx and yy are pluralities, there
need be no plurality zz such that S(xx, zz), +(xx, yy, zz) or ×(xx, yy, zz). To ensure
that these operations are total, we need that there be infinitely many objects. In this
context we have a very simple axiom of infinity: that there is a plurality yy which is not
finite. It is immediate by induction on xx that if xx is finite then any subplurality of xx
is finite, so that the axiom of infinity is equivalent to the statement that the plurality of
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all objects is infinite. Thus given the axiom of infinity, no finite plurality contains every
object that there is, and so for every finite plurality xx there is x′ with x′ not amongst
xx, and thus if we add x′ to the xx to obtain xx∗ then we have a plurality satisfying
S(xx, xx∗). It follows by induction on yy that if xx and yy are finite then there is zz
such that +(xx, yy, zz), and then by induction on yy that if xx and yy are finite then
there is zz such that ×(xx, yy, zz). Thus successor, addition and multiplication are in
effect total functions.
5 Abstraction and cardinalities
As has been mentioned above, it is natural on this approach to think of finite cardinalities
as obtained by quotienting our finite pluralities by the equinumerosity relation. We can
make this precise by introducing an abstraction principle
N(xx) = N(yy) ↔ xx ≈ yy
in which we attach a cardinality, N(xx), to each finite plurality xx – we need to restrict
to finite pluralities as if xx is infinite then xx 6≈ xx so the abstraction principle would
require N(xx) 6= N(xx).3 N functions here as a term forming operator. We can call
this principle Martin’s principle, after R. M. Martin (1943; 1949), whose definition of
equinumerosity was very similar to that given here, though he was working with fusions
of atoms instead of with pluralities. There are two importantly different ways of under-
standing this abstraction principle, depending on whether we take the terms N forms
to have the same type as our other terms, or to be of their own, separate type. The
former is the impredicative option, the latter the predicative option. As Linnebo (2018)
argues, predicative abstraction principles are much more innocent than impredicative
3One would thus have to either restrict the range of the plural variables to finite pluralities – or
perhaps have multiple different types of plural variables – or bring in a free logic in which the term
N(xx) fails to denote if xx is not finite.
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abstraction principles, giving truth conditions for statements involving the operator N
in terms of statements in which N does appear; this is not possible in general for im-
predicative abstraction principles, which function more like a kind of implicit definition,
not totally dissimilar to just taking the arithmetic vocabulary to be implicitly defined
by its second order axiomatization, for instance. As with other kinds of implicit defini-
tion, things can go wrong with impredicative abstraction principles, with some leading
to inconsistent theories. This is not the case for predicative abstraction principles. Thus
the predicative version of the principle is the one I would advocate, and is the one that
will be used here (though as will be noted shortly, one could also use the impredicative
version as an attractive replacement for Hume’s principle to obtain a new version of
Neo-Fregeanism).
With the abstraction principle in place, we obtain relations S, +, × on finite cardi-
nalities n,m, p paralleling the relations S, + and × for pluralities, where S(m,n) holds
iff there are xx, yy such that m = N(xx), n = N(yy) and S(xx, yy), +(m,n, p) holds iff
there are xx, yy and zz such that m = N(xx), n = N(yy), p = N(zz) and +(xx, yy, zz),
and ×(m,n, p) holds iff there are xx, yy and zz such that m = N(xx), n = N(yy),
p = N(zz) and ×(xx, yy, zz). It follows from the above facts about these relations for
pluralities that S(m,n) and S(m,n′) implies n = n′, so that S gives a partial function
on finite cardinalities. Similarly +(m,n, p) and +(m,n, p′) implies p = p′ and ×(m,n, p)
and ×(m,n, p′) implies p = p′, so that + and × are partial binary operations on finite
cardinalities. For these operations to be total, we need the above mentioned axiom of
infinity – totality of these operations for finite cardinalities then following easily from
the discussion there.
Thus though predicative abstraction principles have a degree of innocence that im-
predicative abstraction principles lack, our choice of the predicative version of Martin’s
principle means that we only obtain a full theory of arithmetic if the world contains
infinitely many non arithmetic objects. This seems to me to be a reasonable outcome –
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that natural numbers are the cardinalities of finite pluralities, so that if there are only
finitely many things then there are only finitely many natural numbers. When I have
informally discussed these issues with non specialists, a view of arithmetic something
along these lines – where numbers are the sizes of finite collections of objects – is often
suggested, and when it is mentioned that the universe might only contain finitely many
objects, so that there would then only be finitely many numbers, this is often taken to
be a reasonable – though surprising – consequence (in my experience of the matter).
On the resulting view of arithmetic, our knowledge of arithmetic may be partly logical
– knowledge of plural double ancestral logic – and partly empirical, with it being an
empirically established fact that there are infinitely many objects (if there are, in fact,
infinitely many objects). This seems to me to be a reasonable result.
If one objects to this conclusion then one could instead use the impredicative version
of Martin’s principle, obtaining a version of Neo-Fregeanism in which equinumerosity is
given by the above definition in plural double ancestral logic instead of by the definition
in terms of bijections. As discussed above, this definition of equinumerosity seems to
be a more attractive one, better fitting with intuitive ideas about equinumerosity, and
avoiding the problems with the bijection version – such as that it suggest the infinite
case should be intuitive, when people find it not to be. If one takes the impredicative
version of Martin’s principle then one does obtain that there are infinitely many finite
cardinalities. The key fact in this argument is that (using set formation notation for
pluralities) {N(xx) | xx ( yy} ≈ yy, which isn’t hard to show by induction for yy finite.
Then it follows that S(yy, {N(xx) | xx ⊆ yy)}) (showing along the way that if xx ( yy
then ¬(xx ≈ yy)), and thus that every natural number has a successor.
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What do we want from a foundation for mathematics? The original foundational project
of establishing a basis for mathematics maximally impervious to doubt is long dead, as
Shapiro (1991) recounts (securing the coffin with extra nails in the process). The question
of what a foundation can or should amount to is now contentious.
Some authors still perceive a substantial role for a foundation, with Linnebo and
Pettigrew (2011) regarding a foundation as being an account of a particular part of
reality, containing claims about its subject matter and backed up by a justification
of those claims – (implicitly) thus providing a subject matter for and justification of
the mathematics that can be carried out in it. Ladyman and Presnell (2018) go further,
advocating a view on which a foundation consists of five components: a formal framework
for mathematics, a semantics stating how the terms and rules of this framework are to be
understood, a metaphysical underpinning for this semantics, an epistemology for these,
and a methodology for mathematical practice.
Others are less demanding. Tait (2005) and Muller (2004) argue – in different ways
– that the key feature of an axiom system is just its consistency, and that any consis-
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tent axiom system implicitly defines a concept which then serves as its subject matter,
appealing to a Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use (where the axioms serve
to determine the use of the concept, and thus its meaning). This can be seen as a much
more lightweight view of what we require from a foundation, though neither uses the
term “foundation” as such.
Maddy (2011) picks out a middle course, in a sense. She focuses more explicitly
on the practice of mathematics, discussing various important mathematical roles set
theory plays as a foundation – such as ruling on questions of coherence and existence
in mathematics, facilitating interconnections between disparate branches of mathema-
tics, and answering questions of provability and refutability (ibid., p. 34). She regards
consistency as a basic requirement of an axiom system (ibid., p. 73), but on her view
the key characteristic that should be used to decide between different choices of axioms
is “mathematical depth”, also described as mathematical fruitfulness, mathematical ef-
fectiveness and so on (ibid., pp. 80–83 100, 112, 116–177). Though she is not concerned
with interpreting or intrinsically justifying the axioms – in fact, she concludes by arguing
that intrinsic justifications are less valuable than extrinsic ones (ibid., §V.4) – she in-
tends for the notion of mathematical depth to give a reasonably objective sense in which
one axiom system can be preferable to another.
Finally, Awodey (1996; 2004) opposes the very idea of a foundation, advocating
instead a “categorical-structural” approach in which every piece of mathematics is ac-
companied by a specification of the rules and axioms that it in particular uses (Awodey
2004, p. 56). The conclusions of mathematical arguments are then taken to be schematic
statements, rather than as being true of a fixed domain of quantification (ibid., p. 59).
This approach is intended to be truer to the actual practice and aims of mathematics.
He believes that the standard foundational goal, of elaborating a particular system which
provides enough objects for all the usual needs of mathematics, and enough rules and
axioms for all the usual ways of reasoning about them, is misguided (ibid., pp. 55–56).
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Awodey’s position is supported by McLarty (2012), who states that it should be taken
seriously.
These views exhibit a great range of thought concerning the desired nature and role
of a foundation for mathematics. The positions of Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011) and
Ladyman and Presnell (2018) are closest to what has traditionally been thought of as the
role of a foundation, but they must face the worry that the questions of interpretation
and justification they raise are of interest only to philosophers, and irrelevant to the
actual business of mathematics. Certainly the question of whether the axioms of set
theory are true is not one that many mathematicians express much interest in. The
views of Maddy (2011) and Awodey (1996; 2004) by contrast are much more directly
motivated by considerations internal to mathematics, and the focus of Tait (2005) and
Muller (2004) on the consistency of axiom systems can also be seen as reflecting the
most oft stated concern of mathematicians.
This chapter argues for a new perspective on the purpose and function of a foundation
for mathematics, and on what the desiderata for deciding on a foundation should be. The
aim is to argue for this perspective from concerns that are of importance to mathematics,
rather than being purely philosophical; but one conclusion will be that the best way to
champion a particular foundation appears be to defend an interpretation on which its
axioms are true, thus leading us back to views like that of Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011)
and Ladyman and Presnell (2018).
We start in section VI.2 by discussing the notion of proof in mathematics (again),
noting that there are different senses of the term. We can talk about “proof in S” where
S is any proof system – a system of formal rules determining which strings of symbols
do or do not count as a formal proof. Though such a system only directly determines a
notion of formal proof, it can also give rise to a notion of higher level informal proof, as
discussed for the case of ZFC in chapter I; and by “proof in S” we may mean either the
formal or informal notion. Either way, when we talk of proof in this sense it need not
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have any epistemic connotations. We can talk about proof in S for any S, no matter how
implausible its principles; and one can even work in a proof system with inconsistent
axioms, in which case one may be able to prove anything, which of course tells us nothing
about how likely any such conclusion is.
Then we also have the notion of genuine proof, or proof in the epistemic sense: a
proof that establishes its conclusion as true. Here we talk simply of proving φ, without
mentioning a system S, though in rigorous mathematics this will be proof according to
the principles of some formal system. On the view put forward here, the key property
of genuine proof is the following:
1. Genuine proof is factive: for p to be a genuine proof of φ, φ must in fact be true.
(This is the first of three key claims made in this chapter). One challenge to this account
of genuine proof would state that a genuine proof is required merely to show that if the
axioms are true, then the conclusion follows (similar to the view of Awodey (2004)
mentioned above); I consider this if-thenist view, and argue that it is not in conflict with
genuine proof being factive, but in fact is motivated by this very constraint.
Since a genuine proof establishes its conclusion as true, we need some interpretation
of what the conclusion of such a proof means, and when it is true or false. Section VI.3
discusses various interpretations of mathematical statements that have been put forward.
Not all such interpretations are acceptable, and to prepare the ground for the discussion
of which are, section VI.4 discusses the idea that we can potentially obtain realizations
even of abstract formal structural concepts. Then section VI.5 argues for a condition
that interpretations should satisfy. Namely for a given interpretation of mathematics to
be acceptable, it needs to be the case that:
2. If a mathematical generalization φ about a kind of structure is true (under the




This I term the eliminative constraint. The exact meaning of this constraint will be
clarified.
With this all in hand, we are in a position to discuss what the purpose of a desig-
nating a proof system as a “foundation for mathematics” is. In section VI.6 we will see
that candidate foundations are proof systems in which a wide range of mathematical
structures can be represented and investigated, and it will be argued that:
3. The purpose of choosing a foundation for mathematics is to provide a system
whose proofs of conclusions about as many different kinds of structures as possible
– the natural numbers, the real numbers, groups, rings, topological spaces, banach
spaces, manifolds, schemes, and so on – are then regarded as genuine proofs.
Though I think these three points are of independent interest, as a consequence of
them we obtain the main conclusion of the chapter:
• When judging a candidate foundations S for mathematics, a key desideratum
is that for as many kinds of structure as possible, whenever we prove in S a
mathematical generalization φ about that kind of structure, φ actually holds of all
realizations of that kind of structure.
This condition holding for a given kind of structure is the condition of soundness for
S with regard to that kind of structure. That this should hold for as many kinds of
structure as possible is advocated here as the primary condition we should require of
a foundation for mathematics. For most kinds of structure this is a stronger condition
than consistency, and much harder to argue for by just exploring the consequences of a
system.
Indeed in section VI.7 it will be argued that the only plausible route to the soundness
of a general proof system involves arguing for the soundness of set theory by giving some
conception underlying the axioms on which they can be established to be true, such as the
iterative conception of set, or the limitation of size conception: if we believe some such
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conception, and believe that this justifies the axioms of ZFC, then we have a powerful
way to argue for the soundness of ZFC. Moreover, this kind of argument appears to be
the only live option for arguing for soundness in general. The soundness of ETCS and
homotopy type theory may then be justifiable by proving a relative soundness result,
giving an interpretation of them in terms of ZFC. The implications of this for the above
views of foundations, and the views of Maddy (2011) on set theory and its interpretation,
are discussed in section VI.9.
2 Proof, and proof
We start by considering again the concept of proof in mathematics. As mentioned in
section VI.1, it will be argued that there are different senses of the term.
Any formal proof system T comes equipped with a precise notion of what it is for a
string of symbols to be a formal proof (or formal derivation) in T . Then provided this
notion is sufficiently workable for humans, we can obtain from it a notion of informal,
high level proof in T , as discussed for the case of ZFC in chapter I: we can start by
getting used to writing very detailed natural language arguments that are obviously
formalizable in T , as with the week 2 level of detail from sections I.3 and I.4, and then
gradually ascend to more and more compressed arguments, where inferences at each new
level of compression are provable at a level of greater detail that we have already got
comfortable with. In this way proofs at every stage can still (in principle) be written
out as fully formal proofs in T , as discussed in section I.7.
This process can potentially give us a notion of informal proof in T for a range
of systems T . The familiar case is ZFC. Then it is often claimed by proponents of
categorical set theory (ETCS) that this can be viewed as an underlying framework for
much of mathematics in much the same way that ZFC can, so that sufficiently high
level informal proof in ETCS is very similar or indistinguishable to high level informal
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proof in ZFC.1 One of the stated goals of the homotopy type theory (HoTT) book was
to develop a new style of “informal type theory” (Univalent Foundations Program 2013,
p. iv), or informal proof in HoTT.
Informal proof in an arbitrary system need not provide a justification for its con-
clusion, or require an interpretation of it. One can for instance talk perfectly happily
of proving statements of set theory or arithmetic in Quine’s system New Foundations,
despite its axioms lacking much in the way of intrinsic motivation; and one can even
talk of proving statements in an inconsistent system, with anything then being provable
(under classical logic) – this of course providing no warrant for believing the conclusions
reached at all. Thus instead of talking about “proof in T” it might be more appropriate
to talk about derivations in T , where it is understood that these can be either formal or
informal – but either way, need have no semantic content, nor give any justification for
their conclusion.
This notion of “proof/derivation in T” is thus to be contrasted with another notion
of proof in mathematics, where we talk simply of proving φ, without mentioning a proof
system T . This could be called the notion of genuine proof, or proof in the epistemic
sense. Though not explicitly phrased in terms of a proof system, in rigorous mathematics
this will always be a derivation in T , for some proof system T , as will be discussed in
section VI.6.
The key property of this notion of proof is that it is factive – such a proof establishes
its conclusion as true. Suppose for instance that a young mathematician comes forward
with a shocking claim: they have a proof that in fact there are only finitely many twin
primes. That proof is factive just means that for this to be true – for them to have really
proved that there are only finitely many twin primes – it must in fact be the case that
there are only finitely many twin primes. It is nonsense to suggest that their proof might
1The most significant difference is that ETCS lacks replacement and has separation for only bounded
formulae, but one can address these issues by adding a replacement axiom scheme, as McLarty (2004)
discusses.
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be valid, but that the number of twin primes might still be infinite. This view of proof
can be evidenced by remarks by mathematicians, and commentators on mathematics.
For instance:
for the mathematician, truth is established via proofs (Aschbacher 2005,
p. 2403)
Mathematicians know that a formal proof leads always to a correct result
(Atiyah et al. 1994, p. 200)
Proof is our device for establishing the absolute and irrevocable truth of
statements of mathematics (Krantz 2011, p. 3).
Though this is I think the way we naturally think of proof, it presents a problem
for mathematics. If a mathematician proved that there were between 10100 and 10200
twin primes, then their conclusion would seem to imply that prime numbers exist, and
in particular that natural numbers exist. Though in my experience mathematicians are
often reasonably happy to assert the existence of the natural numbers, they may well be
less sure of this than they are of the correctness of any particular proof about the natu-
ral numbers (especially a straightforward one). And many mathematical proofs concern
structures much more esoteric than the natural numbers, whose existence mathematici-
ans will be more reluctant to categorically assert.
Thus though many mathematicians do believe in the reality of the objects and struc-
tures they study, mathematicians often officially retreat to a reinterpretation of mat-
hematical assertions that does not rely on the existence of mathematical entities. One
popular paraphrase – the if-thenist option – takes a mathematician’s assertion that φ to
mean that if the relevant axioms are true, then φ. For instance when a mathematician
says that there are finitely many twin primes, we might interpret them as meaning that
if the axioms of arithmetic are true, then there are finitely many twin primes. A similar
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paraphrase, which we could call consequentialist, takes the assertion that φ to mean that
φ is a logical consequence of the relevant axioms (both these options are described in
more detail in section VI.3). This is described by Gowers (2002, p. 41) as often appealed
to by mathematicians. Other less definite attitudes, such as a feeling about how a certain
kind of object behaves, or a hunch about the likelihood of a particular conjecture, could
be paraphrased in similar ways. The retreat to this kind of paraphrase may be alluded to
in the aphorism that mathematicians are Platonists on weekdays, and formalists on Sun-
days (Hersh 1997, pp. 39–40; Corry 2012, p. 310): really believing in the reality of their
subject matter while investigating it, but appealing to a perhaps formalist paraphrase
when this reality is questioned. It is important to realise that the use of these kinds of
reinterpretations is not in conflict with the genuine, factive conception of proof: to the
contrary, it is because mathematicians wish to be assured that the conclusions of their
proofs are true that they retreat to restating the content of these conclusions in these
if-thenist or consequentialist terms. As seen in section I.7 and mentioned above, one can
argue that an informal proof in T is formalizable in principle according to the rules of T ,
and thus (if the logic of T is classical) establishes that its conclusion is a logical conse-
quence of the axioms used: thus if one proves results informally in T , both the if-thenist
and consequentialist interpretations relative to the axioms of T are straightforwardly
factive.
In general the factive property of proof (in the genuine or epistemic sense) requires
that an argument p can only be a proof of φ if φ is in fact true. To genuinely prove
a statement φ, we thus need some sort of interpretation of what it is for φ to be true
or false. The if-thenist and consequentialist views just mentioned can be viewed as
interpretations of this kind, whose primary purpose is to make proof straightforwardly
factive.
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3 Interpretations of mathematics
We now discuss a variety of interpretations of mathematical statements that have been
put forward, and how they relate to the issue of factivity of proof raised in the previous
section. After the initial clarification of if-thenism, consequentialism and the related
view of deductivism, much of the remainder of the section consists of exposition of
interpretations that one who knows the field will already be familiar with. How the
question of factivity plays out for these different interpretations is also considered though,
and a summary of this is located at the end of the section.
Firstly, we can say a little more about the if-thenist and consequentialist interpreta-
tions. Each takes there to be an ambient set of axioms, with the if-thenist interpreting
φ as meaning something like “if the axioms are true, then φ”, and the consequentialist
interpreting φ as meaning something like “φ is a logical consequence of the axioms”. In
both cases, we will talk about the interpretation being relative to an axiom set – and
which axiom set this is turns out to be very important.
Though one can roughly characterize these interpretations in the above manner, if one
tries to make them more precise then there are various different options. Suppose for in-
stance that we have a statement φ of arithmetic. An if-thenist might interpret φ as really
meaning that there exists a finite subset Γ of the axioms of PA such that (
∧
γ∈Γ γ) → φ
(this being a material implication, or perhaps a natural language “if. . . then”). Other-
wise we could give a second order interpretation in terms of second order arithmetic
PA2, interpreting φ as meaning that (
∧
γ∈PA2 γ) → φ. These will be referred to as
“local” if-thenist interpretations. They are to be contrasted with “global” if-thenist in-
terpretations, where we take a reduction of φ to a statement φT of some general axiom
system T such as ZFC (for instance translating φ into a statement about a particular set
theoretic simply infinite sequence), and then interpret φ as the statement that there are
finitely many axioms γ of T such that (
∧
γ∈Γ γ) → φ. Alternatively, as in the local case,
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one could use a second order formulation of the axiom system (such as Morse-Kelley set
theory). Similarly for instance if φ states a property of rings, one can interpret it either
locally as the statement that the conjunction of the ring axioms implies φ, or globally by
reducing φ to a statement φT of some general axiom system, and interpret φ as meaning
that some finite conjunction of axioms of T implies φT. How to give a local if-thenist
interpretation of a statement about for instance manifolds or schemes or some other
mathematical kind that we do not have a natural intrinsic axiomatization for is less
clear – though we can often find reasonably self contained axiomatizations, as discussed
in section VI.4. There are similar distinctions to be made in the consequentialist case.
If φ is a statement of arithmetic, it can be interpreted locally as PA ` φ, or PA2 ` φ, or
globally as for instance ZFC ` φZFC where φZFC is a reduction of φ to set theory.
We can denote different interpretations of mathematics with superscripts.2 For in-
stance we could denote the local if-thenist interpretation of statements φ of arithmetic
by φ 7→ φIfPA , and the global interpretation with respect to ZFC by φ 7→ φIfZFC . The
corresponding consequentialist interpretations could be denoted by φ 7→ φConsPA and
φ 7→ φConsZFC .
Awodey (2004) appears to defend something like an if-thenist interpretation of mat-
hematics, though he does not distinguish between the different axioms sets one might
have in mind, or make it clear whether he intends his if-thenism to be local or global.3
These distinctions are important, as we will see.
A first sign of their importance concerns the factivity of proof. As discussed in
section VI.2, if T is a proof system then the if-thenist and consequentialist interpretations
relative to T are straightforwardly factive with regards to proof in T . For instance, a
purely arithmetic proof of φ immediately establishes that there exists a finite subset Γ
of the axioms of PA such that (
∧
γ∈Γ γ) → φ, and that PA ` φ. The notion of proof
2I am not claiming the notation suggested here is the most attractive possible.
3He generally talks in terms of schematic statements about kinds of structures, but mentions at one
point (Awodey 2004, p. 60) that the axioms of a system such as ZFC may be conventionally assumed.
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in a general axiom system such as set theory is not necessarily factive with respect to
local consequentialist interpretations, however: if we have a proof of φ in set theory, it
does not follow that PA ` φ (for instance taking φ to state the consistency of PA). The
case of the local if-thenist interpretation is less clear, and might depend on how one
interprets the relevant vocabulary and the conditional. For instance one might be able
to argue that if φ is a statement of arithmetic provable in set theory, then it is true; and
thus that taking Γ to be just the empty set, we have (
∧
γ∈Γ γ) → φ. Proof in set theory
would then be factive with respect to the local if-thenist interpretation.
In some ways it is a pity that mathematicians so often opt for the if-thenist or con-
sequentialist interpretations, since there are more attractive versions of both. Similar to
consequentialism is what might be called the deductivist interpretation of mathematics.
This approach is the one taken by Tait (2005) and Muller (2004), mentioned in the
introduction. They argue from the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use that
any consistent axiom system gives a valid sense to its vocabulary, with the rules of the
axiom system governing when its statements can be asserted or denied. The difference
between this and consequentialism is when we assert an existential mathematical sta-
tement, for instance, consequentialism takes us to be talking metalinguistically, talking
about our statement and asserting that it follows from certain principles: deductivism,
by contrast, takes the existential statement to be literally valid, but with its meaning
given by the deductive rules for the existential quantifier (such as quantifier introduction
and elimination) in the system. This difference is subtle, but is the difference between a
formalist interpretation of mathematics and one on which it has genuine content.
Of course mathematicians generally do not work explicitly with the formal rules of
an axiom system, but as discussed in chapter I their arguments can be seen as more
compressed, higher level versions of arguments that do. Statements in informal mat-
hematical proofs can thus be seen as valid assertions, gaining a sense either from the
norms governing high level proof or from the underlying axioms – in the same way as one
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can see the meaning of natural language statements involving conjunction or disjunction
as derived from the formal rules for these connectives, though these formal rules might
not actually be explicitly used in speech. Thus we obtain an interpretation which takes
the sense of mathematical statements to be given by the norms for proving or refuting
them. This interpretation trivially makes proof factive (for proofs in the relevant axiom
system, at least).
Deductivism comes in various different forms. On the view of Tait (2005), we are
apparently free to extend our axiom system in an open ended way, adding new axioms
as we see fit, as long as we retain consistency.4 We could denote this by φ 7→ φDoe .
Muller (2004) by contrast seems to have a view where we determine the meaning of a
mathematical concept (such as “set”) by deciding on a fixed list of axioms. This might
give us an interpretation φ 7→ φDZFC of statements reducible to set theory and φ 7→ φDPA
of statements reducible to first order arithmetic. Finally Maddy (2011) can also be
regarded as giving a kind of deductivist interpretation of mathematics, with the norm
for asserting mathematical statements given by deducibility in set theory, but in this case
the set theoretic axioms are regarded as open ended in a more constrained way than by
Tait – with us choosing whichever new axioms best increase mathematical depth and
fruitfulness (properties she regards as reasonably objective). We might denote this by
φ 7→ φDmd .
Just as deductivism is perhaps a more attractive cousin of consequentialism, the view
known as eliminative structuralism is a more flexible version of local if-thenism. On this
interpretation, if φ is a statement about the natural numbers, instead of interpreting it
to mean “if the axioms of arithmetic are true, then φ”, we interpret it to mean roughly
“for any structure, if the axioms of arithmetic hold of that structure, then φ does”. More
formally, we axiomatize (in second order logic, say) the notion of a relation R being the
4For the open-endedness of the axioms see Tait (2005, pp. 91, 96–98, 294–295). That there are
no objective norms for correctness when extending an axiom system (beyond human considerations of
naturalness or fruitfulness for instance) comes out at Tait (ibid., p. 97) and the contrast with Gödel’s
views at Tait (ibid., p. 294).
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successor relation of a simply infinite sequence, as Inf-Seq(R).5 Then, writing φ[R] for
the reconstrual of a statement of arithmetic as about the infinite sequence defined by R,
we interpret such a φ as meaning
∀R (Inf-Seq(R) → φ[R]).
This approach uses the fact that we can often find “real world” characterizations of
concepts (such as infinite sequence) usually defined formally in a mathematical axiom
system. “Real world” here means that such a characterization can be satisfied, or fail
to be satisfied, by real world objects – things that “exist” according to the normal
meaning of that term (though what exactly does exist is of course a contentious issue).
This ability to find real world characterizations of formal concepts is discussed in more
detail in section VI.4, and applies to many other kinds of structures than just infinite
sequences – for instance we can interpet statements about the real numbers as being
about all complete ordered fields, as axiomatized in second order logic, and interpret
statements about all groups in terms of all ternary relations R that define a group
structure. We can denote this interpretation by φ 7→ φElim. For this interpretation,
the question of whether proof is factive is finally an interesting one, as it is for the
following structuralist interpretations. Indeed, how would one argue for a given theory
T that proving statements of arithmetic in T actually delivers truths about simply
infinite sequences that exist? What about proofs about other kinds of structures? This
is essentially the question of soundness for T , as defined in section VI.6.
The standard objection to this interpretation is that it may prove to be vacuous
– if no simply infinite sequences exist, for instance, then all statements of arithmetic
5By “simply infinite sequence” I mean the standard notion with initial element and successor operation
– to be distinguished for instance from the notion of a sequence as a function N → X for some X, or a
sequence with length some larger ordinal. The axioms for this notion state that R defines an injective
function on its domain, and that its domain contains a unique element not in its image, and that its
domain is the smallest collection of objects containing this unique element and closed under the operation
of applying R.
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come out as trivially true. If one accepts the language of necessity and possibility as
meaningful, then one can move from eliminative structuralism to modal structuralism,
defended by Hellman (1993). On this interpretation, mathematical statements are not
just about all structures that do exist, but all structures that could exist. Using modal
logic, a statement φ of arithmetic is interpreted as saying for instance that
 ∀R (Inf-Seq(R) → φ[R]).
There is much less threat of vacuity on this interpretation than the previous one, since
the claim that a simply infinite sequence could exist is much weaker than the claim that
they do exist. Exactly how much mathematics comes out as non vacuous will depend on
the modality used: the notion of logical possibility covers more structures than that of
physical possibility, potentially allowing a non vacuous interpretation even of set theory.
We can denote this interpretation by φ 7→ φModal.
The final main structuralist interpretation of mathematics is ante rem structuralism,
defended by Shapiro (1997). This view holds that the natural numbers structure exists as
the form of simply infinite sequences, a kind of abstract pattern, even if no other simply
infinite sequences do. The individual natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . are the “places” of this
structure, universals in a sense, corresponding to the various positions (0th, 1st, 2nd,
. . .) of other infinite sequences. Arithmetic is then interpreted as about this particular
distinguished infinite sequence. Statements about the real numbers are interpreted in
the same way as about the structure which is the form of complete ordered fields, and
similarly for statements of other categorical theories. For non categorical theories such as
group theory, there are various different group structures – the forms of each isomorphism
type of groups – and generalizations about groups are interpreted as about all these group
structures. We can denote this interpretation by φ 7→ φante.
Apart from structuralist views, the most discussed philosophical interpretation of
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mathematics has been Neo-Fregeanism (Hale and Wright 2004; Wright 1983) This view
sees the meaning of mathematical vocabulary as given by abstraction principles, for
instance
the number of F ’s is equal to the number of G’s iff there is a bijection between
the F ’s and the G’s
as a principle governing how identity for number terms (“the number of F ’s” and the
like) behaves. Neo-Fregeans have sought similar abstraction principles for other mat-
hematical entities, with some success for the real numbers (Hale 2005) but less for the
further reaches of set theory. This view could be considered somewhat similar to the
deductivist view, where the meaning of mathematical vocabulary is given by the rules for
reasoning about it; the main difference is that the numerical vocabulary Neo-Fregeans
see as introduced in this way is directly applicable to the real world, and may allow
us to speak and reason more powerfully about it, whereas on the standard deductivist
view the mathematical vocabulary is semantically isolated from other areas of discourse.
We can denote the Neo-Fregean interpretation by φ 7→ φNeo-F. Again, the question of
whether proof in a general system T is factive is a substantial one on this view.
Another interpretation that should be mentioned is fictionalism. First proposed by
Field (1980; 1989), this view holds that the face value Platonist interpretation of mat-
hematics is correct, but that all statements thus interpreted are false since the abstract
objects being quantified over do not in fact exist.6 We can denote this by φ 7→ φfiction.
On the fictionalist interpretation, essentially by definition, proof is never factive. Thus
though a fictionalist can recognize the notion of a (formal or informal) derivation in
T , for a proof system T , they can never regard mathematicians as genuinely proving
anything. One can try to take Field’s approach, which takes an instrumentalist attitude
to mathematics, regarding it as a useful tool for deducing extra physical facts, but still
6There has been substantial subsequent arguments by fictionalists, such as by Balaguer (2001) and
Leng (2010), though these authors have generally focused on defending fictionalism from the indispen-
sability argument rather than giving positive arguments in favour of fictionalism.
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cannot regard mathematical arguments as genuine proofs. This I think makes fictiona-
lism an unattractive option, when lightweight realist views such as Tait and Muller’s
deductivism are available – so that for fictionalism to be viable, it needs to be buttres-
sed by an argument as to why the substantial (but false) interpretation of Platonism it
advocates is the correct one, instead of these more minimalist views.
A final possible interpretation of mathematics worth mentioning is set theoretic rea-
lism. This comes in many forms, whose common ground resides in regarding set theoretic
statements as a real description of some portion of reality. One might believe that the
set theoretic hierarchy exists, formed by successive applications of the set formation
operator (for instance Boolos 1971 and Burgess 2004); or one might take a potentialist
view based around the idea that any collection of objects could have formed a set (for
instance Linnebo 2010; 2013 and Studd 2013). On these views we can only correctly
postulate set theoretic principles which actually hold of the hierarchy – we are not free
to stipulate the properties of sets, as one may be on a deductivist view like that of Tait
(2005) or Muller (2004) discussed above. Given the sets, one can then interpret mathe-
matical statements in set theory in the usual way: for instance interpreting statements
of arithmetic in terms of some particular set theoretic infinite sequence, such as the finite
Von-Neumann ordinals or the sequence {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . .}, interpreting statements of
group theory as about all set theoretic group structures, and so on. One could denote
such an interpretation by φ 7→ φSet. On these interpretations whether proof in set theory
is factive will come down to whether the set theoretic principles we postulate do actually
hold of the hierarchy of sets.
There are various other notable interpretations of mathematics that have been put
forward, such as the interpretation of Chihara (1991) in terms of constructibility, of
Kitcher (1985) in terms of ideal agents, and Balaguer (2001) in terms of plenitudinous
Platonism. It isn’t possible here to consider all interpretations that have been defended
however, and how the questions of factivity and soundness apply to other interpretations
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is often similar to how they apply to certain of the interpretations above.
Finally, to summarize the discussion of factivity of proof with regards to the views
considered. The if-thenist and consequentialist views are defined relative to some axiom
system, and proof in this axiom system is then automatically factive; but proof in other
proof systems need not be factive, with for instance proof in ZFC not necessarily being
factive for a consequentialist view with respect to the axioms of PA (which interprets φ as
meaning that φ is a logical consequence of the axioms of PA). Deductivist interpretations
come in different forms, but all are relative to a choice of proof system, with proof in this
proof system again then automatically being factive – but proof in other proof systems
perhaps not being factive. For the various structuralist views, and for Neo-Fregeanism,
the factivity of proof in a proof system like ZFC can be a difficult question: for instance
the question of whether if ZFC proves a statement of arithmetic, that statement of
arithmetic actually holds of all simply infinite sequences, or of the distinguished simply
infinite sequences picked out by ante rem structuralism or Neo-Fregeanism. Then there
is fictionalism, for which – essentially by definition – proof is never factive, so that there
can be no notion of genuine proof in mathematics. As discussed above, this seems to
be an unattractive feature of fictionalism. Finally, interpretations of mathematics in set
theory, which take seriously the existence of the set theoretic hierarchy, were discussed –
with the key issue for factivity here being whether the axioms of set theory we postulate
are actually true of the set theoretic hierarchy.
4 Realizations of mathematical concepts
Mathematical concepts are typically officially defined within the context of a mathemati-
cal proof system; for instance, the concept of group can be defined in ZFC as an ordered
pair (G,m) where G is a set and m : G×G → G is a function which satisfies the group
axioms (associativity, existence of an identity, and existence of inverses). However this
172
4. REALIZATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS
section lays out how even when a concept is officially defined in such terms, we can still
often find a real world characterization of “the same” concept – where by a real world
characterization we mean one which can be satisfied, or fail to be satisfied, by real world
objects. Such a characterization can be independent of any broader mathematical proof
system, and in many cases can be more or less self contained, not relying on any objects
outside of the structure of interest. This can be seen as a counter to the view of Maddy
(2011, p. 92), in which mathematical objects and structures always come saddled with
whatever properties the background set theory gives them. The work done in this section
will be used as the basis for a condition that section VI.5 argues we should require of
acceptable interpretations of mathematics.
As noted initially, mathematical concepts – like that of a group – are generally
officially defined within the context of a mathematical proof system, such as set theory.
Maddy takes these kinds of set theoretic definitions very seriously, stating that
[a] mathematical structure . . . doesn’t exist in a vacuum; it’s embedded in a
rich mathematical universe – V if you like – and it has all the properties the
[methods of set theory] reveal . . . as part of its identity as a mathematical
object (ibid., p. 92)
(Maddy is speaking of a particular example, but her comment is intended as a general
one). On her view, the status of mathematical structures as elements of a broader set
theoretic universe – with the properties set theory discerns in them – is essential to them.
We can start developing a different perspective by noting that the exact form that
such a set theoretic definition takes is generally mathematically irrelevant. For instance,
one could otherwise just define a group to be a function m : G×G → G for some set G
which has the appropriate properties, or a quadruple (G,m, e, i) where G and m are as
above and e is the identity for m, i : G → G the map giving inverses. All these capture
“the same” mathematical concept, despite the formal differences: mathematically, we
can do the same things with all of them. We can also capture “the same” concept in
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separate mathematical proof systems: for instance defining a group in the categorical
theory ETCS as a triple of arrows m : G × G → G, e : 1 → G, i : G → G such that
the appropriate diagrams commute; or using the correspondence between propositions
and types in homotopy type theory to give a definition of group as a particular type
(Univalent Foundations Program 2013, §1.11).
All of these definitions are different ways of coding the same information. To reason
about groups we need to know what we can do with their elements – multiply them, or
take inverses – and what properties these satisfy. We can think of these various definitions
of group as being different ways to formally capture the same informal mathematical
concept.
The same applies much more widely: when we make a formal definition of a mathe-
matical concept, we can think of there being an informal concept behind it – which a
variety of potential formalizations could adequately capture.7 The point of this section
is to argue (pace Maddy) that such informal concepts can often also be captured by a
characterization independent of any substantial mathematical proof system, and further,
by a characterization that has real world content – allowing the possibility of real world
instantiations of the formal concept, which we will also refer to realizations or real world
examples of it.
Suppose for instance that you are sitting on a chair c with a laptop l in front of
you. One can define a ternary relation R, where we have R(c, c, c), R(c, l, l), R(l, c, l)
and R(l, l, c), and no other values related by R. It is immediate that this acts as a
binary operation in its first two arguments, with domain consisting of c and l – so that
as long as x and y are amongst c and l, there is a unique z such that R(x, y, z). It
is straightforward to check that this binary operation satisfies the group axioms – it is
associative, c is an identity element, and c and l are each inverses of themselves. Thus,
morally, R makes your chair and laptop into a group.
7This parallels the view of Awodey (2004), who regards mathematical generalizations as really being
schematic assertions that can apply to a variety of different formal concepts.
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This is despite the situation being little like that described by the ZFC definition of
group. Under the (G,m) definition a group is literally an ordered pair, which is literally
– on the usual definition – the set {{G}, {G,m}}, with m being in turn a set of ordered
pairs. Thus for l and c to form a group one would have to believe in the real ability
to form not just sets of everyday objects, but sets of sets (and sets of sets of sets, and
so on) of such objects. I do not mean to claim that this is implausible, just that it is
a further assumption, beyond anything involved in the above case of R. Moreover, in
standard ZFC there is no room for distinct objects such as c and l which aren’t sets –
since by extensionality, if two objects both have no members then they are equal.
None of this prevents us from regarding the relation R as defining a kind of group
structure on the chair and laptop. There is nothing mysterious about the nature of this
R – this is just a variable standing for an open formula of our language, which we could
write as
(x = c ∧ y = c ∧ z = c) ∨ (x = c ∧ y = l ∧ z = l) ∨
(x = l ∧ y = c ∧ z = l) ∨ (x = l ∧ y = l ∧ z = l)
with arguments x, y and z. We can then reason about the properties of such relations in
second order logic; as discussed in Appendix B, as long as we limit ourselves to restrictive
predicative second order logic (in which the comprehension scheme is restricted to open
formulae lacking second order variables) this does not commit us to any abstract entities,
or indeed any entities beyond the open formulae we actually write down. We can define
a notion of group in this logic, stating as a formula Group(P,R×) what it is for predicate
P and ternary relation R to “be” a group, with × defining a binary operation on the
objects falling under P satisfying the properties discussed above. We can take an open
ended view of the quantifiers of this logic, so that if we assert a universal statement about
these group structures we are committed to that statement still holding no matter how
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the vocabulary of our language expands in future, potentially allowing us to define new
groups. Of course one can axiomatize the notion of group in first order logic, but using
this fragment of second order logic allows us to state and argue for generalizations about
all groups, so defined.
Though – as just discussed – this notion of group is formally quite distinct from the
definition in ZFC, it is faithful to the informal concept underlying the definition: we
know what we can do with elements of groups (multiply them and take inverses), and
what properties these have. It is also what we can call a real world characterization: it
is the kind of characterization that can be satisfied, or fail to be satisfied, by real world
objects (and relations between them). The objects being quantified over when we use
this kind of logic are just the objects that genuinely “exist”, whatever we mean by that
word; the logic is just a regimented, clarified version of a fragment of natural language,
with the range of the first order variables just being the range of the quantifiers “there
are” and “for all” in English, including things such as laptops and chairs (the question
of what objects are properly included under these quantifiers is of course a vexed one).
Thus this notion of group is what we can call a faithful real world characterization of the
formal concept of group. We will call a relation satisfying it a realization of the formal
concept of group: a real world instantiation of this formal concept. This is a realization
of the formal concept of group however the formal concept is defined – in ZFC, or ETCS
and so on – with all these formal concepts having the same underlying informal concept
behind them.
The same goes for other concepts that can be axiomatized in first order logic. A
graph would commonly be defined as a pair (V,E) where V is a set and every e ∈ E
is of the form {u, v} with u, v ∈ V , u 6= v. Then a faithful real world characterization
of this is just given by a predicate (one place relation) V and a binary relation R
which is antireflexive and symmetric and only relates things falling under G – so that G
determines the vertices of the graph, and R determines its edges. We call any such V and
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G a realization of the formal concept of graph. For one such realization we could take
the V to apply to the employees of a company, and take the relation R(x, y) defined by
x and y being employees that are facebook friends (assuming there are no complications
like multiple accounts).
There may be various plausible options for a faithful real world characterization of
a formal concept. For instance one might take a group to be given by a predicate G as
well as a ternary relation R with the properties discussed above, where G applies to the
objects making up the group. One may argue about which such variations are faithful,
or the most faithful, but this has little importance to any of the following.
One can obtain similar characterizations of other kinds of structures axiomatizable
in first order logic, such as monoids, rings, fields, partial orders, and categories (the use
of restricted predicative second order logic here is to allow us, in effect, to state gene-
ralizations about such structures). We can also characterize structures axiomatizable in
second order terms. There are different logical options for doing this. If we supplement
restricted predicative second order logic with plural logic (the interaction of other logics
with restricted predicative second order logic is discussed towards the end of Appen-
dix B), then we can give a familiar characterization of a binary relation R being the
successor function of an infinite sequence made up by the objects satisfying predicate P
– where R has these objects as its domain, and this domain contains a unique “initial
element” not in the image of R, and this domain is the smallest plurality containing
the initial element and closed under the operation of applying R (the smallest plurality
being the intersection of such pluralities). We will call the last clause here the inductive
clause. This is a faithful characterization of the notion of simply infinite sequence, pa-
ralleling the usual set theoretic definition, except with quantification over pluralities in
the inductive clause instead of quantification over subsets.
In fact there is a case to be made that restricted predicative second order logic alone
is enough for a faithful characterization, provided we have an open ended conception
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of the range of predicate variables – expanding the range of the comprehension scheme
in restricted predicative second order logic to include new formulae definable as the
vocabulary of our language expands. Indeed we can give a similar characterization in
restricted predicative second order logic, except with the plural logic inductive clause
replaced by the condition that the entire domain of R falls under any predicate containing
its initial element and closed under the operation of applying R. Then one can argue
that this is in fact equivalent to the characterization using plural logic. All we have to
show is that the two inductive clauses are equivalent. That an R satisfying the plural
logic inductive clause also satisfies the restricted predicative second order logic inductive
clause is straightforward, using comprehension for pluralities (and the ability to use free
predicate variables in the plural comprehension scheme, as discused in Appendix B).
For the converse, given an R we can let xx be the smallest plurality containing its
initial object and closed under the operation of applying R, and can then argue that this
plurality consists exactly of those objects in the domain of R, by putting the predicate “is
among the xx’s” into the inductive clause of the restricted predicative characterization
(as discussed in Appendix B we allow free plural variables in instances of restricted
predicative comprehension), and noting that the plurality of objects in the domain of
R is a plurality containing R’s initial object and closed under the operation of applying
R. The case of full second order logic is similar, if one allows two types of second order
variables, the first with impredicative comprehension and the second with the restricted
predicative comprehension scheme (in which second order variables of the first type are
allowed, as discussed in Appendix B).
This characterization of simply infinite sequence just involves the notion of succes-
sor function – essentially the operation of “adding 1” – rather than the more complex
arithmetic operations of addition and multiplication. These can be defined in terms of
the successor function as long as one has the resources to define primitive recursive functi-
ons. One can do this in full second order logic, with its more powerful comprehension
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scheme for relations (actually predicative second order logic is sufficient); however our
preferred option is to use double ancestral logic, which was defended as a valid logic in
chapter IV, and which naturally captures the ability to define primitive recursive functi-
ons. Either way, if we have the resources to define primitive recursive functions, then
we can obtain addition and multiplication operations on any simply infinite sequences.
By combining both double ancestral logic and plural logic with restricted predicative
second order logic, we can prove a categoricity result for simply infinite sequences. Indeed
given two infinite sequences with successor relations R and R′, and initial objects a and
a′, we can define a primitive recursive isomorphism f from the first to the second – which
maps a to a′, and where f applied to the R-successor of x is the R′-successor of f applied
to x.8 This is an instance of the ability to define general primitive recursive functions
seen in section IV.4, though in a setting with different logics in play. Plural logic is used
to establishing that this is an isomorphism (which could otherwise be done by using
the ancestral, definable in terms of the double ancestral): for instance we can form the
plurality of objects which are mapped by f to something lying in the domain of R′, and
argue by induction along R that this contains every element in the domain of R, and thus
that f is total. Here we use the ability to use the free variable R′ in instances of plural
comprehension, which is not possible merely with restricted predicative comprehension.
The case of complete ordered fields is similar. We can give a faithful characterization
by stating what it is for relations R+, R× and R< to give an ordered field structure
on the objects falling under a predicate P , and stating completeness as the property
that for nonempty pluralities of objects falling under P , if there is an R< upper bound
for those objects then there is a least upper bound. Again by combining both double
ancestral logic and plural logic with restricted predicative second order logic, we can
8The result here is of the form “for all simply infinite sequences R and R′ the open formula χ(x, y)
defines an isomorphism from R to R′ such that. . . ” where χ contains R and R′ free. We cannot move
from this to the ∀ ∃ statement “for all simply infinite sequences R and R′ there is an isomorphism from
R to R′ such that. . . ”, since as χ contains R and R′ free it is not suitable for use in an instance of
restricted predicative comprehension.
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prove a categoricity result for this characterization of complete ordered fields – given
two such complete ordered fields, obtaining an isomorphism first between their natural
numbers, extending this to their integers, then their rationals, then all their elements
using the completeness property.
The possibility of characterizations of this kind is a counter to Maddy’s view of mat-
hematical structures, in which their status as elements of the universe of sets is essential
to them. Of course, as discussed initially, mathematical structures typically are (offici-
ally) defined in set theoretic terms; but this need not prevent us from finding alternative
characterizations of the “same” mathematical concept independent of set theory. This is
particularly straightforward for structures axiomatizable in first or second order terms,
as discussed. In these cases, the only objects involved in the characterizations are ele-
ments of the structure we are interested in characterizing. This need not always be the
case. For instance one could characterize the notion of real vector space by using the
above characterization of predicate P and relations R+, R×, R< giving a complete orde-
red field structure, and stating what it is for S+ and S× to define the addition and scalar
multiplication operations of a vector space structure on objects falling under predicate
Q with scalars in this complete ordered field. In this case our real structure of interest is
the vector space itself, but to characterize it we are led to use the elements of a complete
ordered field as auxiliaries. We will talk about such a characterization involving auxilia-
ries, with characterizations that don’t involve auxiliaries (like the other ones considered
so far) being self contained. On Maddy’s conception of mathematical structures, their
place in the set theoretic hierarchy is always essential to them; if whenever we tried to
characterize a structure we needed the whole set theoretic hierarchy as auxiliaries, this
would be a plausible view, but using the whole set theoretic hierarchy as auxiliaries is,
it appears, very rarely necessary.
We have already seen some examples of real world instantiations of simple mathe-
matical structures, such as finite groups and graphs, but there may be a worry about
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whether more complex, substantial mathematical structures will also be instantiated.
Maddy expresses a concern somewhat along these lines, arguing that when applying
mathematics,
we aren’t in fact uncovering the underlying mathematical structures realized
in the world; rather, we’re constructing abstract mathematical models and
trying our best to make true assertions about the ways in which they do
and don’t correspond to physical facts. There are rare cases where this
correspondence is something like an isomorphism . . . but most of the time the
correspondence is something more complex, and all too often it’s something
we simply don’t yet understand (Maddy 2011, pp. 27–28)
This I think is a perceptive and accurate description of the way applied mathematics
currently works in practice, which is what Maddy – as a committed naturalist – is aiming
for. However these kinds of observations should not be taken as any kind of guarantee
that substantial mathematical structure does not, in fact, exist in the world (Maddy
does not claim this, though she does conduct her discussion as though the possibility is
irrelevant).
For instance it may be true that current physics does not confirm the existence of
infinite sequences in the world, or place importance on them, but that does not mean
that it rules them out. It appears for instance that the question of how the universe will
end is still undecided by physics. One possibility is that it may last forever, ending in a
drawn out heat death; otherwise it may collapse in finite time in a Big Crunch; otherwise
it may perhaps continue forever in an infinite sequence of Big Crunches followed by
Big Bangs. If it does last forever, then we can straightforwardly obtain a real world
instantiation of the notion of simply infinite sequence – for instance taking the sequence
of Big Crunches, if there are infinitely many of them, or just a sequence of spacetime
points evenly spaced along some trajectory if not. If the universe will only last for finite
time, but it is spatially infinite, one could similarly obtain a simply infinite sequence
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by picking out a non-intersecting path and taking points evenly spaced along it. Even
if the universe is spatially and temporally finite, space and/or may be continuous –
Maddy (1997, pp.146–152) considers evidence that they are discrete, but this is far
from definitive – in which case we can select an arbitrary point and obtain a simply
infinite sequence of points approaching it. In all these cases we are not finding some
sort of complex correspondence between part of the world and a set theoretic simply
infinite sequence – the kind of outcome Maddy discerns as typical in applications of
mathematics – nor even merely an isomorphism: we are literally finding the structure
of a simply infinite sequence instantiated in the world, as characterized above in a logic
suited to the purpose.
The same circumstances that allow the definition of a real world infinite sequence
generally also allow the definition of two disjoint sequences, in which case we can combine
the two – one to play the role of the non-negative integers, the other the negative integers
– and using the ability to define primitive recursive functions in double ancestral logic,
can obtain real world groups and rings isomorphic to Z. This gives more substantial
groups and rings than simple finite ones like that considered initially.
The structure of a complete ordered field may seem like one that the physical realm is
unlikely to instantiate, but with a slight shift in perspective we can see how it may arise
naturally. It is a basic theorem of order theory that the real line is (up to isomorphism)
the unique nonempty dense separable complete total order without endpoints. This list of
conditions is far from arbitrary: it is a good candidate for what we mean by continuity of
an open interval in time, or continuity of an ordered arc we pick out in space or spacetime
(perhaps just ordered along the rough direction of the arc). Using restricted predicative
second order logic and plural logic together we can state what it is for relations RS and
R< to give such a structure, which we term a continuously ordered open interval: we
require that R< is a complete dense total order without endpoints on some nonempty
domain, and that RS is the successor function of a simply infinite sequence which takes
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values in this domain and which is dense under the ordering R<. We state both the
completeness property of R< and the inductive clause of RS in plural logic. Appendix C
then proves in this setting that a continuously ordered open interval can have a field
structure defined on it, with respect to which it becomes a complete ordered field (this
uses double ancestral logic in addition to plural logic and restricted predicative second
order logic).9 Since – as noted above – the continuity of space and time is an open
question, there is every possibility that there might be physical continuously ordered
open intervals (if realism about moments in time or space/spacetime points is correct,
at least), in which case we would thus obtain physical realizations of the structure of a
complete ordered field.
Though simply infinite sequences and complete ordered fields are perhaps the most
totemic, the variety of structures that mathematics investigates is of course immense. It
will be instructive to consider what real world characterizations might look like in a few
other cases, though there is no possibility of answering this question for all the different
kinds of mathematical structures.
Firstly, we have the concept of a topological space, usually defined as a set X equip-
ped with a topology – a set of “open subsets” of X, which contains X and the empty
set, and is closed under unions and finite intersections. Though this is phrased in ex-
plicitly set theoretic terminology, the key feature is just that we have an appropriate
membership relation between elements of X and the “open subsets”, with the ability
to take unions and intersections of the latter. This situation can be straightforwardly
axiomatized using restricted predicative second order logic together with plural logic.
9As with the case of categoricity for simply infinite sequences discussed above, all we obtain here are
open formulae χ+(x, y, z) and χ×(x, y, z) which contain R< and RS as free variables, and which define
addition and multiplication operations which together with R< give a complete ordered field structure.
Due to the limitations of the logic, we are unable to move from this to a ∀ ∃ statement that for any
R< and RS there are R+ and R× which which define an appropriate field structure, since this would
require the ability to state instances of comprehension with χ+ and χ×, which is ruled out in restricted
predicative second order logic due to the presence of free second order variables. However if we work with
open formulae χ<(x, y) and χS(x, y) in place of R< and RS then the resulting χ+ and χ× do not contain
free second order variables, so we can deduce the appropriate existential conclusion via comprehension.
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We need two predicate variables P and Popen, and a relation variable R∈ where R∈(x, y)
holds only if P (x) and Popen(y), where we think of R∈(x, y) as stating that x is a member
of y. Then we state extensionality for our “open sets”, that if Popen(y) and Popen(y′)
then y = y′ iff for all x, R∈(x, y) iff R∈(x, y′). Finally we state that the analogues of ∅
and {x | P (x)} are open, and that the open sets are closed under binary intersections
and arbitrary unions, in the obvious way – for instance stating that there is y such that
Popen(y) and R∈(x, y) iff P (x), and that if yy is any plurality of objects all falling under
Popen then there is z such that Popen(z) and R∈(x, z) iff there is y amongst the yy such
that R∈(x, y). These are all the mathematically important properties of the “open sets”:
that they are literally collections of things falling under P is arguably not. There are
ways one could require the things falling under Popen to be more like collections, for
instance taking them to be fusions of things falling under P (if the latter are points, or
atoms in some sense), or otherwise properties or pluralities – if one accepts some form
of higher order logic in which one can take collections of these in turn, so that one can
state the property of being closed under unions.
We can then characterize variants of the notion of topological space, such as that of
ringed space – a topological space equipped with a sheaf of rings on it. A sheaf of rings
here is a presheaf of rings that satisfies two extra conditions, where a presheaf of rings is
an assignment of a ring OX(U) to each open subset U of X, and a ring homomorphism
rV,U : OX(U) → OX(V ) for each pair V,U of open subsets with V ⊆ U . The two extra
conditions on a sheaf are firstly, that if (Ui)i∈I is a cover of U (i.e. we have U =
∪
i∈I Ui),
and we have a, b ∈ OX(U) with rUi,U (a) = rUi,U (b) for all i then a = b; and secondly,
that if (Ui)i∈I is a cover of U and we have a family (ai)i∈I where ai ∈ OX(Ui) for all
i, such that rUi∩Uj ,Ui(ai) = rUi∩Uj ,Uj (aj) for all i, j, then there is a ∈ OX(U) such that
rUi,U (a) = ai for all i. To characterize this notion we can take the above characterization
of a topological space in terms of predicates P and Popen and relation R∈, and introduce
a new binary relation RO, ternary relations R+ and R× and a four place relation Rr. We
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use RO(a, U) to play the part of the relation of a being an element of OX(U), requiring
that this only holds of a and U if U is open, and requiring (for convenience) that if
U 6= V then we don’t have both RO(a, U) and RO(a, V ), in other words that the sets
OX(U), OX(V ) are disjoint. Then we use R+ and R× to play the role of addition and
multiplication in every OX(U), stating that if there is U such that RO(a, U) and RO(b, U)
then there is a unique c such that RO(c, U) and R+(a, b, c), and a unique d such that
RO(c, U) and R×(a, b, d); and also stating that if R+(a, b, c) then there is some U such
that RO(a, U), RO(b, U) and RO(c, U), and stating the equivalent for R×. We state that
these operations satisfy the usual ring axioms, in effect giving us a ring structure on each
OX(U). Then we state that for each open set U and V , if V ⊆ U then for each a with
RO(a, U) there is a unique b with RO(b, U) and such that Rr(V,U, a, b), and moreover
that whenever Rr(V,U, a, b) then U and V are open and V ⊆ U and RO(a, U) and
RO(b, U). Thus this relation Rr(V,U, a, b) represents the relation of rV,U (a) = b holding,
and we can state that it is a ring homomorphism. This so far gives us a characterization
of the structure of a presheaf of rings on our topological space, and stating the two
further conditions that make it a sheaf is not difficult, as we can use pluralities UU of
open sets in place of families (Ui)i∈I when discussing covers, and similarly in the second
condition instead of discussing a family (ai)i∈I where ai ∈ OX(Ui) for all i, discussing
a plurality aa where for each U amongst our plurality UU there is a unique a amongst
aa such that RO(a, U) (for this to work, we use the fact that there are no a satisfying
RO(a, U) and RO(a, V ) with U 6= V ). Putting this all together, we have a faithful self
contained real world characterization of the notion of ringed space. One could then try
to build on it to obtain the important mathematical notion of scheme, a particular kind
of ringed space, though that concept brings additional complexities.
Finally we consider the concept of real Banach space – a normed real vector space
which is complete. This case is unlike most of the previous ones, in that the natural
way to characterize the structure does not give a self contained characterization – we
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want auxiliaries in the form of a complete ordered field structure, to provide the scalars
for scalar multiplication of elements of the vector space (the issue of self contained
vs auxiliary involving characterization, and the example of real vector spaces, were
discussed above). Apart from this feature, characterizing the notion of normed real
vector space is straightforward. A further subtlety arises though when we consider the
property of completeness. This is normally defined by quantifying over sequences taking
values in the space, and stating that all such sequences which are Cauchy converge to
some point in the space. A sequence here is a function from N to the space; we have a
copy of N available, lying in our complete ordered field, but functions themselves will be
a further posit, and another step away from a self contained axiomatization. However we
can actually avoid the need for this further posit, by judiciously modifying the definition
of completeness. Instead of phrasing this in terms of Cauchy sequences, we can introduce
the (set theoretic) concept of a Cauchy subset of a metric space X, which is a subset
Y such that for every ε > 0 there is a finite subset Y ′ of Y such that if x, x′ ∈ Y \ Y ′
then d(x, x′) < ε. It is not difficult to see that every Cauchy subset is finite or countably
infinite,10 that if (xn)n∈N is a Cauchy sequence then its image {xn | n ∈ N} is a Cauchy
subset, and that any Cauchy subset is the image of a Cauchy sequence. Moreover we
can define what it is for a Cauchy subset Y of X to converge to a point a ∈ X, namely
that for all ε > 0 there is a finite subset Y ′ of Y such that if x ∈ Y \Y ′ then d(x, a) < ε;
and it is easy to see then that if a Cauchy sequence has infinite image then it converges
to a ∈ X iff its image does (it is a feature of this definition of convergence for Cauchy
sets that if finite then they converge to every point in the space). It then follows quickly
that the statement that a metric space X is complete is equivalent to the statement
that any Cauchy subset of X converges to some point in X. We can then take this as
a definition of completeness – though not standard, it is perfectly valid – and finish our
10If Y is a Cauchy subset then for each n ∈ N we can find a finite subset Yn of Y such that if
x, x′ ∈ Y \ Yn then d(x, x′) < 1n . Then if y, y
′ ∈ Y \
∪
n
Yn then for all n we have d(y, y′) < 1n and so
y = y′. Thus Y = (
∪
n
Yn) ∪ (Y \
∪
n
Yn) is a countable union of finite or countable sets, so is finite or
countably infinite.
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characterization of Banach space by stating its equivalent in plural, namely logic that any
“Cauchy plurality” (paralleling the definition of Cauchy set) converges to some point in
the space. Thus we can avoid having to use a collection of sequences as auxiliary objects,
by reconsidering the set theoretic definition we are seeking a faithful characterization of.
One can of course characterize real Hilbert spaces in a similar way, and complex Banach
and Hilbert spaces given a characterization of the complex numbers.
We won’t discuss in detail how these structures might be physically realised – though
Hilbert spaces are an essential tool in areas of physics like quantum mechanics and
quantum field theory – but as a general point, it has often been noted how concepts
originally defined and investigated out of purely mathematical interest regularly end up
later playing a crucial role in real world applications of mathematics (see for instance
Rowlett 2011). The uses of Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics and smooth manifolds
in general relativity are two standard examples, both concepts being originally developed
with no awareness of their possible applications in physics. The range of mathematical
structures used in physical theories is very great, and we have no way of telling which
kinds of mathematical structures will ultimately end up playing a role in them – let
alone which structures might actually find some manner of physical instantiation. After
all fundamental physics is still, it appears, a decidedly unfinished endeavour, with many
difficult questions remaining open – how should quantum mechanics be reconciled with
general relativity? Is spacetime fundamentally continuous or discrete? Is there a more
fundamental level of explanation than the standard model, which can explain apparently
ad hoc features such as the values the (two dozen or so) physical constants take? What
is the status of dark matter and energy? And so on. There may be a worry like that
seen above expressed by Maddy (2011, pp. 27–28), who considers the applications of
mathematics we tend to make currently and concludes that we are rarely able to establish
anything like an isomorphism between the physical realm and a complex mathematical
structure; often the relationship, she argues, between the mathematical and the physical
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is much less straightforward. However one can just as easily put a different interpretation
on the situation, where the fact that physics makes essential use of serious mathematics
but without confirming its literal truth in the world is not taken as evidence that only
simple mathematical structures are physically instantiated – but to the contrary, taken
as a sign of how complex the mathematical structure of the world must really be.
Now in all these cases we have been seeking real world characterizations of set the-
oretic concepts. It should be pointed out that in each case one can generally obtain
characterizations of “the same” concept in other proof systems as well, such as ETCS
and homotopy type theory. This was discussed above for the case of groups, but applies
much more widely. In ETCS, one can use what is called Mitchell-Bénabou language to
interpret set theoretic formulae with bounded quantifiers – quantifiers of the form ∀x ∈ y
and ∃x ∈ y, where y is a set, instead of ∀x and ∃x – in the context of the category of
sets (see for instance MacLane and Moerdijk 1994, §VI.5). One uses arrows X → Ω,
where Ω is the subobject classifier (representing the set of truth values), to play the role
of propositions, with categorical operations giving conjunction, disjunction, implication,
negation, and bounded quantification. One has (categorical) power sets available in this
context, and can use for instance subobjects of X × Y to play the role of a relation
from X to Y . Thus all standard set theoretic definitions of structures can be carried
out in ETCS in much the same way: indeed one of the claims advocates of ETCS make
is that high level informal proofs according to the principles of ETCS are effectively
indistinguishable from high level informal proofs according to the principles of ZFC.11
Finding real world characterizations of these kinds of set theoretic definitions in ETCS
is then much the same challenge as finding real world characterizations of set theoretic
definitions in ZFC. There are ways concepts can be defined categorically which don’t
have such an immediate analogue in ZFC, such as the definition of a natural numbers
11As mentioned in section VI.2, the main difference is that separation in ETCS only applies to formulae
with bounded quantifiers, and there is no replacement scheme. One can extend the theory to address
these issues though.
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object in terms of the ability (essentially) to define morphisms by recursion out of it
(ibid., §VI.1), but in as much as such a formal definition gives “the same” concept as the
usual definition in ZFC, it thus also gives “the same” concept as that of simply infinite
sequence as defined above.
In homotopy type theory, similar remarks apply. The correspondence between propo-
sitions and types allows one to use define kinds of structures in terms of types, including
definitions in higher order logic, using the presence of universes to allow one to quantify
over “all properties” in a sense, though with the subtlety that such a definition is relative
to a choice of universe (Univalent Foundations Program 2013, §1.11). Definitions of this
kind may then be employed to parallel set theoretic definitions like those considered here.
In the theory one can also define a “cumulative hierarchy type” as a higher inductive
type, which models the set theoretic hierarchy, and if one adds the axiom of choice to the
theory then this hierarchy satisfies the analogues of all the axioms of ZFC, allowing one
to directly carry out set theoretic definitions. When definitions of structures in homo-
topy type theory parallel those in ZFC, obtaining real world characterizations of them
is essentially the same problem. Again there are other kinds of definitions in homotopy
type theory that do not have direct set theoretic analogues (such as definitions involving
the unique properties of identity type) – but if such a definition gives “the same” concept
as a definition in ZFC, then a real world characterization of the ZFC concept will also
be a real world characterization of the homotopy type theory concept.
Before moving on, there are a few final issues to discuss regarding the subject of this
section. One is that though the focus here has been on potential physical realizations
of mathematical structures, there is no requirement that realizations be physical in
any sense. When we characterize a structure in the manner discussed in this section,
we state a characterization which can be satisfied or fail to be satisfied by real world
objects, by objects that really exist – whatever we mean by these kinds of terms. If
one believes that there might be real objects which exist, but exist not in space or
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time – what are generally called abstract objects – then there is nothing to stop such
abstract objects from forming realizations of any of the concepts discussed here (or
other mathematical concepts). There could for instance be a simply infinite sequence of
abstract objects, either one which just “happens” to exist in some sense, or one made
up of distinguished objects with special properties. Ante rem structuralists and Neo-
Fregeans both defend a version of the latter view with regard to the simply infinite
sequence N of natural numbers. There could also be abstract complete ordered fields,
groups, graphs, topological spaces, manifolds, schemes, and so on and so forth. I am not
going to argue for the existence of the abstract objects necessary to form such structures,
but it is worth noting that (as far as I’m aware) arguments against the existence of such
abstract objects have rarely been put forward. Nominalism – the view that abstract
objects do not exist – is not uncommon, but arguments for nominalism generally stem
from worries about how we could know about abstract objects, or refer to them – thus
casting doubt on the advisedness of relying on abstract objects – rather than directly
arguing that abstract objects do not exist. In fact these kinds of nominalist arguments
can even be taken as telling against confidence that abstract objects do not exist, since
how could knowledge that they do not exist be any easier to come by than knowledge
that they do exist? Thus even if a belief in abstract objects may be hard to fully justify,
a belief that they categorically do not exist seems to be equally unwarranted – so that
the possibility of mathematical structures formed out of abstract objects appears to be
a live one.
We should consider here, at least briefly, the status of objects that exist on a de-
ductivist understanding of mathematics. For instance one could advocate a deductivist
understanding of ZFC, along the lines of Tait (2005) and Muller (2004), in which the
sense of set theoretic statements is given by the rules for asserting or denying them
according to the axioms of ZFC and the principles of first order logic.12 Thus one can
12Tait actually advocates a type theoretic understanding of logic, but that is inessential here.
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rightly assert the existence for instance of a set like {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}}, since it can be
proved to exist by the reasoning available. Should the objects which “exist” in this sense
be taken to “really exist” – to be included in the range of things we talk about when we
say “there are” and “every thing” in English? I believe Tait and Muller would argue that
they should, though they do not (as far as I can see) explicitly address the question.
If they are right – and I will remain agnostic on this – then structures formed from
such objects will be examples of real world instantiations of mathematical concepts. A
further subtlety arises with structures that we characterize in plural logic, for instance
the notion of simply infinite sequence or complete ordered field. One might assume that
if we have a set equipped with a successor function which satisfies the set theoretic defi-
nition of simply infinite sequence, then it will also satisfy the plural logic definition; but
this does not follow. When one has the kind of deductivist understanding of set theory
that Tait and Muller advocate, the separation scheme – for forming subsets – is limited
to properties definable in set theoretic language, and thus set theoretic simply infinite
sequences can only be argued to satisfy induction for properties definable in this lan-
guage. There is thus no way to argue that such a set theoretic simply infinite sequence
satisfies the full plural logic inductive clause, as the language of plural logic is not al-
lowed into the set theoretic inductive clause; so there is no way of arguing that a set
theoretic simply infinite sequence, on the deductivist view, is a simply infinite sequence
as defined here. The same goes for complete ordered fields. This may seem like a minor
technical point, but actually reflects a deep mismatch between mathematical concepts as
defined within a deductivist setting, and mathematical concepts as faithfully characteri-
zed in a logic properly capturing their informal content. Because deductivists advocate
an understanding of mathematics based on a closed system of precise rules governing
the mathematical vocabulary,13 the mathematical vocabulary ends up semantically iso-
lated from real world vocabulary, and a mathematical principle like that of induction
13Tait has an open ended conception, with us able to add new rules and axioms to our proof system,
but at any given time we have only some fixed system in mind.
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which should hold of “all properties” or “all pluralities” or “all subsets” ends up in fact
only applying to those properties definable in the mathematical theory – rather than
all properties the full power of our natural language is able to define. This is related
to the point that we can have a model M of ZFC in which the set of natural numbers
ω is actually a non standard model of arithmetic, satisfying the induction axiom in the
model:
M  ∀x (x ⊆ ω and ∅ ∈ x and ∀y (y ∈ x → y ∪ {y} ∈ x)) → x = ω
but where there is in reality an element a such that M, v(x 7→ a)  a ∈ ω and M, v(x 7→
a)  a > n for every numeral n (where v is a variable assignment). In this sense though
the definition of “simply infinite sequence” in set theory and in plural logic above both
aim to capture the same informal concept, they need not be extensionally equivalent –
we can see what the intention behind the set theoretic definition is, but the definition
may still not be a fully adequate one.
One can make clearer what is lacking from the deductivist understanding of set
theory by considering an alternative view, in which one obtains justification for an open
ended understanding of the set theoretic axiom schemes (rather than them just being
limited to mathematical vocabulary). For instance Boolos (1971) discusses the iterative
conception of sets, in which we start with the set of all things which exist which aren’t
sets, and form every set all of whose elements are amongst these objects, and then form
every set all of whose elements are amongst these objects (including the sets formed),
and keep going, iterating this into the transfinite. At each stage we are forming every
possible set, whether such a subset is definable or not, and whatever language such a
subset may or may not be definable in. Thus we can see (if we believe this conception)
that when using the separation axiom scheme to form the subset {x ∈ y | φ} of a set y,
we can use any vocabulary whatsoever in defining the formula φ, not just the vocabulary
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of set theory (with a possible restriction to vocabulary such that the formula φ defines
a sharp property). Thus we obtain what we call an open ended separation scheme –
expanding its range as we add new vocabulary to our language. Given this, the above
problem with the deductivist understanding of set theory is no longer an issue. Indeed
we have a set theoretic simply infinite sequence (x, rs), with rs its successor function,
then defining the relation RS by RS(a, b) iff rs(a) = b we obtain that RS is a successor
function in the sense of plural logic, defined above. Here we use in crucial fashion the
ability to use all vocabulary of our language, including plural variables, in the separation
scheme. Similarly from a successor function RS as defined above in plural logic, we can
obtain a set theoretic infinite sequence.14 The same goes for complete ordered fields.
If one does regard set theoretic language as genuinely meaningful language in this
way, then one can regard characterizations of structures in set theory as real world
characterizations – with no need to reinterpret them in the logics used here. As just
seen, if we have an open ended conception of the set theoretic axiom schemes, we can
often obtain equivalences between set theoretic definitions and the kinds of definitions
given above in restricted predicative second order logic and plural logic. When working
mathematically with sets, they are often conceived of as pure sets – with all sets only
having other sets as their members, rather than other real world objects (like the laptop
and chair in the initial group example). One would have to phrase one’s set theory
as an impure set theory, allowing sets of urelements, for set theoretic characterizations
of structures to allow for structures containing objects that aren’t sets. Apart from
this the main difference between set theoretic definitions of structures and the kinds of
definitions given above is that set theoretic structures are generally taken to be sets,
rather than proper classes, whereas for instance a group as defined above could consist
of a group multiplication operation defined on a proper class of elements, such as the
14We can use here the double ancestral to define a primitive recursive function from the finite ordinals
to the domain of RS , thus obtaining by open ended replacement that the domain of RS is a set. The
rest is easy.
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surreal numbers. If one has the kind of understanding of set theory discussed here, then
one could make the case that a faithful characterization of a concept of group should
limit itself to set sized structures, rather than proper class sized structures. As with
other issues, I will remain agnostic on this.
5 The eliminative constraint
We have seen how though mathematical concepts are often given official definition as
formal concepts in the context of a mathematical proof system, we can generally find
real world characterizations which capture the same informal concept as the formal
definition. This was discussed primarily for the case of ZFC in section VI.4, with the
cases of ETCS and homotopy type theory also being touched on.
Now we use this to argue for a constraint we should put on interpretations of mathe-
matics, specifically interpretations of what generalizations about mathematical structu-
res mean. This will apply to generalizations about all kind of mathematical structures
that we can obtain real world characterizations of, including the examples – groups,
rings, topological spaces, Banach spaces and so on – seen in section VI.4, and we will
also discuss the case of statements about the distinguished structures N and R.15
By generalizations about a kind of structure we mean statements in English, infor-
mally universally quantifying over structures of that kind and stating some property of
them. A generalization about groups, for instance, is just a statement φ of the form
For every group G, G satisfies Q(G)
where Q(G) is some property that any group G does or doesn’t satisfy – for instance Q
might be the property G has a unique identity element, or that for g ∈ G, if there is
15Philosophical interpretations of mathematics have typically focused on what mathematical genera-
lizations about kinds of structures, or about particular structures such as N and R, mean. Later in this
section it will be discussed how though many mathematical results are of this form, there are also many
which are not, and the question of interpreting the latter will be considered.
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h ∈ G with gh = h then g is the identity element of G. As discussed in section VI.3,
a variety of interpretations I : φ 7→ φI of such mathematical generalizations have been
put forward. In addition, as discussed in section VI.4, we can characterize as a formula
Group(P,R×) what it is for a predicate P and ternary relation R× to “be” a group,
capturing the same informal concept of group as that defined for instance in ZFC. Then
if Q is a property stated informally in English that a group G can satisfy or fail to
satisfy, we call Q definable if it can be stated using our logical resources as a property
Q(P,R×) purely in terms of such a predicate P and relation R× and the objects which it
relates, without requiring other auxiliary objects.16 Whether a property is definable can
depend on what logical resources we take there to be available: the property of G having
a unique identity element is straightforwardly definable (provided we accept first order
logic), but the property that “if G is finitely generated and abelian then every subgroup
is abelian” requires a stronger logic, for instance ancestral plural logic as described in
chapter V.
The latter example brings up another incidental issue not related to definability,
which is that instead of thinking in terms of a generalization
For every group G, G satisfies Q(G)
where Q(G) is this complicated property, it may be more natural to think in terms of a
generalization
For every finitely generated abelian group G, G satisfies Q′(G)
where Q′(G) is the property of G having only finitely generated subgroups. One can
then give a faithful real world characterization in ancestral plural logic of the concept of
what it is for a predicate P and ternary relation R× to define a finitely generated abelian
group, and the property of having only finitely generated subgroups is then a definable
16As with the notion of a faithful real world characterization of a formal concept, this notion of
definability is not a precise one, and whether a definition of an informally stated property accurately
captures it may be open to debate.
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property of such a structure. Nothing said here depends on which of these options is
taken.
Now suppose we are given an interpretation I : φ 7→ φI of some class of mathematical
statements, which includes the generalizations about groups. The eliminative constraint
on I is the condition that for all such generalizations φ, if φ is of the form
For every group G, G satisfies Q(G)
where Q is some definable property of groups, then if φ is interpreted by I as true – if
φI holds – then it must be the case that
For every P , R×, if Group(P,R×) then Q(P,R×)
holds. In other words, whenever the statement that all groups have property Q is
interpreted as true, it must be the case that all realizations of the concept of group do
actually have property Q.
Of course, this constraint is not intended to just apply to generalizations about
groups. In general, if S is a kind of structure of which we can obtain a faithful real
world characterization, and Q is a definable property of S’s, then we call the statement
“all S’s satisfy Q” a definable generalization (about S’s). Suppose that I : φ 7→ φI is an
interpretation of some class of mathematical statements, which includes generalizations
about some kind of structure S of which we can obtain a faithful real world characteriza-
tion. Then the eliminative constraint on I requires that for all generalizations φ stating
that a definable property Q holds of all S’s, if φ is interpreted by I as true then every
realization of S satisfies Q. The latter statement, that every realization of S satisfies
Q, is just the eliminative structuralist interpretation φElim of φ. Thus we can state the
eliminative constraint more briefly as the condition that for all definable generalizations
φ interpreted by I, φI implies φElim. Hence the term “eliminative constraint”.17
17Incidentally, it should be mentioned that rather than just thinking in terms of kinds of structures
being the standard examples such as groups, topological space, schemes and so on, one can think of
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The reasoning behind this constraint is simple. The purpose of a faithful real world
characterization of a kind of mathematical structure S is to characterize “the same”
concept, but in a manner which can be satisfied or fail to be satisfied by real world
objects. To assert that every ring has property Q while accepting the existence of a
realization of the concept of ring which does not have property Q could only be coherent
if our real world characterization of “ring” differed in some significant sense from our
pre-existing conception of what a ring is – but this is exactly what our characterization
being faithful rules out.
However it could, perhaps, be argued that such generalizations just do have an
agreed upon hidden meaning, which accepts this kind of clash as a possibility. There
is no evidence of this in everyday discussion of mathematical statements by mathema-
ticians, however: if a mathematician sat through a seminar concerning a property Q of
topological spaces, and at the end said they agreed it was true that every topological
space satisfies Q, but nevertheless there could be a real example of a topological space
for which ¬Q held, they would be met with bafflement. Mathematicians do sometimes
advocate consequentialist or if-then interpretations of mathematics when musing phi-
losophically (rather than when actually doing mathematical research), but never with
awareness that this could lead to such a clash between the apparent meaning of mat-
hematical generalizations and their actual import. Moreover it is only the apparent
meaning of mathematical generalizations that makes sense of the way we regard them,
celebrating their proofs as informing us of a fact about the world, and relying on them
whenever relevant in physics or other sciences; if one proves the result that all groups sa-
tisfy Q, but this is compatible with some real world group still having property ¬Q, then
why should the result license regarding all groups used in applications of mathematics
adjective-noun combinations such as “compact Hausdorff topological space”, “torsion free abelian group”
and the like as naming kinds of structures, and apply this constraint to these more general kinds of
structures. This is in line with the observation from above that the statement that for every group, if it
is finitely generated and abelian then its every subgroup is finitely generated, is perhaps best viewed as
a generalization about finitely generated abelian groups rather than about groups.
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– whether literal or idealized – as satisfying Q?
Note that we do not require here that we actually settle on eliminative structuralism
as the correct interpretation of mathematical generalizations. It is perfectly reasonable
to advocate some other interpretation – just as long as it is compatible with elimina-
tive structuralism in the above sense. For instance one might fix some mathematical
proof system T , and use a consequentialist interpretation with respect to T in which
a generalization φ about a kind of mathematical structure S is interpreted as meaning
that T ` φT , where φT is a reduction of φ to the language of T via a formal definition
in T of what a structure of kind S is. There is nothing incoherent about appealing to
formal definitions in a proof system like this instead of the kinds of real world characte-
rizations seen in section VI.4: they can perfectly well characterize “the same” concept,
and can be more convenient, as a proof system may be a more expressive setting for
defining concepts – with a full range of auxiliary objects available – than the logics used
in section VI.4, where sometimes fairly subtle manoeuvres were needed. We just require
that the resulting interpretation doesn’t mislead us as to the properties of realizations
of structures that actually exist.
The eliminative constraint as stated above applies to the concepts of simply infinite
sequence and complete ordered field as well as to the other examples discussed. However
though these are key concepts in mathematics, generalizations about them are rarely
stated – for the simple reason that all simply infinite sequences are isomorphic, as are all
complete ordered fields, so that any arithmetic fact that holds of one infinite sequence
holds of all of them, and similarly for any fact about complete ordered fields stated in
the language of ordered fields. Thus it is common to state one’s result as simply about
the paradigmatic simply infinite sequence N, or the paradigmatic complete ordered field
R, with it being understood that any such result will hold of all structures of the relevant
kind. Since these distinguished structures are intended as paradigms in this sense (and
statements about them in proof systems are equivalent to generalizations about the
198
5. THE ELIMINATIVE CONSTRAINT
relevant structures) the eliminative constraint applies to statements about them just as
much as to other explicit generalizations: if we have an interpretation I of some class of
statements which includes statements of arithmetic about N, then for I to be acceptable
we require that whenever φ states that some arithmetic property Q holds of N, if φ is
interpreted as true by I then every realization of the concept of simply infinite sequence
satisfies Q. In other words we require again that φI implies φElim. The equivalent
condition is required for statements in the language of ordered fields about R.
As with other generalizations, φElim is required to hold of all realizations that exist,
not just those we know about. The existence of a real example of a topological space
satisfying ¬Q is just as incompatible with the assertion “all topological spaces satisfy Q”
whether we know about it or not. As discussed in section VI.4, the existence of physical
realizations of many kinds of mathematical structures is a live possibility that cannot
currently be ruled out; so – even though we may not yet have confirmed the existence of
such realizations – one cannot currently rely on the eliminative constraint being vacuous
in these cases.
The eliminative constraint has been stated here only in terms of the actual realiza-
tions that exist. However if one takes talk of possibility and necessity seriously, I think
there is a case that the eliminative constraint should apply not just to all actual reali-
zations, but to all possible realizations: a generalization about a kind of structure being
true should not rely on there only being a limited range of realizations of that structure
in our world as it happens to be, but should hold no matter what realizations of that
structure could exist. In this case one obtains a stronger constraint, requiring that if φ
is a definable generalization interpreted as true then φElim doesn’t just hold accidentally,
but holds necessarily. In other words we require that φI implies φModal. One could call
this stronger constraint the modal constraint.
The eliminative constraint as discussed above is only applied to mathematical gene-
ralizations about a single kind of structure. Of course, many mathematical statements
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are not of this restricted form. Some mathematical statements are effectively universal
generalizations about multiple structures – for instance statements about the properties
of certain kinds of homomorphism or other maps between structures of some kind. In
such instances there is a case again for a form of the eliminative constraint, where we re-
quire that φI implies φElim, where this time φElim quantifies over multiple realizations of
the relevant kind of structure, or maybe over realizations of different kinds of structures,
perhaps with some relationship between them. For example suppose φ states that a ring
homomorphism is injective iff its kernel is {0}; this version of the eliminative constraint
would state that for φ to be interpreted as true, whenever we have two realizations of
the concept of ring (quantifying over instantiations of this concept twice), and a suitable
relation Rf between them which defines a homomorphism, we need that this homomor-
phism is injective iff the only object mapped to 0 in the codomain is 0 in the domain.
One could just think of such examples as a case of a single larger joint structure.
Then naturally there are existential statements, or statements of the logical form ∀ ∃
– for instance the statement that a complete ordered field exists, or that any topological
space has a compactification, or a fundamental group and so on. One might be tempted
to argue for some sort of eliminative constraint on the interpretations of such state-
ments, but I think the case here is a much less strong one. The “generalization” form of
the eliminative constraint requires that mathematical generalizations do not mislead us
about the properties of realizations of structures that actually exist; and this, I think,
is just a greater defect than stating the existence of structures which are not actually
instantiated. The latter is an accepted aspect of mathematical discourse – it is well
known that the existence of the structures mathematics describes is a difficult and con-
troversial question, both amongst mathematicians and philosophers. When mathematics
justifies the existence of certain structures, science may well make use of them in models
and theories, but what the proper scientific attitude to the existence of such structures
should be is a difficult question; there are no such reservations concerning mathematical
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generalizations in applications, where any generalizations mathematics takes to be true
of a certain kind of structure will happily be applied, if relevant, to instances of that
structure featuring in models or encountered in reality. Thus the eliminative constraint
will not be applied here to existential statements about structures – though of course
existential statements within structures, such as the statement that in a simply infinite
sequence there are infinitely many primes, can count as generalizations about structures
and so come under its scope.
What counts as an existential statement “within” a structure as opposed to an ex-
istential statement about a structure may depend on what kinds structures we are con-
sidering – for instance, any existential mathematical statement could potentially be
thought of as an existential statement within a broader mathematical universe such as
the set theoretic hierarchy. One can of course apply the eliminative constraint to such
statements about a set theoretic hierarchy – it would require that if a generalization φ
about set theoretic hierarchies (or perhaps about the set theoretic hierarchy, regarded
as a paradigm) is interpreted as true then φElim needs to hold, where φElim restates φ
as a generalization about realizations of the concept of set theoretic hierarchy, via some
suitable faithful real world characterization (for instance using plural logic). Of course
it is implausible that there could be a physical realization of this concept, as its cardi-
nality would be far too large, but – as discussed in section VI.4 – there do not appear
to be good reasons to rule out the existence of abstract objects, so that the possibility
of some domain of really existing abstract objects having the structure of a set theoretic
hierarchy is a live one. If one believes in the iterative conception of set, then that would
provide an example of such a domain.
Now we connect this discussion of the eliminative constraint with the discussion of
the notion of genuine proof from section VI.2. As seen there, the notion of genuine proof
is one in which proof is factive – for a statement φ to be provable, it must be the case
that φ is actually true. To genuinely prove a statement we thus need some interpretation
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of what it means (so that it is the kind of thing that can be true or false). As discussed
here though, we should reject any interpretation that does not satisfy the eliminative
constraint. Thus, being able to genuinely prove φ requires that φI holds for some I
where φI implies φElim, and thus requires that φElim holds.
We do not need to be over eager with the condition that we require an interpretation
of φ in order to be able to genuinely prove it. We need an interpretation that doesn’t
immediately collapse under scrutiny, but do not necessarily need to have a fully developed
philosophical account – in the same way as to argue whether something is frivolous,
you need to know what “frivolous” means, but do not need a philosophical theory of
frivolity. Also, it is perfectly possible for multiple people to all regard an argument p
as a genuine proof of φ, whilst each having their own differing interpretation of what
φ means – for instance all regarding a proof in first order arithmetic as a proof of an
arithmetic statement, whilst disagreeing about what the proper interpretation of the
result is. Thus to be able to regard some argument as a genuine proof of φ (where φ is
of the form discussed above), it just needs to be the case that there is some available
interpretation of φ which interprets it as true and satisfies the eliminative constraint –
we do not necessarily have to agree on any such particular interpretation, or have a fully
realized philosophical theory of it.
The standard worry about eliminative structuralism is the threat of vacuity: that
there may not actually be any structures of the given kind. This possibility may in
fact weaken the eliminative constraint, but it is only if we know that it is vacuous for
some particular kind of structure that it becomes relevant. To regard an argument p
establishing φ as a genuine proof, one must be able to know that φ is true on acceptable
interpretation – if it is merely probable that it is true on acceptable interpretation, the
argument is not a proof – and thus requires knowing that φElim holds. If the eliminative
constraint for generalizations like φ is in fact vacuous, but we don’t know this to be the
case, then this doesn’t allow us to regard an argument p establishing φ as a proof.
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To end the section, we discuss which of the interpretations seen in section VI.3 sa-
tisfy this eliminative constraint. Firstly, the consequentialist, deductivist, and if-thenist
interpretations. For consequentialism and if-thenism, here the distinction between local
and global versions is again key. If for instance we have a local consequentialist inter-
pretation of a statement φ of arithmetic, interpreting φ as meaning that for instance
PA ` φPA, then this trivially satisfies the eliminative constraint: if φ is provable in PA,
then it will hold in any simply infinite sequence, as all the axioms of PA hold in any
simply infinite sequence (and deductions in first order logic preserve logical entailment).
On the other hand if we take a global consequentialist interpretation, interpreting φ as
meaning that ZFC ` φZFC, then it is not at all clear whether φ being “true” will imply
that it holds in any simply infinite sequence. This is an example of the question of sound-
ness for ZFC, discussed in section VI.6. The same goes for statements about groups,
and topological spaces, and other kinds of structure: if one takes a local consequentialist
interpretation, with regard to an axiomatization of the structure of interest, then the
eliminative constraint may be trivially satisfied; but for global consequentialism, with
regard to a general mathematical axiom system, it is an example of a the soundness
question discussed in section VI.6, and may be a question requiring substantial thought.
The outcomes for if-thenism are similar. The eliminative constraint for deductivism is
similar to that for global consequentialism – a statement of arithmetic φ being assertible
amounts to φ being provable according to the rules of our chosen proof system T , and
so the eliminative constraint amounts to the question of whether provability in T im-
plies that an arithmetic statement actually holds of all infinite sequences, which is the
question of (arithmetic) soundness for T .
As noted above, the eliminative structuralist interpretation trivially satisfies the
eliminative constraint. Modal structuralism also trivially satisfies the eliminative con-
straint, moreover actually trivially satisfying the stronger modal constraint. Ante rem
structuralism satisfies the eliminative constraint as well, given the posit that for any
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realization of a kind of structure, the abstract form of the isomorphism type of that
realization exists; the ante rem structuralist interpretation φante of a statement φ then
implies the eliminative structuralist interpretation, since any realization of a kind of
structure is isomorphic to the form of its isomorphism type. For the cases of complete
ordered fields and simply infinite sequences, we use here the relevant categoricity results.
The Neo-Fregean interpretation of arithmetic satisfies the eliminative constraint, again
because of categoricity for simply infinite sequences.
If one interprets the conditional in the statement of the eliminative constraint as a
material conditional, then the fictionalist interpretation actually trivially satisfies the
eliminative constraint, as φfiction is always false, so that φfiction → φElim is always true.
However I think this example just suggests that the implication in the eliminative con-
straint should be understood as a natural language if-then, rather than a material con-
dition, in which case the status of fictionalism becomes unclear. It is possible though
that a fictionalist could accept a form of the eliminative constraint as a condition on
axiom systems; this becomes an example of the requirement of soundness, as discussed
in the next section.
Finally there is set realism. How this stands with regard to the eliminative constraint
is an interesting and important question, that will be returned to in section VI.7.
6 Foundational goals
Now we turn to the central questions of this chapter: what the purpose of a foundation
for mathematics is, and what we should look for when deciding on one.
When looking for a foundation for mathematics we are choosing between proof sy-
stems – for instance ZFC, ETCS, homotopy type theory, PA2, Quine’s theory New
Foundations, amongst many others. As discussed in section VI.2, any such proof system
T comes equipped with a precise notion of what it is for a string of symbols to be a
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formal proof (or formal derivation) in T . If the workings of this notion of formal proof
are suitably amenable to being grasped by humans, then it can give rise to a correspon-
ding notion of informal proof in T , consisting of informal arguments that take place at a
range of levels of detail/compression, from those which are highly detailed and close to
the level of formal proof in T , all the way to those which are very highly compressed, for
which formalization may be a lengthy process, though still always possible in principle
if a proof is valid. This was discussed for the case of informal proof in ZFC in chapter I.
Not just any proof system can serve the role of a foundation, however. Those proof
systems that are considered candidate foundations are ones in which a wide range of
mathematical structures can be represented and investigated. This was discussed for the
case of ZFC, ETCS and homotopy type theory in section VI.4, where it was seen that
sets and types can be used both to characterize and construct all manner of structures.
The same goes for Quine’s theory New Foundations, and PA2 also has some potential in
this regard, with a range of structures being representable in it via coding.
Such proof systems can thus provide a subject matter for a wide range of branches
of mathematics (hopefully, all of them). The purpose of designating a particular proof
system as a foundation is that it is then used as a setting in which one researches all
these various branches, regarding proofs in the system about the relevant structures not
just as derivations – empty of content – but as establishing their conclusions as true, as
genuine proofs in the sense discussed in section VI.2. When Fermat’s last theorem, the
Poincaré conjecture or the Green-Tao theorem are proved in set theory, for instance, one
does not just say that they have been proved in set theory but that they are theorems,
that they have been proved, tout court: our current choice of set theory as a foundation
means that results proved in set theory are taken as established, as truths.
Thus when deciding on a foundation for mathematics we are seeking a proof sy-
stem which can provide a home for as many branches of mathematics as possible, by
allowing us to (genuinely) prove statements about the structures which those branches
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study. There is nothing in principle I think to bar us from studying different branches of
mathematics in different proof systems, though one might then have to be careful when
discussing a result to make clear which proof system it was proved in: for instance if
proof system T1 allowed the construction of certain kinds of topological spaces which
proof system T2 did not, then one would have to be careful when reasoning using the
methods of T2 not to appeal to any results proved in T1 about the existence and pro-
perties of those kinds of topological spaces. In this kind of case, the univocal notion
of proof in mathematics would be lost – it is the choice of a single foundational proof
system for mathematics that makes this univocal notion of proof possible.18 Apart from
the condition that it provide a home for as many branches of mathematics as possible,
I believe the key property we want from a choice of foundation is just that it provide
methods of proof that are maximally powerful and flexible – that deciding conjectures by
these methods is as easy for mathematicians as it can be. In fact this second property
is closely related to the first, as one of the main ways that a proof system can make
results easier to establish is by allowing the construction of all manner of novel objects
and structures, which can then allow new methods of attacking old problems (as well as
providing the subject matter for new branches of mathematics).
This account of what we want from a foundation tallies closely with Maddy’s com-
ments on the subject. Indeed a potential foundation allowing structures studied by the
various branches of mathematics to be defined and constructed, and results about them
proved, are the key properties underlying Maddy’s list of the benefits of a foundation
(Maddy 2011, pp. 33–34).19 She discusses that a foundation can “give explicit meaning
to questions of existence and coherence”, via the test of whether a certain kind of ob-
ject/structure can be constructed in the proof system – a role which a proof system can
only play if it has suitably rich methods for carrying out such constructions of novel
18At least in modern rigorous mathematics, where proof is always founded on some underlying formal
proof system.




entities; “make previously unclear concepts and structures precise”, which requires that
the resources of the proof system for phrasing definitions be sufficiently expressive; and
“facilitate interconnections between disparate branches of mathematics”, as discussed
above. Then the crucial property of using a foundation to “formulate and answer questi-
ons of provability and refutability” by “investigating what does or doesn’t follow from the
axioms of the theory” implicitly assumes that we are accepting the methods of the proof
system as constitutive of what counts as a (genuine) proof, about the various structures
we are interested in – otherwise these are purely formal properties of the proof system,
of no especial wider interest. Finally, using a foundation to “identify perfectly general
fundamental assumptions that play out in many different guises in different fields” is
also only possible if we are accepting the methods of the proof system as valid for esta-
blishing results about the subject matter of the different branches of mathematics, as is
“open[ing] the door to new strong hypotheses to settle old open questions”.
In fact this account even appears to be compatible with Awodey’s remarks about
set theory, despite him being an avowed anti foundationalist. To clarify what he means
by his if-thenist view, he describes one form of if-thenism that he intends to distance
himself from (Awodey 2004, p. 10): that in which the laws, axioms and rules of the
foundational system are taken as conditional, so that for instance if one proves in set
theory a conditional “if A, then B”, this result is reported as meaning that “if the laws,
axioms, and rules of the system are true and correct, then if A, then B” (ibid., p. 10). He
discusses that the argument against this form of if-thenism is that it makes all theorems
of mathematics hypothetical: “We may never know whether the axioms of ZFC are true,
or they may even be inconsistent, so it will not do to carry them along as conditions
on every theorem” (ibid., p. 10). Instead, in his form of if-thenism, “the conditions are
rather of the kind ‘if G is a finitely generated abelian group’, not ‘if the axioms of ZFC are
true’ ”(ibid., p. 10). On his version of if-thenism, the antecedents of the conditionals are
not hypotheses, but rather “serve to specify the range of application of the subsequent
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statement” (Awodey 2004, p. 10). Thus in terms of the vocabulary used in the discussion
of interpretations of mathematics from section VI.3, Awodey’s view appears to be more
like a form of eliminative structuralism than if-thenism (though the views are obviously
closely related) – which is consonant with his description of it as a form of structuralism.
Regarding the reasoning used to derive results, he says that “establishing any ‘if ... ,
then ... ’ implication requires some tacitly assumed methods of reasoning, from simple
chains of equations, to, say, ZFC” (ibid., p. 10): the principles of set theory may thus be
assumed when establishing results about different kinds of structures, and are not taken
to be hypotheses on which those results depend. Thus the role of set theory on his view
is essentially its role as a foundation as described here – it is a body of reasoning that
may be used without comment when establishing mathematical results about the kinds
of structures we are interested in.
Now we combine these remarks on foundations with the discussion of genuine proof
and interpretations from section VI.2 and section VI.5. For a proof system T to be
a setting for genuinely proving results about structures of some kind S of structure of
which we can obtain a faithful real world characterization, it needs to be the case that
proof in T is factive for statements about such structures, so that if φ is a statement
about such structures then T ` φT implies φI where I is a chosen interpretation of φ
(with φT the translation of φ into the language of T ). Call this condition the factivity
of T with respect to I. Then for such an I to be acceptable, it needs to satisfy the
eliminative constraint, so that whenever φ is a definable generalization about structures
of this kind, we have that φI implies φElim. Combining these, it follows that for T to be
a setting for genuinely proving results about structures of kind S it needs to be the case
that whenever φ is a definable generalization about S’s, T ` φT implies φElim.
This holding for generalizations of this form about some kind of structure (of which
we can obtain a faithful real world characterization) is the condition of soundness for T
with respect to that kind of structure, though we should determine more precisely what
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kinds of generalizations are included, by specifying what logic and language we have in
mind. For instance one could define T to be arithmetically sound when this holds of
all first order (or second order) arithmetic statements, define T to be real-analytically
sound when this hold for all statements in the language of the complete ordered fields
in monadic second order logic, define T to be group theoretically sound when this holds
for all statements in the language of the theory of groups in monadic second order logic,
and so on.
Actually it appears plausible that this condition of soundness holding for a kind of
structure (of which we can obtain a faithful real world characterization) is equivalent
to the condition that there be an acceptable interpretation I of statements about that
kind of structure for which proof in T is factive. Indeed if real examples of this kind
of structure do exist, then the eliminative structuralist interpretation is non vacuous,
and arguably is thus an acceptable interpretation (it trivially satisfies the eliminative
constraint), and it is one with respect to which T is factive – this being essentially the
definition of soundness. On the other hand if real examples of this kind of structure
do not exist, then the eliminative constraint for this case is trivial, and presumably one
could then regard the deductivist interpretation based on proof system T as acceptable,
for which proof in T is trivially factive.
Now when deciding on a foundation for mathematics, we are seeking a proof system
which will be a home for as many branches of mathematics as possible, by allowing us
to define and construct the structures they study, and (genuinely) prove results about
these structures. As just discussed, being able to genuinely prove statements about kinds
of structures for which we can obtain faithful real world characterizations requires that
the proof system be sound with respect to those kinds of structures – and soundness is
also plausibly a sufficient condition for this. Thus when seeking a proof system to be
a foundation for mathematics, we should be seeking one which is sound for as wide a
variety of kinds of structures as possible.
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In principle I think it is possible that one could settle on a (limited) foundation in
the form of a proof system which allowed proofs about certain kinds of structures to
be regarded as genuine proofs, but not about other kinds of structures. For instance,
perhaps we could argue that a certain proof system T is sound for deriving first order
statements about structures axiomatizable in first order logic, such as groups and graphs,
and also sound for first order statements of arithmetic, but be unable to argue that it
is sound for statements about the real numbers, of statements in plural logic about
groups, graphs or the natural numbers. In this case we could potentially regard T as a
kind of limited foundation, in which we can genuinely the appropriate kinds of statements
about groups and graphs and the natural numbers, but regard other kinds of statements
proved in the theory as having a purely instrumental role within the theory, rather than
as being established as genuine facs. One would then have to be clear which kinds of
results were which, though – some being genuinely established truths about a kind of
structure, others being merely derived results which might have applications within the
proof system, but not outside of it – so that in applications of mathematics only the
genuinely established results were used, and applied to deduce facts about structures in
reality or in idealized models.
Similarly one could conceivably pick on a kind of foundation which only allowed
some limited class of statements about a given kind of structure to be regarded as being
genuinely proved – for instance Π1 statements of first order arithmetic. This would need
to be a well defined, general class of statements though. One couldn’t for instance take
one’s “foundation” to be the theory {φGC} where φGC is the Goldbach conjecture, and
use this to trivially “prove” the Goldbach conjecture, arguing that this is a sound theory
since φGC is likely true as a fact about the natural numbers (Paseau 2015 discusses the
wealth of evidence we have for the Goldbach conjecture, arguing that we are “virtually
certain” of it, though lacking a proof). Also one can’t try to say for instance that the
arithmetic statements which are genuinely provable in T are the “natural” ones, since it
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needs to be clear or easy to establish whether a statement is in the target class or not;
and we have no criteria or decision procedure for what naturality amounts to here, so
that it may well be arguable – in a way that is difficult or impossible to resolve – whether
a statements belongs to this class or not. Thus we would not know which arguments we
should actually be regarding as proofs – as it may not be clear whether their conclusions
are “natural” – which is antithetical to the notion of proof (recall that as discussed in
section I.5, a key feature of the modern rigorous notion of proof is that it provides an
effective procedure for resolving disputes about the validity of proofs). Of course coming
up with some criteria, for instance a syntactic one, for what is “natural” would resolve
this issue, giving a well class of genuinely provable statements.
To conclude the section, it is worth noting that even if we forget about the discussion
of interpretations from section VI.5, there is an attraction just in the direct idea that a
foundation should be sound, for as many kinds of structures as possible, so that proving
generalizations about those kinds of structures in the proof system correctly informs us
of properties of real examples of them. This could be an attractive view of foundations
for a fictionalist, giving an instrumental use for a foundation for mathematics (in a simi-
lar vein to the advocacy of the notion of conservativeness by Field 1980; 1989). However
as discussed in section VI.3, since the deductivist and eliminative structuralist interpre-
tations of mathematics are available, I think fictionalists need to give more sustained
arguments for why the face value platonist interpretation of mathematics is correct if
their view is to be an attractive one.
7 Arguing for soundness
We now briefly consider how one might argue for the soundness of a proof system. First
we consider the relation between soundness and consistency, and then consider how
extrinsic or inductive evidence might be used to argue for soundness.
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As a technical note, we will assume in this section that we have the resources to
talk about truth of mathematical statements as interpreted in terms of real structures.20
For example, if we have a real infinite sequence A, with initial element a and successor
function SA, then we saw in section VI.4 that we can define addition and multiplication
on such a sequence, and thus can interpret any statement φ of arithmetic as a statement
φA about this sequence; and we will assume that we have the resources to talk about
denotation of arithmetic terms in A, and truth and satisfaction of arithmetic statements,
with A  φ used to denote the satisfaction of arithmetic statement φ by the sequence
A (the details of this how this might be set up will be skipped over). We note a few
technical facts about this. Firstly, we obtain that each numeral – which may be an object
of some theory of syntax, rather than an element of A – denotes an element of A under
this interpretation; and we can argue by induction on elements x of A that if x ∈ A
then x is denoted by some numeral (using the open-endedness of induction along A).
A useful fact we thus obtain is that if φ(x1, . . . xn) is an open arithmetic formula then
A  ∀x1 . . . xkφ iff for all numerals n1 . . . nk, A  φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), and A  ∃x1 . . . xkφ
iff there are numerals n1 . . . nk, A  φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk). Also, PA is sound for A – all
axioms of PA hold when interpreted in PA, and arguments in first order logic preserve
truth, so that if PA ` φ then A  φ.
Now, to the main arguments of the section. A first key point is that soundness is a
stronger condition than consistency. Assuming that PA is consistent, we can obtain a
consistent proof system T ′ by adding in the statement that PA is inconsistent, ¬Con(PA);
but we can argue that this proof system T ′ is arithmetically unsound. Indeed suppose
we have a real simply infinite sequence A. If A  (¬Con(PA)), then we have
A  (∃x∃y x is a formula and y is a derivation in PA of (x ∧ ¬x))
20This does not involve any self referential uses of the truth predicate so should be uncontroversial.
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and thus (by the discussion in the first, technical paragraph) that there is some numeral
n and some first order arithmetic statement φ such that
A  (n codes a derivation in PA of φ ∧ ¬φ)
and thus that A  (PA ` φ∧¬φ), so that by soundness, A  φ∧¬φ, which is impossible.
Thus the assumption that A  (¬Con(PA)) must be false, so that the proof system T ′
is arithmetically unsound.
The example of this theory T ′ may be felt to be unnatural, so further examples may
be helpful. As seen in Appendix D, we can define a number of concepts from standard
real analysis in terms of a complete ordered field (as axiomatized in section VI.4), and
can state what it is for a plurality of elements of a complete ordered field to be analytic,
or Σ12, or to have the Baire property, or the perfect set property, or to be Lebesgue
measurable; and we can also interpret talk of games on N of length N, and what it
is for such a game to be determined (for one player or the other to have a winning
strategy). We can thus ask whether every Σ12 plurality of reals has the Baire property,
or the perfect set property, or is Lebesgue measurable. To answer this question, we
actually need to supplement ZFC with additional axioms. As shown by Solovay, if we
add an axiom stating the existence of a measurable cardinal to ZFC then we can prove
that all Σ12 subsets of R do have the Baire property, the perfect set property, and are
Lebesgue measurable (see Kanamori 1997 §14, specifically 14.3 and 14.10 – p.179 and
p.184). Then if we write MC for the statement that there is a measurable cardinal,
then if ZFC + MC is sound for the reals then we can deduce that for any real example
of a complete ordered field, all Σ12 pluralities have the Baire property, the perfect set
property, and are Lebesgue measurable. On the other hand if we add the axiom V = L
to ZFC, we get the opposite answers: One can prove that there is a ∆12 set which is not
Lebesgue measurable and does not have the Baire property, and there is a Π11 set which
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does not have the perfect set property (see Kanamori 1997, 13.10 and 13.12, pp.169–
170). It follows that there are Σ12 sets with all these properties. Thus if ZFC + (V = L)
is sound for the reals, we can deduce that for any real example of a complete ordered
field, there is a Σ12 plurality which does not have the Baire property, one which does
not have the perfect set property, and one is not Lebesgue measurable. Thus if both
ZFC + MC and ZFC + (V = L) were sound for the reals, we would obtain that for any
real example of a complete ordered field, it is the case that every Σ12 plurality has the
Baire property, but also the case that there is a Σ12 plurality which does not have the
Baire property (and similarly for the perfect set property and Lebesgue measurability);
thus we would obtain that there cannot in fact any real examples of complete ordered
fields, so that the eliminative constraint and the condition of soundness for the reals are
vacuous. This is despite ZFC + MC and ZFC + (V = L) both being consistent, as far
as we know. Thus we have two (apparently) consistent theories which cannot both be
sound for the reals, unless soundness for the reals is a vacuous property.
The continuum hypothesis is also interpretable in terms of any real example of a
complete ordered field – it just states that any plurality of elements either injects into
N (i.e. the copy of N in the field) or is bijective with the whole field. Thus the theories
ZFC + CH and ZFC + ¬CH, which are relatively consistent with ZFC, cannot both be
sound for the reals, unless again soundness for the reals is a vacuous property. For a final
example, Appendix D shows how one can interpret talk of subpluralities of NN in terms
of any real example of a complete ordered field, and can regard such subpluralities as the
target set of a game on N of length N, where each of two players takes it in turn to select
natural numbers, and the first player wins iff the resulting sequence is in the target set.
One can define what it is for such a game to be determined – for one player or the other
to have a winning strategy – and can thus phrase the statement that all such games are
determined, in terms of any real example of a complete ordered field. Then if AD is
the axiom of determinacy, the soundness of the apparently consistent theory ZF + AD
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for the reals would imply that for any real example of a complete ordered field, every
such game is determined, whereas the soundness of ZFC for the reals would imply that
for any real example of a complete ordered field, there is a game which is undetermined
(this being a standard consequence of the axiom of choice). Thus again, ZF + AD and
ZFC cannot both be sound for the reals unless soundness for the reals is vacuous.
From these examples, we can already see that there is no way to argue for the
soundness of a general proof system by a quick assessment of its superficial plausibility,
or coherence. The proof systems ZFC + CH and ZFC + ¬CH are both plausible, and
both appear to be coherent, but cannot both be sound (unless no complete ordered fields
exist). The same goes for ZFC + MC and ZFC + (V = L), and for ZFC and ZF + AD
(which all have at least some plausibility). When establishing the soundness of a proof
system, some sort of deeper reason than just its apparent plausibility and coherence will
have to be appealed to. Incidentally these kinds of examples tell against Shapiro’s claim
that any coherent theory characterizes a structure, or (non empty) class of structures,
which he describes as “[t]he main principle behind structuralism” (Shapiro 1997, p. 95).
The second order versions of all these theories are perfectly coherent, so by Shapiro’s
principle it follows that there is a structure satisfying the ZFC2 +CH, and one satisfying
ZFC2 + ¬CH, for instance. But in the former there is a substructure RCH which is a
model of the second order theory of complete ordered fields which satisfies the continuum
hypothesis, and in the latter there is a substructure R¬CH which is a model of the second
order theory of complete ordered fields which does not satisfy the continuum hypothesis.
Moreover by the categoricity of the second order theory of complete ordered fields, we
have that RCH and R¬CH are isomorphic; thus we obtain a contradiction. Thus either
Shapiro’s principle – that all coherent theories characterize a structure, or (non empty)
class of structures – is false, or apparently coherent theories may fail to be coherent.
But in the latter case, coherence cannot do the work Shapiro needs it to do, as we then
cannot know that ZFC2 for instance, or the second order theories of complete ordered
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fields or of arithmetic, are coherent, any more than we can know that ZFC2 + CH and
ZFC2 + ¬CH (or ZFC2 + MC, ZFC2 + (V = L), ZFC2 and ZF2 + AD) are coherent.
Returning to the main topic of the section, we can argue that consistency does get
us a certain amount of soundness though – soundness for various finitary structures
and statements. For instance if there really exist objects a1, . . . a200 with R× giving
a group structure on them, a well defined, precise relation, then in ZFC will be able
to define a set X = {x1, . . . x200} with ternary relation ×X such that for each i, j, k,
ZFC ` xi × xj = xk iff R×(ai, aj , ak), and ZFC ` xi × xj 6= xk iff ¬R×(ai, aj , ak), and
thus such that (X,×X) is a group. Then if ZFC is consistent, and ZFC proves that all
finite groups satisfy group theoretic property Q, then is must be the case that (X,×X)
satisfies property Q (ZFC would otherwise be inconsistent), and thus that the a1, . . . a200
under operation R× satisfy Q; a metatheoretic induction shows that if φ(y1, . . . yn) is
an open formula of group theory, then φ(ai1 , . . . ain) holds iff ZFC ` φ(xi1 , . . . xin), and
any single instance of this equivalence follows without requiring metatheoretic reasoning.
One gets soundness for finite finite graphs, finite fields, finite topological spaces and so
on in the same way.
We can also argue that consistency delivers soundness for Π01 statements of arithme-
tic – statements of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xkφ where φ contains only bounded quantifiers.
Suppose that we have a real simply infinite sequence A, as discussed initially. We have
seen that if PA  φ then A  φ. Also, given any closed formula φ in the language of
arithmetic containing only bounded quantifiers, it is easy to see that PA ` φ or PA ` ¬φ.
Thus suppose that ZFC ` ∀x1 . . . ∀xkφ where φ has only bounded quantifiers, and that
A  ¬∀x1 . . . ∀xkφ. Then for some numerals n1, . . . nk, A  ¬φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk). But
then we also have that either PA ` φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk) or PA ` ¬φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), but
the former would imply A ` φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), which would give a contradiction. Thus
we must have PA ` ¬φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), and thus ZFC ` ¬φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), so that
ZFC is inconsistent. Thus if ZFC is consistent, and ZFC ` ∀x1 . . . ∀xkφ where φ has
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only bounded quantifiers, then A  ∀x1 . . . ∀xkφ, as claimed. These soundness properties
ZFC has if consistent will also hold of other general proof systems if consistent, such as
ETCS, homotopy type theory, and PA2.
A stronger property than consistency is Σ01 soundness, the property of soundness for
Σ01 statement of arithmetic; Σ01 statements being those of the form ∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ where φ
has only bounded quantifiers. We can argue that if ZFC (as an example) is Σ1 sound,
and any infinite sequence A as above exists, then ZFC is sound for first order statements
about groups. Indeed suppose that φ states that all groups have property Q, where Q
is a first order definable properties of groups, and that ZFC ` φ. Then if we let TG
be the theory of groups as defined via some arithmetic coding in ZFC, and φTG be the
statement of property Q in the language of TG, then it follows that ZFC ` (TG  φTG),
and thus since ZFC proves the completeness of first order logic that ZFC ` (TG ` φTG).
But this is a Σ01 statement of arithmetic, and so we obtain that A  TG ` φTG , and
thus by the soundness of first order logic (applied to first order logic as defined using
arithmetic coding in terms of sequence A), that if RG is any real example of a group
structure then RG satisfies property Q. One similarly obtains that Σ10 soundness delivers
soundness for first order statements about graphs, or rings, or fields, or partial orders,
provided one assumes that there is an infinite sequence A as here, or makes some other
assumption that allows this argument to go through.
There is a reasonable case that by exploring the consequences of a proof system, we
can reassure ourselves that there are no apparent inconsistencies, and become highly
confident that further exploration will not stumble across any. Potter (2004, p. 35)
doubts this point has been reached for set theory, as the theory has not been pushed “to
its limits”, as do Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011, p. 248), as contradictions have not been
sought in the parts of the theory “closest to paradox”. Nonetheless neither deny that in
principle one could explore a theory thoroughly enough that the chance of encountering
a future inconsistency was established to be very low. If this could be done, then one
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could argue from the above that one could be confident not to encounter an unsoundness
concerning finite groups, finite graphs, finite fields and so on, or concerning Π01 statements
of arithmetic.
The prospects of using extrinsic or inductive evidence to argue for any more soundness
than this appear to be very weak, however. Suppose for instance that one tried to argue
for Σ01 soundness by inductive evidence, arguing that whenever some proof system T
proves a Σ01 statement, this statement actually holds of any infinite sequence that exists.
We currently cannot confirm the existence of any physical infinite sequences, so have
no way of physically checking whether any Σ01 statement holds of them. The only
way to “confirm” a Σ01 statement of arithmetic ∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ would be to find, either
by hand or by computer, numerals n1 . . . nk such that φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk) holds. Here
φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk) is a decidable statement, which can be checked in a routine (though
perhaps time consuming) way using basic arithmetic properties. φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk) being
checkable in this sense is equivalent to it being the case that PA ` φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk);
and we call a choice of numerals n1, . . . nk such that PA ` φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk) a witness for
∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ in PA. If such a witness does exist, then ∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ does hold in any infinite
sequence A, since then we have A  φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk), and thus A  ∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ. One
could potentially try to confirm the Σ01 soundness of a proof system T by checking for
witnesses in PA, seeing if when T ` (∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ)T there are numerals n1 . . . nk such
that PA ` φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk). The problem is that this is not actually confirming the
statement that T is Σ01 sound, but is instead evidence for the claim that if T proves a
Σ01 statement, then there are witnesses for this statement in PA; and if T extends PA
then this claim is false, since there are examples of such φ for which PA ` ∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ
– and thus T ` (∃x1 . . . ∃xkφ)T – but for all numerals n1, . . . nk, PA 0 φ(n1|x1, . . . nk|xk)
(assuming PA is consistent).21 There is no way that this kind of evidence can give
21The following two examples were given by Joel David Hamkins on Mathoverflow
(https://mathoverflow.net/questions/190711/existential-statement-without-witness). Firstly, PA
proves that there is a number n such that if there is no proof of a contradiction in PA of length at
218
7. ARGUING FOR SOUNDNESS
us reason to believe that if T proves a Σ01 statement for which there are no witnesses
in PA, such a statement is actually true of simply infinite sequences that exist – and
so since there will be provable Σ01 statements without a witness in PA for any general
proof system T , this kind of evidence cannot deliver the Σ01 soundness of a general proof
system.
The prospects of confirming other instances of soundness by inductive evidence are
similarly dim (or dimmer). For most kinds of mathematical statements, we have no
hope of checking whether they hold by examining physical examples of the relevant
structures. Consider the statement that every Σ12 subset of a complete ordered field has
the perfect set property. As discussed in section VI.4, in our present state of knowledge
we cannot confirm that the physical universe is infinite in any sense, let alone whether it
contains any complete ordered fields. We discern properties of spacetime by observing
how particles behave, and cannot even determine the position of a particle to an arbitrary
degree of accuracy – so even experimentally determining whether a line segment in space
really satisfies the completeness axiom, or only completeness for some restricted class of
subsets (perhaps the open or closed subsets) is not a problem we have any prospect of
being able to resolve. When physically indicating a subregion of such a line segment, we
are again limited to a finite degree of accuracy, so it seems implausible that we could
even reliably refer to a particular Σ12 subset of it, much less determine whether is satisfies
the perfect set property. The same goes for other mathematical statements. Consider
for instance the statement that every subgroup of a finitely generated abelian group
is finitely generated. We are unable to even pick out any infinite physical groups, not
knowing whether the universe is infinite or not; and even if we could, trying to examine
their subgroups by physical experiment would be a thankless task.
most n, then there is no proof of a contradiction in PA at all; since if PA is consistent, then the
antecedent is true, and if PA is inconsistent, then one can take n to be the length of shortest proof of a
contradiction in PA. But PA does not prove that this property holds of any particular number (unless
it is inconsistent), since then it would prove its own consistency. For a second example, if σ is any
statement unprovable in PA, and we let φ(x) be the statement (x = 0 ∧ σ) ∨ (x = 1 ∧ ¬σ), then PA
proves φ(0) ∨ φ(1), and thus proves ∃xφ(x), but does not prove φ(n) for any numeral n.
219
CHAPTER VI. SOUND FOUNDATIONS
One could perhaps try to confirm such mathematical statements by finding establis-
hed physical theories in which they play an essential role. As far as I’m aware, statements
like the first – that every Σ12 subset of a complete ordered field has the perfect set pro-
perty – currently play no physical role, so this option will not help with them. Many
mathematical generalizations are used in physical theories however, and it is possible
that the second statement – that every subgroup of a finitely generated abelian group is
finitely generated – or ones like it play some role in certain physical theories (I do not
know). All this could establish though is that the theorem does apply (for instance) to
all groups of which it is assumed to hold by the theory – not that it actually holds of all
physical examples of groups which exist (let alone all groups that exist). Anyway, when
a mathematical theorem like this is used in physics, it is generally taken for granted that
it is true; physicists will rarely set up competing theories, one in which a mathematical
theorem is assumed to be true, one in which it is assumed to be false, and the two theo-
ries tested against each other. Since mathematical theorems are not tested as empirical
claims in the same way as other aspects of the theory, instead playing a regulative role
in setting it up, it is hard to see how they could be confirmed in the same way as those
more empirical aspects. Additionally, so much of physics itself is still so uncertain – what
for instance should we infer from quantum mechanics about the nature of the world?
what is the real nature of spacetime? – and lacking in confirmation that it is hard to
see how the more obscure, mathematical parts of theories could be definitely confirmed
in this way. Finally, many mathematical theorems are simply not used in physics in any
way currently, so the prospects of establishing soundness for all statements about any
kind of structure in this way are very dim.
Another option is, as with the case of Σ01 soundness, to try to settle these kinds of
mathematical questions by resorting to evidence from within mathematics itself. One
general method for trying to do this starts with a base proof system T which we believe,
and tries to confirm a proof system T ′ which extends T by checking whether when we
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can prove a statement in T ′, we can actually prove it already in T . Here for instance T
might be the theory of groups in first order logic, sound for reasoning about groups, or
the theory PA2, sound for reasoning about simply infinite sequences. In cases like the
former, this may be a valid strategy: perhaps one could indeed argue for the soundness
of a general proof system T ′ by seeing whether when it proves first order statements of
group theory, these are actually provable in the first order theory of groups. However in
general, this style of reasoning runs into the same problem as in the case of Σ01 arithmetic
soundness: what we’re really confirming by this kind of argument is not the claim that
T ′ is sound for reasoning about the relevant kind of structure, but the claim that if
T ′ ` φT ′ then T ` φT , and this is false for many classes of structures and many general
proof systems T ′. This kind of argument tells us nothing about the soundness of T ′ for
statements about the relevant kind of structure that are not provable in T , which often
will exist.
What we need is some way to use the base proof system T to confirm statements
not provable in T . One way to attempt this is to try to confirm statements of the
form ∀x1 . . . xnφ by verifying that T ` φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn) for as many terms t1, . . . tn as
possible, or equivalently trying to disconfirm statements of the form ∃x1 . . . xnφ by being
unable to find terms t1, . . . tn such that T ` φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn).22 Then one could try to
confirm a proof system T ′ extending T by seeing if consequences of T can be confirmed
in this manner – where again T could be a proof system known to be sound with regard
to some kind of structure, and T ′ a more general proof system. This is essentially the
kind of evidence seen in a famous case study involving determinacy hypotheses described
by D. A. Martin (1998), which is taken to be a paradigmatic example of how one can
confirm theories by extrinsic evidence and investigation of their consequences – discussed
for instance by Maddy (1997, p. 72; 2011, pp. 127,130). The problem with this kind
22Formally our language may not actually contain many terms, or ways of forming terms, so instead
of φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn) one could consider statements of the form ∀x1 . . . xn(ψ1(x1) ∧ . . .∧ψn(xn)) ⇒ ψ(x)
where T ` ∃!xiψi(xi) for each i
221
CHAPTER VI. SOUND FOUNDATIONS
of “confirmation” is that if we have an existential statement ∃x1 . . . xnφ independent of
T , this kind of “evidence” will only serve to disconfirm it, and if we have a universal
statement ∀x1 . . . xnφ independent of T , then this kind of “evidence” will only serve to
confirm it. Indeed if a statement ∃x1 . . . xnφ is independent of T , then there will be no
terms t1, . . . tn for which T can prove φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn) – for any such terms, either T will
prove ¬φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn), or it will leave this substitution instance undecided. Either
way, whichever terms t1, . . . tn we consider, we will find no evidence for the statement
∃x1 . . . xnφ. This statement will automatically just accumulate disconfirming evidence
on this approach. By contrast if a statement ∀x1 . . . xnφ is independent of T , then no
matter which terms t1, . . . tn we consider, it will always be the case that either T proves
φ(t1|x1, . . . tn|xn), or T leaves the substitution instance undecided. Either way we find
nothing to tell against the assumption that ∀x1 . . . xnφ holds, and may well discover
evidence for it – so that ∀x1 . . . xnφ will only every accumulate confirming evidence on
this approach. Thus we can choose to confirm or disconfirm a statement depending on
whether we phrase it as a universal or existential statement. For instance we can confirm
the statement “no set is intermediate in cardinality between N and R” by seeking one,
and being unable to find it – and thus confirm the continuum hypothesis; or we can
confirm the statement “there is no bijection between ω1 and R” by seeking one, and
being unable to find it, and thus confirm the negation of the continuum hypothesis.
A sign of the weakness of this kind of evidence is that in practice, it is not typically
taken to be convincing. If it was, then if we accept the axioms of ZF as governing the set
theoretic hierarchy, we would have an overwhelming weight of evidence against the axiom
of choice: there are many cases where we can prove ∃xφ(x) with the axiom of choice,
but cannot show the existence of any example without it, for instance the existence of a
right inverse to any surjection, the existence of a non measurable subset of the real line,
the existence of a maximal ideal containing any proper ideal in a ring, the existence of a
basis of the reals as a vector space over the rationals, and so on. We would indeed also
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have a strong case against any existential statement independent of ZFC, such as the
existence of an inaccessible cardinal – however hard we try in ZFC, we cannot prove the
existence of such a cardinal, so by this line of reasoning we should reject the statement
of its existence. Of course this is not a convincing argument, because of the weakness of
this form of evidence.
There are a variety of other kinds of extrinsic evidence that have been appealed to by
set theorists as evidence for a theory, as discussed by Maddy (1988a,b; 2011, §II.2, §V.3).
None of the other forms appear to have much potential as a way of arguing directly for
the soundness of a general proof system, though one could perhaps try to use extrinsic
evidence of these kinds to argue for the truth of an axiom system for set theory for
describing some domain of sets, and thus for the soundness of the axiom system.
This kind of possibility – of arguing for the soundness of a proof system via its truth
with respect to some subject matter – is what we consider now. It appears to be by far
the most plausible route to arguing for the general soundness of a proof system.
For instance, suppose one believes in the iterative conception of set. On this per-
spective sets are formed in a series of cumulative stages. Briefly, at the initial stage, all
sets of individuals (things that aren’t sets) are formed; then, all sets of things at that
stage, or before (individuals or sets of individuals) are formed; then, all sets of things
formed at that stage, or before, are formed; and so on. After the first infinity of stages,
there is a stage consisting of all sets formed at any one of those stages; then there is
a stage after that, at which all sets of things at that stage are formed; and so on (for
more careful descriptions of this conception, see Boolos 1971 or Potter 2004, Chapter
3). One can argue that the sets formed in this manner collectively satisfy the various
axioms of ZFC. Indeed Boolos (1971, pp. 224–231) shows this for the axioms of Zermelo
set theory, hesitating only about extensionality; this because extensionality appears to
be analytic of our concept of set, and Boolos has Quinean doubts about the notion of
analyticity. However we can perfectly well take extensionality to be partly constitutive
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of what we mean by “set”, as Burgess (2004, p. 199) does, so that a cumulative hierarchy
of objects not satisfying extensionality would not be a cumulative hierarchy of sets in our
sense (and stating this does not require a definition of analyticity, or a sharp distinction
between the analytic and the synthetic). Boolos believes that the iterative conception
is neutral about the truth of the axiom of choice, but Paseau (2007, p. 34–35) argues
that it flows naturally from a combinatorial understanding of the set formation process
– and otherwise one can obtain it from a form of choice phrased as a logical principle
in plural logic, or via a version of Hilbert’s ε-operator for pluralities (Burgess 2004, §8).
That leaves the axiom scheme of replacement. Boolos (1971, pp. 228–229) notes that
this follows from a bounding or cofinality principle for stages, which he considers at-
tractive, though he believes it to be a further thought than that contained in the basic
form of the iterative conception. Otherwise Paseau (2007, p. 33) notes that the instan-
ces of replacement follow from a reflection scheme, which is justified by the idea that
the set theoretic hierarchy is absolutely infinite and “transcends unique mathematical
specification” – though Potter (2004, Chapter 13) view this as a separately motivated
principle.
Suppose now that we believe in the iterative conception of set, and in fact are con-
vinced by it, and convinced that all the axioms of ZFC hold of the resulting hierarchy.
Actually, the theory we want is not a pure set theory, since the initial stage of the hier-
archy consists of all individuals – all things that aren’t sets – and our theory needs to be
able to talk about these as well as about sets. Since we are regarding set theory here as
being part of how we describe what the real world is like, we use the same background
logic as discussed in section VI.4, using a combination of restricted predicative second
order logic together with plural logic and double ancestral logic (one could also use the
plural ancestral and plural double ancestral, though we won’t need them). Then we
modify ZFC into a theory ZFCU in this logic in which urelements are admitted. ZFCU
can be formalized by introducing predicates Ure and Set into the language, with every
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object satisfying exactly one of these, and where if Ure(y) then for all x, x /∈ y. We
can include any vocabulary which holds of individuals (such as “physical” or “spatially
located”), provided perhaps that it is suitably sharply defined and determinate, and can
adjust any theory T which holds of individuals (non sets) to this context by relativizing
its quantifiers to the predicate Ure. We introduce into ZFCU an axiom stating that
there is a set containing all urelements (formed at the first stage of set formation above).
We modify extensionality to only hold of sets – urelements may be unequal even if they
have the same members (i.e. both having no members).
An important point is that we extend the separation scheme in an open ended man-
ner, so that for any formula φ formed from all the vocabulary available in this context
– including second order variables, instances of the double ancestral, and any empirical
vocabulary we have available – we admit the statement that
∀x ∃y ∀z (z ∈ y ↔ ((z ∈ x) ∧ φ)),
or its universal closure if φ contains parameters (we require in this scheme that y is
not free in φ).23 Extending separation in this manner is fully justified by the iterative
conception of set, in exactly the same manner as the original separation scheme of
ZFC is justified. Indeed as Boolos discusses, we obtain from the iterative conception
of set an axiom scheme which he calls specification, whose instances are for each open
formula ψ(z) that for any stage s, there is a set consisting of just those objects24 to
which ψ(z) applies that were formed before s (Boolos 1971, p. 223). In this scheme
the vocabulary used to define ψ is irrelevant (as long, perhaps, as ψ is suitably sharply
defined and determinate) – all that is needed is that it is something that objects can
satisfy or fail to satisfy. Thus the specification scheme should be taken as open ended,
23This scheme does not have to be restricted to sets x, since if x is a urelement then we can take y to
be the empty set, or another urelement.
24Boolos restricts his scheme to just sets here, rather than allowing individuals, but there seems to be
no basis for this.
225
CHAPTER VI. SOUND FOUNDATIONS
and extended to include all vocabulary that we have available, and Boolos’s argument
for the separation scheme then extends immediately to an argument for the open ended
version of separation (Boolos 1971, p. 226).
If one takes the cofinal or bounding approach to replacement that Boolos (ibid.,
p. 228) discusses, then the replacement scheme should also apparently be taken as open
ended. If one argues like Paseau (2007, p. 33) for replacement via a reflection principle,
then I think there is also a case for taking an open ended form of the reflection principle,
leading to open ended replacement, though problems can arise from extending reflection
principles in a naive manner and I am not certain of this route. Though there may be
a case either way for an open ended form of replacement, we will not need it, and we
will just take the replacement scheme in ZFCU to consist of its normal instances, not
involving second order variables, plural logic, or the double ancestral (I do not think
there is any objection to allowing the predicates Ure and Set in the scheme).
The other axioms of ZFC – power set, union, pair set, foundation and so on – are
unchanged. Foundation takes the form that any set has an ε-minimal element, which
may just be a urelement. In this context we call a set pure if its transitive closure only
contains sets, rather than urelements, and call it impure otherwise.
Suppose then that we are convinced by this theory ZFCU as a theory of how (part
of) the world is. Then we can argue straightforwardly for the soundness – with a caveat,
to be discussed – of ZFC with respect to a wide range of structures. To see this, let
T be a theory in monadic 100th order logic in language L, and let φ be a statement L
such that ZFC ` (T  φ). We will argue that ZFCU ` (T  φ) (we call this the transfer
result). Indeed working within ZFCU we can define what it is for a set to be pure, as
above, and prove for each axiom of ZFC that that axiom holds when relativized to the
pure sets. Thus if ZFC ` (T  φ) then we can prove in ZFCU that amongst the pure
sets T  φ, i.e. that if B is an L-structure which is a pure set, then if B satisfies every
axiom of T then B satisfies φ. Now let C be any L-structure satisfying the axioms of T ,
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possibly an impure set, with C its base set. In this context the proof that all sets have
a cardinality – i.e. that there is a bijection between any set and some cardinal – goes
through as usual, including for impure sets. In particular we can prove the existence of
a bijection between C and some cardinal D. The latter is of course a pure set. Then we
can transfer across the L-structure from C to D, defining an L-structure D on D which
is isomorphic to C, and moreover where D is a pure set. Thus since D satisfies every
axiom of T (as C does), D satisfies φ, and so C satisfies φ, as required.
This gives us soundness for all the kinds of structures discussed in section VI.4, at
least for set sized structures. Indeed suppose for instance that φ states that some defina-
ble property Q holds of all groups – where definable means definable in the combination
of logic used in section VI.4, so the combination of restricted predicative second order
logic with plural ancestral and double ancestral logic. Let φZFC and φZFCU be the trans-
lations of φ into the language of ZFC and ZFCU respectively. If we let T be the theory
of groups in ω-th order logic, we can state Q as a property QT in the language of T that
holds of a generic group (with plenty of wiggle room – this is why 100th order logic was
used, though it is huge overkill), and φZFC is equivalent in ZFC to the statement that
T  QT . Thus ZFC proves that T  QT , and so by the above, ZFCU ` (T  QT ). But
again, T  QT is equivalent in ZFCU to φZFCU, and so ZFCU ` φZFCU. But then if R×
is any ternary relation which defines a group, as defined in section VI.4, and such its
domain is “small enough” in that there is some set containing every element related by
R×, then using open ended separation we can let G be the set of objects related by R×,
and (again using open-ended separation) can define a set theoretic group structure on
G corresponding to the relation R×. Then we can deduce from φZFCU that this set the-
oretic group structure satisfies property Q, and thus, finally, that R× satisfies property
Q. Thus any definable generalization provable about groups in ZFC does actually hold
of all real examples of set sized group structures.
This argument is very general, and applies to all the kinds of structures considered
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in section VI.4, and much more widely – indeed 100th order logic is huge overkill for
axiomatizing almost any kind of mathematical structure (at least those I’m familiar
with), and for being able to define properties that are definable in the combination of
logics used in section VI.4. The number 100 here is of course arbitrary, and anyway
even the use of the theory T here is not essential; if some kind of structure were not
axiomatizable in this kind of logic, the argument would still go through as long as
one could transfer the structure on an impure set C to a pure set D, and obtain an
isomorphism between them.
The caveat to this argument for soundness via is that it only gives soundness for set
sized structures. As noted right at the end of section VI.4, there is a case to be made
that this is all the soundness we need. Indeed if we take set theoretic language to be
meaningful, and to describe a genuine part of the world, as we are here, then a structure
being the size of a proper class is a reasonable mathematical ground for not requiring
our standard results to hold of it: we can take mathematical results to be implicitly
restricted in their domain of applicability to structures that are not “too large” in this
way – after all, when we characterize mathematical structures in set theory we do require
them typically to be sets, and thus do rule out structures that are “too large” in exactly
this sense. If this is the only variety of soundness we can obtain, it is certainly one we
can live with, establishing as it does soundness for all structures consisting entirely of
individuals (non sets) – since the collection of all individuals forms a set.
Additionally, we can still get soundness for certain kinds of structures even without
the assumption that they are set sized. For instance if ZFC proves some arithmetic
statement φ, and R is any relation defining the successor function of a simply infinite
sequence, then using the double ancestral we can define a primitive recursive isomorphism
between the objects related byR and the finite Von Neumann ordinals.25 Then since ZFC
proves φ, φ holds of all simply infinite sequences which are pure sets, and in particular
25We use here the open-endedness of induction on both sides, with open-endedness of induction for
the Von Neumann ordinals following from the open-endedness of our separation scheme.
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holds of the finite Von Neumann ordinals; and then since we have an isomorphism
between them and the simply infinite sequence defined by R, we obtain that φ also holds
of the latter. One can obtain the same result for complete ordered fields, with the key step
being the definition of an isomorphism between a real example of a complete ordered field
and some complete ordered field structure which is a pure set – using again the double
ancestral to define a primitive recursive isomorphism between the natural numbers of
the two complete ordered field structures, and then extending the isomorphism to the
rest of the elements.
Also, if one takes a potentialist view of set theory, a view in which any objects
whatsoever “could” have formed a set, in some sense, then one can argue for soundness
even for proper class sized structures. Indeed suppose for instance that in ZFC we can
prove that some definable property Q holds of all groups. Then given any relation R×
defining a group structure, one can argue that the domain of objects related by R× could
have formed a set, and that if it did then one could construct a pure set defining a group
structure which is isomorphic to R× (as above in the proof of the transfer result), and
the latter would satisfy Q, and so R× would satisfy Q as well. Then one argues that
whether Q holds of R× is independent of whether its objects form a set or not, and thus
since they could have formed a set, Q does hold of R×. There are a number of different
attempts in the literature to formalize a potentialist view of set theory using a form of
modal logic, such as Studd (2013) and Linnebo (2013); I will not attempt to give a more
formal version of this argument using either of these frameworks, though that would be
an interesting project.
This kind of justification of soundness via truth extends to more powerful set theories,
if we are convinced by additional axioms. For instance if we believe an axiom stating the
existence of an inaccessible or measurable cardinal, the same argument shows that adding
this axiom to ZFC results in a theory which is sound for the same range of structures.
Though extrinsic evidence appears to be insufficient to directly justify soundness in
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general, as discussed above, a different route would be to try to use extrinsic evidence to
justify the truth of the axioms, and thus their soundness. For instance if one is convinced
by the iterative conception, one could then try to use extrinsic evidence to confirm what
further axioms are true of the set theoretic hierarchy, for instance by examining their
consequences, as discussed by Maddy (1988a,b; 2011). Soundness could then follow. This
approach has its own problems, however, as discussed in section VI.9 when evaluating
Maddy’s recent remarks on set theory.
Other justifications of set theory can also lead to soundness, along the same lines. For
instance Burgess (2004) gives motivation and arguments for the axioms of ZFC based on
the limitation of size conception, as ultimately captured by a reflection scheme. He uses
plural logic as his setting, and his justification for the axiom of choice goes via a form of
choice for pluralities Burgess (ibid., §8), as mentioned above. If one is convinced by this
limitation of size conception, as a description of the sets that really exist, then can again
be led to phrase the theory – as just another part of our description of the world – in the
background logic of section VI.4, including predicates Ure for individuals, and Set for
set. One can argue that there is a set of all individuals, if one allows formulae involving
the predicate Ure in the reflection scheme (and there seems to be no objection to this).
One is led in this way to the same version of ZFCU as before. In particular one again
has a strong justification for an open ended form of the axiom scheme of separation, in
which one can separate subsets using any formula of our expanded language: indeed it is
clear that the comprehension scheme for pluralities should be phrased in an open ended
way – when discussing the objects satisfying some property, we need not be limited in
what vocabulary we use to define that property – and open ended separation then follows
from Burgess’s single axiom of separation (ibid., p. 203). Having come to accept ZFCU
as a genuine description of the way the world is, we can argue for the soundness of ZFC
for a very wide variety of structures in exactly the same way as before.
That soundness argument uses replacement in an essential way – to find a pure set
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structure D isomorphic to a given impure set structure C. Without replacement, it is
entirely possible that the set theoretic hierarchy does not extend high enough for this to
be possible: if the rank of the cumulative hierarchy is small, and the set of urelements is
sufficiently large, then there need be no pure set the same size as the set of all urelements
(or subsets of it). Thus if one only believes a weaker set theory than ZFC – for instance
if one does not believe that the iterative conception makes a strong case for the axiom
scheme of replacement or reflection – then this kind of argument will not be available.
However an argument like this was only needed because of the mismatch between the
mathematical theory ZFC, in which there are only pure sets, and the theory ZFCU which
describes sets as a feature of the real world, in which there are also individuals and impure
sets. If instead of ZFC we worked in a set theory in which individuals/urelements were
allowed, then there would be no such mismatch. For instance one could work in a first
order version of the theory ZFCU described above, or in the theory ZU that Potter
directly argues for from the iterative conception of sets Potter (2004, p. 72). Though I
do not think Potter emphasises this point, as far as I’m aware in mathematics (outside
of axiomatic set theory) one never actually uses the assumption that every object is a
set, rather than an individual or urelement – for instance if reasoning about a group or
topological space, one never uses the assumption that its elements are themselves sets
(or for instance that real numbers are sets, except when constructing them and proving
their basic properties). Thus – to my knowledge – a set theory with urelements like
these would be just as suitable as a foundation for mathematics as their pure cousins
(at least for the purposes of proving mathematical results about structures of interest).
For such theories we obtain soundness for set sized structures essentially immediately.
Indeed suppose for instance that we accept Potter’s theory ZU as our theory of sets, and
that it proves that all groups have some definable property Q. Let R× be ternary
relation defining some group structure, whose domain of objects is “small enough”, i.e is
contained in some set. Then by open-ended separation applied to the set of individuals,
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we can form the set of all objects related by R×, and (again by open-ended separation)
define a set theoretic group structure G on these objects corresponding to the relation
R×. Then since ZU proves that all set theoretic groups have some definable property Q,
and we believe this theory is true of the sets that exist, then by the soundness of first
order logic it follows that our group structure G has property Q, as required.
For these kinds of soundness arguments to be convincing, we do actually have to be
convinced of the truth of the set theory in question for describing the domain of sets.
If we are merely positing ZFCU as one possible theory of sets, then we are under no
obligation to take arguments like these seriously: if we are not convinced that ZFCU
correctly describes the sets that exist – or that there are any sets – then when we argue
that any structure made up of individuals is isomorphic to some pure set structure, and
thus that any fact proved in pure set theory holds of it, these are just empty words. If
we could just posit any set theory we like, and derive its soundness, then it would follow
that ZFC + CH, ZFC + ¬CH, ZFC + MC, ZFC + (V = L), ZF + AD and ZFC were
all sound for the reals, but this is impossible as discussed earlier (unless no complete
ordered fields exist).
The arguments for soundness via truth here all use the open-endedness of separation
in an essential way, so that set theoretic surrogates can be found of any realizations
of mathematical structures. As far as I can see, there is no obvious way to make the
same kind of argument for other general proof systems that lack a separation scheme,
such as ETCS and homotopy type theory. Even if one believed these theories to be
true, on some interpetation, it is not at all clear (to me at least) how one would link
vocabulary describing real world structures with the vocabulary of these theories, to
establish that mathematical results proved in the theory actually hold of real world
examples of structures. However for ETCS at least, I believe one can argue for soundness
if one can first argue for the soundness of a membership based set theory, as above.
Suppose for instance that one has established the soundness of ZFC, or of ZU. One can
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give a fairly straightforward interpretation of ETCS as the theory of the category of
sets in either case, and one can prove any generalization about some kind of structure
in ETCS, one may well be able to transfer it across to a theorem about that kind of
structure in ZFC or ZU respectively, and thus (via soundness of the latter) deduce that
it holds of all real examples of that kind of structure. Thus if one does believe in the
iterative conception of set, or the limitation of size conception, the soundness of ETCS
may follow from that of ZFC or ZU. I do not think there is any need for the soundness
of a general proof system to be “directly” justifiable, whatever that might mean: if
one can justify the soundness of ETCS via the soundness of ZFC, then (as long as this
argument is valid) that establishes ETCS as a valid candidate foundation, according to
the requirements discussed here.
That still leaves the soundness of homotopy type theory unaccounted for. I am not
an expert in the theory, so there may be ways to argue for this that I am not aware of.
One possible option though is to use the ability to model homotopy type theory in set
theory to again prove a relative soundness result, so that the soundness of set theory
can be used to argue for the soundness of homotopy type theory. If homotopy type
theory has an ω-model (a model in which the finite Von Neumann ordinals play the role
of the natural numbers in the theory) then one could use this to argue for arithmetic
soundness, at least. I would assume there was a known ω-model, but am not familiar
enough with the relevant literature to know for sure. What these last two examples
show though is that once we recognize the importance of soundness for deciding on a
foundation for mathematics, it is not relative consistency results between proof systems
that should most concern us, but relative soundness results: results showing that if
some proof system T1 is sound for certain kinds of structures, then so is some other
proof system T2.
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8 Summary
Before drawing some implications of these arguments, it may help to briefly review what
has been said. In section VI.2 it was noted that the term “proof” is used in different ways
in mathematics: we talk of “proof in T”, for a proof system T , where there need be no
connotations that the conclusion of such a proof is actually true; but we also talk about
proving a conclusion φ with no mention of a proof system T , where this latter notion
of proof does establish its conclusion as true (or is assumed to). In order to discuss
whether φ is true or not, we need to have some sort of interpretation of what φ means,
and section VI.3 discussed various interpretations of mathematical statements that have
been put forward. Section VI.4 then argued that – despite certain comments of Maddy
(2011, p. 92) – we can generally give characterizations of mathematical structures in
their own right, independent of general mathematical proof systems. Moreover we can
give characterizations that have real world content – that can be satisfied, or fail to
be satisfied, by real world objects. Section VI.5 then argued that if φ is a definable
generalization about a kind of structure of which we can give such a characterization,
stating that all such structures satisfy some property Q, then an interpretation of φ
should only interpret φ as true if it is the case that all real examples of that kind of
structure actually do have property Q. This was termed the eliminative constraint on
interpretations. After that the key claim of the chapter was made in section VI.6, where
it was argued that when seeking a potential foundation for mathematics, we should be
seeking a proof system that can serve as a setting for as many branches of mathematics
as possible, by allowing us to genuinely prove statements about the structures those
branches study – where if the proof system in question is selected as a foundation, proofs
in it are subsequently regarded as genuine proofs, as establishing their conclusions as
true. But by the eliminative constraint, it is only possible for proofs in T to be genuine
proofs of a class of statements on an acceptable interpretation if the proof system is
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sound for those statements, where soundness of T for φ requires that if T ` φT then
φElim holds. Thus for a proof system to be a candidate foundation, it is necessary that
it be sound for a wide range of structures, as many as possible. Finally section VI.7
considered a variety of ways to try to argue for soundness, and concluded that the only
plausible way to argue for soundness for a wide variety of structures is in fact to argue
for the soundness of ZFC via the iterative conception of set or the limitation of size
conception – showing that some such conception establishes the axioms of ZFC to be
true. The soundness of ETCS and homotopy type theory may then be (at least partially)
justifiable by a relative soundness result.
9 Implications
We will now draw some implications of these arguments for various positions in the
philosophy of mathematics, including those mentioned in section VI.1.
Firstly, as discussed in section VI.6, it appears that though Awodey (2004) is an
avowed anti foundationalist, his view of the role of set theory is very similar to the
view of foundations put forward here: it is a body of reasoning that may be assumed
when establishing structural truths, truths of the form “all groups have property Q”
for instance. The difference between the perspective here and Awodey’s is just that we
consider what property a body of reasoning must have for it to be suitable to play this
role – and that property is the property of soundness.
Next, we note that since soundness is not implied by consistency, the arguments
of deductivists like Tait (2005) and Muller (2004) – claiming that all we want from
our proof system is that it be consistent – cannot be right (unless they wish to argue
for instance that there are no simply infinite sequences). What is missing from their
accounts is the requirement that our mathematical results be compatible with the real
examples of mathematical structures that exist. Tait’s view of mathematical axioms, in
235
CHAPTER VI. SOUND FOUNDATIONS
which we are apparently free to choose new axioms as we see fit, though we may be led
to decide on certain more natural or attractive ones Tait (2005, pp. 91, 96–98, 294–295),
is simply too liberal. There are constraints on our choice of proof system that go beyond
consistency – if we want our mathematical results to be compatible with reality. As
discussed in section VI.7, the notion of coherence is also not enough to justify a proof
system, as there are pairs of apparently coherent theories whose soundness (for the reals)
is mutually incompatible.
One implication for mathematical practice is that when judging potential foundati-
ons for mathematics, since we are concerned with their soundness rather than just their
consistency, it is relative soundness results rather than relative consistency results that
are most relevant – with relative soundness results with respect to set theory perhaps
being the best way to justify the soundness of ETCS and homotopy type theory. When
comparing for instance ZFC with ZFC + (V = L), it is relevant that the latter is rela-
tively arithmetically sound (as it has an ω model), rather than merely being relatively
consistent.
Maddy (2011) is right to identify the property of mathematical depth as an attractive
feature of a proof system, but in line with the arguments of this chapter, the first priority
needs to be to find proof systems that are sound – with mathematical depth then being
one kind of property that can be used to decide between sound systems. She is misled in
her discussion of the role of a foundation by her assumption that mathematical structures
automatically have the properties that advanced methods (i.e. set theory, and extensions
of it) discern in them (ibid., p. 92); as discussed in section VI.4, in fact we can generally
give characterizations of mathematical structures that can be satisfied by systems of real
world objects and are independent of general mathematical proof systems like set theory.
One of Maddy’s main priorities is advocating for the importance of extrinsic evidence
in mathematics (ibid., Chapter V). As discussed in section VI.7 however, extrinsic
evidence does not appear to be very useful for directly arguing for the soundness of a
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proof system – and thus for its status as a candidate foundation. If one is convinced by
the iterative conception of sets, or the limitation of size conception, then it is possible
that one could try to confirm which further, stronger axioms hold of the set theoretic
hierarchy by considering those axioms’ consequences – the kind of confirmation Maddy
is most concerned with (ibid., Chapters II, V). However the problem is that one is then
trying to use extrinsic evidence from the point of view of a a robust realist – in Maddy’s
terms – and as she discusses, there seems to be no reason why axioms that merely have
attractive consequences in this way should turn out to be true, in fact: some sort of
further argument linking attractive consequences with truth would seem to be required
(ibid., pp. 57–58).
It is this worry that leads Maddy to develop her thin realist and arealist viewpoints on
set theory. The idea behind the former is that sets just are the things that set theoretic
methods track (ibid., p. 61), so that set theoretic methods are automatically accurate
ways of reasoning about them. On the latter viewpoint, even this thin form of existence
is jettisoned (ibid., pp. 88–89), and set theory is viewed as a field without entities
for its subject matter, but still with a form of objectivity governed by mathematical
depth. Either way, the idea is to avoid the hard questions about why the extrinsic
evidence Maddy focuses on should actually indicate the truth of certain set theoretic
axioms. When faced with the question of soundness, there is no way to avoid these
hard questions though: one cannot assume that these set theoretic methods – justifying
axioms by extrinsic evidence in this way – automatically track the truths of set theory,
since one cannot assume that these set theoretic methods justify the sound axiom systems
in particular. It is perfectly plausible for instance that one could justify ZFC + MC or
ZFC+CH by extrinsic evidence of this kind, but that in fact ZFC+(V = L) or ZFC+¬CH
could turn out to be the sound theories. This possibility cannot be dismissed a priori
by the kind of manoeuvres Maddy hopes to carry out.
Though the arguments of this chapter are intended to establish the need for sound-
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ness largely by a consideration of what is important to our mathematics, and what we
expect from mathematical results – the kinds of questions that philosophers of mathema-
tical practice might consider – we are led in this way back to the questions of justification
and truth, as the truth of either the iterative conception or the limitation of size con-
ception of set seems to be the only plausible candidate for justifying the soundness of
our current foundation. Thus we end up with a view of foundations more like that of
Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011) and Ladyman and Presnell (2018) than the other authors
considered above, though there are still differences. Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011) are
concerned with the question of whether ETCS forms an autonomous foundation for set
theory, and as discussed in section VI.7, there is no need for autonomy when it comes to
soundness – it is perfectly plausible that we could justify the soundness of ETCS by first
justifying the soundness of a membership based theory such as ZFC or ZU. Ladyman
and Presnell (2018) give an account of foundations in which a foundation may consist of
five components: a framework for mathematics, a semantics for this framework, a me-
taphysics for this semantics, an epistemology for this metaphysics, and a methodology
for mathematical practice. From the point of view here, the first is essential, and the
fifth arises from the first as discussed in chapter I. The second, third and fourth may all
be important, in as much as these questions contribute to establishing the soundness of
a proof system, as they do for ZFC.
Overall, this chapter can be seen as making a case for veritism, which we can define
(in the context of philosophy of mathematics at least) as the view that it matters whether
the principles of the proof system we use in mathematics are true. Indeed, according to
the arguments of this chapter, unless the iterative conception of set or the limitation of
size conception do establish that the axioms of ZFC(U) hold collectively of the sets that
exist – or some other account which establishes the truth of these axioms is available –
we should not be using ZFC as our foundation.
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The focus of this thesis has been on mathematical proof: how it is done, and how it
should be done. Chapter I started by giving a new account of what the standard of ri-
gour in mathematics consists in, discussing some attractive properties of this standard,
and defending the account from some objections. Chapters II and III then considered
contrasting views of proof based around the result from knot theory known as Alexan-
der’s lemma, with chapter II undermining De Toffoli and Giardino’s comments about
this result, and diffusing the threat their view of proof poses to the kind of account given
in chapter I, and chapter III arguing that Jones’s comments about the argument also
pose no threat to that account of rigour, using his version of the argument to illustrate
that account, and also to illustrate general conditions that rigour requires of pictorial
arguments.
Then chapter IV and chapter V discussed conceptual and logical issues that are
relevant to the discussion of soundness in chapter VI: with chapter IV discussing the
basis of primitive recursion, arguing for a view of it as founded on a logical operator
called the double ancestral, and incidentally using this to strengthen an argument for
Isaacson’s thesis; and chapter V combining the ancestral and double ancestral operators
with plural logic, to give a new account of the concepts of finiteness and equinumerosity
for finite pluralities, and thus a new interpretation of arithmetic, contrasted in places
with the Neo-Fregean interpretation.
Finally with this work done, chapter VI gave an argument for what we should require
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of a proof system for it to be a candidate foundation for mathematics: namely, that it
be sound for as many kinds of structures as possible, i.e. that for as many kinds of
structures as possible, when a generalization about that kind of structure is provable in
the proof system, that generalization actually holds of all real examples of that kind of
structure which exist. It was argued that our best prospects of arguing for soundness
are via the iterative conception of set, or the limitation of size conception; that the view
of set theory of Maddy (2011), that extrinsic justifications are key, and automatically
accurate, is thus mistaken; and that – if the arguments of this thesis are correct – our
use of ZFC as a foundation is only appropriate if some such conception of the totality






The Smooth Case of Alexander’s
Lemma
This appendix supplies the mathematical details for the rigorous reconstruction of Jo-
nes’s argument, discussed in chapter III. The reconstructed proof is found in section A.1.
The proof refers to basic facts about smooth and periodic functions, and smooth knots,
which are collected in section A.2 and section A.3 respectively. An effort is made to use
elementary arguments, or arguments as elementary as can be hoped, though there is one
appeal to Sard’s theorem in proposition A.3.23.
1 The proof
First, some notation. An interval is a subset I ⊆ R such that if a, b ∈ I and a 6 c 6 b
then c ∈ I. A subset of R is thus an interval iff it is connected. The empty set is included
by this definition as an interval. We say that an interval is proper if it contains at least
two points, and is thus uncountable.
We write Int(A) for the interior of a subset A of a topological space. We write for
instance A + B for {a + b | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} if A and B are subsets of some vector space,
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and similarly write for instance λA for {λa | a ∈ A} if λ is a scalar.
If T > 0, a T -periodic function is a function f with domain R such that f(x+ T ) =
f(x) for all x. From now on we fix T > 0 to serve as the period of our periodic functions
(and in particular, our knots). If V is a subspace of Rn, we let C∞T (R, V ) denote the
space of smooth T -periodic functions from R to V .
For t, t′ ∈ R, we write t ≡ t′ if there is k ∈ Z with t′ − t = Tk, i.e. if t′ − t ∈ TZ. This
is an equivalence relation on R. We let RTZ be the quotient of R by ≡, and let π : R →
R
TZ
be the quotient map. RTZ is compact since it is the image of [0, T ], and π is open since
if U ⊆ R then π−1(π(U)) = U + TZ =
∪
k∈Z U + k is open, so by the definition of the
quotient topology π(U) is open.
Now for the definition of smooth knot.
Definition 1.1. A smooth knot is a smooth map γ : R → R3 with period T such that
for all t, γ′(t) 6= 0, and such that γ is injective up to ≡-equivalence – i.e. for any t, t′ ∈ R
we have γ(t) = γ(t′) iff t ≡ t′.
In general, if A is a proper interval in R we call a smooth curve β : A → Rn an
immersion if for all t, β′(t) 6= 0. We say that a pair (s, t) ∈ R2 is a crossing pair of
β ∈ C∞T (R,Rn) if s 6≡ t and β(s) = β(t). We say that a point s ∈ R is a crossing point
of β if there is some t such that (s, t) is a crossing pair of β. Thus smooth knots are
T -periodic smooth immersions with no crossing pairs, and no crossing points.
Definition 1.2. Let β and γ be smooth knots in R3. A smooth isotopy from β to γ
is a smooth map H : [0, 1] × R → R3 such that if we set Hs : t 7→ H(s, t) then Hs is a
smooth knot for all s ∈ [0, 1], and H0 = β and H1 = γ. We write β ∼ γ if a smooth
isotopy from β to γ exists.
As shown in proposition A.3.1, this relation ∼ is an equivalence relation.
When working with knots it is helpful to have a notion of when two curves in space
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An important fact about smooth knots is that if γ is a smooth knot, and β is any
T -periodic smooth curve that is close enough to γ, then β is a smooth knot which is
smoothly isotopic to γ (theorem A.3.8).
Let P be a plane in R3. Any point x ∈ R3 can be written uniquely as x = px + qx
with px ∈ P and qx orthogonal to P . The map x 7→ px is called the projection onto
P . It is an affine linear and therefore smooth map, and we denote it by πP . If γ is a
curve, we write γP for the curve πP ◦ γ.
We will focus our attention on the plane {(x, y, 0) | x, y ∈ R}, which we identify
with R2 and with C. Questions about projection onto any other plane can be reduced
to questions about projection onto C by a suitable rotation (and translation) of space.
Recall that a crossing pair of a T -periodic curve β is a pair (s, t) such that s 6≡ t and
β(s) = β(t), and that a crossing point is a point s such that (s, t) is a crossing pair for
some t.
Definition 1.3. Let γ ∈ C∞T (R,C). Say that γ is regular in C if:
(i) Crossing points of γ are only double crossings, so that if s is a crossing point of γ
then |{t ∈ [0, T ) | γ(t) = γ(s)}| = 2
(ii) γ is an immersion, so for all t, γ′(t) 6= 0
(iii) Crossings are transversal, so that if (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ, then γ′(s) and
γ′(t) are not parallel
If γ ∈ C∞T (R,R3), say that γ has regular projection if γC is regular.
If γ has regular projection then theorem A.3.10 shows that crossing points form a
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closed and isolated set, as do crossing pairs, and there are only finitely many t ∈ [0, T )
such that γC has a crossing point at t.
The following is basic and crucial.
Theorem 1.4. The set of smooth knots which have regular projections is open and dense
in the set of smooth knots.
Proof. We have that CImmT (R,C) is open by proposition A.3.2 and dense by proposi-
tion A.3.20. Then if we let G be the set of γ ∈ C∞T (R,C) which are regular, then G is
an open subset of CImmT (R,C) by theorem A.3.17 and thus an open subset of C∞T (R,C).
Also G is a dense subset of CImmT (R,C) by theorem A.3.26 and thus a dense subset of
C∞T (R,C).
Now let S be the set of smooth knots, K the set of smooth knots which have regular
projections. If we let
proj : C∞T (R,R3) → C∞T (R,C), γ 7→ γC
then we have that K is (proj|S)−1(G). By proposition A.3.18 proj is continuous, so K is
an open subset of S. Then we claim that proj−1(G) is dense in C∞T (R,R3). Indeed let γ ∈
C∞T (R,R3) and ε > 0. Then we can find α ∈ G with ‖α− γC‖C1 < ε. Then if we let β =
γ+(α−γC) we have βC = α and so β ∈ proj−1(G), but also ‖β−γ‖C1 = ‖α−γC‖C1 < ε as
required. Thus proj−1(G) is dense in C∞T (R,R3), so K = (proj|S)−1(G) = S∩proj−1(G)
is dense in S, since S is open. Thus K is both open and dense in S, as required.
To discuss Alexander’s lemma, we need a way of talking about “which direction a
path goes around p0” where p0 is a point in our plane C. For simplicity, we will just
cover the case p0 = 0 ∈ C, for which the existing notion of complex argument suffices.
If γ is a curve in R3 such that 0 /∈ Image(γC) then we say that γ projects avoiding 0.
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Proposition 1.5. The set of smooth knots γ which have regular projection onto C
position avoiding 0 is open and dense in the set of smooth knots.
Proof. Immediate by combining proposition A.3.19 with theorem A.1.4.
Thus any smooth knot β is smoothly isotopic to such a γ, by theorem A.3.8.
Now suppose γ is a smooth knot which projects avoiding 0. exp : C → C× is
the smooth universal cover of C×, so there is a smooth lifting γ̃ : R → C such that
exp ◦γ̃ = γC, and γ̃ is unique up to a translation of the plane by 2kπi, k ∈ Z. We will
call such a γ̃ a lifting of γC through exp. We will use the notation Argγ for the second
component of γ̃, which is appropriate since for every t we have γ(t) = eγ̃1(t)eiArgγ(t). We
call such a function Argγ a smooth argument function for γ.
Note that we have
γ′C(t) = γ̃′(t) exp(γ̃(t)) = γ̃′(t)γC(t)
so since γC(t) 6= 0 we have that γ′C(t) = 0 iff γ̃′(t) = 0. Thus γC is an immersion iff γ̃ is.
We similarly write for instance γ̃ for a smooth lifting through exp of γ if γ is a curve
in C×.
The above gives us the ability to talk about “the direction γC is going around 0 at
t”. Letting Dγ(t) = Arg′γ(t), we have
{t | (Arg(γC))′(t) > 0} = {t | Dγ(t) > 0}
being the set of t at which γC is going anti clockwise around 0, and
{t | (Arg(γC))′(t) < 0} = {t | Dγ(t) < 0}
being the set of t at which γC is going clockwise around 0. If Dγ(t) = 0 then γC is
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going towards or away from 0 at t. Thus the function Dγ indicates which direction γ is
going around zero. It is visibly smooth, and is independent of the choice of γ̃. It can
be checked that this coincides with other ways of making rigorous the concept of which
direction γC is going around 0.
Then the result we seek to prove is the following.
Alexander’s lemma. Let γ be a smooth knot. Then there is a smooth knot β which
is smoothly isotopic to γ such that β has regular projection avoiding 0, and we have
Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
This is finally reached below as lemma A.1.24.
To prove this, we first split the knot up into sections on which it goes the wrong
way. This is not quite so straightforward as in the polygonal case (Alexander 1923), as
a section on which the knot goes the wrong way can smoothly bend at each end into
sections on which it goes the right way.
We will define what we require of these sections below. First, some notation. If γ is
a smooth knot which projects avoiding 0, and A is a subset of R, we will use for instance
the notation D60γ (A) for {t ∈ A | Dγ(t) 6 0}, a closed subset of A. We will similarly
use the notation D>0γ (A) for {t ∈ A | Dγ(t) < 0} and so on (this one is an open subset
of A).
Definition 1.6. Let I be a nonempty compact interval in R. Let γ be a smooth knot
which projects avoiding 0. We say that γ has at most one backwards bend on I if
sup(I) < inf(I) + T2 , and D
60
γ (I) is an interval such that
sup{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (I)} 6 inf{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (I)} + π.
Then if J is any nonempty bounded interval we say that γ has at most one backwards
bend on J if it has at most one backwards bend on J .
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This is independent of the choice of Argγ . We require sup(I) < inf(I) + T2 so that
two such sections can only intersect at one end modulo ≡, which simplifies things a little.
The condition
sup{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (I)} 6 inf{Argγ(t) | t ∈ D60γ (I)} + π.
controls the argument of γ on D60γ (I), so that γ always stays in some half plane through
the origin. It follows from this that
Argγ(inf D60γ (I)) 6 Argγ(supD60γ (I)) + π,
and this is actually an equivalent statement, since Argγ is decreasing on D60γ (I) (since
Arg′γ(t) = Dγ(t)).
Note that the cases where I is a singleton, or where D60γ (I) is empty, are allowed
under this definition. Note also that if γ has at most one backwards bend on I, and J
is a nonempty interval with J ⊆ I then γ has at most one backwards bend on J . Note
finally that if sup(I) < inf(I) + T2 and Dγ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ I then γ has at most one
backwards bend on I.
When folding parts of the knot back around itself the results will be of the following
form.
Definition 1.7. Let γ be a smooth knot which has regular projection avoiding 0. Let I
be a compact interval with sup(I)− inf(I) < T2 . Say that a smooth knot β is a bending
forwards of γ on I if it has regular projection avoiding 0, is smoothly isotopic to γ
and:
(i) D>0β (I) is an interval
(ii) If t /∈ Int(I) + TZ then β(t) = γ(t)
(iii) Dβ(t) > Dγ(t) for all t
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A basic fact about bending forwards is that it is transitive in a sense.
Proposition 1.8. Suppose β is a bending forwards of γ on I and α is a bending forwards
of β on J , such that there is t ∈ I∩J with Dβ(t) > 0 and such that sup(I∪J)−inf(I∪J) <
T
2 . Then α is a bending forwards of γ on I ∪ J .
Proof. We have that α has regular projection avoiding 0, and is smoothly isotopic to γ.
If t ∈ D>0α (I ∪ J) and t /∈ J then Dα(t) = Dβ(t) so Dβ(t) > 0, so t ∈ D>0β (I). In
other words D>0α (I ∪ J) = D>0α (J) ∪ D>0β (I), which are both intervals, with nonempty
intersection since there is t ∈ I∪J with Dβ(t) > 0. Thus D>0α (I∪J) = D>0α (I)∪D>0β (J)
is an interval.
Also we have that if t /∈ Int(I ∪ J) + TZ then t /∈ Int(I) + TZ and t /∈ Int(J) + TZ,
so α(t) = β(t) = γ(t). Finally for all t we have Dα(t) > Dβ(t) > Dγ(t).
The reason for modifying γ according to these constraints is the following.
Proposition 1.9 (Bending forwards does not interfere with other sections). Suppose γ
is a smooth knot, and I is a compact interval such that γ has at most one backwards
bend on I. Suppose that β is a bending forwards of γ on J such that that D>0β (J) *
Int(D60γ (I)) + TZ. Then β has at most one backwards bend on I.
Proof. First, let W = I+TZ. If W ∩J = ∅ then β|Iγ|I so β has at most one backwards
bend on I and we are done.
Note that there is at most one k ∈ Z such that I+kT ∩J 6= ∅. If we have u+kT ∈ J
and v + lT ∈ J with u, v ∈ I and k, l ∈ Z then we have |(u + kT ) − (w + lT )| 6
sup(J) − inf(J) < T2 , so
|k − l|T 6 |(u− w) + (k − l)T | + |u− w|





so k = l.
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Thus we can assume that there is exactly one k ∈ Z with (I + kT ) ∩ J 6= ∅. Since
γ and β are periodic, if k ∈ Z then the proposition holds for I iff it holds for I + kT .
Thus we can assume I ∩ J 6= ∅. Then if t ∈ I and t /∈ Int(J) then t /∈ Int(J) + TZ, so
β(t) = γ(t) and Dβ(t) = Dγ(t).
We claim that D60β (I) = D60γ (I) \ D
>0
β (J). Certainly if t ∈ D
60
β (I) then Dγ(t) 6
Dβ(t) 6 0, so t ∈ D60γ (I), and necessarily t /∈ D>0β (J). Conversely if t ∈ D60γ (I)\D>0β (J)
then if t /∈ J we have Dβ(t) = Dγ(t) 6 0, and if t ∈ J then we have t ∈ J \ D>0β (J) so
Dβ(t) 6 0, as required.
Now we argue that D60γ (I)\D>0β (J) is an interval, i.e. that if a, b ∈ D60γ (I)\D
>0
β (J)
and a 6 c 6 b then c ∈ D60γ (I) \D>0β (J). But since D60γ (I) is an interval, the only way
this could fail is if a, b ∈ D60γ (I) \ D>0β (J) and c ∈ D
>0
β (J). If this were the case then
since D>0β (J) is an interval we would have D
>0
β (J) ⊆ (a, b) ⊆ Int(D60γ (I)), contradicting
a premise. Thus we do indeed have that D60γ (I) \D>0β (J) = D
60
β (I) is an interval.
Finally we need to control the angle of β on D60β (I). If t, t′ ∈ D60γ (I) we have
Argγ(t) 6 Argγ(t′) + π.
Let β̃ be a lifting of β through exp. We have 0 > Dβ(t) > Dγ(t) for t ∈ D60β (I),
i.e. Arg′γ(t) 6 Arg′β(t) 6 0, so if t 6 t′ ∈ D60β (I) then Argγ(t′) − Argγ(t) 6 Argβ(t′) −
Argβ(t) 6 0. Thus
−π 6 Argγ(t′) − Argγ(t) 6 Argβ(t′) − Argβ(t) 6 0
so that indeed
sup{Argβ(t) | t ∈ D
60
β (I)} 6 inf{Argβ(t) | t ∈ D
60
β (I)} + π.
Let γ be a smooth knot which has regular projection avoiding 0. The proof strategy is
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to cover the stretches where γC bends the wrong way with finitely many open intervals on
which it has at most one backwards bend (as defined above), and then go through these
intervals one by one correcting them. One problem with this is that some troublesome
stretches of γC may not be covered by intervals on which γ has at most one backwards
bend. Smooth functions can be very wriggly. For instance the function
f(x) =









x if x > 0
is smooth, and wiggles above and below the y-axis infinitely many times as x approaches
0 from above:
Similarly there may be a point t ∈ R such that in every neighbourhood of t, Dγ
oscillates above and below zero infinitely many times. Thus t cannot be contained in a
neighbourhood on which γ has at most one backwards bend, as defined above.
This factor complicates the argument. One potential response might be to observe
that if Dγ oscillates above and below zero near t then the diagram of γ is roughly radial
near t, roughly heading straight out from or straight towards the axis, and to try to
argue that these roughly radial sections can also be bent forwards (as sections on which
γ has at most one backwards bend can be). But filling in the details of this would mean
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much extra work. We would need a precise definition of what we mean by “roughly
straight” here, paralleling that of “at most one backwards bend” given above; we will
need an analogue of proposition A.1.9 for these roughly straight sections; and we will
also (probably) need to give two separate arguments justifying the over the shoulder
manoeuvre – one for sections with at most one backwards bend, and one for roughly
straight sections.
Fortunately, all this can be avoided with a small change to γ. Note that if Dγ(t) = 0
but D′γ(t) 6= 0 then the zero of Dγ is isolated – there is a neighbourhood U of t such
that t is the only point of U at which Dγ is zero. Such points are called simple zeroes
of Dγ . If Dγ has only simple zeroes then {t | Dγ(t) = 0} is a closed isolated set, so has
finite intersection with [0, T ].
Though it might be possible to “by hand”, going through all the points on the
diagram of γ where Dγ does not have a simple zero and adjusting them appropriately,
that looks like it could well turn out to be a lot of work. Instead we can obtain the
result by adding a small perturbation to the diagram of γ. By considering all small
perturbations of a certain form, we can argue that one will have the desired result.
Proposition 1.10. The set of smooth knots γ which project avoiding 0 such that Dγ
has only simple zeroes is dense in the set of smooth knots.
Proof. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects onto C× and let ε > 0. We may assume
that ε is small enough that Bε(γ) consists only of smooth knots β which project onto
C×, by proposition A.3.19. Let γ̃ be a lifting of γ through exp. By proposition A.2.10,
there is δ > 0 such that if ‖β̃ − γ̃‖C1 < δ then ‖exp ◦β̃ − γ‖C1 < ε.
Let














This is a smooth curve. Thus by proposition A.2.9 we can find z such that ‖z‖(1+ 2πT ) < δ
and z /∈ Image(α).
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Let z = reiθ, and let






This is periodic with period T . We have








Then we have ‖β̃(t) − γ̃(t)‖ 6 ‖z‖, and ‖β̃′(t) − γ̃′(t)‖ 6 ‖z‖(2πT ). Thus ‖β̃ − γ̃‖C1 6
‖z‖(1 + (2πT )) < δ, so ‖exp ◦β̃ − γ‖C1 < ε. Thus if Dexp ◦β̃ has only simple zeroes then
we are done, i.e. if Arg′β has only simple zeroes.


















































which contradicts the choice of z.
The set of smooth knots γ with Image(γC) ⊆ C× such that Dγ has only simple zeroes
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is not open in the set of smooth knots, under the topology we have given it, so it may
be a bad idea to think of such knots as being in “general position”. It looks like it would
be open in the Whitney C2-topology, but using that would complicate other arguments.
For brevity we will say that a smooth knot γ projects nicely if it has regular
projection avoiding 0, with Dγ only having simple zeroes. By proposition A.1.10 together
with proposition A.1.5 we have that the set of smooth knots which project nicely is dense
in the set of smooth knots. Thus by theorem A.3.8, every smooth knot is isotopic to
a smooth knot which projects nicely. Thus it suffices to prove Alexander’s lemma for
smooth knots which project nicely.
If γ projects nicely then every troublesome part of γC can be covered by an open
interval on which γ bends backwards. Indeed, if t is a point such that Dγ(t) 6 0 then
either Dγ(t) < 0 or Dγ(t) = 0. In the former case, t is contained in an open interval U
such that Dγ < 0 on U , so that γ has at most one backwards bend on U . In the latter
case, since Dγ has only simple zeroes, Dγ changes sign at t so there is an open interval U
containing t such that {t′ ∈ U | Dγ(t′) 6 0} is either {t′ ∈ U | t′ > t} or {t′ ∈ U | t′ 6 t}.
Thus we have that D60γ ([0, T ]) is a compact set which is covered by intervals on which
γ has at most one backwards bend, so is covered by finitely many such intervals. This
gives us our proof strategy: go through these intervals, bending them the right way one
by one. Indeed, having done this preliminary work, Alexander’s lemma can be derived
fairly straightforwardly from the following.
Bending Forward proposition. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely. Let U
be an open interval in R such that γ has at most one backwards bend on U . Then there
is a smooth knot β which projects nicely and is a bending forwards of γ such that if t ∈ U
then Dβ(t) > 0.
This is proved below as proposition A.1.21, and the proof of Alexander’s lemma
follows as lemma A.1.24.
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To prove this Bending Forward proposition result we use the “over the shoulder”
manoeuvre that Jones describes.
We start with the ability to push our section of knot into the plane, or pull it out
away from the plane (depending on whether our stretch lies above or below the stretch
it crosses).
Proposition 1.11. Let γ be a smooth knot such that γ′C(t) 6= 0 for all t, and γC has at
most one crossing point in (a, b), with a < b < a+ T . Let K > 0 such that |γ3(t)| < K
for all t, and let a < c < e < f < d < b. Then γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot
β with:
• βC = γC
• β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ
• |β3(t)| 6 K for t /∈ (c, d) + TZ
• |β3(t)| > K for t ∈ [c, d]
• |β3(t)| = 2K for t ∈ [e, f ]
• (|β3|)′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (c, e)
• (|β3|)′(t) < 0 for t ∈ (f, d)
Proof. First, note that if (t, t′) is a crossing pair of γC with t ∈ (a, b) then (t′, t) is a
crossing pair of γC with t′ 6= t so we must have t′ /∈ (a, b). We can let u ∈ {±1} such
that if γC has a crossing pair (t, t′) with t ∈ (a, b) then γ3(t) = γ3(t′) + λu with λ > 0,
i.e. uγ′3(t) > uγ′3(t′).
Now, let φ : R → R be a smooth function such that φ(t) = 2K for t ∈ [e, f ], φ(t) = K
for t 6 c or t > d, and φ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (c, e), and φ′(t) < 0 for t ∈ (f, d). Then let
ψ : R → R be a smooth function such that 0 6 ψ(t) 6 1 for all t, ψ(t) = 0 for t 6 a or
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t > b and ψ(t) = 1 for t ∈ [c, d]. Then let
β : [b− T, a+ T ] → R3, t 7→ γ1(t)e1 + γ2(t)e2 + (γ3(t) + ψ(t)(uφ(t) − γ3(t)))e3,
and extend it to a T -periodic smooth curve, using proposition A.2.8. We will show that
this is a smooth knot smoothly isotopic to γ. Let
H : [0, 1] × R → R3, (s, t) 7→ γ(t) + s(β(t) − γ(t)).
This is a smooth map, and for every s we have (Hs)C = γC. Thus for every s we
have for all t that (Hs)′C(t) = γ′C(t) 6= 0, so Hs is a smooth immersion. Note also that
Hs(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) +TZ, and that uβ3(t) > uγ3(t) for all t, so u(Hs)3(t) > uγ3(t)
for all s, t.
Now we show that each Hs has no crossing pairs. If t, t′ /∈ (a, b) + TZ then Hs(t) =
γ(t) and Hs(t′) = γ(t′) so (t, t′) is not a crossing pair of Hs. If (t, t′) is a crossing pair of
(Hs)C with t ∈ (a, b) then t is a crossing point of γC, so is the unique crossing point of
γC on (a, b), and we have t′ /∈ (a, b) as noted at the start of the proof. But then we have
u(Hs)3(t) > uγ3(t) > uγ3(t′) = u(Hs)3(t′) so (Hs)3(t) 6= (Hs)3(t′) and so (t, t′) is not a
crossing pair of Hs. Thus Hs has no crossing pairs, so is a smooth knot. This holds for
all s, so H is a smooth isotopy from γ to H1 = β.
To conclude, note that βC = γC, and β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b)+TZ. If t /∈ (c, d)+TZ
then uφ(t) ∈ [−K,K] and γ3(t) ∈ [−K,K], so β3(t) ∈ [−K,K]. If t ∈ [c, d] then then
|β3(t)| = |γ3(t)+uφ(t)−γ3(t)| = |uφ(t)| = φ(t), so |β(t)| > K, and we have |β3(t)| = 2K
for t ∈ [e, f ] and |β3|′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (c, e) and |β3|′(t) < 0 for t ∈ (f, d).
In order to suitably bend a piece of knot forwards, it is useful to be able to smoothly
bend one planar curve into another while controlling the location of points on the curve.
Let I be a proper interval in R, let n ∈ N× and let a ∈ I and X ⊆ Rn. We say that a
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smooth map H : [0, 1]×I → Rn is a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) if H is smooth,
and for all s if we write Hs : t 7→ H(s, t) then Hs is an injective smooth immersion with
Hs(a) ∈ X. We say such a map is a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) from H0 to
H1. For any a, b ∈ R, X,Y ⊆ Rn, and injective smooth immersions α, β : I → Rn, the
relation of there being a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) and relative (b ↪→ Y ) is an
equivalence relation (by almost the same argument as proposition A.3.1).
Proposition 1.12. Let I be a proper interval and let α, β : I → R2 be injective smooth
immersions. Let a 6= b ∈ I and let X,Y be disjoint convex subsets of R2 with α(a), β(a) ∈
X and α(b), β(b) ∈ Y . Then there is a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) and relative
(b ↪→ Y ) from α to β.
Proof. We will show that for any such α, a, b, X and Y , and any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
there is a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) and relative (b ↪→ Y ) from α to the line
λx,y : t 7→
t− a
b− a
· (y − x) + x.
Since the existence of a smooth isotopy relative (a ↪→ X) and relative (b ↪→ Y ) is an
equivalence relation, this will prove the proposition.
X is convex so the map σa : [0, 1] → R2, s 7→ x+ s(α(a) − x) is a smooth map into
X, and similarly σb : [0, 1] → R2, s 7→ y + s(α(b) − y) is a smooth map into Y . For all
s, σa(s) 6= σb(s) since X and Y are disjoint.
Let µ ∈ I and let
ψ : [0, 1] × I → I, (s, t) 7→ µ+ s(t− µ).
This is smooth, and for each s > 0 the map φs : t 7→ φ(s, t) is a bijection from I to
µ+ s(I − µ), with positive derivative. Thus for each s > 0, if we let αs = α ◦ φs then αs
is an injective smooth immersion.
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We identify R2 with C and write · for complex multiplication on C. For any
u, v, w, y ∈ C with u 6= v and w 6= y the map Au,v,w,y : z 7→ z−uv−u ·(y−w)+w is a complex
linear map which takes u to w and v to y. It is a combination affine rotation and dilation,
with complex derivative y−wv−u which is non zero. Taking As = Aαs(a),αs(b),σa(s),σb(s) for
s 6= 0 we have that the map
As ◦ αs : t 7→
αs(t) − αs(a)
αs(b) − αs(a)
· (σb(s) − σa(s)) + σa(s)
is an injective smooth immersion, and we have for all s that As(αs(a)) = σa(s) ∈ X and
As(αs(b)) = σb(s) ∈ Y . We also have A1 = Aα1(a),α1(b),σa(1),σb(1) = Aα(a),α(b),α(a),α(b) =
Id, so A1 ◦ α1 = α. Thus to prove the proposition it suffices to show that the map
H : [0, 1] × I → R2, (s, t) 7→

As(αs(t)) if s 6= 0
t−a
b−a · (y − x) + x if s = 0
is smooth, as if it is smooth then it a smooth isotopy from λx,y to α relative (a ↪→ X)




αs(b)−αs(a) · (σb(s) − σa(s)) + σa(s) if s 6= 0
t−a
b−a · (σb(0) − σa(0)) + σa(0) if s = 0
so to prove that H is smooth it suffices to show that the function
J : [0, 1] × I → R2, (s, t) 7→

αs(t)−αs(a)
αs(b)−αs(a) if s 6= 0
t−a
b−a if s = 0
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is smooth. We have by proposition A.2.11 that the map
Fα : I2 → R2, (t, t′) 7→

α(t)−α(t′)
t−t′ if t 6= t
′
α′(t) if t = t′
is smooth. Thus the map
[0, 1] × I2 → R2,
(s, t, t′) 7→

α(µ+s(t−µ))−α(µ+s(t′−µ))
s(t−t′) if s 6= 0 and t 6= t
′
α′(φs(t)) if s 6= 0 and t = t′
α′(µ) if s = 0.
is smooth, so multiplying by (t− t′) we obtain that the map
f : [0, 1] × I2 → R2,
(s, t, t′) 7→

αs(t)−αs(t′)
s if s 6= 0
(t− t′)α′(µ) if s = 0
is smooth, and non zero for all s and all t 6= t′. Thus we obtain a smooth map











if s 6= 0
(t−a)α′(µ)




αs(b)−αs(a) if s 6= 0
(t−a)





Proposition 1.13. Suppose γ ∈ C∞T (R,C) is regular with a < b < a+T such that γ(a) 6=
γ(b), and β ∈ C∞T (R,C) is a smooth immersion with β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ.
Then if
J : [0, 1] × R → R2, (s, t) 7→ γ(t) + s(β(t) − γ(t)),
there is h > 0 such that for all s, Js|[b−T−h, a+h] is a smooth immersion with its only
crossing points on [b− T, a].
Proof. By proposition A.3.21 there are δ, ε > 0 such that if 0 < h < ε and α : [b −
T − h, a + h] → R is smooth with α|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a] and ‖α′(t) − γ′(b − T )‖ < δ for
t ∈ [b− T − h, b− T ] and ‖α′(t) − γ′(a)‖ < δ for t ∈ [d, d+ h] then α|[b−T−h,a+h] has no
crossing points on [b− T − h, b− T ) ∪ (a, a+ h].
Since β′(b − T ) = γ′(b − T ) and β′(a) = γ′(a) we can find h > 0 such that ‖β′(t) −
γ′(t)‖ < δ2 for t ∈ [b − T − h, b] ∪ [a, a + h]. Then by shrinking h if necessary we may
assume that ‖γ′(t) − γ′(b − T )‖ < δ2 for t ∈ [b − T − h, b], and ‖γ
′(t) − γ′(a)‖ < δ2 for
t ∈ [a, a+ h]. It follows that if t ∈ [b− T − h, b] and s ∈ [0, 1] then we have
‖J ′s(t) − γ′(b− T )‖ = ‖γ′(t) + s(β′(t) − γ′(t)) − γ′(b− T )‖





Similarly if t ∈ [a, a+h] then ‖J ′s(t)−γ′(a)‖ < δ. Thus for each s ∈ [0, 1], Js is a smooth
immersion with no crossing points on [b− T − h, b), (a, a+ h].
Proposition 1.14. Let γ be a smooth knot which has regular projection, with a < b <
a+ T such that γC(a) 6= γC(b) and γC has at most one crossing point in (a, b). Suppose
α ∈ C∞T (R,C) is a smooth immersion such that α|[a,b] is injective, and with α(t) = γC(t)
for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ. Then γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot β with β(t) = γ(t) for
/∈ (a, b) + TZ, and βC = α.
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Proof. Let
J : [0, 1] × R → R2, (s, t) 7→ γC(t) + s(α(t) − γC(t)),
so J is smooth and if t /∈ (a, b)+TZ then J(s, t) = γC(t) for all s. By proposition A.1.13
we can find h with 0 < h < b−a2 such that for all s, Js|[b−T−h,a+h] is a smooth immersion
with its only crossing points on [b− T, a].
Find η < 0 such that B2η(α(a)) and B2η(α(b)) are disjoint. We can find ε < h such
that α([a, a + ε]) ⊆ Bη(α(a)), γC([a, a + ε]) ⊆ Bη(α(a)) and α([b − ε, b]) ⊆ Bη(α(b)),
γC([b − ε, b]) ⊆ Bη(α(b)). Thus for all s we have Js([a, a + ε]) ⊆ Bη(α(a)) and Js([b −
ε, b]) ⊆ Bη(α(b)).
The maps γC|[a,b] and α|[a,b] are injective smooth immersions, with γC(a+ε), α(a+ε) ∈
Bη(α(a)) and γC(b− ε), α(b− ε) ∈ Bη(α(b)), so by proposition A.1.12 there is a smooth
isotopy H from γC|[a,b] to α|[a,b] relative (a ↪→ Bη(α(a))) and relative (b ↪→ Bη(α(b))).
Then we can find δ with 0 < δ < ε such that if s ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [a + δ, a + ε] then
H(s, t) ∈ B2η(α(a)) and if s ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [b− ε, b− δ] then H(s, t) ∈ B2η(α(b)).
The next step is to “push γ into the page/pull it out of the page” on (a, b), so that
in this section the knot is at a different vertical location to the rest of the knot. That
means we will be able to move it around freely without hitting the rest of the knot. We
can find M such that |γ3(t)| < M for all t. Then by proposition A.1.11 we can find a
smooth knot σ smoothly isotopic to γ such that:
• σC = γC
• σ(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) + TZ
• |σ3(t)| 6M for t /∈ (a+ δ, b− δ)
• |σ3(t)| >M for t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ]
• |σ3(t)| = 2M for t ∈ [a+ ε, b− ε]
• |σ3|′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (a+ δ, a+ ε)
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• |σ3|′(t) < 0 for t ∈ (b− ε, b− δ)
Let g : R → R be a smooth function with 0 6 g(t) 6 1 for all t, g(t) = 0 for t 6 a+ δ
or t > b− δ, and g(t) = 1 for t ∈ [a+ ε, b− ε]. Let
K : [0, 1] × [b− T, a+ T ] → R2,
(s, t) 7→

J(s, t) + g(t)(H(s, t) − J(s, t)) if t ∈ [a, b]
J(s, t) if t /∈ (a+ δ, b− δ).
This is smooth and by a similar argument to proposition A.2.8 we can extend it to
a smooth function K on [0, 1] × R which is T -periodic in its second argument. Let
L(s, t) = K(s, t) + σ3(t)e3. Then L is smooth. We have L0 = σ.
For all s and all t /∈ (a, b)+TZ we have L(s, t) = γ(t) = σ(t), and for all t ∈ [a+ε, b−ε]
we have L(s, t) = H(s, t) + σ3(t). For all s, if t ∈ [a + δ, a + ε] then J(s, t) ∈ Bη(α(a))
and H(s, t) ∈ B2η(α(a)) so K(s, t) ∈ B2η(α(a)). Similarly if t ∈ [b− ε, b− δ] then for all
s, K(s, t) ∈ B2η(α(b)).
Let s ∈ [0, 1]. We will argue that Ls is a smooth knot. We have that (Ls)C|[b−δ−T,a+δ] =
Js|[b−δ−T,a+δ], so is a smooth immersion with its only crossing points on [a, b]. Thus
we have L′s(t) 6= 0 for t ∈ [b − δ − T, a + δ], and Ls|(a,a+δ]∪[b−δ,b) is injective and if
t ∈ (a, a + δ] ∪ [b − δ, b) then Ls(t) /∈ Image(Ls|[b−T,a]. But also Ls|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a] so
Ls|[b−T,a] is injective. Thus Ls|[b−δ−T,a+δ] is injective. Then if t ∈ [b− δ − T, a+ δ] and
t′ ∈ (a+ δ, b− δ) we have |σ3(t)| 6 M and |σ3(t′)| > M so Ls(t) 6= Ls(t′). Thus Ls has
no crossing points in [b− δ − T, a+ δ].
Then if t ∈ (a+ δ, a+ ε), we have |σ3(t)| > M and |σ3|′(t) > 0. Thus σ3 is injective
and has non zero derivative on (a+δ, a+ε), so Ls is injective and has non zero derivative
on (a + δ, a + ε). Then if t ∈ (a + δ, a + ε) and t′ ∈ [a + ε, b − ε] we have |σ3(t)| < 2M
and |σ3(t′)| = 2M so Ls(t) 6= Ls(t′). If t ∈ [a + δ, a + ε] and t′ ∈ [b − ε, b − δ] then
Ks(t) ∈ B2η(α(a)) and Ks(t′) ∈ B2η(α(b)), so by the choice of η, Ks(t) 6= Ks(t′). Thus
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if t ∈ (a+ δ, a+ ε) then t is not a crossing point of Ls. Similarly if t ∈ (b− ε, b− δ) then
t is not a crossing point of Ls. Thus Ls has no crossing points on (b− ε− T, a+ ε) and
has non zero derivative on (b− ε− T, a+ ε).
Finally if t ∈ [a+ ε, b− ε] then (Ls)C(t) = Hs(t), so since Hs is an injective smooth
immersion we have that (Ls)′C(t) 6= 0, and if t, t′ ∈ [a + ε, b − ε] with t 6= t′ then
(Ls)C(t) 6= (Ls)C(t′). Thus Ls has no crossing points on [a+ ε, b− ε], so has no crossing
points, and on [a− ε, b+ ε] we have L′s(t) 6= 0, so Ls is a smooth immersion. Thus Ls is
indeed a smooth knot for all s.
Thus L is a smooth isotopy, so L0 = σ is isotopic to L1, so γ is isotopic to L1. We
will take β = L1. Then if t /∈ (a, b)+TZ we have β(t) = γ(t). Also we have J(1, t) = α(t)
for all t, and if t ∈ [a, b] then H(1, t) = α(t). Thus we have K1 = α, so βC = α, as
required.
With this in hand, to carry out the “over the shoulder” manoeuvre we just need to
find a suitable target curve α. We will break this up into sections. First we find an
argument θ that will (almost) play the role of Argα. There are quite a few conditions
that this has to satisfy.
Proposition 1.15. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely, let a < b such that γ
has at most one backwards bend on [a, b], and Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Let u ∈ (a, b] and
suppose that γC has at most one crossing point on [a, u]. Let V be an open interval with
[a, u] ⊆ V . Let γ̃ be a lifting of γ through exp, Argγ = γ̃2.
Then there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function θ : [y − T, x] → R such that:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (u, y]
(iii) θ(t) = Argγ(t) for t 6 x, θ(t) = Argγ(t) + 2π for t > y
(iv) θ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
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(v) θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ (x, y)
(vi) Arg′γ(a) = 0 implies θ′(x) > 0, Arg′γ(a) < 0 implies θ′(x) < 0
(vii) Arg′γ(u) = 0 implies θ′(y) > 0, Arg′γ(u) < 0 implies θ′(y) < 0
(viii) θ′ has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(ix) If Arg′γ(u) < 0 then if w is the unique zero of θ′ on [u, y], if we have t ∈ [w, y] and
t′ ∈ [y, u+ T ] such that exp(γ̃1(t) + iθ(t)) = γC(t′) then we have t = t′ = y
(x) Any zeroes of θ′ are simple
(xi) If t ∈ [x, a] then θ(t) 6 θ(a)
(xii) If t ∈ [u, y] then θ(t) > θ(u)
(xiii) There is ζ ∈ R such that θ([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π)
(xiv) The sets θ([x, a]) and Argγ([u, b]) + 2πZ are disjoint
Proof. We have Arg′γ(t) = Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b], and have Argγ(u) > Argγ(b) >
Argγ(a) − π since γ has at most one backwards bend on [a, b]. Thus we can find τ1, τ2
with Argγ(a) < τ1 < τ2 < Argγ(b) + 2π. Let
λ(t) = t− a
u− a
· (τ2 − τ1) + τ1,
so λ is smooth with λ(a) = τ1 > Argγ(a) and λ(u) = τ2 < Argγ(b) + 2π. We have
λ′(t) = τ2−τ1b−a > 0.
We will pick x, y ∈ V with x < a and y > u to satisfy the above conditions. By
picking x close enough to a and y close enough to u we can ensure that γC has no





2 . We will add further conditions on the choice of x and y
depending on whether Arg′γ = 0 at a and at u.
265
APPENDIX A. THE SMOOTH CASE OF ALEXANDER’S LEMMA
Suppose Arg′γ(a) = 0. Then Arg′γ has a simple zero at a so we must have Arg′′γ(a) < 0.
We can choose x < a so that Argγ(x) < λ(x), and such that if t ∈ [x, a) then λ′(t) >
Arg′γ(t) > 0. Then we have Argγ(t) < λ(t) for t ∈ [x, a]. Thus by proposition A.2.13
there is a smooth function θx : R → R such that θx(t) = Argγ(t) for t 6 x, θx(t) =
λ(t) for t > a+x2 , Argγ(t) 6 θx(t) 6 λ(t) for t ∈ [x,
a+x
2 ], and such that θ
′
x(t) >
min(Arg′γ(t), λ′(t)) = Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ [x, a+x2 ]. It follows that we have θ
′
x(t) > Arg′γ(t)
for t ∈ (x, a]. Also we have θ′x(t) > 0 for t ∈ [x, a].
Now suppose Arg′γ(a) < 0. We can choose x < a so that Argγ(x) < λ(x) and such
that Arg′γ(t) < 0 for t ∈ [x, a]. Thus by proposition A.2.15 there is a smooth function
θx such that θx(t) = Argγ(t) for t 6 x, θx(t) = λ(t) for t > a, Argγ(t) 6 θx(t) 6 λ(t)
for t ∈ [x, a], Arg′γ(t) < θ′x(t) for t ∈ (x, a], and such that θ′x has a single simple zero in
[x, a].
We do a similar thing for u. Suppose Arg′γ(u) = 0. Then we cannot have u ∈
Int([a, b]), and have a > u, so we must have u = b. Then since Arg′γ has a simple
zero at u we must have Arg′′γ(u) > 0. We can choose y > u so that if t ∈ (u, y] then
λ′(t) > Arg′γ(t) > 0 and such that Argγ(y)+2π > λ(y). Thus by proposition A.2.13 there
is a smooth function θy such that θy(t) = λ(t) for t 6 u+y2 , θy(t) = Argγ(t)+2π for t > y,
λ(t) 6 θy(t) 6 Argγ(t) + 2π for t ∈ [u+y2 , y] and θ′y(t) > min(Arg
′
γ(t), λ′(t)) = Arg′γ(t)
for t ∈ (u+y2 , y). It follows that we have θ
′
y(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ [u, y), and that we have
θ′y(t) > 0 for t ∈ [u, y].
Finally suppose Arg′γ(u) < 0. Then we can choose y > u so that Argγ(y)+2π > λ(y)
and such that Arg′γ(t) < 0 for t ∈ [u, y]. Before defining θy, so that we can satisfy
condition (ix) we seek v ∈ (u, y) such that if γ(t) ∈ exp(γ̃1([v, y]) × [Argγ(y),Argγ(v)])
then t ∈ [v, y] + TZ. Since y is not a crossing point of γC, by proposition A.3.5 we
can find an open interval U containing y such that γC has no crossing points on U .
We can assume WLOG that U is small enough that if t ∈ U then Arg′γ(t) < 0, and
such that if t, t′ ∈ U then |t − t′| < 2π. Then we have γ−1C (γC(U + TZ)) = U + TZ,
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i.e. U + TZ is a saturated open set with respect to γC, so by proposition A.2.6 we have
that γC(U) = γC(U +TZ) is open in γC(R). Thus we can find open intervals W,W ′ such
that γ̃(y)+2πi ∈ W×W ′ and exp(W×W ′)∩γC(R) ⊆ γC(U). Then we can find v ∈ (u, y)
such that [v, y] ⊆ U and γ̃1([v, y]) ⊆ W and [Argγ(y) + 2π,Argγ(v) + 2π] ⊆ W ′. Now
suppose that t ∈ R is such that γC(t) ∈ exp(γ̃1([v, y])× [Argγ(y)+2π,Argγ(v)+2π]). We
seek to show that t ∈ [v, y]+TZ. We have γC(t) ∈ exp(W×W ′) so that γC(t) = γC(t′) for
some t′ ∈ U , by the choice of W,W ′. Then since U contains no crossing points we have
t ≡ t′. But also Argγ(t′) ∈ [Argγ(y) + 2π,Argγ(v) + 2π] + 2kπ for some k ∈ Z, so that
Argγ(t′) = Argγ(t′′) + 2kπi for some t′′ ∈ [v, y], and we have t′, t′′ ∈ U so |t′ − t′′| < 2π,
so k = 0 and t′ = t′′. Thus t′ ∈ [v, y], so indeed t ∈ [v, y] + TZ.
Now let f, g : R → R, f : t 7→ −Argγ(−t) − 2π, g : t 7→ −λ(−t). Then if t ∈ [−y,−v]
we have f(t) < g(t), f ′(t) = Arg′γ(−t) < 0 and g′(t) = λ′(−t) > 0, so we can apply
proposition A.2.15 to obtain a smooth function j such that j(t) = f(t) for t 6 −y,
j(t) = g(t) for t > −v, f(t) 6 j(t) 6 g(t) for t ∈ [−y,−v], f ′(t) < j′(t) for t ∈ (−y,−v],
and such that j′ has a single simple zero on [−y,−v]. Letting θy : t 7→ −j(−t), we have
that θy is smooth, that θy(t) = λ(t) for t 6 v, that θy(t) = Argγ(t) + 2π for t > y, that
λ(t) 6 θy(t) 6 Argγ(t) + 2π for t ∈ [v, y], that θ′y(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ [v, y), and that θ′y
has a single zero in [v, y]. Let w be the zero of θ′y on [v, y].
We have θ′y(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ [w, y], and θy(y) = Argγ(y) + 2π, so we must have
θy(w) 6 Argγ(w) + 2π, but also Argγ(w) 6 Argγ(v) since w ∈ [v, y] and Arg′γ < 0 on
[v, y]. Thus θy(w) 6 Argγ(v) + 2π. Thus if we have t ∈ [w, y] and t′ ∈ [y, u + T ] with
exp(γ̃1(t) + iθy(t)) = γC(t′) then we have γC(t′) = exp(γ̃1(t) + iθy(t)) ∈ exp(γ̃1([v, y]) ×
[Argγ(y) + 2π,Argγ(v) + 2π]) so as shown above, we must have t′ ∈ [v, y] + TZ. But




θx(t) if t ∈ [y − T, u]
θy(t) if t ∈ [a, x+ T ].
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This is smooth, and satisfies θ(t) = Argγ(t) for t 6 x, θ(t) = Argγ(t) + 2π for t > y, and
θ(t) = λ(t) for t ∈ [a, u]. If t ∈ [a, u] then θ′(t) = τ2−τ1u−a > 0. This means that if t ∈ [a, u]
then θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t), and we also have θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ (x, a] and t ∈ [u, y), so if
t ∈ (x, y) then θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t). By the choice of x and y we have θ′(x) = Arg′γ(x) 6= 0
and θ′(y) = Arg′γ(y) 6= 0. By construction θ′ has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most
one zero on [u, y]. It was argued above that if we have t ∈ [w, y] and t′ ∈ [y, u+ T ] with
exp(γ̃1(t) + iθy(t)) = γ(t′) then t = t′ = y, so that if we have t ∈ [w, y] and t′ ∈ [y, u+T ]
with exp(γ̃1(t) + iθ(t)) = γ(t′) then t = t′ = y. That covers properties (i)–(ix) required
of θ.
Any zero of θ′ on [x, a] ∪ [u, y] is simple by construction, and θ′ has no zeroes on
[a, u], and we have θ|[y−T,x] = Argγ |[y−T,x] and θ|[y,x+T ] = Argγ |[y,x+T ] +2π so θ has only
simple zeroes on [y− T, x] ∪ [y, x+ T ]. Thus θ′ has only simple zeroes. That covers (x).
We now prove (xi)–(xiii).
First we claim that if t ∈ [x, a] then min(Argγ(x),Argγ(a)) 6 θ(t) 6 max(Argγ(x), θ(a)).
Indeed suppose Arg′γ(a) = 0. Then we have θ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [x, a], so if t ∈ [x, a]
then Argγ(x) = θ(x) 6 θ(t) 6 θ(a), as required. Now suppose Arg′γ(a) < 0. Then
we have Arg′γ(t) < 0 for t ∈ [x, a], and if t ∈ [x, a] we have θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t), so
θ(t) − θ(x) > Argγ(t) − Argγ(x) so θ(t) > Argγ(t) > Argγ(a). Moreover θ′ has a
single simple zero in [x, a] and we have θ′(x) < 0 and θ′(a) > 0 so if t ∈ [a, x] then
θ(t) 6 max(θ(x), θ(a)) = max(Argγ(x), θ(a)). That proves the claim.
Then by the choice of x we have Argγ(x) < λ(x), so Argγ(x) < λ(a) = θ(a) so if
t ∈ [x, a] then θ(t) 6 max(Argγ(x), θ(a)) = θ(a). That proves (xi).
Next we claim that if t ∈ [u, y] then min(Argγ(y)+2π, θ(u)) 6 θ(t) 6 max(Argγ(y)+
2π,Argγ(u)+2π). Indeed suppose Arg′γ(u) = 0. Then we have θ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [u, y] so if
t ∈ [u, y] then θ(u) 6 θ(t) 6 θ(y) = Argγ(y)+2π, as required. Now suppose Arg′γ(u) < 0.
Then we have Arg′γ(t) < 0 for t ∈ [u, y], and if t ∈ [u, y] then θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t) so
θ(y) − θ(t) > Argγ(y) − Argγ(t) so θ(t) 6 Argγ(t) + 2π 6 Argγ(u) + 2π. Moreover θ′ has
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a single simple zero in [u, y], and we have θ′(u) > 0 and θ′(y) < 0 so if t ∈ [u, y] then
θ(t) > min(θ(y), θ(u)) = min(Argγ(y) + 2π, θ(u)). That proves the claim.
Then by the choice of y we have Argγ(y)+2π > λ(y), so Argγ(y)+2π > λ(u) = θ(u),
so if t ∈ [u, y] then θ(t) > min(Argγ(y) + 2π, θ(u)) = θ(u). That proves (xii).
It only remains to show that there is ζ ∈ R such that θ([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π). We
have that if t ∈ [x, u] then θ(t) 6 θ(u), and that if t ∈ [u, y] then θ(t) 6 max(Argγ(y) +
2π,Argγ(u) + 2π), so for all t ∈ [x, y] we have θ(t) 6 max(Argγ(y) + 2π,Argγ(u) + 2π).
Similarly for all t ∈ [x, y] we have θ(t) > min(Argγ(x),Argγ(a)). But by the choice of x
and y we have Argγ(x) >
Argγ(a)+Argγ(u)
2 and Argγ(y) <
Argγ(a)+Argγ(b)
2 . Since Argγ(u) <
Argγ(a) this means that min(Argγ(x),Argγ(a)) >
Argγ(a)+Argγ(u)
2 . Similarly we have
Argγ(u) <
Argγ(a)+Argγ(u)
2 , so that max(Argγ(y) + 2π,Argγ(u) + 2π) >
Argγ(a)+Argγ(u)
2 +
2π. Thus taking ζ = Argγ(a)+Argγ(u)2 + 2, we have θ([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π). That proves
(xiii).











⊆ (Argγ(u),Argγ(b) + 2π).
This is disjoint of Argγ([u, b]) + 2kπ = [Argγ(b),Argγ(u)] + 2kπ for every k ∈ Z. That
proves the proposition.
Now we find a suitable radius function for our target curve α, and combine it with
the above θ.
Proposition 1.16. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely, let a < b such that γ
has at most one backwards bend on [a, b], and Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Let u ∈ (a, b] and
suppose that γC has at most one crossing point on [a, u]. Let V be an open interval with
[a, u] ⊆ V . Let γ̃ be a lifting of γ through exp, Argγ = γ̃2.
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Then there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function φ : R → C such that:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (u, y]
(iii) exp ◦φ is T -periodic
(iv) (exp ◦φ)|[y−T,x] = γC|[y−T,x]
(v) φ′2(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
(vi) If t ∈ (x, y) then φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t)
(vii) φ′2(x) 6= 0 and φ′2(y) 6= 0
(viii) φ′2 has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(ix) Any zeroes of φ′2 are simple
(x) There is ζ ∈ R such that φ2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π)
(xi) φ is an immersion
(xii) φ|[x,y] is injective
(xiii) If w is the unique zero of φ′2 on [u, y], then exp ◦φ has no crossing points on [w, y]
(xiv) (exp ◦φ)((x, y)) and (exp ◦φ)([y, b]) are disjoint
Proof. By proposition A.1.15 there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function θ : [y−T, x] → R
such that:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (u, y]
(iii) θ(t) = Argγ(t) for t 6 x, θ(t) = Argγ(t) + 2π for t > y
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(iv) θ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
(v) θ′(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ (x, y)
(vi) Arg′γ(a) = 0 implies θ′(x) > 0, Arg′γ(a) < 0 implies θ′(x) < 0
(vii) Arg′γ(u) = 0 implies θ′(y) > 0, Arg′γ(u) < 0 implies θ′(y) < 0
(viii) θ′ has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(ix) If Arg′γ(u) < 0 then if w is the unique zero of θ′ on [u, y], if we have t ∈ [w, y] and
t′ ∈ [y, u+ T ] such that exp(γ̃1(t) + iθ(t)) = γC(t′) then we have t = t′ = y
(x) Any zeroes of θ′ are simple
(xi) If t ∈ [x, a] then θ(t) 6 θ(a)
(xii) If t ∈ [u, y] then θ(t) > θ(u)
(xiii) There is ζ ∈ R such that θ([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π)
(xiv) The sets θ([x, a]) and Argγ([u, b]) + 2πZ are disjoint
We will take this as the argument part of φ, its second co-ordinate. We only need to
find a suitable function ρ to serve as the first co-ordinate of φ and determine the radius
of exp ◦φ.
This will be formed by putting together a section ρx which behaves correctly around
x and a section ρy which behaves correctly around y. We can let r1, r2 ∈ R with
γ̃1([x,max(y, b)]) = [r1, r2], and pick k with k > r2 (one could also carry the proof
through by picking k < r1).
If Arg′γ(a) = 0, we can let ρx : [y − T, x + T ] → R be any smooth function with
ρx(t) = γ̃1(t) for t 6 x, and ρx(t) = k + 1 for t > a. We have θ′(x) > 0, θ′(a) > 0 and
θ′ has at most one zero on [a, x], and any zeroes are simple, so θ′ can have no zeroes on
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[a, x], i.e. we have θ′ > 0 on [a, x]. Thus θ′ is strictly increasing on [a, x], so (ρx+iθθ)|[x,a]
is injective.
Then since θ′ > 0 on [x, a], we have that the map ρ+ iθ is injective on [x, a].
If Arg′γ(a) < 0, then θ′(x) < 0, θ′(a) > 0 and θ′ has a single simple zero on [x, a].
Let w ∈ (x, a) be the point with θ′(w) = 0. Let ψ : [y − T, x + T ] → R be a smooth
function with ψ(t) < k for t 6 w, ψ(w) = k and ψ′(w) > 0, k < ψ(t) < k + 1 for
t ∈ (w, a) and ψ(t) = k + 1 for t > a. Then by proposition A.2.12 there is a smooth
function ρx : [y−T, x+T ] → R such that ρx(t) = γ̃1(t) for t 6 x, ρx(t) = ψ(t) for t > w
and min(γ̃1(t), ψ(t)) 6 ρx(t) 6 max(γ̃1(t), ψ(t)) for t ∈ [x,w]. Thus if t ∈ [x,w) then
γ̃1(t) < k and ψ(t) < k so ρx(t) < k. We also have ρ′x(w) > 0, and for t ∈ [w, a] we have
ρx(t) = ψ(t) > k, and for t > a we have ρx(t) = k + 1. We claim that (ρx + iθ)|[a,x] is
injective. Indeed we have θ′ < 0 on [x,w) and θ′ > 0 on (w, a], so θ is strictly decreasing
on [x,w] and strictly increasing on [w, a] and so is injective on both sets. But if t ∈ [x,w)
and t′ ∈ (w, a] then we have ρx(t) < k and ρ(t′) > k by construction, so ρx(t) 6= ρx(t′),
so (ρx + iθ)(t) 6= (ρx + iθ)(t′). Thus (ρx + iθ)|[x,a] is indeed injective.
Similarly if Arg′γ(u) = 0, so u = b, we can let ρy : [y − T, x+ T ] → R be any smooth
function with ρy(t) = γ̃1(t) for t > y and ρy(t) = k+ 1 for t 6 u. Again, it is easy to see
that (ρy + iθ)|[u,y] is injective.
If Arg′γ(u) < 0 then θ′(y) < 0, θ′(u) > 0 and θ′ has a single simple zero on [u, y].
Again let w ∈ (u, y) be the point with θ′(w) = 0. Let η : [x − T, y + T ] → R, t 7→
γ̃1(t) + iθ(t). By (ix) we have that if t ∈ [w, y], t 6= y then exp(η(t)) /∈ γC([y, u + T ]).
Pick v ∈ (w, y). Then we have for t ∈ [w, v] that t 6= y so exp(η(t)) /∈ γC([y, u+T ]), and so
there is ε > 0 such that |exp(η(t))−γC(s)| > ε for all t ∈ [w, v], s ∈ [y, u+T ]. Then we can
find δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if |x−η(t)| < δ for some t ∈ [w, v] then |exp(x) − exp(η(t))| < ε,
so exp(x) /∈ γC([y, u+ T ]). Next we can find v′ ∈ (w, v) such that γ̃1([w, v′]) ⊆ (c, c+ δ2)




Then we can find a smooth function χ : [y − T, x + T ] → R such that χ(t) = k + 1
for t 6 z, such that χ(t) ∈ (c + δ2 , k + 1) if t ∈ (z, w), such that χ(w) = c +
δ
2 and
χ′(w) < 0, and such that if t ∈ (w, v′] then χ(t) ∈ (c, c+ δ2). Then by proposition A.2.12
there is a smooth function ρy : [y − T, x + T ] → R such that ρy(t) = χ(t) for t 6 w,
ρy(t) = γ̃1(t) for t > v′, and min(γ̃1(t), χ(t)) 6 ρy(t) 6 max(γ̃1(t), χ(t)) for t ∈ [w, v′].
Thus if t ∈ (w, v′] then ρy(t) ∈ (c, c+ δ2), and we have ρ
′
y(w) < 0, and ρy(t) > c+ δ2 for
t ∈ [z, w], and ρy(t) = k + 1 for t 6 z.
Again we claim that (ρy + iθ)|[u,y] is injective. Indeed, we have that θ is strictly
increasing on [u,w] and strictly decreasing on [w, y], so is injective on both sets, so
(ρy+ iθ) is injective on [u,w] and on [w, y]. Suppose for contradiction that t ∈ [u,w] and
t′ ∈ (w, y] with ρy(t) + iθ(t) = ρy(t′) + iθ(t′). We have ρy(t) = χ(t) > c+ δ2 , so if we had
t′ ∈ (w, v′] then ρy(t) 6= ρy(t′), so we must have t′ ∈ (v′, y]. But then θ(t′) 6 θ(v′) < θ(z)
by the choice of z, and if t ∈ [z, w] then we have θ(t) > θ(z), so if t ∈ [z, w] then we
would have θ(t) > θ(t′). Thus we cannot have t ∈ [z, w], so we must have t ∈ [u, z). But
then ρy(t) = k+ 1 > ρy(t′), a contradiction. Thus no such t and t′ exist, so (ρy + iθ)|[u,y]
is injective as claimed.
Now define
ρ : [y − T, x+ T ] → R, t 7→

ρx(t) if t 6 u
ρy(t) if t > a.
This is well defined and smooth by construction. Thus ζ : [y−T, x+T ] → C, t 7→ ρ(t)+
iθ(t) is a smooth map, and exp ◦ζ is periodic on [y−T, x+T ]. Thus by proposition A.3.22
we obtain that exp ◦ζ extends to a T -periodic curve τ . Then τ has a lifting φ through exp
which satisfies φ|[y−T,x+T ] = ζ = ρ + iθ. Thus φ : R → C is smooth with φ|[y−T,x+T ] =
ρ + iθ, and exp ◦φ is T -periodic. By construction we have φ|[y−T,x] = γ̃|[y−T,x], so
(exp ◦φ)|[y−T,x] = γC. Also, since φ2|[y−T,x+T ] = θ we have that if t ∈ (x, y) then
φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t), that φ′2(x) 6= 0 and φ′2(y) 6= 0, that φ′2 has at most one zero on [x, a]
and at most one zero on [u, y], and that any zeroes of φ′2 are simple. Thus this choice of
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φ, x and y satisfies properties (i)–(x) of those required by the proposition.
Next we show that φ is a smooth immersion. Indeed as just noted, (exp ◦φ)|[y−T,x] =
γC is a smooth immersion, so φ|[y−T,x] must be a smooth immersion since (exp ◦φ)′(t) =
φ′(t) exp(φ(t)). But also if t ∈ [x, y] with θ′(t) = 0 then t is either the unique zero of θ′
in [x, a] or the unique zero of θ′ in [u, y], and either way we have by the construction of
ρ that ρ′(t) 6= 0. Thus φ′ has no zeroes on [x, y], so has no zeroes on [y − T, y], so has
no zeroes. That proves (xi).
Now for (xii). We have θ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ (a, u), so if t ∈ (a, u) then θ(a) < θ(t) < θ(u).
But by (xi) and (xii) for θ, if t ∈ [x, a] then θ(t) 6 θ(a), and if t ∈ [u, y] then θ(t) > θ(u).
Thus θ([x, a]), θ((a, u)) and θ([u, y]) are disjoint, so φ([x, a]), φ((a, u)) and φ([u, y]) are
disjoint. Thus to show that φ|[x,y] is injective, it suffices to show that φ|[x,a], φ|(a,u) and
φ|[u,y] are injective. But the middle of these is obvious, and the first and third have
already been shown. That proves (xii).
Now for (xiii). Suppose that φ′2 has a zero on [u, y], necessarily unique. Then
Arg′γ(u) < 0. Let w, v, ε, δ, and v′ be as described above in the construction of ρy in
this case. As shown above we have that φ|[x,y] is injective, so (exp ◦φ)|[x,y] is injective
since there is ζ ∈ R such that φ2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π). Thus if t ∈ [w, y] was a crossing
point of exp ◦φ there would be t′ ∈ (y, x+ T ) with exp(φ(t)) = exp(φ(t′)) = γC(t′). But
if t ∈ [v′, y] then φ(t) = γ̃1(t) + iθ(t), and so by (ix) if exp(φ(t)) = γC(t′) then t = t′ = y
so (t, t′) is not a crossing pair of exp ◦φ. And if t ∈ [w, v′] then we have




since we have both ρy(t) ∈ [c, c+ δ2 ] and γ̃1(t) ∈ [c, c+
δ
2 ]. Thus by the choice of δ we have
that |exp(φ(t)) − exp(η(t))| < ε, so by the choice of ε we have exp(φ(t)) /∈ γC([y, u+T ]).
Thus there is no crossing pair (t, t′) with t ∈ [w, v′] and t′ ∈ [y, x+ T ]. Thus exp ◦φ has
no crossing points on [w, y], proving (xiii).
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Finally, we show (xiv). If u = b then y > b so the conclusion is trivial, so we may
assume u < b. Thus Arg′γ(u) < 0. We have (exp ◦φ)([y, b]) = γ([y, b]). Then by (xiv) for
θ, we have that φ2((x, a]) is disjoint from Argγ([y, b])+2πZ, so (exp ◦φ)((x, a]) is disjoint
from γ([y, b]). Letting z be as described above in the construction of ρy, if t ∈ [a, z] then
φ1(t) = ρ(t) = k + 1, which is not in γ̃1([y, b]) by the choice of k, so (exp ◦φ)([a, z])
is disjoint from γ([y, b]). Finally, we cover (exp ◦φ)([z, y)). If we had t ∈ [w, y) with
exp(φ(t)) ∈ (exp ◦φ)([y, b]) then t would be a crossing point of exp ◦φ, contradicting
(xiii) which was just proved. Thus we need only cover t ∈ (z, w). But if t ∈ [w, z] then
Argγ(w) > θ(w) > θ(t) > θ(z) > θ(v′) > θ(y) so again exp(φ(t)) /∈ γ([y, b]). Thus
indeed, (exp ◦φ)((x, y)) is disjoint from (exp ◦φ)([y, b]).
That proves the proposition.
This exp ◦φ is almost suitable as the plane projection of a smooth knot which has
the section [a, u] of γ bent forwards without adding crossings to [a, b]. The only problem
is that exp ◦φ may not be regular. We can fix this using proposition A.3.23.
Proposition 1.17. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely, let a < b such that γ
has at most one backwards bend on [a, b], and Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Let u ∈ (a, b] and
suppose that γC has at most one crossing point on [a, u]. Let V be an open interval with
[a, u] ⊆ V . Let γ̃ be a lifting of γ through exp, Argγ = γ̃2.
Then there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function α̃ : R → C such that, letting α =
exp ◦α̃, we have:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (b, y]
(iii) α|[y−T,x] = γC|[y−T,x]
(iv) Arg′α(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
(v) If t ∈ (x, y) then Arg′α(t) > Arg′γ(t)
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(vi) α is regular
(vii) Arg′α has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(viii) Arg′α(t) has only simple zeroes
(ix) α|[x,y] is injective
(x) If w is the unique zero of Arg′α on [u, y], then α has no crossing points on [w, y]
(xi) α((x, y)) and α([y, b]) are disjoint
Proof. By proposition A.1.16 there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function φ : R → C such
that:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (u, y]
(iii) exp ◦φ is T -periodic
(iv) (exp ◦φ)|[y−T,x] = γC|[y−T,x]
(v) φ′2(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
(vi) If t ∈ (x, y) then φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t)
(vii) φ′2(x) 6= 0 and φ′2(y) 6= 0
(viii) φ′2 has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(ix) Any zeroes of φ′2 are simple
(x) There is ζ ∈ R such that φ2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π)
(xi) φ is an immersion
(xii) φ|[x,y] is injective
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(xiii) If w is the unique zero of φ′2 on [u, y], then exp ◦φ has no crossing points on [w, y]
(xiv) (exp ◦φ)((x, y)) and (exp ◦φ)([y, b]) are disjoint
We will use proposition A.3.23 to perturb a section of φ so that exp ◦φ is regular. We
let τ = exp ◦φ. First note that since φ|[x,y] is injective, and there is ζ ∈ R such that
φ2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π), we have that τ |[x,y] is injective. Next note that since φ is an
immersion, so is τ , so by proposition A.3.5 the set of crossing points of τ is a closed set.
Now we claim that x is not a crossing point of τ . Indeed if t ∈ [x, y] then since
τ |[x,y] is injective, (x, t) is not a crossing pair of τ . If t ∈ [y − T, x) then τ(x) = γC(x)
and τ(t) = γC(t), and x is not a crossing point of γC, so γC(x) 6= γC(t) and (x, t) is
not a crossing pair of τ . Thus indeed, x is not a crossing point of τ . Similarly y is
not a crossing point of τ . Thus since crossing points of τ form a closed set we can find
h > 0 such that τ has no crossing points on [x, x + h] ∪ [y − h, y]. WLOG we may
assume that x + h < a and y − h > u, and that Sign(φ′2(x + h)) = Sign(φ′2(x)), and
Sign(φ′2(y − h)) = Sign(φ′2(y)).
Now pick x′ ∈ (x, x + h), y′ ∈ (y − h, y). We have ζ ∈ R such that φ2([x, y]) ⊆
(ζ, ζ + 2π), and can find ε1 > 0 such that φ2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ + ε1, ζ + 2π − ε1). Since
φ′2(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u] we can find ε2 > 0 such that φ′2(t) > ε2 for t ∈ [a, u]. Then since
φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t) for t ∈ [x′, y′] we can find ε3 > 0 such that φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t) + ε3 for
t ∈ [x′, y′]. Next, we have Sign(φ2(x + h)) = Sign(φ2(x)), so since any zeroes of φ′2 are
simple and φ′2 has at most one zero on [x, a] we have that |φ′2|(t) > 0 for t ∈ [x, x + h].
Similarly we have |φ′2|(t) > 0 for t ∈ [y−h, y]. Thus there is ε4 > 0 such that |φ′2|(t) > ε4
for t ∈ [x, x+h]∪ [y−h, y]. After that since τ(x′) /∈ τ([y−T, x]) and τ(y′) /∈ τ([y−T, x]),
there is η > 0 such that Bη(τ(x′)) ∪ Bη(τ(y′)) is disjoint from τ([y − T, x]). Then we
can find ε5 such that if |z−φ(x′)| < 2ε5 then exp(z) ∈ Bη(τ(x′)) and if |z−φ(y′)| < 2ε5
than exp(z) ∈ Bη(τ(u′)).
Next suppose φ′2 has a zero w on [u, y]. This is necessarily unique, and we have
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w ∈ (u, y). By property (xiii), we have that τ([w, y′]) and τ([y − T, x]) are disjoint, so
since these are compact we can find η2 > 0 such that if s ∈ [w, y′] and t ∈ [y−T, x] then
|τ(s) − τ(t)| > η2. Then we can find ε6 > 0 such that if s ∈ [w, y′] and |z − φ(s)| < ε6
then |exp(z) − τs| < η2, so exp(z) /∈ τ([y − T, x]). If φ′2 does not have a zero on [u, y],
set ε6 to be any positive value.
Finally we have that τ((x, y)) and τ([y, b]) are disjoint, so τ([x′, y′] and τ([y, b]) are
disjoint, so similarly we can find ε7 > 0 such that if s ∈ [x′, y′] and |z − φ(s)| < ε7 then
exp(z) /∈ τ([y, b]). Let ε = min(ε1, ε3, ε4, ε5, ε6, ε7) > 0.
Let δ > 0 such that if t ∈ [x′, x′ + δ] then φ(t) ∈ Bε(φ(x′)), and if t ∈ [y′ − δ, y′] then




For each j ∈ Z, let σj : [y − T, x] → R2, t 7→ γ̃(t) + 2πji. Let X be the set of points
γ̃(t) + 2πji ∈ R such that t is a crossing point of γ and j ∈ Z, which is a countable
set. Then by proposition A.3.23 applied to the injective smooth immersion φ|[x,y], the
countable family (σj)j∈Z, the countable set X, the points x′ < y′ ∈ [x, y], and this choice
of δ and ε, there is an injective smooth immersion β : [x, y] → R2 with β(t) = φ(t) for
t /∈ (x′, y′), ‖β − φ‖C1 < ε, β′(t) = φ′(t) for t ∈ [x′ + δ, y′ − δ], and such that for all
t ∈ [x′ + δ, y′ − δ] we have β(t) /∈ X, and if β(t) = σj(s) for any j then β′(t) and σ′j(s)
are not parallel.
Now if t ∈ [x, y] then |β2(t)−φ2(t)| 6 ‖β−φ‖C1 < ε < ε1 so since φ2(t) ∈ (ζ+ ε1, ζ+
2π− ε1) we have β2(t) ∈ (ζ, ζ + 2π). Thus β2([x, y]) ⊆ (ζ, ζ + 2π), so since β is injective
we have that exp ◦β is injective.
Next if t ∈ [a, u] then we have |β′2(t) − φ′2(t)| 6 ‖β − φ‖C1 so β′2(t) > φ′2(t) − ε2 > 0,
by the choice of ε2.
Next if t ∈ [x′, y′] then similarly we obtain β′2(t) > φ′2(t)− ε3 > Arg′γ(t) by the choice
of ε3. Also if x ∈ (x, x′] ∪ [y′, y) then β′2(t) = φ′2(t) > Arg′γ(t). Thus for all t ∈ (x, y) we
have β′2(t) > Arg′γ(t).
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Next if t ∈ [x, x+ h] ∪ [y − h, y] then we have |β′2(t) − φ′2(t)| < ε4 and |φ′2|(t) > ε4 so
β′2(t) 6= 0.
Then if t ∈ [x′, x′ +δ] then ‖β(t)−φ(x′)‖ 6 ‖β−φ‖C1 +‖φ(t)−φ(x′)‖ < 2ε 6 2ε5, so
exp(β(t)) ∈ Bη(τ(x′)), so so exp(β(t)) /∈ τ([y−T, x]). Thus exp(β([x′, x′ +δ])) is disjoint
from τ([y − T, x]). But also if s ∈ (x, x′] and t ∈ [y − T, x] then τ(s) 6= τ(t), since τ has
no crossing points on [x, x+h], so exp(β(s)) = exp(φ(s)) 6= τ(t). Thus exp(β((x, x′ +δ]))
and τ([y − T, x]) are disjoint. Similarly exp(β([y′ − δ, y)) and τ([y − T, x]) are disjoint.
Next suppose φ′2 has a zero w on [u, y]. Then if t ∈ [w, y′] we have ‖β(t) −φ(t)‖ < ε6
so by the choice of ε6, exp(β(t)) /∈ τ([y − T, x]). Thus by the above, exp(β[w, y)) and
τ([y − T, x]) are disjoint.
Finally note that if t ∈ [x′, y′] then ‖β(t) − φ(t)‖ < ε7 so by the choice of ε7,
exp(β(t)) /∈ τ([y, b]). But also if t ∈ (x, x′] ∪ [y′, y) then exp(β(t)) = exp(φ(t)) =
τ(t) /∈ τ([y, b]). Thus we have that exp(β((x, y)) and τ([y, b]) are disjoint.
Since β(t) = φ(t) for t ∈ [x, x′] ∪ [y′, y], the map
ζ : [y − T, x+ T ] → R, t 7→

β(t) if t ∈ [x, y]
φ(t) if t ∈ [y − T, x′] ∪ [y′, x+ T ]
is smooth. This is a smooth immersion since β and φ both are. Then exp ◦ζ is T -periodic,
so has an extension α to R. Let α̃ be a lifting of α through exp, with α̃|[x−T,y+T ] = ζ.
We have α|[y−T,x] = exp ◦φ|[y−T,x] = τ |[y−T,x] = γ|[y−T,x].
Note that α|[x,y] = exp ◦β is injective. Thus α has no crossing pairs (s, t) with
s, t ∈ [x, y]. Also if s ∈ (x, x′ + δ] and t ∈ [x− T, y] then α(s) = exp(β(s)) 6= τ(t) = α(t)
since exp(β((x, x′ + δ])) and τ([y− T, x]) are disjoint. Thus α has no crossing points on
(x, x′ + +δ]. Also taking s = x and t ∈ [y − T, x] we have α(x) = τ(s) and α(t) = τ(t),
and x is not a crossing point of τ , so (x, t) is not a crossing pair of α. Thus α has no
crossing points on [x, x′ + δ]. Similarly it has no crossing points on [y′ − δ, y].
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We claim that this map α̃ satisfies the requirements of the proposition. We have that
α = exp ◦α̃, and obviously have properties (i) and (ii) satisfied. We have α|[x−T,y] =
exp ◦ζ|[x−T,y] = exp ◦φ[x−T,y] = γC|[x−T,y], giving property (iii).
Showing (iv) is straightforward, since if t ∈ [a, uy] then Arg′α(t) = β′2(t) > 0, as
argued above. Then (v) is also straightforward, since if t ∈ (x, y) then Arg′α(t) =
β′2(t) > Arg′γ(t) as argued above.
Now for (vi). We have that α̃|[x−T,y+T ] = ζ, which is a smooth immersion, so α̃
is a smooth immersion, so α is a smooth immersion. If (s, t) is a crossing pair of α
then as noted above we cannot have both s ∈ [x, y] and t ∈ [x, y]. Thus if α had
any triple crossing (r, s, t), we could not have two of {r, s, t} in [x, y], so WLOG can
assume that r, s ∈ [y − T, x], r 6= s. Since α|[x−T,y] = γ we have that (r, s) is a crossing
point of γC, and we cannot also have t ∈ [y − T, x] + TZ (or γC would have a triple
crossing), so we can assume t ∈ [x, y]. But as noted above, α has no crossing points
on [x, x′ + δ] ∪ [y′ − δ, y], so in fact we may assume t ∈ (x′ + δ, y′ − δ). Then we have
α(t) = exp(β(t)) = γC(r) = exp γ̃(r), so there is j ∈ Z such that β(t) = γ̃(t) + 2πji, so
β(t) ∈ X. But that contradicts the construction of β. Thus α has no triple crossings.
Now to show that any crossing pairs of α are transversal. If (s, t) is a crossing pair
of α with s, t ∈ [y − T, x], then we have α′(s) = γ′C(s) and α′(t) = γ′C(t) so (s, t) is
transversal. If s ∈ [x, y] and t ∈ [x, y] then (s, t) is not a crossing pair of of α. Finally
suppose (s, t) is a crossing pair of α with s ∈ [x, y] and t ∈ [y − T, x]. Thus necessarily
s ∈ (x′ + δ, y′ − δ). Then we have exp(β(s)) = α(s) = γ(t), so β(s) = γ̃(t) + 2πji for
some j ∈ Z, i.e. β(s) = σj(t). Thus by the construction of β we have that β′(s) and σ′j(t)
are not parallel. Thus β′(s) and γ̃′(t) are not parallel, so (exp ◦β)′(s) = β′(s) exp(β(s))
is not parallel to (exp ◦γ̃)′(t) = γ̃′(t)γ(t), since exp(β(s)) = γ(t). Thus crossing pairs of
α are indeed transversal. Thus α is indeed regular, proving (vi).
Now for (vii). We have Argα|[x,y] = β2. As noted above, if t ∈ [x, x + h] ∪ [y − h, y]
then β′2(t) 6= 0. We also have that if t ∈ [x′ + δ, y′ − δ] then β2(t) = φ2(t), so that since
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x′ + δ < x + h and y′ − δ > y − h, any zero of β′2 on [x, y] is also a zero of φ′2, and lies
in either (x+ h, a) or in (u, y − h). Since φ′2 has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most
one zero on [u, y], this proves (vii).
For (viii), we have α|[y−T,x] = γ, so any zero of Arg′α on [y − T, x] is a simple zero.
Thus we need only check that zeroes of Arg′α|[x,y] = β′2 are simple. But if w ∈ [x, y] with
β′2(w) = 0 then as just argued we have w ∈ (x + h, a) ∪ (u, y − h), and we have that
w is also a zero of φ′2, so φ′′2(w) 6= 0. But also we have by the construction of β that
β′|[x′+δ,y′−δ] = φ′[x′+δ,y′−δ], so that β
′′
2 (w) = φ′′2(w) 6= 0, as required.
For (ix), we have α|[x,y] = exp ◦β which is injective as noted above.
For (x), suppose that Arg′ has a zero w ∈ [u, y], necessarily unique by (vii). Then
α([w, y)) = exp(β([w, y)) and α([y−T, x]) = τ([y−T, x]) are disjoint, as noted previously,
so if s ∈ [w, y) and t ∈ [y − T, x] then (s, t) is not a crossing pair of α. Also α|[x,y] is
injective, so if s ∈ [w, y) and t ∈ [x, y] then (s, t) is not a crossing pair of α. Thus if
s ∈ [w, y) then s is not a crossing point of α. But it was noted above that y is not a
crossing point of α. Thus indeed, α has no crossing points on [w, y], proving (x).
Finally, (xi) is easy: we have α((x, y)) = exp(β((x, y)) which is disjoint from τ([y, b]) =
α([y, b]) as noted above.
Now the hard work is done. To obtain the Bending Forward proposition we need one
final definition.
Definition 1.18. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely. Let c 6 a 6 b 6 d.
Let I be a compact interval. Say that a smooth knot β is a bending forwards of
(γ, [a, b]) on I without adding crossings to [c, d] if β is a bending forwards of γ
on I such that:
1. Dβ(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, b]
2. If s ∈ [c, d] has Dβ(s) 6 0 and s is a crossing point of βC then s is a crossing point
of γC
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Now we can put propositions A.1.14 and A.1.17 to use.
Proposition 1.19 (Bending forwards one crossing point). Let γ be a smooth knot which
projects nicely, let a < b such γ has at most one backwards bend on [a, b], and such that
Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Let u ∈ (a, b] and suppose that γC has at most one crossing point
on [a, u]. Suppose that V is an open interval containing [a, u]. Then there is a compact
interval I with [a, u] ⊆ I ⊆ V and a smooth knot β such that β projects nicely and is a
bending forwards of (γ, [a, u]) on I without adding crossings to [a, b].
Proof. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely, let a < b such that γ has at most
one backwards bend on [a, b], and Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Let u ∈ (a, b] and suppose that
γC has at most one crossing point on [a, u]. Let V be an open interval with [a, u] ⊆ V .
Let γ̃ be a lifting of γ through exp, Argγ = γ̃2.
Then by proposition A.1.17 there are x, y ∈ V and a smooth function α̃ : R → C
such that, letting α = exp ◦α̃, we have:
(i) x < a, y > u, and y − x < T2
(ii) γC has no crossing points on [x, a) ∪ (b, y]
(iii) α|[y−T,x] = γC|[y−T,x]
(iv) Arg′α(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, u]
(v) If t ∈ (x, y) then Arg′α(t) > Arg′γ(t)
(vi) α ∈ C∞T (R,C) is regular
(vii) Arg′α has at most one zero on [x, a] and at most one zero on [u, y]
(viii) Arg′α(t) has only simple zeroes
(ix) α|[x,y] is injective
(x) If w is the unique zero of Arg′α on [u, y], then α has no crossing points on [w, y]
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(xi) α((x, y)) and α([y, b]) are disjoint
Then since γC has at most one crossing point on (x, y), and α|[x,y] is injective, by
proposition A.1.14 there is a smooth knot β which is smoothly isotopic to γ such that
β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (x, y) + TZ, and βC = α.
β projects nicely since βC = α is regular, for all t we have βC(t) = exp(α(t)) 6= 0,
and by (viii) Dβ = Arg′α has only simple zeroes.
We claim that β is a bending forwards of γ on [x, y]. It has regular projection and
is smoothly isotopic to γ. Since Arg′α > 0 on [a, u] we have Arg′α(a) > 0, Arg′α(u) > 0.
Then since Arg′α has at most one zero on [x, a], either we have Arg′α > 0 on [x, a] or
there is wx ∈ [x, a) such that if t ∈ [x, a] then Arg′α(t) > 0 iff t > wx. Similarly either
Arg′α > 0 on [u, y] or there is wy ∈ (u, y] such that if t ∈ [u, y] then Arg′α(t) > 0 iff t < wy.
Thus {t ∈ [x, y] | Arg′α(t) > 0} is a nonempty interval, i.e. {t ∈ [x, y] | Dβ(t) > 0} is a
nonempty interval. As noted we have that if t /∈ (x, y) + TZ then β(t) = γ(t). Finally
if t ∈ (x, y) then Arg′α(t) > Arg′γ(t), and if t ∈ [y − T, x] then Arg′α(t) = Arg′γ(t), so for
all t we have Dβ(t) = Arg′α(t) > Arg′γ(T ). Thus β is indeed a bending forwards of γ on
[x, y].
Also, we have that if t ∈ [a, u] then Dβ(t) > 0. Then we claim that if s ∈ [a, b] is
a crossing point of βC such that Dβ(s) 6 0 then s is a crossing point of γC. Suppose
first that (s, t) is a crossing pair of βC with s ∈ [y, b]. Then since α((x, y)) and α([y, b])
are disjoint we must have t ∈ [y − T, x] + TZ, so that βC(t) = α(t) = γC(t), and s is a
crossing point of γC. But if s ∈ [a, y] with Dβ(s) 6 0, then we must have s > w where
w is the unique zero of Arg′α on [u, y], so that s is not a crossing point of α = βC. Thus
indeed, if s ∈ [a, b] is a crossing point of βC such that Dβ(s) 6 0 then s is a crossing
point of γC. Thus β is a bending forwards of (γ, [a, u]) on [x, y] without adding crossings
to [a, b].
Now we use this to bend forwards the entire section [a, b].
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Proposition 1.20. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely, let a < b such γ has at
most one backwards bend on [a, b], and such that Dγ(t) 6 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Then there is a
smooth knot β which projects nicely and is a bending forwards of γ such that if t ∈ [a, b]
then Dβ(t) > 0.
Proof. Since γ has at most one backwards bend on [a, b] we have b < a+ T2 and can find
an open interval V containing [a, b] with sup(V ) < inf(V ) + T2 . Pick s0 < s1 < . . . <
sn ∈ [a, b] with s0 = a, sn = b such that for each i = 0 . . . (n − 1), γC has at most one
crossing point on [si, si+1]. Set s−1 = inf(V ), sn+1 = sup(V ).
We claim by induction on i that for each i = 1 . . . n there is a smooth knot βi which
projects nicely and is a bending forwards of (γ, [s0, si]) on some compact interval Ii
with Ii ⊆ (s−1, si+1) without adding crossings to [a, b]. For i = 1 this follows from
proposition A.1.19.
Suppose true for i < n, and let βi be a smooth knot which projects nicely and is
a bending forwards (βi, [s0, si]) of γ on some compact interval Ii with Ii ⊆ (s−1, si+1)
without adding crossings to [a, b]. Let c = supD>0βi (Ii) ∈ (si, si+1). Then if t ∈ [c, b]
then Dβ(t) 6 0, and so if t ∈ [c, b] is a crossing point of βi then since βi is a bending
forwards of γ without adding crossings to [a, b], we must have that t is a crossing point
of γC. In particular βi has at most one crossing point on [c, si+1]. Also, we have a = s0 ∈
D> 0β(Ii) so that D> 0β(Ii) * Int(D60γ ([a, b])) = (a, b), so that by proposition A.1.9
βi has at most one backwards bend on [a, b] and thus at most one backwards bend on
[c, b]. Thus by proposition A.1.19 there is a smooth knot βi+1 which projects nicely and
is a bending forwards of (βi, [c, si+1]) on some compact interval J ⊆ (s−1, si+2) without
adding crossings to [c, b]. Let Ii+1 = Ii ∪ J ⊆ (s−1, si+2).
We will argue that βi+1 is a bending forwards of (γ, [s0, si+1]) on Ii+1 without adding
crossings to [a, b] (we already have Ii+1 ⊆ (s−1, si+2)). Since Dβi+1(c) > 0 we must have
c ∈ J , and also c = supD>0βi (Ii) ∈ Ii so that c ∈ J ∩ Ii with Dβi(c) > 0. Also we have
sup(Ii + 1) − inf(Ii+1) 6 sn+1 − s−1 < T2 . Thus by proposition A.1.8, βi+1 is a bending
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forwards of γ on Ii+1. We have that if t ∈ [s0, si+1] then Dβi+1(t) > 0. If t ∈ [a, b] is
a crossing point of βi+1 with Dβi+1(t) 6 0 then since βi+1 is a bending forwards of βi
without adding crossings to [a, b] we have that t is a crossing point of βi, and then since
Dβi(t) 6 Dβi+1(t) 6 0 and βi is a bending forwards of γ without adding crossings to
[a, b] we have that t is a crossing point of γ. Thus indeed βi+1 projects nicely and is a
bending forwards of (γ, [s0, si+1]) on Ii+1 without adding crossings to [a, b].
Thus by induction for each i we can indeed find a smooth knot βi which projects nicely
and is a bending forwards of (γ, [s0, si]) on some compact interval Ii with Ii ⊆ (s−1, si+1)
without adding crossings to [a, b]. But taking i = n we have that there is a smooth knot
βn which projects nicely and is a bending forwards of γ with Dβ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [a, b],
as required.
Now we can finally prove the Bending Forward proposition.
Proposition 1.21 (Bending forward one troublesome part). Let γ be a smooth knot
which projects nicely. Let U be an open interval in R such that γ has at most one
backwards bend on U . Then there is a smooth knot β which projects nicely and is a
bending forwards of γ such that if t ∈ U then Dβ(t) > 0.
Proof. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely and let U be an open interval such
that γ has at most one backwards bend on U . If D60γ (U) = ∅ we are done, so we may
assume D60γ (U) 6= ∅. Then if t ∈ D60γ (U) then Dγ(t) 6 0 and Dγ has only simple zeroes,
so we have some proper interval containing t contained inD60γ (U). Thus D60)γ(U) is a
proper interval, and we can find a < b with D60γ (U) = [a, b]. Then by proposition A.1.20
there is a smooth knot β which projects nicely and is a bending forwards of γ such that
if t ∈ [a, b] then Dβ(t) > 0; but thus if t ∈ U then Dβ(t) > 0, and we are done.
Before concluding, one final definition is helpful.
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Definition 1.22. Let γ be a smooth knot which projects nicely. Say that γ is (6n)-
troublesome where n ∈ N if we can write π(D60γ ([0, T ])) ⊆
∪
i∈I π(Ui) where |I| = n
and for each i, γ has at most one backwards bend on Ui.
Thus if γ is (6 n)-troublesome, it is also (6 m)-troublesome for every m > n.
D60γ ([0, T ]) is covered by open intervals Ui on which γ has at most one backwards bend,
as discussed after definition A.1.6. Thus π(D60γ ([0, T ])) is covered by sets π(Ui), and
then by compactness of π(D60γ ([0, T ])) is covered by finitely many such sets (since π is
an open map). Thus every smooth knot which projects nicely is n-troublesome for some
n ∈ N.
Now we put proposition A.1.21 together with proposition A.1.9.
Proposition 1.23 (Decreasing trouble). Let γ be a smooth knot which is (6n)-troublesome.
Then γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot β which is (6n−1)-troublesome.
Proof. Suppose γ is a smooth knot which is (6n)-troublesome. Write




with |I| = n and where for each i, γ has at most one backwards bend on Ui. If for
some i 6= j we have π(D60γ (Ui)) ⊆ π(Uj) then we can discard Ui and obtain that γ is
(6n−1)-troublesome. Thus we may assume that for all i 6= j, π(D60γ (Ui)) * π(Uj). But
then for all i 6= j, D60γ (Ui) * π−1(π(Uj)) = Uj + TZ.
Picking i ∈ I, by proposition A.1.21 we can let β be a smooth knot which projects
nicely and is a bending forwards of γ on some compact interval J and such that if t ∈ Ui
then Dβ(t) > 0.
Letting D>0β (J) = {t ∈ J | Dβ(t) > 0} we have that D60γ (Ui) ⊆ D
>0
β (J), so if j 6= i
we have D>0β (J) * Uj+TZ, so D
>0
β (J) * Int(D60γ (Uj))+TZ. Thus by proposition A.1.9
β has at most one backwards bend on Uj , so has at most one backwards bend on Uj .
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Taking L = {i ∈ I | D60β (Ui) 6= ∅}, we have |L| < |I|. Suppose that t ∈ D
60
β ([0, T ]), so
Dβ(t) 6 0. Then Dγ(t) 6 0, so π(t) ∈ π(Ui) for some i, i.e. there is t′ ∈ Ui with t ≡ t′.
Thus i ∈ L, and t′ ∈ Ui, so t ∈ π(Ui) ⊆
∪
j∈L π(Uj). Thus π(D
60




Finally we have our desired conclusion.
Lemma 1.24 (Alexander’s lemma). Let γ be a smooth knot. Then there is a smooth
knot β which is smoothly isotopic to γ such that β has regular projection avoiding 0, and
we have Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
Proof. By proposition A.1.23 and induction, if γ is (6 n)-troublesome for any n then
γ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot β which is (6 0)-troublesome, and thus with
Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
Now let γ be any smooth knot. By proposition A.1.10 together with proposition A.1.5
the set of smooth knots which project nicely is dense in the set of smooth knots. Thus
by theorem A.3.8, every smooth knot is isotopic to a smooth knot which projects nicely.
Thus we can find a smooth knot γ∗ which projects nicely which is smoothly isotopic to
γ.
As discussed after definition A.1.22, γ∗ is n-troublesome for some n. But then as
initially noted, γ∗ is smoothly isotopic to a smooth knot β with Dβ(t) > 0 for all t.
Since γ is thus smoothly isotopic to β we are done.
2 Smooth and periodic functions
If U is an open subset of Rn then a smooth function f : U → Rm is one which has
continuous partial derivatives of all orders on U . Then identity functions are smooth,
linear and bilinear maps are smooth, products and sums of smooth functions are smooth,
and compositions of smooth functions are smooth.
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Then for arbitrary subsets A of Rn, smooth functions on A are defined to be those
which have smooth extensions in the neighbourhood of each point.
Definition 2.1. Let A ⊆ Rn. A function f : A → Rm is smooth if for every a ∈ A
there is a neighbourhood U of a in Rn and a smooth function f̃ : U → Rm such that
f̃ |A∩U = f |A∩U .
If A ⊆ R and B is a linear subspace of Rn we let C∞(A,B) denote the vector
space of smooth functions f from A to Rn such that Image(f) ⊆ B. Again, identity
functions on arbitrary subsets of R are smooth, products and sums of smooth functions
are smooth, and compositions of smooth functions are smooth. Also, functions that are
locally smooth are smooth: if A ⊆ R and A =
∪
i∈I Ui with each Ui an open subset of
A, and f : A → Rn has that f |A∩Ui is smooth for all i ∈ I, then f is smooth.







(similar to the norm on C∞T (R, V )).
The key difference between smooth functions and real analytic functions is that
smooth functions are not rigid: they can be going “along one path” at one point, and
then smoothly change to going “along another path”. This difference is exemplified by
the existence of smooth cutoff functions.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a smooth function f : R → R such that f(x) = 0 for
x 6 0, f(x) = 1 for x > 1, and f is strictly increasing on (0, 1).
Proof. This is a standard fact, see for instance Hirsch (1976, p.42), Guillemin and Pollack
(1974, p.7) or J. Lee (2012, pp.41–42).
One can use such cutoff functions to glue together other smooth functions and obtain
very varied results, often corresponding to intuitive ideas about how functions can be
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“bent”. Some examples of this are seen in propositions A.2.12 to A.2.15.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that γ : R → Rn is differentiable, and that I is a proper
interval such that there is u ∈ Rn such that for all s ∈ I, γ′(s) · u > 0. Then γ is
injective on I.
Proof. The map s 7→ γ(s) · u has positive derivative on I so is strictly increasing on I,
so is injective. Thus s 7→ γ(s) must be injective on I.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose γ : R → Rn is an immersion. Then γ is locally injective,
i.e. for all t there is an open interval U around t such that γ|U is injective.
Proof. Given t ∈ R, we have γ′(t) · γ′(t) = ‖γ′(t)‖2 > 0 and γ′ is continuous so there is
an open interval U around t such that if s ∈ U then γ′(s) · γ′(t) > 0. Thus we are done
by proposition A.2.3.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose γ : U → Rn is an immersion with U an open interval, and
that a < b ∈ U . If γ|[a,b] is injective then there is c < a such that γ|(c,b] is injective.
Proof. We can find δ > 0 such that γ|[a− δ, a+ δ] is injective by proposition A.2.4,
and then since γ(a) /∈ γ([a + δ, b]) there is ε > 0 such that Bε(γ(a)) is disjoint from
γ([a + δ, b]), and then we can find δ′ ∈ (0, δ) such that γ([a − δ′, a + δ′]) ⊆ Bε(γ(b)).
Then if s ∈ [a − δ′, b] and t ∈ [a − δ′, b] with γ(s) = γ(t) then by the choice of δ′ we
cannot have t ∈ [a + δ, b] so must have t < a + δ, but then by the choice of δ we must
have t = s. Thus indeed taking c = a− δ′ we have that γ|[c,b] is injective.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose γ : R → X is T -periodic with X Hausdorff. Then if A ⊆ R
is a saturated closed set then γ(A) is closed, and if U ⊆ R is a saturated open set then
γ(U) is an open subset of γ(R).
Proof. We do the saturated closed sets first. Let A ⊆ R be saturated and closed. Then
f(A) = f(A ∩ [0, T ]) is a compact set therefore closed (since X is Hausdorff). Now let
289
APPENDIX A. THE SMOOTH CASE OF ALEXANDER’S LEMMA
U be saturated and open. Then f(U) = f(R) \ f(U c) is an open subset of f(R), since
f(U c) is a closed subset of X, and thus of f(R).
Proposition 2.7. Suppose γ is a smooth knot. Then if U ⊆ R is open then γ(U) is an
open subset of γ(R).
Proof. We have that γ(U) = γ(U + TZ) which is an open subset of γ(R) by proposi-
tion A.2.6.
Proposition 2.8. Suppose I is a proper interval and γ : I → Rn is smooth. Suppose
that sup(I) − inf(I) > T and γ is T -periodic on I, i.e. that if s, t ∈ I with s − t ∈ TZ
then γ(s) = γ(t). Then there is a unique T -periodic map γ : R → Rn such that γ|I = γ.
We call γ the T -periodic extension of γ to R.
Proof. Since sup(I) − inf(I) >, for every t ∈ R there is t′ ∈ I with t ≡ t′. We define γ(t)
to be γ(t′) for any such t′. This is well defined since γ is T -periodic, and is smooth since
it is smooth on each Int(I) + Tk for k ∈ Z, and these are open sets which cover R.
Proposition 2.9. Let γ : U → Rn be a C1 curve, with U an open interval and n > 2.
Then Image(γ) has measure zero, and there is no open set U ⊆ Rn such that U ⊆
Image(γ).
Proof. Cover U by countably many sections [ai, bi] on which γ is Lipschitz, i.e. there
is K > 0 such that ‖γ(s) − γ(t)‖ 6 K|s − t|. There is L > 0 such that the measure
of a ball of radius ε in Rn is Lεn. Fix i. Given m ∈ N, we can divide [ai, bi] into m
sections [c0, c1], . . . [cm−1, cm], with cj+1 − cj = bi−aim for each j. Then each γ([cj , cj+1])
is compact and therefore measurable, and we have
γ([cj , cj+1]) ⊆ BK(bi−ai)
m
(γ(cj)),
so the measure of γ([cj , cj+1]) is at most L(K(bi−ai)m )
n. Thus the measure of γ([ai, bi])
is at most nL(K(bi−ai)m )
n. As n → ∞ this quantity tends to zero, so the measure of
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γ([ai, bi]) is zero. γ(U) is a countable union of such sets, so has measure zero. Thus it
can contain no open set.
Proposition 2.10. The map exp∗ : C∞T (R,C) → C∞T (R,C), α 7→ exp ◦α is continuous.
Proof. Let α ∈ C∞T (R,C) and let ε > 0. We seek δ > 0 such that ‖β − α‖C1 < δ implies
‖exp ◦β − exp ◦α‖C1 < ε. WLOG we may assume ε 6 1.
Let K = max(‖α‖C1 , ‖exp ◦α‖C1 , 1). Let A = {z | |z| 6 K + 1}. The set A is
compact so exp is uniformly continuous on it. Thus we can find δ > 0 such that if
|w − z| < δ then |exp(w) − exp(z)| < ε3K . WLOG we may assume δ(K + 1) <
ε
3 . Then
if ‖β −α‖C1 < δ we have for any t that |exp(β(t)) − exp(α(t))| 6 ε3K 6
ε
3 . Thus for any
t, |exp(β(t))| 6 |exp(α(t))| + |exp(β(t)) − exp(α(t))| 6 K + ε3K < K + 1. Then we have
|(exp ◦β)′(t) − (exp ◦α)′(t)| = |β′(t) exp(β(t)) − α′(t) exp(α(t))|
6 |(β′(t) − α′(t)) exp(β(t))| + |α′(t)(exp(β(t)) − exp(α(t)))|
6 δ(K + 1) +K|exp(β(t)) − exp(α(t))|










Thus ‖exp ◦β − exp ◦α‖C1 < ε3+
2ε
3 = ε, as required.
Proposition 2.11. Let γ : B → Rn be smooth with B ⊆ R a proper interval. Then the
map
Fγ : B2 → Rn, (x, y) 7→

γ(x)−γ(y)
x−y if x 6= y
γ′(x) if x = y
is smooth.
Proof. First, if e is an endpoint of B then γ has a smooth extension to a neighbourhood
of e. Thus γ has a smooth extension γ̃ to an open interval U with B ⊆ U . Thus WLOG
we may assume B is open.
291
APPENDIX A. THE SMOOTH CASE OF ALEXANDER’S LEMMA
By the integral form of the remainder for Taylor’s theorem we have for all (x, y) ∈ B2
that
f(y) = f(x) + (y − x)f ′(x) + (y − x)2
∫ 1
0
(1 − s)f ′′(x+ s(y − x)) ds.
Thus we have Fγ = f ′(x) + (y − x)
∫ 1
0 (1 − s)f ′′(x + s(y − x)) ds, which is a smooth
function by the ability to differentiate under the integral sign (here we use that B2 is
open, often taken as a prerequisite for differentiating under the integral sign).
Proposition 2.12. Let I be a proper interval, and let a > b with [a, b] ⊆ I. Let
f, g : I → R be smooth functions. Then there is a smooth function h such that
• h(t) = f(t) for t 6 a
• h(t) = g(t) for t > b
• min(f(t), g(t)) 6 h(t) 6 max(f(t), g(t)) for t ∈ [a, b]
• min(f(t), g(t)) < h(t) < max(f(t), g(t)) for t ∈ (a, b) such that f(t) 6= g(t)
Proof. Let φ : R → R be a smooth function with φ(t) = 0 for t 6 a, φ(t) = 1 for t > b,
and φ(t) ∈ (0, 1) for t ∈ (a, b). Then the function h : t 7→ f(t) +φ(t)(g(t) − f(t)) has the
required properties.
Proposition 2.13. Let I be a proper interval, and let a > b with [a, b] ⊆ I. Let
f, g : I → R be smooth functions with f(t) 6 g(t) for t ∈ [a, b] and f ′(t), g′(t) > 0 on
[a, b]. Then there is a smooth function h : I → R such that
• h(t) = f(t) for t 6 a
• h(t) = g(t) for t > b
• f(t) 6 h(t) 6 g(t) for t ∈ [a, b]
• h′(t) > min(f ′(t), g′(t)) for t ∈ [a, b]
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• h′(t) > min(f ′(t), g′(t)) if t ∈ (a, b) and f ′(t) 6= g′(t)
Proof. Take φ as in the previous proposition, but with the added requirement that φ′ > 0
on [a, b]. Let h(t) = f(t) + φ(t)(g(t) − f(t)) as above. Then if t ∈ [a, b] we have
h′(t) = φ′(t)(g(t) − f(t)) + φ(t)(g′(t) − f ′(t)) + f ′(t)
> φ(t)(g′(t) − f ′(t)) + f ′(t)
since g(t) > f(t). This proves the proposition since φ(t)(g′(t)−f ′(t))+f ′(t) > min(f ′(t), g′(t)),
and if f ′(t) 6= g′(t) and t ∈ (a, b) then φ(t) ∈ (0, 1) so φ(t)(g′(t) − f ′(t)) + f ′(t) >
min(f ′(t), g′(t)).
Proposition 2.14. Let I be a proper interval and f, g : I → R smooth. Suppose we
have a < b ∈ I such that f(t) < 0 and g(t) > 0 for t ∈ [a, b]. Then there is a smooth
function h : I → R such that
• h(t) = f(t) for t 6 a
• h(t) = g(t) for t > b
• f(t) < h(t) < g(t) for t ∈ (a, b)
• h has a single simple zero in [a, b]
Proof. We can find c, d > 0 such that if t ∈ [a, b] then f(t) 6 −c and g(t) > d. Then
by proposition A.2.12 there is a smooth function f2 : I → R such that f2(t) = f(t) for
t 6 a, f2(t) = −c for t > 2a+b3 , and −c > f2(t) > f(t) for t ∈ (a,
2a+b
3 ). Similarly there is
a smooth function g2 : I → R such that g2(t) = d for t 6 a+2b3 , g2(t) = g(t) for t > b, and
d < g2(t) < g(t) for t ∈ (a+2b3 , b). It follows from these that f2(t) > f(t) for t ∈ (a, b)
and g2(t) < g(t) for t ∈ (a, b).
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Let φ : R → R be a smooth function with 0 6 φ(t) 6 1 for all t, φ(t) = 0 for t 6 2a+b3 ,




3 ). Then we can take
h(t) = φ(t)(g2(t) − f2(t)) + f2(t).
This is smooth and satisfies h(t) = f2(t) for t 6 2a+b3 and h(t) = g2(t) for t >
a+2b
3 .
Thus we have h(t) = f(t) for t 6 a and h(t) = g(t) for t > b. If t ∈ (a, b) we have
f(t) < f2(t) 6 h(t) 6 g2(t) < g(t), so f(t) < h(t) < g(t).
Since h(t) = f2(t) 6 −c for t ∈ [a, 2a+b3 ], h has no zeroes on [a,
2a+b
3 ]. Similarly
we have h(t) = g2(t) > d for t ∈ [a+2b3 , b] so h has no zeroes on [
a+2b
3 , b]. Finally on
(2a+b3 ,
a+2b
3 ) we have f2(t) = −c and g2(t) = c so
h′(t) = φ′(t)(d− (−c)) > 0.
Thus h has a unique simple zero on [2a+b3 ,
a+2b
3 ], so has a unique simple zero on [a, b].
Proposition 2.15. Let I be a proper interval and f, g : I → R smooth. Let a < b ∈ I
such that g(a) > f(a) and if t ∈ [a, b] then f ′(t) < 0, g′(t) > 0. Then there is a smooth
function h : I → R such that
• h(t) = f(t) for t 6 a
• h(t) = g(t) for t > b
• f(t) < h(t) 6 g(t) for t ∈ (a, b)
• f ′(t) < h′(t) for t ∈ (a, b]
• h′ has a single simple zero on [a, b]
Proof. By proposition A.2.14 we can find a smooth function θ : I → R such that θ(t) =
f ′(t) for t 6 a, θ(t) = g′(t) for t > a+b2 , f ′(t) < θ(t) < g′(t) for t ∈ (a,
a+b
2 ), and with θ
having a single simple zero in [a, a+b2 ].
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Let φ : R → R be any smooth non zero non negative function such that if φ(t) > 0
then t ∈ (a+b2 , b). For k > 0 let
ψk : I → R, t 7→

∫ t
a(θ(t) + kφ(t)) dt+ f(a) if t > a
f(a) −
∫ a
t (θ(t) + kφ(t)) dt if t 6 a.
By the fundamental theorem of calculus, for each k this is smooth with ψ′k(t) = θ(t) +
kφ(t). Thus we have ψ′k(t) > f ′(t) for t ∈ (a, b], so ψk(t) > f(t) for t ∈ (a, b]. If
t ∈ [a, a+b2 ] then ψ
′




Also if t ∈ (a+b2 , b) then ψ
′
k(t) = θ(t) + kφ(t) > θ(t) = g′(t). Additionally if t ∈ [a+b2 , b]
then ψ′k(t) > θ(t) > g′(t) > 0, and if t ∈ [a, a+b2 ] then ψk(t) = θ(t), so ψ′k has a single
simple zero on [a, b].
We have ψk(a) = f(a), and φ0(b) = f(a)+
∫ b
a θ(t) dt 6 g(a)+
∫ b











which is a continuous function of k which tends to ∞ as k tends to ∞ (since
∫ b
a φ(t) dt >
0), so there is k > 0 with ψk(b) = g(b). Thus ψk(t) = g(t) for t > b. Then for this k
for all t ∈ [a+b2 , b] we have ψ
′
k(t) > g′(t), so for any such t we must have ψk(t) 6 g(t).
Also it was noted above that if t ∈ [a, a+b2 ] then ψk(t) 6 g(t), so for all t ∈ [a, b] we have
ψk(t) 6 g(t).
Then taking this value of k we have that ψk : I → R is smooth, that ψk(t) = f(t)
for t 6 a, that ψk(t) = g(t) for t > b, that f(t) < ψk(t) 6 g(t) for t ∈ (a, b), that
f ′(t) < ψ′k(t) for t ∈ (a, b), and that ψ′k has a single simple zero in [a, b].
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3 Smooth knots and projections
To cover at the same time certain facts both about smooth knots and about projections
of smooth knots onto a plane, here V will be used to denote either R3 or the subspace
R2 × {0} of R3, which can be identified with R2 (and with C). One can derive facts
about projection onto a general plane P ⊆ R3 from facts about projection onto R2 ⊆ R3
by a rotation (and translation) of space.
If γ : A → Rn is a curve with A a compact interval, we can define the notions of
crossing pair and crossing point for γ in a similar way as for T -periodic curves. We say
that (s, t) ∈ A2 is a crossing pair of γ if s 6= t and γ(s) = γ(t). We say that s ∈ A is a
crossing point of γ if (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ for some t ∈ A.
Proposition 3.1. The relation ∼ of there being a smooth isotopy from β to γ is an
equivalence relation on knots.
Proof. If γ is a smooth knot then the map H : [0, 1] × R, (s, t) 7→ γ(t) is smooth – it is
γ ◦ π2 where π2 : [0, 1] × R → R is the second projection, a restriction of a linear map.
For all s we have Hs = γ which is a smooth knot, and H0 = H1 = γ, so ∼ is reflexive.
If β and γ are smooth knots, and H is a smooth isotopy from β to γ, then H̃ :
(s, t) 7→ H(1 − s, t) is a smooth isotopy from γ to β, so ∼ is symmmetric.
Now suppose H is a smooth isotopy from α to β, and J is a smooth isotopy from β
to γ. Let f : R → R be a smooth bump function as described in proposition A.2.2. Let
0 < ε < 12 and let g(t) = f(
1
1−2ε(t − ε)). Then g is smooth, and we have g(t) = 0 for




H(g(2s), t) if s 6 12
J(g(2s− 1), t) if s > 12 .
This is well defined since H(1, t) = β(t) = J(0, t). We have that G|[0, 12 )×R : (s, t) 7→
H(g(2s), t) is smooth, and G|( 12 ,1]×R : (s, t) 7→ J(g(2s − 1), t) is smooth. But also if
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s ∈ (1−ε2 ,
1





then g(2s−1) = 0 so J(g(2s−1)) = β(t). Thus we have that G|( 1−ε2 , 1+ε2 )×R : (s, t) 7→ β(t)
is smooth. Thus G is locally smooth (smooth on each of a collection of open subsets of
[0, 1] × R, which collectively cover [0, 1] × R) so is smooth. Finally we have G0 = α and
G1 = γ, so α ∼ γ. Thus ∼ is transitive.
Proposition 3.2. The set of elements of C∞T (R, V ) that are immersions is open.
Proof. Let γ ∈ C∞T (R, V ) be a smooth immersion. Since γ′ 6= 0 and γ is periodic we can
find δ > 0 such that ‖γ′(t)‖ > δ for all t. Then if β ∈ C∞T (R, V ) and ‖β − γ‖C1 < δ we
have ‖β′(t)‖ > 0 for all t, so β is an immersion.
We denote the set of elements of C∞T (R, V ) that are immersions by CImmT (R, V ).
Proposition 3.3. Let
NotCrossPairV
= {(γ, s, t) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R2 | (s, t) is not a crossing pair of γ}
= {(γ, s, t) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R2 | s ≡ t or γ(s) = γ(t)}.
Then NotCrossPairV is an open subset of CImmT (R, V ) × R2.
Proof. Let (γ, s, t) be an element of NotCrossPairV .
Suppose we have s ≡ t, with t = s + kT , k ∈ Z. Then γ′(s) 6= 0, and we can find
δ > 0 and an open interval U around s such that γ′(x) · γ′(s) > ‖γ
′(s)‖2
2 on U . Then
if ‖β − γ‖C1 <
‖γ′(s)‖2
2 then γ
′(x) · γ′(s) > 0 so by proposition A.2.3 we have that β is
injective on U . Then if we have x ∈ U and y ∈ U + kT with β(x) = β(y), then we have
β(x) = β(y − kT ) with y − kT ∈ U so x = y − kT so x ≡ y. Thus β has no crossing
pairs on U × U + kT . Thus Bδ(γ) × U × (U + kT ) is an open neighbourhood of (γ, s, t)
contained in NotCrossPairV .
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Now suppose we have γ(s) 6= γ(t). We can find δ > 0 such that B2δ(γ(s)) and
B2δ(γ(t)) are disjoint, and we can find open intervals U around s and V around t such
that γ(U) ⊆ Bδ(γ(s)) and γ(V ) ⊆ Bδ(γ(t)). Then if ‖β − γ‖C1 < δ then β(U) ⊆
B2δ(γ(s)) and β(V ) ⊆ B2δ(γ(t)), so β(U) and β(V ) are disjoint, so β has no crossing
pairs on U × V . Thus Bδ(γ) × U × V is an open neighbourhood of (γ, s, t) contained in
NotCrossPairV .
Proposition 3.4. Let
NotCrossPointV = {(γ, s) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R | s is not a crossing point of γ}.
Then NotCrossPointV is an open subset of CImmT (R, V ) × R.
Proof. Note that we have
NotCrossPointV = {(γ, s) | for all t ∈ R, (γ, s, t) ∈ NotCrossPairV }
= {(γ, s) | for all t ∈ [0, T ], (γ, s, t) ∈ NotCrossPairV }.
Thus if (γ, s) ∈ NotCrossPointV then we have {γ} × {s} × [0, T ] ⊆ NotCrossPairV ,
so since [0, T ] is compact and NotCrossPairV is open there is an open neighbourhood
U ⊆ CImmT (R, V ) × R of {(γ, s)} such that U × [0, T ] ⊆ NotCrossPairV . Thus U ⊆
NotCrossPointV .
Proposition 3.5. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R, V ). Then the set of crossing pairs of γ is a closed
set, as is the set of crossing points.
Proof. Let ι2γ : R2 → CImmT (R, V ) × R2, (s, t) 7→ (γ, s, t), and ι1γ : R → CImmT (R, V ) ×
R, s 7→ (γ, s), which are continuous. The set of crossing pairs of γ is ((ι2γ)−1(NotCrossPairV ))c,
which is closed since NotCrossPairV is open. Similarly the set of crossing points of γ is
((ι1γ)−1(NotCrossPointV ))c, which is closed.
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Theorem 3.6. The set of smooth knots is an open subset of C∞T (R,R3).
Proof. Note that the set of smooth knots is the set
{γ ∈ CImmT (R,R3) | for all s ∈ R, (γ, s) ∈ NotCrossPointV }
= {γ ∈ CImmT (R,R3) | for all s ∈ [0, T ], (γ, s) ∈ NotCrossPointV },
and NotCrossPointV is open by proposition A.3.4. Thus if γ is a smooth knot then
we have {γ} × [0, T ] ⊆ NotCrossPointV , so there is an open neighbourhood W ⊆
CImmT (R,R3) of γ such that W × [0, T ] ⊆ NotCrossPointV , so W consists only of smooth
knots, and is open in C∞T (R,R3) since CImmT (R,R3) is.
By a very similar argument we obtain:
Proposition 3.7. Let A be a compact proper interval. Then the set of α ∈ C∞(A, V )
which are injective smooth immersions is an open set.
Theorem 3.8. Smooth isotopy classes of knots are open subsets of C∞T (R,R3).
Proof. It suffices to show that for all γ, there is ε > 0 such that if ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε then β
is smoothly isotopic to γ. By theorem A.3.6 there is ε > 0 such that if ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε
then β is a smooth knot. Then if ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε, we can construct a smooth isotopy
from γ to β. Indeed, let
H(s, t) = γ(t) + s(β(t) − γ(t)).
This is visibly smooth. For all s and t we have
‖Hs − γ‖C1 = ‖s(β(t) − γ(t))‖C1 6 ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε
so Hs is a smooth knot for all s. Since H0 = γ and H1 = β, H is the required smooth
isotopy.
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Proposition 3.9. Let u, v ∈ Rn be non zero and non parallel, n ∈ N×. Then there is
δ > 0 such that for any smooth curves γ : I → Rn, β : J → Rn with ‖γ′(x) − u‖ < δ for
x ∈ I and ‖β′(y) − v‖ < δ for y ∈ J , where I and J are proper intervals, then there is
at most one pair (x, y) ∈ I × J with γ(x) = β(y), and if there is such a pair then γ′(s)
and β′(t) are non zero and non parallel.
Proof. We prove a little intermediary result, which is that if u, v ∈ Rn are non zero and
non parallel then there is δ > 0 such that if x ∈ Bδ(u), y ∈ Bδ(v) then x, y are non
zero and non parallel. Indeed since u‖u‖ 6=
v
‖v‖ there are open subsets U and V of S
n−1
which are neighbourhoods of u‖u‖ and
v
‖v‖ respectively, such that U ∩ V = ∅. Then
U ′ = {x 6= 0 | x‖x‖ ∈ U} and V
′ = {y 6= 0 | y‖y‖ ∈ V } are disjoint open neighbourhoods
of u and v respectively. Thus we can pick δ > 0 such that Bδ(u) ⊆ U ′ and Bδ(v) ⊆ V ′,
and the claim is proved.
WLOG we may assume that this δ is small enough that if ‖w−u‖ < δ then w ·u > 0,
and that if ‖z − v‖ < δ then z · v > 0. Suppose that we have curves γ : I → Rn,
β : J → Rn with I and J proper intervals, and s ∈ I and t ∈ J such that γ(s) = β(t),
and such that ‖γ′(x)−u‖ < δ for x ∈ I and ‖β′(y)−v‖ < δ for y ∈ J . Then by the choice
of δ we have γ′(x) · u > 0 for x ∈ I and β′(y) · v > 0 for t ∈ J so by proposition A.2.3
we have that γ is injective on I and β is injective on J .
If there are no pairs (s, t) ∈ I × J with γ(x) = β(y) then we are done, so suppose we
have such a pair (s, t). We have ‖γ′(s) −u‖ < δ and ‖β′(t) −v‖ < δ so by the choice of δ
we have that γ′(s) and β′(t) are non zero and non parallel. Thus we need only show that
(s, t) is the only pair in (x, y) ∈ I × J such that γ(x) = β(y). Since γ is injective on I,
we have if x ∈ I \ {s} that γ(x) 6= γ(s) = β(t). Similarly if y ∈ J \ {t} then β(y) 6= γ(s).
Thus we need only show that if x ∈ I \ {s} and y ∈ J \ {t} then γ(x) 6= β(y).
If f : x 7→ γ(x)−ux then ‖f ′(x)‖ = ‖γ′(x)−u‖ < δ for x ∈ I so ‖f(x)−f(s)‖ < δ|x−s|
for x 6= s, or in other words ‖γ(x) − γ(s) − u(x− s)‖ < δ|x− s|, so ‖γ(x)−γ(s)x−s − u‖ < δ.
Similarly if y ∈ J and y 6= t then ‖β(y)−β(t)y−t − v‖ < δ. Thus by the choice of δ, we have
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that γ(x)−γ(s)x−s and
β(t)−β(y)
t−y are non zero and non parallel. Thus γ(x)−γ(s) 6= β(t)−β(y),
so since γ(s) = β(t) we must have γ(x) 6= β(y), as required.
Theorem 3.10. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R, V ), and suppose that γ has only transverse crossings.
Then the set of crossing pairs of γ is a closed isolated set, and has finite intersection
with any compact set. The set of crossing points of γ also has finite intersection with
any compact set.
Proof. Let C be the set of crossing pairs of γ. This is closed by proposition A.3.5. We
show it is isolated. Suppose s 6≡ t and γ(s) = γ(t), so γ′(s) and γ′(t) are not parallel.
By proposition A.3.9 there is δ > 0 such that if we have curves α : I → R3, β : J → R3
with I and J proper intervals with ‖α′(x) − β′(s)‖ < δ for x ∈ I and ‖β′(y) − β′(t)‖ < δ
for y ∈ J , then there is at most one pair (x, y) ∈ I × J with α(x) = β(y), and if there is
such a pair then γ′(s) and β′(t) are non zero and non parallel. But by continuity of γ′
at s and at t we can find open intervals U around s and W around t such that if x ∈ U
then ‖γ′(x) − γ′(s)‖ < δ and if y ∈ W then ‖γ′(y) − γ′(t)‖ < δ. Thus there is at most
one pair (x, y) ∈ U ×W with γ(x) = γ(y), i.e. C ∩ (U ×W ) = {(s, t)}, so C is isolated.
Then since C is closed, if A is compact then A∩C is compact, and thus both compact
and isolated, and so finite. If D is the set of crossing points of γ then if B ⊆ R is compact
then we have that D ∩ B = π1(C ∩ (B × [0, T ])), where π1 is projection onto the first
co-ordinate. Thus D ∩B is indeed finite.
By a very similar argument we obtain:
Proposition 3.11. Let A be a compact proper interval, γ : A → V a smooth immersion
such that if s 6= t with γ(s) = γ(t) then γ′(s) and γ′(t) are not parallel. Then the set of
crossing pairs is a closed and isolated set, and thus a compact and isolated set, and thus
a finite set. The set of crossing points of γ is also finite.
Definition 3.12. If γ ∈ C∞T (R, V ), say that (r, s, t) is a triple crossing of γ if we have
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r 6≡ s, r 6≡ t, s 6≡ t, and γ(r) = γ(s) = γ(t). Say that (s, t) ∈ R2 is at most a double
crossing of γ if for all r ∈ R we have that (r, s, t) is not a triple crossing of γ.
It is immediate that (r, s, t) is a triple crossing of γ iff (r, s), (r, t) and (s, t) are
crossing pairs of γ, and that if (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ then it is a double crossing iff
it is at most a double crossing by the above definition.
Proposition 3.13. Let
NotCrossTripleV =
{(γ, r, s, t) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R3 | (r, s, t) is not a triple crossing of γ}.
Then NotCrossTripleV is an open subset of CImmT (R, V ) × R3.
Proof. Let
π1,2 : CImmT (R, V ) × R3 → CImmT (R, V ) × R2, (γ, r, s, t) 7→ (γ, r, s)
π1,3 : CImmT (R, V ) × R3 → CImmT (R, V ) × R2, (γ, r, s, t) 7→ (γ, r, t)
π2,3 : CImmT (R, V ) × R3 → CImmT (R, V ) × R2, (γ, r, s, t) 7→ (γ, s, t)
These are continuous maps. Then NotCrossPairV is open by proposition A.3.3, and as
noted before the proposition we have
NotCrossTripleV =
π−11,2(NotCrossPairV ) ∪ π
−1
1,3(NotCrossPairV ) ∪ π
−1
2,3(NotCrossPairV ),
which is visibly open.
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Proposition 3.14. Let
AtMostDoubleV =
{(γ, s, t) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R2 | (s, t) is at most a double crossing of γ}.
Then AtMostDoubleV is an open subset of CImmT (R, V ) × R.
Proof. This can be proved from proposition A.3.13 in much the same way as proposi-
tion A.3.4 is deduced from proposition A.3.3.
Proposition 3.15. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R, V ) and suppose that (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ
which is transversal and at most a double crossing. Then there is a neighbourhood U of
γ and a neighbourhood W of (s, t) such that if β ∈ U then β has at most one crossing
pair on W , and any crossing pair (s′, t′) ∈ W of β on W is a transversal double crossing.
Proof. By proposition A.3.14 we can let U ′ be a neighbourhood of γ and W ′ be a
neighbourhood of (s, t) such that if β ∈ U ′ and (s′, t′) ∈ W ′ then (s′, t′) is at most a
double crossing of β. We have that γ′(s) and γ′(t) are non zero and non parallel so by
proposition A.3.9 we can find δ > 0 such that if we have curves α : I → R3n, β : J → R3
with I and J proper intervals with ‖α′(x) − u‖ < δ for x ∈ I and ‖β′(y) − v‖ < δ for
y ∈ J , then there is at most one pair (x, y) ∈ I × J with α(x) = β(y), and if there is
such a pair then α′(s) and β′(t) are non zero and non parallel.
Pick an open interval Ws around s such that if x ∈ Ws then ‖γ′(x) −γ′(s)‖ < δ2 , and
similarly pick an open interval Wt around t such that if y ∈ Wt then ‖γ′(y) −γ′(t)‖ < δ2 .
We can assume that Ws ×Wt ⊆ W ′. Then if β ∈ CImmT (R, V ) with ‖β − γ‖C1 < δ2 , then
for x ∈ Ws we have ‖β′(x) − γ′(s)‖ < δ2 + ‖γ
′(x) − γ′(s)‖ < δ, and similarly for y ∈ Wt
we have ‖β′(y) − γ′(t)‖ < δ. Thus β has at most one crossing pair no Ws × Wt, which
is transversal by the choice of δ, and a double crossing by the choice of W ′.
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Proposition 3.16. For γ ∈ CImmT (R, V ), say that (s, t) ∈ R2 is unproblematic for γ if
either (s, t) is not a crossing pair of γ, or it is a transversal double crossing pair. Then
if we let
UnproblemV = {(γ, s, t) ∈ CImmT (R, V ) × R2 | (s, t) is unproblematic for γ},
then UnproblemV is an open subset of CImmT (R, V ) × R2.
Proof. We need to show that if (γ, s, t) ∈ UnproblemV then there is an open neighbour-
hood W of (γ, s, t) such that W ⊆ UnproblemV . But for (s, t) which is not a crossing
pair of γ this is proved in proposition A.3.3, and for (s, t) which is a transversal double
crossing this is proved in proposition A.3.15.
Theorem 3.17. The set of γ ∈ CImmT (R, V ) which have only double and transversal
crossings is open.
Proof. This follows from proposition A.3.16 in the same way that theorem A.3.6 follows
from proposition A.3.3.
Proposition 3.18. Let P be a plane in R3. Then for all γ ∈ C∞T (R,R3) we have
‖βP − γP ‖C1 6 ‖β − γ‖C1. In particular, the function γ 7→ γP is continuous.
Proof. We define the tangent space TP of P to be {u − v | u, v ∈ P}, which is a plane
parallel to P through 0. We let πTP be the projection onto TP . For any smooth curve γ
we have γ′P (t) = (πP ◦ γ)′(t) = πTP (γ′(t)).
Then for all t we have
‖βP (t) − γP (t)‖ = ‖πP (β(t)) − πP (γ(t))‖ = ‖πP ((β − γ)(t))‖ 6 ‖(β − γ)(t)‖
and similarly
‖β′P (t) − γ′P (t)‖ = ‖πTP (β
′(t)) − πTP (γ
′(t))‖ = ‖πTP ((β − γ)
′(t))‖ 6 ‖(β − γ)′(t)‖.
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Thus
‖(βP − γP )(t)‖ + ‖(βP (t) − γP )′(t)‖ 6 ‖(β − γ)(t)‖ + ‖(β − γ)′(t)‖ 6 ‖β − γ‖C1
which proves the result.
Proposition 3.19. Let P be a plane, p0 a point in P . The set of smooth curves γ ∈
C∞T (R,R3) such that for all t, γP (t) 6= p0 is open and dense.
Proof. First, openness. Suppose we have γ ∈ C∞T (R,R3) such that for all t γP (t) 6= p0.
The function t 7→ ‖γP (t) − p0‖ is thus continuous and periodic on R, and everywhere
positive, so there is δ > 0 such that ‖γP (t)−p0‖ > δ for all t. Then if β ∈ C∞T (R,R3) with
‖β− γ‖C1 < δ then for all t we have ‖βP (t) − γP (t)‖ 6 ‖β− γ‖C1 by proposition A.3.18
so
‖βP (t) − p0‖ > ‖γP (t) − p0‖ − ‖βP (t) − γP (t)‖ > δ − ‖β − γ‖C1 > 0
so that we have βP (t) 6= p0 for all t, as required.
Now for denseness. Let γ ∈ C∞T (R,R3). Then Image(γP ) cannot contain any ball
around p0, by proposition A.2.9. Thus given ε > 0, we can find q ∈ P \ Image(γP ) with
‖q − p0‖ < ε. Then γ + (p0 − q) is a smooth curve in C∞T (R,R3), with ‖(γ + (p0 − q)) −
γ‖C1 < ε, and for all t, (γ + (p0 − q))P (t) = γP (t) + p0 − q 6= p0 since then we would
have γP (t) = q.
Proposition 3.20. The set CImmT (R,R2) is dense in C∞T (R, C∞T (R,R3)).
Proof. Let γ ∈ C∞T (R,C) and let ε > 0. The function





is a smooth curve so by proposition A.2.9 its image contains no open ball in C around
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Thus ‖β‖C1 6 ‖z‖ + ‖2πiT z‖ < ε. Thus ‖(γ + β) − γ‖C1 < ε. Moreover for all t ∈ R we
have










so (β + γ)′(t) 6= 0.
Thus β + γ is an element of CImmT (R,R2) within ε of γ. That proves the claim.
Proposition 3.21. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R,R2) such that γ has only double and transversal
crossing points. Let c < d < c + T such that γ(c) 6= γ(d). Then there are δ, ε > 0
such that if 0 < h < ε and β : [c − h, d + h] → R2 is smooth with β|[c,d] = γ|[c,d] and
‖β′(t) − γ′(c)‖ < δ for t ∈ [c− h, c] and ‖β′(t) − γ′(d)‖ < δ for t ∈ [d, d+ h] then β is a
smooth immersion and has no crossing points on [c− h, c) ∪ (d, d+ h].
Proof. We pick δc > 0 small enough that if ‖u − γ′(c)‖ < δc then u · γ′(c) > 0, and
pick εc > 0 small enough that if |x − c| < εc then |γ′(x) − γ′(c)| < δc, and γ(d) /∈
γ((c− εc, c+ εc)).
If c is a crossing point of γ|[c,d] then we add extra conditions on the choice of δc and
εc. We have γ(c) = γ(sc) for some sc ∈ (c, d), and γ′(c) and γ′(sc) are non parallel. Thus
by proposition A.3.9 we can pick δc small enough that if we have curves ρ : I → R2,
σ : J → R2 with I and J proper intervals with ‖ρ′(x) − γ′(c)‖ < δc for x ∈ I and
306
3. SMOOTH KNOTS AND PROJECTIONS
‖σ′(y) − γ′(sc)‖ < δc for y ∈ J , then there is at most one pair (x, y) ∈ I × J with
ρ(x) = σ(y). Then we can pick εc small enough that if |x−c| < εc then ‖γ′(x)−γ′(c)‖ < δc
and if |x − sc| < εc then ‖γ′(x) − γ′(sc)‖ < δc. WLOG we may assume that εc is small
enough that (sc − εc, sc + εc) ⊆ (c, d).
Similarly we pick δd > 0 small enough that if ‖u − γ′(d)‖ < δd then u · γ′(d) > 0,
and pick εd > 0 small enough that if |x − d| < εd then |γ′(x) − γ′(d)| < δd, and
γ(c) /∈ γ((d− εd, d+ εd)).
If d is a crossing point of γ|[c,d] then we add extra conditions on the choice of δd and
εd. We have γ(d) = γ(sd) for some sd ∈ (c, d), and γ′(d) and γ′(sd) are non parallel. Thus
by proposition A.3.9 we can pick δd small enough that if we have curves ρ : I → R2,
σ : J → R2 with I and J proper intervals with ‖ρ′(x) − γ′(d)‖ < δd for x ∈ I and
‖σ′(y) −γ′(sd)‖ < δd for y ∈ J , then there is at most one pair (x, y) ∈ I×J with ρ(x) =
σ(y). Then we can pick εd small enough that if |x − d| < εd then ‖γ′(x) − γ′(d)‖ < δc
and if |x− sd| < εd then ‖γ′(x) − γ′(sd)‖ < δd. WLOG we may assume that εd is small
enough that (sd − εd, sd + εd) ⊆ (c, d).
If c is a crossing point of γ|[c,d], take Uc = ((sc − εc, sc + εc) ∪ (c − εc, c + εc)),
otherwise take Uc = (c − εc, c + εc). Similarly for Ud. Thus Uc and Ud are open and
γ(c) /∈ γ([c, d] \ Uc), and γ(d) /∈ γ([c, d] \ Ud), so since γ([c, d] \ Uc) and γ([c, d] \ Ud) are
compact we can find η > 0 such that B2η(γ(c)) is disjoint from γ([c, d]\Uc) and B2η(γ(d))
is disjoint from γ([c, d] \Ud). Now take ε 6 min(εc, εd) such that ε(‖γ′(c)‖ + δc) < η and
ε(‖γ′(d)‖ + δd) < η. Take δ = min(δc, δd).
Now suppose 0 < h < ε and β : [c − h, d + h] → R is smooth with β|[c,d] = γ|[c,d]
and ‖β′(t) − γ′(c)‖ < δ for t ∈ [c − h, c] and ‖β′(t) − γ′(d)‖ < δ for t ∈ [d, d + h]. First
note that if x ∈ [c − h, c] then by assumption ‖β′(x) − γ′(c)‖ < δ, and if x ∈ [c, c + εc)
then x ∈ [c, d] so ‖β′(x) − γ′(c)‖ = ‖γ′(x) − γ′(c)‖ < δc. Thus if x ∈ [c − h, c + εc)
then ‖β′(x) − γ′(c)‖ < δc. Thus if x ∈ [c − h, c + εc) then β′(x) · γ′(c) > 0. Similarly if
y ∈ (d− εd, d+ h] then ‖β′(y) − γ′(d)‖ < δd and β′(y) · γ′(d) > 0.
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This means that β is a smooth immersion, since if x ∈ [c−h, c] then β′(x) · γ′(c) > 0
so β′(x) 6= 0, if y ∈ [d, d + h] then β′(y) · γ′(d) > 0 so β′(y) 6= 0, and if x ∈ [c, d] then
β′(x) = γ′(x) 6= 0.
Now we show that β has no crossing points on [c− h, c) ∪ (d, d+ h]. We have that if
x ∈ [c− h, c+ εc) then β′(x) · γ′(c) > 0, so by proposition A.2.3 β|[c−h,c+εc) is injective.
Thus β has no crossing pair (x, y) with x ∈ [c − h, h), y ∈ (c − ε, c + ε). Thus if c is
not a crossing point of γ then β has no crossing pairs (x, y) with x ∈ [c− h, c), y ∈ Uc.
Suppose on the other hand that c is a crossing point of γ|[c,d], with sc as above. Then
β(c) = β(sc). We have that if x ∈ [c − h, c + εc) then ‖β′(x) − γ′(c)‖ < δc, and if
y ∈ (sc − εc, sc + εc) then ‖γ′(y) − γ′(sc)‖ < δc. Thus by the choice of δc, there is at
most one pair (x, y) ∈ [c − h, c + εc) × (sc − εc, sc + εc) with β(x) = β(y). Thus since
β(c) = β(sc), we have that if x ∈ [c − h, c) and y ∈ (sc − εc, sc + εc) then β(x) 6= β(y).
Then since in this case Uc = ((sc − εc, sc + εc) ∪ (c − εc, c + εc)), we again obtain that
β has no crossing pairs (x, y) with x ∈ [c − h, c) and y ∈ Uc; so whether or not c is a
crossing point of γ|[c,d], β has no crossing pairs (x, y) with x ∈ [c− h, c) and y ∈ Uc.
Next suppose x ∈ [c−h, c] and y ∈ [c, d] \Uc. Then we have ‖γ(y) − γ(c)‖ > 2η, and
‖β(x) − γ(c)‖ 6 sup
t∈[c−h,c]
‖β′(t)‖|t− c| 6 (‖β′(c)‖ + δc)ε < η
by the choice of ε. Thus ‖β(y) − β(x)‖ = ‖γ(y) − β(x)‖ > η. In particular β(y) 6= β(x).
Also taking y = d we have that ‖β(d) −β(x)‖ > η, and by a similar argument we obtain
that if y ∈ [d, d + h] then ‖β(y) − β(d)‖ < η. Thus if x ∈ [c − h, c) and y ∈ [d, d + h]
then β(x) 6= β(y). Thus for all x ∈ [c− h, c) and y ∈ [c− h, d+ h] we have that if x 6= y
then β(x) 6= β(y). Thus β[c−h,d+h] has no crossing points on [c− h, c). The proof that it
has no crossing points on (d, d+ h] is similar.
Proposition 3.22. Let γ ∈ C∞T (R,R2). Let a < b < a+ T and suppose β : U → R2 is
smooth with U an open interval containing [b− T, a], and such that β|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a].
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Let ε > 0. Then there is δ > 0 such that for all h ∈ (0, δ) there is α ∈ C∞T (R,R2) such
that α|[b−T−h,a+h] = β|[b−T−h,a+h], α|[a+2h,b−2h] = γ|[a+2h,b−2h] and ‖α− γ‖C1 < ε.
Proof. Let γ, a, b, U , β be as described. Let η > 0 such that [b− T − η, a+ η] ⊆ U , and
a+ η < b− η + T .
We can find a family φh : (b− T − η, a+ η) → R of smooth functions for h ∈ (0, η2 )
such that 0 6 φh(t) 6 1 for all t, φh(t) = 0 for t 6 b − T − 2h or t > a + 2h, φh(t) = 1
for b− T − h 6 t 6 a+ h, and with a constant K such that |φ′h(t)| 6 Kh for all h and t.
Then for each h the map
[a+ η − T, b− η] → R, t 7→

γ(t) + φh(t)(β(t) − γ(t)) if t ∈ (b− T − η, a+ η)
γ(t) if t /∈ [b− T − 2h, a+ 2h]
is well defined and smooth, and extends to a smooth T -periodic map βh. If t ∈ [a+ η−
T, b− η] we have
β′h(t) =

γ′(t) + φ′h(t)(β(t) − γ(t)) + φh(t)(β′(t) − γ′(t)) if t ∈ (b− T − η, a+ η)
γ′(t) if t /∈ [b− T − 2h, a+ 2h].
We have (β − γ)′′(a) = (β − γ)′′(b) = 0 so there is ρ > 0 such that if h ∈ (0, ρ) then
|β′(a+h) − γ′(a+h)| < h, |β′(b−T −h) − γ′(b−T −h)| < h, |β(a+h) − γ(a+h)| < h2
and |β(b − T − h) − γ(b − T − h)| < h2. We have βh(t) = γ(t) for t ∈ [b − T, a] and
t ∈ [a+ 2h, b− 2h], so letting 0 < h < ρ2 and A = [a, a+ 2h] ∪ [b− T − 2h, c] we have for
all t that |βh(t) − γ(t)| 6 supA‖β(t) − γ(t)‖ 6 4h2 and










· 4h2 + 2h
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so we obtain ‖βh − γ‖C1 6 4h2 + 4Kh+ 2h which tends to zero as h tends to zero. Thus
given ε > 0 we can find δ ∈ (0, η2 ) such that if h ∈ (0, δ) then we have ‖βh − γ‖C1 < ε,
and this satisfies βh|[b−T−h,a+h] = β[b−T−h,a+h] and βh|[a+2h,b−2h] = γ|[a+2h,b−2h].
Proposition 3.23. Let γ : I → R2 be an injective smooth immersion with I a compact
interval, and let σj : Vj → R2 be a smooth immersion for each j ∈ J with each Vj an
open interval and J a countable set. Let X ⊆ R2 be countable. Let a < b ∈ I and let
δ, ε > 0 with δ < b−a2 . Then there is an injective smooth immersion β : I → R
2 with
β(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b), ‖β− γ‖C1 < ε, β′(t) = γ′(t) for t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ], and such that
for all t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ] we have β(t) /∈ X, and if β(t) = σj(s) for any j then β′(t) and
σ′j(s) are not parallel.
Proof. Here we write v ‖ u to signify that the vectors v and u are parallel (or at least
one is zero).
By proposition A.3.7 we can find η > 0 such that if β : I → R2 is smooth with
‖β − γ‖C1 < η then β is an injective smooth immersion.
Let h : R → R be a smooth function with 0 6 h(t) 6 1 for all t, h(t) = 0 for t 6 a
and t > b and h(t) = 1 for t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ]. If z ∈ R2 let
γz : I → R2, t 7→ γ(t) + h(t)z.
We have γz(t) = γ(t) for t /∈ (a, b) and γ′z(t) = γ′(t) for t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ]. We also have
‖γz(t) − γ(t)‖ 6 ‖z‖ for all t, and ‖γ′z(t) − γ′(t)‖ = ‖h′(t)‖‖z‖. Thus if we pick K with
K > h′(t) for all t then we have ‖γz − γ‖C1 6 (1 + K)‖z‖, so if ‖z‖ < max(η,ε)1+K then
γz is an injective smooth immersion and ‖γz − γ‖C1 < ε. Thus letting η′ =
max(η,ε)
1+K we
just need to find z with ‖z‖ < η′ such that if t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ] then γz(t) /∈ X, and if
γz(t) = σj(s) for some j then γ′z(t) and σ′j(t) are not parallel.
For each x ∈ X the image of the curve (a, b) → R2, t 7→ x − γ(t) has measure zero
by proposition A.2.9, so {x− γ(t) | t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ], x ∈ X} has measure zero.
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Now for each j ∈ J , consider the map Rj : Vj × (a, b) → R2, (s, t) 7→ σj(s) − γ(t),
which is smooth. We have ∂Rj∂t |s,t = −γ
′(t), ∂Rj∂s |s,t = σ
′
j(s). Thus if σ′j(s) ‖ γ′(t) then
the Jacobian of Rj at (s, t) has rank 6 1, so (s, t) is a critical point of Rj , so Rj(s, t)
is a critical value of Rj . Thus by Sard’s theorem {Rj(s, t) | σ′j(s) ‖ γ′(t)} has measure
zero, so
{z | ∃j ∈ J, t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ], s ∈ Vj with z = σj(s) − γ(t), σ′j(s) ‖ γ′(t)}
has measure zero.
Thus the union of the above two sets has measure zero, so we can find z with ‖z‖ < η′
and such that for all t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ], for all x ∈ X, x− γ(t) 6= z, and for all such t, all
j ∈ J and all s ∈ Vj , if z = γ(t) −σj(s) then γ′(t) 6 ‖ σ′j(s). But the former just says that
if t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ] and x ∈ X then we have γz(t) = γ(t) + z 6= x, so γz(t) /∈ X. And the
latter just says that if t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ] and j ∈ J and s ∈ Vj with γz(t) = σj(s) then
γ′z(t) = γ′(t) 6 ‖ σ′j(t). Thus taking β to be γz, we are done.
For the next propositions, we extend the notions of transverse crossing and double
crossing to curves with compact domain. Suppose that γ : A → Rn is a C1 immersion
with A a compact proper interval. If (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ, we say that (s, t) is a
transverse crossing if γ′(s) and γ′(t) are non parallel. We say that (s, t) is a double
crossing if when we have r ∈ A with γ(r) = γ(s) = γ(t) then r = s or r = t.
We also introduce the notion of a union-minimal family of sets. If (Ui)i∈I is a family





i∈I Ui. If (Ui)i∈I is a finite family of open intervals in R which is
union-minimal then it is easy to see that for all i we have Ui 6= ∅, we have that the values
(inf(Ui))i∈I are distinct, and that if we order the Ui as U0 . . . Un with inf(Um) < inf(Up)
for m < p then we have for m = 1 . . . (n− 1) that inf(Um) < sup(Um−1) < inf(Um+1) <
sup(Um), and that inf(U0) < inf(U1), sup(Un−1) < sup(Un). Conversely if we have a
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family (Um)nm=0 of nonempty open intervals in R satisfying these conditions then it is
easy to see that (Um)nm=0 is union-minimal. If these conditions are satisfied then we call
(Um)nm=1 an ordered union-minimal family of open intervals.
Lemma 3.24. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R,R2). Let ε > 0. Let (U, V,W ) be an ordered union-
minimal family of open intervals of length < T such that:
• γ|U has only transverse double crossings
• γ|V is injective
• γ|W is injective
• inf(U) > sup(V ) − T
• inf(V ) > sup(W ) − T
Then there are elements β ∈ CImmT (R,R2), a ∈ U ∩ V and b ∈ V ∩ W , and nonempty
open intervals U ′ and W ′ such that:
• ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε
• β|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a]
• β|U ′ has only transverse double crossings
• β|W ′ is injective
• U ′ ⊆ U ∪ V
• W ′ ⊆ W
• U ′ ∪W ′ = U ∪ V ∪W
• b ∈ W ′
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Proof. By proposition A.3.11, γ|U has finitely many crossing points, so we can pick
a ∈ U ∩ V which is not a crossing point of γ|U . Since inf(V ) > sup(V ) − T and
inf(V ) > sup(W ) −T we can choose a so that a > sup(V ) −T and a > sup(W ) −T . We
pick b ∈ V ∩W , and note that b > inf(W ) > sup(V ) > a > sup(V ) − T > b− T . Then
we pick δ > 0 such that a+ δ ∈ U ∩V , such that γ|U has no crossing points on [a, a+ δ],
and such that b− δ ∈ V ∩W . Then γ([a, a+ δ]) and γ([inf(U), inf(V )]) are disjoint, so
we can find η > 0 such that Bη(γ([a, a + δ])) and γ([inf(U), inf(V )]) are disjoint, and
η < ε. Similarly we can find η′ > 0 such that Bη′(γ([b− δ, b])) and γ([sup(V ), sup(W )])
are disjoint. WLOG we assume that η 6 η′. Take
X = {γ(s) | s is a crossing point of γ|U},
a finite set. Now since γ|V is injective, by proposition A.3.23 we can find a smooth
injective immersion ρ : V → R2 such that ρ(t) = γ(t) for t ∈ V \ (a, b), such that
‖ρ − γ|V ‖C1 < η, and such that if we have t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ] then ρ(t) /∈ X, and if
ρ(t) = γ(s) with s ∈ R then ρ′(t) and γ′(s) are not parallel.
Let β be the T -periodic smooth curve with β|V = ρ, β|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a]. This is
well defined since inf(V ) > sup(V ) − T and a > b− T . Then β is a smooth immersion,
with ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε. Since inf(U) > sup(V ) − T we have inf(U) > b − T so that
β|[inf(U),a] = γ|[inf(U),a].
Suppose that (s, t) is a crossing pair of β|[inf(U),b−δ]. We will argue that this crossing
pair is transverse. Since β|V = ρ is injective we cannot have both s, t ∈ [inf(V ), b − δ]
and can assume WLOG that s ∈ [inf(U), inf(V )). Then since β|[inf(U),a] = γ|[inf(U),a], if
t ∈ [inf(U), a] then (s, t) is a crossing pair of γ|U and so β
′(s) = γ′(s) and β′(t) = γ′(t) are
non parallel. Thus we may assume t ∈ (a, b−δ]. But by the choice of η, γ([inf(U), inf(V )])
and ρ([a, a+ δ]) are disjoint, so since β(s) = β(t) we must have t > a+ δ. But then by
the choice of ρ we do indeed have that β′(s) = γ′(s) and γ′(t) = ρ′(t) are non parallel,
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as required.
Next we show that if r, s, t ∈ [inf(U), b − δ] are distinct then it’s not the case that
β(r) = β(s) = β(t). Indeed, suppose that we had r, s, t ∈ [inf(U), b − δ] with β(r) =
β(s) = β(t). Then since β|[inf(V ),b−δ] is injective we have that at least 2 of r, s, t lie
in [inf(U), inf(V )). WLOG r, s ∈ [inf(U), inf(V )), and so β(r) = β(r) = β(s) = γ(s)
and β(r) ∈ X. Then since γ has only double crossing points we cannot have t ∈
[inf(U), inf(V )], and as above since β(t) = β(r) cannot have t ∈ [a, a + δ], so that
we must have t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ. But then ρ(t) = β(t) = β(r) ∈ X, contradicting the
choice of ρ. Thus indeed if r, s, t ∈ [inf(U), b− δ] are distinct then it’s not the case that
β(r) = β(s) = β(t). Thus letting c = b − δ we have that β|[inf(A),c] has only transverse
double crossings.
Now we argue that β|[b−δ,sup(W )] is injective. So let s < t ∈ [b − δ, sup(W )]. Since
sup(W ) − T < a we have β|[b,sup(W )] = γ|[b,sup(W )], so that β|[b,sup(W )] is injective. Thus
if b 6 s < t then β(s) 6= β(t) so we may assume s < b. Then since β|[b−δ,sup(V )] =
ρ|[b−δ,sup(V )] is injective we may assume t > sup(V ). But then we have s ∈ Bη′(γ([b −
δ, b])) and t ∈ γ([sup(V ), sup(W )]) so that by the choice of η′ we have β(s) 6= β(t), and
we are done. Thus β|[b−δ,sup(W )] is indeed injective.
Thus by proposition A.2.5 there is w < b− δ with w ∈ V ∩W such that β|[w,sup(W )]
is injective. Then we let U ′ = (inf(U), b − δ), W ′ = (w, sup(W )), and then this choice
of β, a, b, U ′ and W ′ satisfy the required conditions.
Lemma 3.25. Let γ ∈ CImmT (R,R2). Let ε > 0. Let U, V be nonempty open intervals
of length < T such that:
• γ|U has only transverse double crossings
• γ|V is injective
• sup(U) ∈ V
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• sup(V ) > inf(U) + T
Then there is an element β ∈ CImmT (R,R2) such that ‖β − γ‖C1 < ε and β has only
transverse double crossings.
Proof. The proof is very similar to lemma A.3.24. We have inf(V ) + T > sup(V ) >
inf(U) + T so that inf(U) < inf(V ).
Since γ|U has finitely many crossing points, so we can pick a ∈ U ∩ V which is not a
crossing point of γ|U . Since inf(V ) > sup(V )−T we can choose a so that a > sup(V )−T .
Then we have inf(U) +T < sup(V ) so we can pick b ∈ (inf(U) +T, sup(V )) which is not
a crossing point of γ|U+T , and we obtain inf(U) + T < b < sup(V ) < a + T . Then we
pick δ > 0 such that a + δ ∈ U ∩ V , such that γ|U has no crossing points on [a, a + δ],
such that b − δ > inf(U) + T , and such that γ|U+T has no crossing points on [b, b − δ].
Then γ([a, a + δ]), γ([b − δ − T, b − T ]), and γ([sup(V ) − T, inf(V )]) are disjoint since
γ|U has no crossing points on [a, a+ δ] or [b− δ− T, b− δ]. Thus we can find η > 0 such
that Bη(γ([a, a+ δ])), Bη(γ([b− δ− T, b− T ])) and γ([sup(B) − T, inf(V )]) are disjoint,
and η < ε. Take
X = {γ(s) | s is a crossing point of γ|U},
a finite set. Now since γ|V is injective, by proposition A.3.23 we can find a smooth
injective immersion ρ : V → R2 such that ρ(t) = γ(t) for t ∈ V \ (a, b), such that
‖ρ − γ|V ‖C1 < η, and such that if we have t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ] then ρ(t) /∈ X, and if
ρ(t) = γ(s) with s ∈ R then ρ′(t) and γ′(s) are not parallel.
Let β be the T -periodic smooth curve with β|V = ρ, β|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a]. This is well
defined since the length of V is < T and a > b−T . Then β is a smooth immersion, with
‖β − γ‖C1 < ε.
Suppose that (s, t) is a crossing pair of β. We will argue that this crossing pair is
transverse. We can assume WLOG that s, t ∈ (b−T, b] and that s < t. If s, t ∈ [b−T, a]
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we are done since β|[b−T,a] = γ|[b−T,a] and γ|U has only transverse crossings. If s, t ∈ V
then we are done since β|V = ρ|V is injective. Thus we may assume s < inf(V ), t > a.
Then if s ∈ (b − T, sup(V ) − T ], t ∈ [a, b] we have β(s) = ρ(s + T ) 6= ρ(t) since ρ is
injective. Finally if s ∈ [sup(V ) − T, inf(V )] and t ∈ [a, b] then by the choice of η we
have t /∈ [a, a + δ] ∪ [b − δ, b] so that t ∈ [a + δ, b − δ]. But then by the choice of ρ we
have that β′(s) = γ′(s) and β′(t) = ρ′(t) are non parallel, as required.
Finally we show that if r, s, t ∈ (b − T, b] are distinct then it’s not the case that
β(r) = β(s) = β(t). Indeed, suppose that we had r, s, t ∈ (b − T, b] distinct with
β(r) = β(s) = β(t). Then since β|[inf(V ),b] is injective we have that at least 2 of r, s, t lie
in (b − T, inf(V ))). WLOG r, s ∈ (b − T, inf(V )). Thus γ(r) = β(r) = β(s) = γ(s) and
β(r) ∈ X. Then since γ has only double crossing points we cannot have t ∈ (b − T, a],
and by the choice of η cannot have t ∈ (a, a+ δ) ∪ (b− δ, b] so must have t ∈ [a+ δ, b− δ].
But then ρ(t) = β(t) = β(r) ∈ X, contradicting the choice of ρ. Thus indeed if r, s, t ∈
(b− T, b] are distinct then it’s not the case that β(r) = β(s) = β(t).
Thus β has only transverse double crossings, as required.
Theorem 3.26. The set of β ∈ CImmT (R,R2) which have only double and transversal
crossings is dense.
Proof. Let α ∈ CImmT (R,R2) and let ε > 0. We seek β ∈ CImmT (R,R2) such that ‖β −
α‖C1 < ε and β has only double and transversal crossings. By proposition A.2.4 we can
find a finite open cover U0, . . . Un of [0, T ] such that α|Ui is injective for each i. We may
assume that the length of each Ui is < T , and that this cover is a minimal cover of [0, T ],
and can also arrange things so that n > 2, for convenience. Since this is a minimal cover
of [0, T ] it is certainly a union-minimal family. Then by reordering the Ui may assume
that i < j implies inf Ui < inf Uj , and thus that (Ui)ni=0 is an ordered union-minimal
family. It can be seen that for each i > 0, inf(Ui) > 0. By shrinking the Ui if necessary
we may also assume that inf(U0) > sup(Un−1) − T , sup(Un) < inf(U1) + T .
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We have that α|U0 is injective so has only transverse double crossings (since it has no
crossing points), and α|U1 , α|U2 are also injective. We also have inf(U0) > sup(Un−1) −
T > sup(U1) − T and inf(U1) > 0 > sup(U2) − T . Thus by lemma A.3.24 there is an
element β1 ∈ CImmT (R,R2) with ‖β1 − α‖C1 < εn , and such that there are a1 ∈ U0 ∩ U1,
b1 ∈ U1 ∩ U2 with b and nonempty open intervals I1,W1 such that:
• β1|[b1−T,a1] = γ|[b1−T,a]
• β1|I1 has only transverse double crossings
• β1|W1 is injective
• I1 ⊆ U0 ∪ U1
• W1 ⊆ U2
• I1 ∪W1 = U0 ∪ U1 ∪ U2
• b1 ∈ W1
Suppose that n > 3. Then for i = 3 . . . n, since b1 < inf(Ui) < sup(Ui) 6 sup(Un) <
inf(U1) + T < a1 + T we have that β1|Ui = γ|Ui , and so β1|Ui is injective. Also inf(I1) <
inf(W1) < sup(I1) < inf(U3) < sup(W1) < sup(U3) and so (I1,W1, U3) is an ordered
union-minimal family. Finally inf(I1) > sup(U2) − T = sup(W1) − T , and inf(W1) >
inf(U2) > inf(U1) > sup(Un) − T > sup(U3) − T . Thus we can use lemma A.3.24 again
to obtain that there is an element β2 ∈ CImmT (R,R2) with ‖β2 − β1‖C1 < εn , and such
that there are a2 ∈ I1 ∩W1, b2 ∈ W1 ∩U3 and nonempty open intervals I2,W2 such that:
• β2|[b2−T,a2] = β1|[b2−T,a2]
• β2|I2 has only transverse double crossings
• β2|W2 is injective
• I2 ⊆ I1 ∪W1 ⊆ U0 ∪ U1 ∪ U2
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• W2 ⊆ U3
• I2 ∪W2 = I1 ∪W1 ∪ U3 = U0 ∪ U1 ∪ U2 ∪ U3
• b2 ∈ W2
Thus ‖β2 − α‖C1 < 2εn , a2 ∈ U1 ∩ U2, b2 ∈ U2 ∩ U3.
Suppose that n > 4. Then for i = 4 . . . n, we have that β2|Ui = β1|Ui = γ|Ui
and so β2|Ui is injective. We again have that (I2,W2, U4) is an ordered union-minimal
family, and that inf(I2) > sup(W2) − T , inf(W2) > sup(U4) − T . Thus again we can use
lemma A.3.24 to obtain that there is an element β3 ∈ CImmT (R,R2) with ‖β3−β2‖C1 < εn ,
and such that there are a3 ∈ I2 ∩W2, b3 ∈ I2 ∩ U4 and nonempty open intervals I3,W3
such that
• β3|[b3−T,a3] = β2|[b3−T,a3]
• β3|I3 has only transverse double crossings
• β3|W3 is injective
• I3 ⊆ I2 ∪W2 ⊆ U0 ∪ U1 ∪ U2 ∪ U3
• W3 ⊆ U4
• I3 ∪W3 = U0 ∪ U1 . . . ∪ U4
• b3 ∈ W3
Thus ‖β3 − α‖C1 < 3εn , a3 ∈ U2 ∩ U3, b3 ∈ U3 ∩ U4.
Continuing in this way we obtain ultimately an element βn−1 ∈ CImmT (R,R2) with
‖βn−1 − γ‖C1 <
(n−1)ε
n , such that there are an−1 ∈ Un−2 ∩ Un−1, bn−1 ∈ Un−1 ∩ Un, and
nonempty open intervals In−1, Wn−1 such that
• βn−1|[bn−1−T,an−1] = βn−1|[bn−1−T,an−1]
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• βn−1|In−1 has only transverse double crossings
• βn−1|Wn−1 is injective
• In−1 ⊆ U0 ∪ U1 ∪ . . . ∪ Un−1
• Wn−1 ⊆ Un
• In−1 ∪Wn−1 = U0 ∪ U1 . . . ∪ Un
• bn−1 ∈ Wn−1
But now we have sup(In−1) ∈ Wn−1, sup(Wn−1) = sup(Un) > T > inf(U0) + T =
inf(In−1) + T so we can apply lemma A.3.25 and deduce that there is an element βn ∈
CImmT (R,R2) with ‖βn − βn−1‖C1 < εn and with βn having only transverse and double
crossings. But then ‖βn − α‖C1 < ε and we are done.
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This appendix defends what I call restricted predicative second order logic as an ontolo-
gically innocent fragment of second order logic, which formalizes a conception of second
order logic in which the second order quantifiers are open ended – interpretable at any
point in time as ranging over the open formulae that have so far been formed, but not
limited in their significance to any such restricted domain, and open to extension as the
vocabulary expands. This is similar to the open ended interpretation of schematic logic
that some authors have defended (Lavine 1998, §VII.4; Parsons 2007, §47), but resulting
in a richer, more expressive fragment of full second order logic.
By an open formula we just mean a formula φ for which we have marked out a list
x1, . . . xn of distinct variables as “arguments”. We denote the result by φ(x1, . . . xn).
Then if a1 . . . an are objects, φ(x1, . . . xn) holds of a1 . . . an iff φ is true when each xi
denotes ai. If λ is a closed sentence, then we do not need to mark it with arguments –
λ holds of a1 . . . an iff φ is true.
The syntax of restricted predicative second order logic is the same as that of standard
second order logic. One has a countably infinite stock of first order variables, denoted
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x, y, z, x1, y
′, . . . , and for each natural number n > 1 a (disjoint) countably infinite stock
of second order variables of arity n, commonly denoted P,Q,R, P ′, Q2, . . . . One specifies
a language for the logic by specifying collections of (first order) constants, functions and
relation symbols – each function and relation symbol having a specified arity n > 1.
Terms are formed by applying function symbols to constants and first order variables
as for first order logic. Then R is a relation symbol of arity n, and t1, . . . tn are terms,
then R(t1, . . . tn) is an atomic sentence; similarly if P is a relation symbol of arity n, and
t1, . . . tn are terms, then P (t1, . . . tn) is an atomic sentence. One obtains more complex
sentences by joining sentences with propositional connectives, or affixing quantifiers,
either first order ∀x ∀y or second order ∀P ∀Q of any arity.
If P and Q are second order variables of the same arity and P does not occur in φ
in the scope of any quantifier that binds Q, then we write φ(Q|P ) for the substitution
of Q for P in φ, in the usual way.
Deductively, the difference between predicative second order logic and standard se-
cond order logic is in the comprehension scheme. In standard second order logic this
scheme consists of the formulae
∃P ∀x1 . . . xn (P (x1, . . . xn) ⇔ φ)
for every n, every second order variable P of arity n, every n-tuple x1, . . . xn of distinct
first order variables and every formula φ. In predicative second order logic this scheme
is restricted only to those formulae φ which contain no second order quantifiers. In
restricted predicative second order logic, this scheme is restricted only to those formulae
φ which contain no second order variables at all, bound or free.
Apart from this change, the deductive rules for restricted predicative second order
logic are the same as for standard second order logic. In the introduction and elimination
rules for second order quantifiers, the second order variables of the appropriate arity play
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the role of “terms”.
The above was stated for a setting where we have a single type of first order variables,
in addition to which we introduce second order variables. Sometimes we will also want
to use restricted predicative second order logic in cases where there are multiple types
of first order variables, or for instance a type of first order variables and then also plural
variables. We call such initial types, to which we introduce in addition a type of second
order variables, object types. In cases where there is more than one object type, the arity
of a second order variable is not a number, but instead a list of object types, with atomic
formulae obtained from second order variables by combining them with a list of terms
of the appropriate types.
Importantly though no second order variables are allowed in the formula being used
in an instance of comprehension in restricted predicative second order logic, free and
bound variables of other kinds are: this formalizes the ability to talk for instance about
the predicate “related to x”, where x is a perhaps unknown or unnamed person. This
applies even to variables that may have second order properties, as long as they are
distinguished (of a different type) from the second order variables being used to represent
open formulae. For instance if we accept plural logic, then we allow free (or bound) plural
variables in instances of comprehension, representing the ability to form a predicate like
“related to one of the xx’s” where “xx” is a plural variable. The same goes if as well
as our second order variables discussed here representing predicates or open formulae,
we then introduce a further type of second order variables representing properties or
relations as abstract entities independent of our ability to define them – as long as we
take such entities to exist, and to properly be the subject of quantification, there is no
problem with allowing them in instances of comprehension.
The interpretation of restricted predicative second order logic on which it is ontolo-
gically innocent is one where we make second order assertions that are valid when the
domain of the second order quantifiers consists only of the open formulae we have so far
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formed, but which will remain valid however this domain of quantification expands. As-
serting a universally quantified second order statement thus demands that it will remain
true as we state new formulae, and even expand our language to include new vocabulary.
To see how this works formally, if φ is a formula we can express, then we can state
it in an instance of comprehension
∃P ∀x1 . . . xn (P (x1, . . . xn) ⇔ φ).
Then given a universally quantified formula ∀Q Ψ(Q) where Q is of the same arity as P ,
we can reason about a P whose existence is asserted by this instance of comprehension,
deducing Ψ(P ), and thus Ψ(φ) using the equivalence in the instance of comprehension.
We can give a simple semantics to model ontologically innocent interpretation of this
logic. If φ is a formula and x1, . . . xn are distinct first order variables with n > 1, we call
the pair (φ, (x1, . . . xn)) an open formula, and denote it by φ(x1, . . . xn). We call n the
arity of φ(x1, . . . xn) Given a language L for the logic, by a structure we just mean the
usual notion of first order structure for L. By a second order structure we mean a pair
(M,S) where M is a first order structure and S a set of open formulae which contains
at least one open formula of each arity. In this set up, S can model the set of open
formulae that we have formed at a given point in time.
The condition that S contain an open formula of each arity is important, as it means
we can use the standard natural deduction rules for second order quantifiers instead
of “inclusive” versions of those rules (inclusive being the term for a logic which allows
for the possibility that the domain of quantification may be empty). However it may
seem gratuitous to build this into our definition of second order structure, since it seems
perfectly possible that we will not have managed at a given point in time to have formed
an open formula of every arity; indeed this might seem more like a near certainty than
a possibility, since forming infinitely many open formulae seems a hard task for us finite
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beings. However as noted initially, any closed formula immediately delivers an open
formula of every arity in a trivial way – where the resulting open formula (of each arity)
does not actually depend on the values its arguments take. Thus to obtain a suitable S,
we can take ourselves to be initially specifying some arbitrary closed formula λ, regarding
it as providing an open formula of every arity. If one is uncomfortable with this move
one could otherwise rephrase the deductive system as an inclusive logic (but that would
complicate things).
Back to the semantics. By a variable assignment over such an (M,S) we mean a
function v which assigns an element v(x) ∈ M to each first order variable, and assigns
to each second order variable P an open formula v(P ) ∈ S of the same arity.
We define a notion of satisfaction for a second order structure (M,S), a variable
assignment v over it and a formula φ, in the usual way by induction on φ. We write
this relation holding by (M,S), v  φ. The clauses for interpretation tv of a first order
term t with respect to variable assignment v are the usual ones, as is the clause for
atomic formulae containing relation symbols. If P is a second order variable of arity n
and t1 . . . tn are terms, then we define (M,S), v  P (t1, . . . tn) to hold iff when we write
v(P ) as φ(x1, . . . xn), we have (M,S), v(x1 7→ tv1, . . . xn 7→ tvn)  φ. Then clauses for
propositional connectives and first order quantifiers are as usual, and the clauses for the
second order quantifiers are the obvious ones, for instance with (M,S), v  ∀P φ iff for
every s ∈ S of the same arity as P , we have (M,S), v(P 7→ s)  φ.
We define a sequent to be a pair (Γ, φ) where Γ is a finite set of formulae and φ a
formula. We can write this as Γ ` φ, or as γ1, . . . γn ` φ if Γ = {γ1, . . . γn}. If (M,S)
is a structure and Γ ` φ a sequent, we say that (M,S) satisfies Γ ` φ if every variable
assignment v over (M,S) which satisfies every element of Γ also satisfies φ.
Then the observation underlying the ontologically innocent status of restricted pre-
dicative second order logic is just that whenever we form a derivation D in the logic, the
validity of the conclusion of D is ensured even when the domain of second order quanti-
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fiers is restricted to those open formulae found in instances of predicative comprehension
used in D – so that we never need to assume an infinity of formulae for our reasoning to
be justified, and the formulae we have written down (or stated) always already suffice.
More formally, given an instance
∃P ∀x1 . . . xn (P (x1, . . . xn) ⇔ φ)
of restricted predicative comprehension, we define the corresponding open formula to be
φ(x1, . . . xn). We can take this open formula to be implicitly specified by this instance
of comprehension – with φ being literally written out within it, and the list x1 . . . xn of
variables also literally written out. Then given a derivation D in the logic, we define
the set of open formulae SD corresponding to D to contain open formulae corresponding
to each instance of comprehension in D (and also to contain open formulae of the form
λ(y1, . . . yn) of each arity for some distinguished, specified closed formula λ, as discussed
above).
Then the argument is simply that for each M and D, if φ is the conclusion of D
with live set of premises Γ, then (M,SD) satisfies Γ ` φ. We prove this by proving by
induction on each line ψ of D that if ∆ is the set of live premises at ψ, then (M,SD)
satisfies ∆ ` ψ. For lines that are premises this is trivial, and for lines deduced by any
of the natural deduction rules this is just the standard case of soundness of those rules
(though in a restricted domain, for the rules for second order quantification). The only
potentially problematic case is that of lines which are instances of comprehension. So
suppose that ψ is an instance of comprehension, more explicitly of the form
∃P ∀x1 . . . xn (P (x1, . . . xn) ⇔ φ).
By assumption the open formula φ(x1, . . . xn) is in SD. Suppose that v is any vari-
able assignment over (M,SD). We seek to argue that v satisfies ψ. Assigning value
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φ(x1, . . . xn) ∈ SD to P , it suffices to show that for all a1 . . . an ∈ M , we have
(M,SD), v(P 7→ φ(x1, . . . xn), x1 7→ a1, . . . xn 7→ an)  P (x1, . . . xn)
⇔ (M,SD), v(P 7→ φ(x1, . . . xn), x1 7→ a1, . . . xn 7→ an)  φ.
But this is trivial by the definition of satisfaction for P (x1, . . . xn), so we are done.
Thus we can use this logic to make statements and argue without being committed
to any formulae beyond those which explicitly appear in instances of comprehension
we appeal to. On the open ended conception of second order quantifiers, we can assert
statements with universal second order quantifiers as long as those statements will remain
true no matter how the vocabulary of our language expands, and what new open formulae
we become able to form. This is entirely compatible with the above argument: though
there was no explicit mention of the possibility of language change, one could have a
derivation D with an initial segment in a restricted portion of the language, making
universally quantified assertions which then have implications later in the derivation
where a broader vocabulary is used.
As an example of the open ended use of the quantifiers, we might encounter a simply
infinite sequence N, with an initial object 0 and a successor operation given by S; then
we could state that for any predicate P of elements of this sequence, if P applies to 0 and
applies to S(n) whenever it applies to n then it applies to all elements of the sequence:
∀P (P (0) ∧ ∀nP (n) → P (S(n))) → ∀nP (n).
Asserting this requires being sure that it will remain true no matter how our vocabulary
expands (so that the Sorites paradox poses a potential problem, unless we can somehow
rule out predicates like “small” as illegitimate).
Though the above argument was given for a language with just two types of variables
– first order and second order – one could give a similar argument if there were other
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types, such as multiple different types of first order variables, or plural variables, or a
different type of second order variable representing properties and relations as abstract
entities. A little should be said about how restricted predicative second order logic
interacts with other logics however.
A subtlety arises since a universally quantified statement ∀R φ[R] does not actually
allow any substitution instance φ[ψ(x1, . . . xn)] for any open formula ψ(x1, . . . xn) to be
derived. Indeed one derives substitution instances via the comprehension scheme, which
is restricted to instances without second order variables in restricted predicative second
order logic, so that one can only directly derive φ[ψ(x1, . . . xn)] from ∀R φ[R] when ψ
does not contain any second order variables. Thus a universally quantified statement
∀R φ[R] does not actually have the usual force of an axiom scheme with template φ[R].
This means that when we combine restricted predicative second order logic with another
logic which uses an axiom scheme, such as plural logic, full second order logic, or double
ancestral logic, there is a question about how the axiom scheme should be formalized:
as a universally quantified statement of the form ∀R φ[R], or as the full infinite (and
open ended) set of substitution instances of a template φ[R]?
When giving a semantics for the joint logic (combining the above semantics for
restricted predicative second order logic with the usual semantics for the other logic(s)),
one can generally justify the full scheme rather than just the quantified formula. However
there may be a worry that on the above semantics for restricted predicative second order
logic, there is no fixed domain for the second order variables, so that a statement with
bound second order variables does not have a fixed sense: thus for instance if χ(x) is
an open formula containing bound predicate variables, it may be felt to be illegitimate
to form the plurality of objects which satisfy χ(x), since which objects are amongst
this plurality may shift as the domain of predicate variables expands. However we do
not need to address this worry, since for the applications of joint logics in this chapter
we only ever need free predicate variables – rather than bound predicate variables – in
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the instances of the plural logic comprehension scheme and the double ancestral logic
induction scheme, and such instances are legitimate, since for any well defined predicate
R (no matter what the totality of such predicates is) if χ(x) is an open formula involving
R then we can form the plurality of objects satisfying χ, or argue by induction along χ.
By considering a variant of the simply infinite sequence case, we can give an example
which shows that the restriction in restricted predicative second order logic is genuine,
and that restricted predicative second order logic is weaker than predicative second
order logic. Suppose that we have not one simply infinite sequence but two, defined by
predicates N1,N2, with initial elements 01, 02 and successor operations S1, S2. Suppose
we hope to define an isomorphism between N1 and N2. The standard way to do this is
to go via an attempt, where an attempt is a binary relation R such that:
• R’s domain is a subset of N1
• R’s codomain is a subset of N2
• R is single valued on its domain
• if S(n) is in R’s domain then so is n
• R relates 01 to 02
• if R relates n1 ∈ N1 to n2 ∈ N2, and S1(n1) is in R’s domain, then R relates S1(n1)
to S2(n2)
Thus an attempt is a partial isomorphism, defined on an initial segment of N1. Then in
predicative second order logic, we can prove that for every n ∈ N1 there is an attempt
with n in its domain. The proof is by induction on n. For the induction step, we are
given an attempt R with n in its domain, and seek to define an attempt R′ with S1(n) in
its domain. For this we can use predicative comprehension, taking R′ to be the relation
which relates all things related by R, and which also relates S1(n) to S2(m) where R
329
APPENDIX B. ONTOLOGICALLY INNOCENT SECOND ORDER LOGIC
relates n to m. Key here is the ability to form an instance of comprehension in which
a free predicate variable (R) appears – exactly what restricted predicative second order
logic rules out. Having proved that for every n ∈ N1, an attempt exists which is defined
at n, we can obtain an isomorphism N1 to N2 by quantifying over attempts – where the
isomorphism relates n to m if there is an attempt which relates n to m.1
It is clear that this argument cannot go through in restricted predicative second
order logic. Indeed we can define a second order structure whose base set is the disjoint
union of two infinite sequences, thus giving an interpretation to N1,N2, 01, 02, S1, S2, and
whose set of open formulae just consists of the open formulae of the form λ(y1, . . . yn) of
each arity where λ is some closed formula. Then the statement that for all n ∈ N1 there
is an attempt defined at n is trivially false in this second order structure.
1We can form an open formula defining this isomorphism in predicative second order logic, though we
cannot prove the existence of it as the value of a second order variable, since that would require bound
second order variables in the comprehension scheme.
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Appendix C
Complete ordered field structure
on a continuously ordered open
interval
Here we suppose we are given the structure R<, RS of a continuously ordered open
interval (as defined in section VI.4) on some domain, and will show how to define a field
structure on this domain which, together with R<, makes it into a complete ordered
field.
We will write X for the domain of R<, and write <X for R<. We will write N for
the domain of RS , and write S for the successor function on N defined by RS . Using
double ancestral logic we can define addition and multiplication on N from S (this is the
only use of double ancestral logic in the argument), which we write as +N and ×N. We
write <N for the usual ordering on N. We introduce the symbol α, which we use just to
signify the inclusion N ↪→ X, but where we think of n and α(n) as playing very different
roles: n plays the role of a natural number, and α(n) plays the role of an element of the
totally ordered set X, with the totality of all α(n) being dense in X.
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Since does not have endpoints, if x ∈ X then there are y, z ∈ X with y <X x and
z >X x. In particular since X is nonempty, it thus has at least two elements, so that
its topology (the order topology on it) has base given by the open intervals of the form
(x,∞) = {y ∈ X | y >X x}, (∞, x) = {y ∈ X | y <X x} and (x, y) = {z ∈ X |
x <X z <X y}. As initially noted, for any x ∈ X there is y ∈ X with y >X x, so
that (x,∞) 6= ∅, and thus since the α(n) are dense in X there is n ∈ N such that
α(n) ∈ (x,∞). Similarly there is n ∈ N such that α(n) ∈ (∞, x). Finally since X is
densely ordered, for any x, y ∈ X we have that (x, y) 6= ∅, so that there is n ∈ N with
α(n) ∈ (x, y).
The usual argument that any nonempty dense, separable, complete totally ordered
set X without endpoints is isomorphic to (R, <) works by setting up a correspondence
between Q and the dense countable subset of X, and then extending this to all of R and
X by completeness. The argument given here is basically similar, though we start with
no copy of R available, and have to be more careful in places due to the limitations of
the logic we are using.
Though we have no copy of R at hand, we can partially rectify this by using standard
coding techniques, to get a more substantial domain of mathematical objects to work
with. Indeed in the context of our sequence N, we can code talk of a ring Z and then
a field Q: this is done by defining a pairing function, and then taking certain pairs of
natural numbers to represent integers, and then certain pairs of integers to represent
rationals.1 In this coding, we need to be careful to distinguish elements of Q from
elements of N, with for instance 11 as a rational perhaps not being coded as the natural
number 1. We will write uncoded elements of N with subscripts 0N, 1N, and write whole
rationals as fractions 01 ,
1
1 to avoid ambiguity. We will use this field Q to give the skeleton
for the field structure on X, first pairing off elements of Q with elements of the countable
1For instance one might use (n, 0) to represent n ∈ Z, and (n, 1) to represent −n ∈ Z. Then one
might use (a, b) to represent a
b
∈ Q where a, b ∈ Z and b 6= 0. For simplicity we will assume we are using
fractions in lowest terms, i.e. whenever we write c
d
we signify the pair (a, b) where a, b ∈ Z are coprime,
b > 0, and ad = bc.
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dense sequence in X, as in the usual argument sketched above.
To do this, we need to be able to define a certain function from Q to X by recursion,
a recursion in terms of all previously defined values of the function. This would normally
be straightforward – if one was working in set theory, or even just with full second order
logic – but because of our restricted logical toolbox, some care is needed (the double
ancestral is not useful as we need a recursion in terms of all previously defined values of
the function, rather than a simple primitive recursion). We will take a bit of time now
to sketch how this can work in our setting, before returning to the main course of the
argument.
The way such recursive functions are usually defined in the arithmetic context is by
first coding up the ability to talk about finite sequences of objects. For this we want
two functions Len(x) and β(x, i), with the former giving the length of a sequence x and
the latter being the function giving the ith place of a sequence x. The key property we
need is the ability to extend any sequence by adding a single element: so that for all k
and n, if x has length k then there is y with length k + 1, where β(y, i) = β(x, i) for
i 6 k, and β(y, k + 1) = n. A standard way of defining functions with these properties
(which works in our context) is seen in Buss (1998, pp. 92–94). From this it follows that
if Len(x) = k and l 6 k then there is y with Len(y) = l and β(y, i) = β(x, i) for i 6 l.
We write such a y as x|l. With this in hand, we can obtain a scheme for recursive finite
sequence definition. Suppose that φ(x, l, n) is any open formula such that for all x and
l, if x is a finite sequence then there is (at least one) n such that φ(x, l, n) holds. Then
we can prove that:
• For all k there is x such that for all l, if 0 6 l < k then φ(x|l, l, β(x, l + 1)).
In other words each subsequent lth element of the sequence x is defined in terms of φ
from the index l and the previous elements of x. This is proved by induction on k,
and importantly in our logical setting the inductive clause for RS is phrased in plural
logic, so inductions along N can be carried out for any formula we can define, including
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formulae containing R<. Thus this scheme for recursive finite sequence definition holds
for all such open formulae φ(x, n), even if they involve R<, or in other words, the relation
<X . If we put a uniqueness constraint on φ, namely that for all x and l< if x is a finite
sequence then there is a unique n such that φ(x, l, n) holds, then we obtain that any two
finite sequences satisfying the above recursive finite sequence definition for this φ must
have all the same values.
Then by using a pairing function, we obtain the ability to define a finite sequence
((a1, b1), . . . (an, bn)) of pairs of natural numbers, with the value of each (ai, bi) defined
in terms of the previous values ((a1, b1), . . . (ai−1, bi−1)). In particular we can use pairs
of the form (i, bi) to represent the values of a function f , giving us the ability to define a
function on N by recursion on its values (for a well defined function on all of N, we need
the just mentioned uniqueness constraint on φ). Since the above scheme for recursive
finite sequence definition applies even to formulae involving <X , we can define functions
by recursion on their values even when this recursion involves the relation <X .
One simple use of this is to obtain an enumeration of the rationals: by sending n to
the <N-smallest rational not enumerated so far, we can define a function by recursion
which gives a bijection between N and Q. We will write the value of this function at n
by qn. Combining this enumeration with the above ability to define functions along N
by recursion gives us the ability to define functions along Q by recursion, defining where
qk+1 is sent in terms of where q0 . . . qk are sent. Once again we are able to define such
functions by a recursion involving the relation <X and the function α (the latter just
being the identity function on N).
With this in hand we are ready to define our function from Q to X by recursion.
First, suppose that x ∈ X. As discussed initially, there is n ∈ N such that α(n) ∈ (x,∞).
Thus we can let
Above(x) = α(min
<N
{n ∈ N | α(n) ∈ (x,∞)}).
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Similarly we can let
Below(x) = α(min
<N
{n ∈ N | α(n) ∈ (∞, x)}),
and if x <X y, we can let
Between(x, y) = α(min
<N
{n ∈ N | α(n) ∈ (x, y)}).
Now we define our function f from Q to X. First, we define f to send the initial element
q0 of Q in the enumeration to α(0N). Then if we have defined the function f for the
elements q0, . . . qk of Q, we define it for qk+1 by cases.
• If qk+1 is <Q-greater than all the q1, . . . qk, then we define f(qk+1) to take the value
Above(max<X {f(q1), . . . f(qk)})
• If qk+1 is <Q-less than all the q1, . . . qk, then we define f(qk+1) to take the value
Below(min<X {f(q1), . . . f(qk)})
• If we have qi <Q qk+1 <Q qj , where l 6 k implies ql 6Q qi or ql >Q qj , then we
define f(qk+1) to be Between(f(qi), f(qj))
This recursive definition is legitimate, by the previous remarks (recalling that the function
α is just the identity function, with the symbol introduced to make clear the different
roles of elements of our sequence – either as natural numbers, or as elements of the dense
subset of X).
It is immediate by N-induction that for each l ∈ N, if k < l then if qk <Q ql then
f(qk) <X f(ql), and if qk >Q ql then f(qk) > f(ql). Thus the map f is injective and
order preserving as a map (Q, <Q) → (X,<X).
Next we can argue that its image consists exactly of all the α(n). Obviously it only
takes values amongst the α(n). Conversely, we can argue by induction on n that for
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each n, every α(0N) . . . α(n) is in the image of f . This is obviously true for 0N. If true
for n, then we can find k such that α(0N) . . . α(n) are amongst f(q0) . . . f(qk). Then if
α(n + 1) is also one of f(q0) . . . f(qk) then we are done. Otherwise one of three cases
obtain for α(n+ 1):
• α(n+ 1) >X f(qi) for i 6N k
• α(n+ 1) <X f(qi) for i 6N k
• There are i, j 6N k with f(qi) <X α(n + 1) <X f(qj) and for all l 6N k we have
f(ql) 6X f(qi) or f(ql) >X f(qj)
In the first case, if we let p > k+1 be minimal such that qp >Q qi for all i 6M k, then we
have α(n+ 1) = Above(max<X {f(q0) . . . f(qp−1)}) and so α(n+ 1) = f(qp). The second
case is similar. In the third case, if we let p > k + 1 be minimal such that qi < qp < qj
then we have α(n+ 1) = Between(f(qi), f(qj)) and so α(n+ 1) = f(qp). Thus we have
proved the induction hypothesis for n+ 1, so are done by induction.
From here on we will be taking various supremums and infimums of pluralities of
elements of X, using the completeness property. We will write such a supremum for
instance as sup{x | φ}, though this is a supremum of a plurality, not a set. For instance
since the values of f(q) for q ∈ Q are dense in X, we have for all x ∈ X that x =
sup{f(q) | f(q) <X x}.
Now obtaining the field structure on X is fairly straightforward. The argument is
very similar to that giving a field structure on Dedekind cuts of rationals. Here we use
q, r, . . . for variables ranging over Q, and x, y . . . for variables ranging over X, with it
being understood that by eg q 6 r we mean q 6Q r, and by x 6 y we mean x 6X y.
We let 0X be f(01), we define x+X y to be sup{f(q +Q r) | f(q) < x, f(r) < y}, and we
define −Xx = inf{f(−Qq) | f(q) < x}. We will often just denote these by 0, + and −
respectively, allowing the context to make clear which object or operation is intended.
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It is easy to see that +X is commutative, and that if x > x′ and y > y′ then
x + y > y + y′. It follows from x = sup{f(q) | f(q) < x} that 0X is an identity
element and that f(q + r) = f(q) + f(r). For associativity we argue that if q ∈ Q then
f(q) < x+ (y+ z) iff there are r, u, v with q <Q r+Qu+Q v and f(r) <X x, f(u) <X y,
f(v) <X z, which also holds iff f(q) <X (x + y) + z, so that f(q) <X (x + y) + z iff
f(q) <X x+ (y + z), and thus x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z.
Now we have f(q) 6 −x iff f(q) is a lower bound for {f(−r) | f(r) < x}, iff whenever
f(r) < x we have f(q) 6 f(−r), iff whenever f(r) < x we have q 6 −r, iff whenever
f(r) < x we have −q > r, iff whenever f(r) < x we have f(−q) > f(r), iff f(−q) > x.
Thus if f(q) < x and f(r) < −x then f(q) < x 6 f(−r), and so q < −r, so q+ r < 0, so
f(q + r) < 0. Thus 0 > sup{f(q + r) | f(q) < x, f(r) < −x} = x+ (−x). Conversely if
f(s) < 0 then s > 0Q and we can find q with f(q) < x < f(q− s2), and so f(−q+
s
2) 6 −x
by the first fact noted. Thus f(−q + 3s4 ) < −x and so sup{f(q + r) | f(q) < x, f(r) <
−x} > f(q+(−q+ 3s4 )) = f(
3s
4 ) > f(s). Thus sup{f(q+r) | f(q) < x, f(r) < −x} > 0X ,
and so 0 = x+ (−x).
Thus these definitions of 0X , +X and −X give us a totally ordered group. We thus
obtain standard group properties such as that −(−x) = x.
Next we define our ring structure. We let 1X be f(11), and for x, y > 0 we define
x ×X y to be the sup{f(q ×Q r) | f(q) < x, f(r) < y}. We extend x ×X y for other
arguments by cases:
• If x = 0 or y = 0 then we set x×X y = 0
• If x 6 0 and y > 0 then we set x×X y to be −((−x) ×X y)
• If x > 0 and y 6 0 then we set x×X y to be −(x×X (−y))
• If x 6 0 and y 6 0 then we set x×X y to be (−x) ×X (−y)
It is easy to see that this gives a well defined function. It is also easy to see that this
function is commutative, and that it has identity element 1X . It is also easy to check
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that for all y, (−x) ×X y = −(x×X y). In particular, (−1) ×X y = −y. It is also obvious
that if x, y > 0 then x× y > 0.
Next we want to argue for associativity – that for x, y, z we have x × (y × x) =
(x×y)×z. That this holds for strictly positive x, y, z can be argued in a similar manner
to the case of addition. That it holds whenever one of x, y, z is 0 or 1 is easy, and that
it holds whenever x, y or z is −1 follows from the above noted properties of negation.
Then we can define the operation x 7→ xn for n ∈ N as usual, where x0 = 1 and
xn+1 = x ×X xn.2 We have (−1)2 = 1, so by induction if x ∈ {1,−1} then the only
values that xn takes are in {1,−1}, for which the commutative and associative properties
of multiplication hold, so that xn+m = xn × xm and (xn)m = xnm as usual. Now given
x ∈ X \ {0} there is a unique ax ∈ {0, 1} and a unique x′ > 0 such that x = (−1)axx′.
These satisfy (−1)ax×y = (−1)ax(−1)ay = (−1)ax+ay , and (x× y)′ = x′ × y′. Then given
x, y, z 6= 0 we have
x× (y × z)
= (−1ax × x′) × ((−1)ay×z × (y × z)′)
= ((−1)ax × (−1)ay × (−1)az ) × (x′ × (y′ × z′))
= ((−1)ax × (−1)ay × (−1)az ) × ((x′ × y′) × z′)
(since x′, y′, z′ are positive)
= ((−1)ax×y × (x× y)′) × ((−1)az × z′)
= (x× y) × z.
Thus multiplication is associative.
One can prove that (x+ y) × z = x× z + y× z, for the case where (x+ y) and z are
2This can be defined using the double ancestral, though we will only need it for x = 1, (−1) which
are technically elements of N and so recursion on natural numbers suffices.
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positive, in similar fashion to the proof that addition is associative. Then if any of x, y, z
are 0 this identity is immediate. For z = 1 the identity is immediate, and for z = (−1)
it follows from properties of negation, so the identity holds when z is any power of (−1).
Then for (x+ y), z 6= 0 we have
(x+ y) × z = (−1)az+ax+y × ((−1)ax+y (x+ y) × z′)
= (−1)az+ax+y × (((−1)ax+y × x+ (−1)ax+y × y) × z′)
(from the identity for powers of (−1))
= (−1)az+ax+y × ((−1)ax+y × x× z′ + (−1)ax+y × y × z′)
(by the identity for positive (x+ y), z)
= (−1)az+ax+y × (−1)ax+y × x× z′ + (−1)az+ax+y × (−1)ax+y × y × z′
= (−1)az × x× z′ + (−1)az × y × z′
= x× z + y × z.
Thus we have an ordered ring structure, and all we need are multiplicative inverses.
For x > 0 we define x−1 to be sup{f(1q ) | f(q) > x}. First, if f(r) < 1 then pick q with
x < f(q) < x× f(1r ), and then we have by definition f(
1
q ) 6 x−1 and so
x× x−1 > x× f(1/q) = x× f(1/q) × f(r × (1/r))
= x× f(1/r) × f(r) × f(1/q) > f(q) × f(r) × f(1/q) = f(r).
Since this holds for all f(r) < 1 we have x× x−1 > 1. For the converse, given f(r) > 1
we can pick u > 0 with f(1r ) ×x < f(u) < x. Since x > f(u), if q satisfies f(q) > x then
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f( 1u) > f(
1
q ), and so f(
1
u) > x−1. Thus
x · x−1 6 x× f(1/u) = x× f(1/r) × f(r) × f(1/u)
< f(u) × f(r) × f(1/u) = f(r).
Since this holds for all f(r) > 1 we have x × x−1 6 1, and thus x × x−1 = 1. Thus
this ordered ring structure has multiplicative inverses, so is an ordered field; which is




terms of a complete ordered field
Here we show how one can interpret more mathematics – including much of what is
normally thought of as making up real analysis – in terms of a complete ordered field, as
defined in section VI.4. That definition uses plural logic for the completeness axiom, and
we also have double ancestral logic available, allowing definitions by primitive recursion.
We will see how one can interpret talk of relation variables over a complete ordered field,
by defining a pairing function; and how to interpret talk of sequences of elements of the
field, and thus of sets like Rk for k ∈ R. This work will allow us to show how various
analytic properties are definable in this context, such as the property of a plurality
being analytic, or Σ12, or having the Baire property, or the perfect set property, or being
Lebesgue measurable; and properties concerning the determinary of infinite games. We
will write R for the plurality of objects making up our complete ordered field, with N
its plurality of natural numbers. We will use set builder notion {x | φ} to denote the
plurality of objects satisfying φ.
We start by sketching how to define a pairing function for our complete ordered
field, allowing us to simulate the use of relation variables. For each real x and natural
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number n we can let f2(x, n) be the largest rational of the form a2n which is at most x
(using primitive recursion to define the function n 7→ 2n). Using these we can define
the nth place g2(x, n) in the binary expansion of x (chosen to be the terminating binary
expansion if x is a dyadic rational). Then given x and y, by using a pairing function on
their integer parts and interleaving their binary expansions appropriately we can define
their pair ρ(x, y), uniquely determined by x and y. Thus we will take it for granted that
we have a pairing function, and can simulate the use of relation variables.
We want a good way of phrasing talk of sequences. We can define what it is for a
binary relation on R to be a function N → R; however we want to identify these relations
on R with certain reals, via an injection RN → R, so that we can talk about pluralities
of them. There are various ways to define such an injection, normally using either
base-n expansions for some n or continued fractions, and these can be straightforwardly
expressed in the theory (the case of base-n expansions was sketched above). So we will
take it for granted that we can pick an open formula Φ(F, x) where F is a binary relation
variable, such that for all F if F defines a function N → R then there is a unique x such
that Φ(F, x), and such that for all x there is at most one such F (and such that there
only exists an x such that Φ(F, x) if F does define a function N → R).
We will from now on use RN to denote the “image” of Φ. If y ∈ RN then we for n ∈ N
we let η(n, y) be the nth place of y, i.e. F (n) where F satisfies Φ(F, y).
Using these ingredients we can define what it is for a plurality of reals to be analytic.
We start by for natural numbers k ∈ N defining Rk to be
{ρ(p, k) | p ∈ RN ∧ ∀i > k (η(i, p) = 0)}
and for z ∈ Rk and i = 1 . . . k we let zi be η(i, z′) where z = ρ(z′, z′′). This gives us
disjoint pluralities which can play the role of finite powers of R. We can define the usual
distance function on each Rk, and thus define what it is for a subplurality of Rk to be
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an “open plurality” (analogous to the usual notion of open set). We can also define the
plurality NN contained in RN, and define which subpluralities of NN are open (under the
product topology – the usual topology on ωω). We can then define for each k what it
is for a relation R to actually be a continuous function from NN to Rk. Thus we can
define the analytic subpluralities of Rk: they are those which are either empty, or are
the image of a continuous function from NN to Rk.
We use the symbol Σ11 to apply to the analytic pluralities (analytic subpluralities
of Rk for some k). We can define what it is for a plurality to be Π11 in the usual way:
a subplurality X of Rk is Π11 if Rk \ X is Σ11. Then we can go on to define the Σ12
pluralities. A subplurality X of Rk is Σ12 if there is a Π11 subplurality Y of Rk+1 such
that X is {p | ∃q ∈ Y (i 6 k → pi = qi)}.
We will now abuse notation slightly. We are really interested in the Σ12 subpluralities
of R, not the Σ12 subpluralities of R1; so we redefine Σ12 to apply to the images of the Σ12
subpluralities of R1 (by the old definition) under the obvious bijection between R and
R1.
Next we will show how to define what it is for a plurality of reals to have the Baire
property, the perfect set property, or be Lebesgue measurable.
To do this, we want to be able to talk about sequences of pluralities. We can just take
these to be binary relations R such that for all x if there is a y such that R(x, y) then x
is in N. If R is such a relation and n ∈ N then the nth term of R is {y | R(n, y)} and is
denoted η(n,R). We can also easily express what it is for a plurality to be countable: a
plurality X is countable if there is a function F with domain N, whose range is X.
With the ability to define sequences of pluralities, we can express what it is for a
plurality to be meagre – a countable union of nowhere dense pluralities – and thus what
it is for a plurality of reals to have the property of Baire, i.e. to have meagre symmetric
difference with some open plurality. Next we can easily define what it is for a plurality to
be perfect (i.e. closed and having no isolated points), and hence what it is for a plurality
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to have the perfect set property, i.e. to be countable or contain a nonempty perfect
subplurality. Finally using our ability to define sequences of pluralities we can define
Lebesgue outer measure for pluralities. We let S apply to sequences of pluralities all of
which are open intervals, and let l(I) denote the length of an open interval I. Lebesgue










With this we can define what it is for a plurality X to lie in the Lebesgue σ-algebra: it
does so if for every plurality Y of reals,
λ∗(X) > λ∗(X ∩ Y ) + λ∗(X ∩ Y c).
To conclude, we consider questions of determinacy. We can define the plurality NN
of reals, as seen previously. Subpluralities of NN can be thought of as target sets for
games with a countably infinite number of moves: given a subplurality X of NN, the first
player in our game picks an element of N, followed by the second player, then the first
player, and so on, and if the sequence generated lies in X then the first player wins, but
if it doesn’t then the second player wins. We have already seen that we can define the
pluralities Rk, functions, and countable unions of pluralities in the analytic context, and
accordingly we can take a strategy for the first player to be a function from
∪
k>0 N2k to
N: the function’s value on (n0, n1 . . . n2k) is the move the first player makes when the
previous moves are (n0, n1 . . . n2k) (there is redundancy here since if n1 is not the move
the strategy dictates after n0, then (n0, n1 . . . n2k) will never be played so the function’s
value on this sequence is irrelevant; this does not matter though). Similarly a strategy
for the second player is a function from
∪
k>0 N2k+1 to N. We can define what it is for a
strategy to be a winning strategy in the usual way. Then the question of determinacy
is the question for a subplurality X of NN of whether one of the players has a winning
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strategy (if so, this subplurality defines a determined game).
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